John Locke and the scientific revolution: a study of the essay concerning human understanding in relation to seventeenth century science by Rogers, G A J
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and 
duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be 
duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational 
purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-
commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to 
quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the 
copyright holder/s. 
JOHN LOCKE AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
A study of the Essay Co:ncE'rnine Human Unnerstanrli:ne 
in relation to Seventeenth Century Science 
by 
G. A. J. Rogers 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Keele. 
i :. 
"Medioine has for long possessed the qualities 
necessary to make a science. These are orieinal 
observations and a known method accordine to which 
valuable disooveries have been made over a long 
period of time. By such a method, too, the rest 
of science will be discovered if anyone who is clever 
enough is versed in the observations of the past 
and makes these the starting point of his researches. 
If anyone should reject these and, castine them 
aside, endeavour to procede by a new method, and 
then assert that he has made a discovery, he has been 
and is being deoeived. A discovery cannot be made 
thus, and the reason why such a thing is impossible 
I shall endeavour to show by expounding the true 
nature of the science. ~~ exposition will demonstrate 
clearly the impossibility of making discoveries by 
any other method but the orthodox one." 
(The Mp~ical Works of Hirrocrat~~. 5th century B.C~) 
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AbBtract 
This work aims to set Looke'a Essay Concerni:nr, Human UndeT'standi.:ns 
in the context of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. 
It does this by showing that the problem of the extent of human under-
standing to whioh Locke tried to find an answer was an issue which itself 
arose out of developments in the soienoes in the seventeenth century, and 
that Locke's answer was itself indebted in a variety of ways to the work 
of the scientists. Locke's ERsay, therefore, cannot be appreciated 
fully unless its background is also understood. 
There is, therefore, a dual aspeot to the programme: the scientific 
background, and the Essay itself. For this reason the thesis is divided 
into two parts. Part One traces the course of a series of soientific 
and epistemological issues in the scientific revolution, and shows how 
scientists answered the problems, sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, 
but, nearly always within the oonfines of natural philosophy. Part Two 
is concerned with the intimate link between Locke's answers and the 
problems faoed and the method practised by the soientists. It emerges 
that not only is much of the oontent of Looke's answer indebted to the 
scientifio revolution, but also that muoh of the form of his argument 
borrows from the new soienoe. The two parts of the work are preoeded by 
an Introduction. 
Part One has seven chapters. Each chapter is concerned with a particular 
period or a key figure in the soientific revolution. A oommon theme 
is the outlook of the various scientists to the possibility of soience 
achieving knnwledr,e, as opposed to either belief, or its function being 
only to 'save the appearances', to be, that is, merely a useful 
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(ii) 
oaloulatine devioe. Other aspects of the thoueht of the soientiflts 
are also oonsidtl!red, but ·the strong oentral theme is whether or not 
they believed that man oould obtain knowlAoee. 
Chapter Orl" is about a eroup I oall the Neoplatonists. These inolud.e 
Copernious, Kepler, and. the Englishman John Dee. With Copernious and 
Kepler I have oonoentrated partioularly on their attitltde towards the 
truth of the heliooentrio system. I have used this example to draw out 
their attitude towards the possibility of achievine truth in the soience 
of astronomy, and I have contrasted their attitude with that of Osiander. 
Dee's general attitude to scienoe and. knowledee, as revealed in. his 
Preface to the first English edition of Euclid's Elementa, is shown to 
have important likenesses with the outlook of Copernicus and Kepler. 
In Chapter Two I oonsider the general soientifio outlook of Galileo, 
beginning with his aooeptance of the heliocentrio theor.y, and relati~ 
his views on astronomy to his larger oonception of the nature of science 
and the possibility of achieving truth in the sciences. Gali1eo, like the 
earlier Neoplatonists, emerges as a man who saw the natural soienoes as 
achieving a degree of oertainty which is in faot unjustified; it is 
an attitude which stands in marked oontrast to most pre-Renaissanoe 
thinkers. 
Chapter III looks at the nature and limits of soienoe as conceived 
by Descartes. The paradigm of mathematical oertainty whioh Desoartes 
propounded is assessed, and the limitations of the programme whioh 
Descartes mapped out are identified. The ohapter also inoludes a seotion 
on Rohault, a Cartesian who did not follow Desoartes in all his 
(iii) 
recommendations, and who was influential in science in the latter part 
of the century. 
In Chapter IV we return to the work of Francis Bacon whose influence 
over the development of the English conception of the right method to be 
pursued by scientists was central. Baoon laid down the general empirical 
approach to nature which was to become the dominant procedure of the 
scientists of the Royal Society; but Bacon never set the method in a 
general epistemological context. 
The general approach of Englishmen in the period from Bacon to Newton 
towards the proper extent and nature of the scientifio enterprise is 
examined in Chapter V. Generally, there were two rather different 
approaches. Some men, like Sir Kenelm Digby and Robert Hooke, expected 
certainty from science in the true Baoonian fashion. others, like 
Joseph Glanvill, had no such high expeotations. The position, therefore, 
remained unoertain as to the possible e~tent of human knowledge. 
In Chapter VI we look at the approach to this problem of one of the 
most important thinkers of seventeenth oentury England, Robert Boyle. 
Boyle, we discover, was not so optimistio in outlook as the true 
Baoonians, for he did not expeot soienoe to give absolute oertainty. 
Indeed he saw good reason why it oould never do so. But he did believe 
that Boienoe could and did achieve Borne form of knowledee about the 
physioal world. 
Similar attitudes towards the soope of soienoe were exhibited by 
Isaao Newton whose views on the possibility of knowledge are oonsidered 
in Chapter VII. Newton did not expeot science to be able to go muoh 
(iv) 
beyond experience, but he did hold that there was a. correct method to 
be followed in scientific.procedure which could and did lead to 
knowledge. This knowledge might have to be revised in the light of 
experience, but it should not be rejected out of hand simply because 
that possibility existed. 
In the second part of this work I have attempted to show how John 
Locke's Essa~ was a very real attempt to answer the question which 
had arisen largely as a result of the new soienoe, namely: What was 
the extent and the limits of human knowledge? We see also how right 
Locke was to characterize himself as an underlabourer of the new SCience, 
for not only was he concerned to clarify issues which scientists had 
raised about the nature and limits of knowledge, but he also took Over 
many of their presuppo's'i tioos.Further, Locke's method of approach to his 
problem is one which itself borrows much from the method of oontemporary 
science. 
In Chapter VIII we look at Lockets own scientific background to 
discover the extent of Lockets acquaintance with the new science. Locke 
emerges as a man who was well establiShed in at least two important 
branches of contemporary science, medicine and chemistry, and familiar 
with most others. He was, therefore, eminently well suited to try to 
relate science to epiBtemolo~ioa.l issues. 
In Chapter IX we turn to the first Book of Lockets Ea~~y in Which we 
find that Locke's a.rgument is one that takes a. great d.ea.l from the 
method of oontemporary soienoe. Tile theory of innate ideas is treated 
by Locke as an hypothesis whioh is to be rejeoted as not being sub-
stantia.ted by the empirical d.ata. 
(v) 
Locke's positive thesis, that the mind is ft~nished with ideas 
which are all drawn from experience, is considered in Chapter X. 
Locke's arguments to show that certain of our ideas are the result of 
experienoes are found to be lacking. Thus we find that Locke fails to 
give an adequate account of suoh central notions to the scientifio 
revolution as those either of oausation or of material object. But 
the effect of Lockets programme is to emphasise the importance of 
the contingent and the empirical for man's knowledge. 
Chapter XI examines Locket .• trea.tment of the notion of a material 
object. I consider the reasons why he is led to postulate the 
existence of materia.l substance, his arguments to shoti' that we cannot 
know the essences of physical objects, and the implioations which these 
points have for the possibility of achieving knowledge in the sciences. 
Finally, in Chapter XII, we turn to Locke's positive answers to the 
question of the limit and extent of human knowledge. We find that 
although Lockets definition of knowledge is excessively narrow, the 
general points which he haa to make about the possible extent of 
knowledge are substantial, and substantially oorreot. Furthermore, they 
refleot very acourately the views expressed, usually only with regard 
to science, by Locke's contemporaries such as Boyle and Newton. 
Fundamentally, Lookets message was that whilst man should not have 
expectations about the degree of certainty which sci.ence could give 
which went beyond the contingent and the empirical, it was, nevertheless, 
right to have such expectations: there was indeed a middle course 
between the two evils of soeptioism and dogmatism. 
Pr~face 
~ earliest opinion of Looke's ESsay was formed in my first year 
as an undergraduate and it was, I believe, a typical reaction. I found 
this great olassio of British Empirioism wordy and dull. There is 
some justification for this. The EAsay is a long book, often repetitive, 
and not given to muoh humour. But what I did not then appreciate was 
the pivotal position which the ESsay holds in the development of the 
modern European mind. More particularly, I had little understanding of 
how much our minds have been shaped by the achievements in the natural 
soiences, and how close the conneotion was between the development of 
those sciences and the epistemology advocated by Locke. 
In this thesis I have attempted to explain how Locke's F~say is 
related to the rise of modern science, and how it fits in to the 
intellectual landscape which existed around it. More than any other 
great work in British philosophy the F~Aay is a produot of the intelleotual 
issues of its time, and for this reason alone to be appreciated, it must 
be seen in the light of those issues. 
I do not pretend that this work is a comprehensive treatment of the 
oonnection between seventeenth oentury thought and Looke's EAsay. 
Indeed, it is not even a comprehensive treatment of the conneotions 
between the EAAay and seventeenth century science. I do, however, hope 
that it begins to make such a treatment by showing that the more that 
the Essay is probed, the more strongly do the resemblanoes emerge 
between its oontents and the issues which exercised some of the greatest 
(vii) 
scientists of the period. I have particularly conoentrated on one 
question, though not to the exclusion of all others. That question is: 
How does Looke's answer to the question 'What is the soope of human 
knowledge?' compare with the answers given by soientists during the course 
of the soientifio revolution? The answer to that question is en1iehtenin~ 
... 
for an appreciation both of Locke's philosophy and of the scientifio 
revolution. 
It will be fairly obvious, I believe, that I have been influenced 
in my thinking on this subject by a variety of historians of soienoe 
and philosophers. Without in any sense being able to claim to emulate 
him, the historian of science who has most influenced me is the late 
, 
Alexandre Koyre. My whole sense of philosophy has been much influenced. 
by ~ mentor Gilbert Ryle. 
For this work in particular I am very grateful to Professor 
A. G. N. Flew who has at all times been a hardworkine and helpful 
supervisor, and to ~~. Patriok Day who .has offered man~ helpful oomments 
on the script. I would also like to thank colleagues 3.n the department 
for conversations on a variety of aspects of the work, and my pupils 
who have oriticised my ideas. I would also like to thank ~~. Alan Hall, 
V~. Eric Hill, and Mr. Riohard Wallaoe, of the nepartment of Classios 
in Keele University, for their aid in matters of classical scholarship. 
~~ thanks are due too to the staff of Keele University library for 
their many efforts on ~ behalf, and. for similar efforts and assista.nce 
from the staff of the :Bodleian Library. Finally may I thank Mrs. Rita 
Lee for her exoellent typing, a.nd my wife Jo-Ann for her help and 
oonstant support. 
Keele, April 1971. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. 
Introduction 
1. John Locke is the father of British Empirioism, and the 
Essay Conoerning Ruman Understanding stands at the threshold of the 
Enlightenment. Both the British Empirioal tradition and the Enlighten-
ment are rightly reoognised as oentral features of modern intellectual 
history; Looke's importanoe is guaranteed. But Looke is generally 
viewed with the hindsight supplied by his sucoessors, most espeoially 
in the light, of oritioisms levelled at him or towards him by Berkeley 
and Hume. Looke is seen as an instigator, whose initial assumptions 
were largely taken over by the later olassioal empirioists, but whOse 
logio was often faulty. It is thought that if Looke had been more 
rigorous his pod tion would have been far oloser than it was to that 
of Rume. 
There is some truth in this view of Looke. It is the one most 
oommonly advooated in the teaohing of undergraduates at Commonwealth 
and Amerioan universities. It is the one, partially as a result of 
this, that is held in those oountries by most aoademio philosophers. 
But this approach to Looke leaves too much unanswered. It fails to' 
take suffioient aooount of Lookets stated purpose in writing the F,ssM. 
"Everyone must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenlwnj" wrote Looke 
in the lli'L?istle to the Reader, n and· in an age that produoes suoh 
masters as the great HyygeniuB and the inoomparable l~. Newton, with 
some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as 
an underlabourer in olearing the ground a little, and removing some 
.. 
".' 1 
of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge.« . Looke was wholly 
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committed to the achievements of the new science. He was not a 
critic of those achievements. And the presuppositions upon which 
his work rested were largely those which were held in common by 
him and the master builders whom he so much admired. The Essay, 
therefore, cannot be understood unless the scientific context in 
which it developed is also understood. !lW aim is to show the way 
in which the Essay arose in response to a very real need which the 
scientifio revolution generated and how it was itself indebted to 
that revolution. 
1~ argument is this: Locke's F~sa: is the last great work of 
the Seventeenth Century Soientific Revolution: it summed up the 
basic presuppositions of that revolution, and stated the basic lessons 
2 
which had been learned. 
The Essat is not generally viewed in this light. This is, I 
believe, a tunotion of the division of academic learning which has 
occurred sinoe Locke wrote; but these artifioial compartments should 
not be allowed to distort our vision of events. 11ben Locke wrote, 
science and philosophy were not so olearly separable. Even though 
Locke himself is most responsible for that division, we must look 
back before it to appreciate the significanoe of Lockets work. 
Frederick Copleston in his History of PhiloaoPPrl,points out that 
ftLocke was really the first philosopher to devote his main work to 
an inquiry into human understanding, its scope and its limits. And 
we oan s~ that the prominent place oocupied in modern philosophY by 
the theory of knowledge is in large measure due to him." 3 
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A basic question arises: wl\1 did this issue raise itself as 
an important one when it did? Why was it that the problem of the 
scope of human intellect became so crucial in the middle of the 
seventeenth century? The answer is that the scientific revolution 
generated a whole series of problems and confusions at an epistemological 
level, a series which has its beginnings with the publication in 1543 
of Copericus's De Revolution1bqs, and which persisted right through 
until Newton's Principia in 1687. and indeed beyond. Only against 
this background is it possible to see how important Locke's Eesa~ was. 
For it was truly the philosophical counterpart of Newton's great work, 
itself not only a monumental statement of Newton's discoveries, but 
of a method in oontemporary science whioh emerged from a long series 
of attempts to identity the soope and method of the natural philosopher. 
I am not suggesting that Looke offered adequate solutions to all the 
questions raised by the new soienoe. t~ny of Looke's answers are 
still hotly oontested, others are simply wrong. But Locke left the 
issues in a form whioh made further progress possible, and made it 
possible within a framework which took full account of the oontemporary 
method and achievement of the soientists. In order, therefore, to 
understand Locke's work we must see it in the oontext of the issues 
which oOnfronted the oreators of the new soience, and the answers 
which they proffered. 
2. The problem of the soope of human understanding was oruoial in 
the middle of the seventeenth oentury. When in the autumn of 1517 
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Luther nailed the ninety-five theses to the door of the castle 
church at Wittenberg religious authority suffered a blow, and 
religious teaching received a challenge, which was by no means 
resolved a hundred years later. Similarly, Copernicus's pe Revolution1bus 
which appeared in the spring of 1543, in commending a stationary sun, 
produced a movement throughout the intellectual world of gigantic 
proportions. 
Although the eddies emanating from these two sources washed 
one against the other, it is only those that flowed from the pen of 
Copernicus that directly ooncern us. Copernious offered to the world 
a new cosmology, and although the world was slow to acoept it, the 
oonsequenoe of this offering was radically to call in question the 
grounding of all oontemporary views of the nature of the universe. 
Copernicus himself was pretty sure of his ground. But his argument 
was esoteric, imbedded in mathematics and Neoplatonio theory. It is 
not surpriSing, therefore that the full impact of the new oosmology 
was not felt for some decades. It was not until 1632, with the 
publication of Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World System~, 
that the arguments for the Copernioan system were spelled out in a 
form which laymen oould appreoiate. 
The men of scienoe of the seventeenth oentury were not unnaturally 
convinced that the methods they used to wrest Nature's secrets from 
her were adequate to the task. They were anti-soeptics: to have been 
otherwise would have nullified their efforts. Indeed, as I shall 
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show, they were often too optimistio. 
A powerful soeptioal tradition was opposed to the soientists 
on this soore. The soeptics drew their inspiration largely from 
the works of Sextus Empirious and they were a force to be reckoned 
with throughout the seventeenth century. 4 The soeptioism of this 
period took many forms and pervaded large, probably most, areas of 
intellectual enquiry. It was used both to attaok natural religion, 
and also to advooate fideism (for example by }.!ontaigne and Charron). 
It supplied a basis for rejeoting sCience,5 and the possibility of 
obtaining knowledge through any form of empirioal investigation. 
Soience, in part, aotually reinforoed the soeptioism of the seven-
teenth oentury. There was, for example, the feeling of complete 
uncertainty in the first half of the oentury generated by the 
competing accounts of the celestial orbs: in Donne's oft-quoted 
lines:-
"New Philosophy calls all in doubt •••• 
••• Tis all in pieoes, all ooherenoe gone; 
All just supply, and all relation." 
The new scientists were themselves olearly opposed to soepticism. 
It is not therefore surprising to find a olassio oonfrontation 
between these two traditions in the middle of the seventeenth oentury. 
That oonfrontation was Descartes' Discourse on the Method of rightl~ 
~irecting one's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sci,no~s. Desoartes, 
beginning from a position of oomplete soeptioism, developed a system 
. . 
whereby it was possible to aohieve oertain knowledge - or BO he 
maintained. The sceptics' weapons were turned upon themselves, and. 
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for a period scepticism took a very secondary place to the 
achievements of the sciences. 
As the new scientific tradition gathered momentum the ground 
separating the sceptics from the scientists became clearer. The 
problem of the nature and limits of scientific knowledge was drop 
by drop distilled from purely theological and metaphysical matters. 
Almost always the scientists overstated their case. They claimed 
more certainty for their results than their methods could support. 
Dut gradually there emerged a compromise position. Especially, and 
oharaoteristically, was this true in England. It was Boyle, Newton, 
and most important for our purposes, John Locke, who advocated this 
middle way. 
All of these later thi~~ers took the sceptic's point that matters 
of fact about the world might - logically might - be other than they 
are. But they upheld the scientist's position that natural philosophy, 
properly practised, could lead to knowledge of the world as it is. 
Their position was summed up by David flume, who wrote of Newton :-. 
"In Newton this island may boast of havitlt3' produoed the greatest 
and rarest genius that ever rose for the ornament and instruotion 
of the species. Cautious in admitting no principles but such as 
were founded on experiment; however new or unusual ..... 
And further flume saw in Newton a man who ha.d come to terms with 
the limits of scientific enquiry:-
rttfuile 11ewton seemed to draw off the veil· from some of the 
mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imper-
fections of the meohanical philosophy; and thereby restored 
her ultimate secrets to that obscurity in which they ever did 
and ever will remain. 6 
When in 1690 Locke published the Essax the issues generated by 
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the new science had become fairly clear. But answers to the 
problems had not been clearly expounded. It was in large part 
Locke's task to do this. 
3. The problem of the scope of science was one which had been 
answered, sometimes explicitly, often implicitly, by the scientists 
of the revolution themselves. It is with their solutions that 
Part One of this work is concerned. The solutions were varied, but 
there was a fairly definite development towards the position with 
regard to the scope of science which was to be advocated by Locke 
in the Essay;. 
Later medieval science cannot easily be separated from religious 
and metaphysical attitudes towards the physical world. As A. C. 
Crombie has written: 
"medieval natural philosophers were primarily interested less 
in the ooncrete problems of the world of experience than in the 
kind of knowledge natural science was, how it fitted into the 
general structure of their metaphysics, and, if it extended eo 
far, how it bore on theology." 7 
~ the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, soientists 
were aohieving suooesses with the oonorete problems of the physioal 
world on a scale never before realised. Once again the question 
arose: what kind of knowledge were the new discoveries? how indeed 
could the new science be fitted into the metaphysical and theological 
preconoeptions of the age? The irol'J3" is in faot that the sucoess of 
soience itself generated problems. Was the soientist's method a 
way to reach knowledge? Was there indeed such a thing as "the 
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scientist's method"? And. anyway, what exactly was or were the 
method or methods employed by soientists? 
The problem of method became crucial. The competing accounts 
were many and varied. In astronomy Copernicus appeared to offer one 
dogmatic solution, echoed by Kepler, and even by Galileo, whilst 
Osiander, (the author of the Preface to Copernicus's great work) 
and the sceptics remained cautious. Descartes and Bacon offered 
methods which in their different ways each olaimed would lead to 
certain knowledge. 
In oontrast, though not always markedly, other scientists like 
Hobbes and Boyle expected less oertainly from their method, were 
less eager to offer a general panacea for dispelling all ignorance. 
Newton and Locke supported this approach to the problem, and it 
was Locke especially who produced the arguments to justify this 
o aut ion. Locke put it thus:-
ttl think not only that it becomes the mOdesty of philosophy not 
to pronounce majestically where we want that evidence that oan 
produce knowledge, but it is of use to us to discern how far 
our knowledge does reach. tt 8 
The Ess~, then, arose in response to a very real problem which 
the new science generated, and it emerged,too, as a natural develop-
ment from a tradition which grew during the century. 
4. That the ~ssaI is in large part a produot of the scientific 
revolution is not, nor could be, in question. Not only was Locke 
a personal friend of many of the leading scientifio figures such 
as Boyle, Sydenham, and Newton, he was himself a Fellow of the Roya.l 
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Society, and had considerable knowledge and wide interest in 
virtually all branches of contemporary scientific enquiry. It is 
not therefore surprising that soience was a great influence in 
formulating Looke's philosophical ideas.9 
The nature of this influence was threefold. First, Locke took 
over from oontemporary science some of its main presuppositions. 
These included a belief in the existence of matter, and a belief 
that matter had two sorts of properties, the primary qualities of 
10 
"solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number", and 
the secondary qualities such as "colours, sounds, tastes etc."ll 
Second, the existence of science, and the success of scientists forced 
Locke to consider the nature of scientific reasoning, and subject 
it to careful scrutitJy. Third, inseparable f'rom atJy natural science 
is empirical observation. The importance attached to observation 
by the scientists of the period fluctuated. But by the time that 
Locke wrote , certainly in England, it was generally reckoned the most 
fundamental aspect of soientific work. Locke took over this empirical 
approach and turned it into an epistemological axiom. Whether his 
work was always consistent with this axiom, and indeed whether it is 
possible to be entirely oonsistent with it , is another matter. 
S. Despite these obvious influences, the actual extent of,Lockets 
debt to the scientific revolution, and the way in which Locke's 
EssSI arose out of' issues grounded in contemporary science has never 
been satisfactorily explored. The only published work devoted 
specifically to an examination of' the impact of' soienoe on Looke is 
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F. H. Anderson's The Influence of Contemporary Science on Locke's 
Method and Results!2 Dut Anderson's work is much narrower in 
scope than the present one. The most illuminating account of Locke's 
historical debt has been supplied by J. Gibson in his Locke'a Theo£t 
of Y~owledge and its Historical Relations.13 But there is there no 
sustained specific concern with the topic of this work. The same is 
true of the excellent critique of the EssaY by R. I. Aaron.14 
Further, none of these works attempt to show in an historical context 
how it was that the problem of the extent of human understanding 
arose out of the developments in the science during the century. The 
aims of this work, I would suggest, have not been attempted at any 
length before. This plus the intrinsic interest of the topic surely 
make it well worthy of consideration. 
6. We should make some preliminary distinctions. Philosophers may 
be olassified in a variety of ways. One broad olasSfication is that 
between Rationalists and Empiricists. Rationalists believe that it 
is possible to obtain factual knowledge of the world a priori. 
Empiricists believe that all knowledge is ultimately derived from 
sense experienoe. 
Another classification is in terms of the number of basic 
substances to which a philosopher subscribes, and the naturecf those 
substanoes. A substance, fcr these purposes, may be understood as 
ultimate: stuff out of which the totality of creation is oomposed. 
- 11 -
Those who hold that there is only one basic stuff whioh is 
matter are oalled materialists. Those who olaim that there is only 
one substanoe, but it is mind and not matter are oalled idealists. 
Others see no ohanoe of either of the former views being oorreot 
and maintain that there are at least two basic substanoes, mind and 
matter. These, not inappropriately, are labelled duallsts.15 
It is a sad oomment on intelleotual freedom, or, more important, 
the lack of it, that until oomparatively recently it has been diffioult 
to advocate materialism. ~~terialism, it has been maintained, leads 
naturally - even inevitably - to atheism, and atheism is wicked. In 
the seventeenth century the two most important materialist philosophers, 
Hobbes in England, and Spinoza in Holland, were hounded for their 
16 intellectual views simply because they were held to lead to atheism. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the theory of knowledge which 
emerged as an aooompan~ent to the soientific revolution was not 
founded on materialism, even though the predominant model used to 
explain the nature was almost entirely meohanioal. Cartesian and 
Lockian dualism allowed both for the mechanioal universe and the 
religious preoonoeptions of the age. 
But olearly there were reasons, other than sooiologioal, for 
the acoeptability of dualism in the seventeenth oentury. Desoartes, 
especially, presented important arguments in favour of a dualist 
theory, arguments whioh if not oonclusive would have to be met if 
dualism was to be replaced by either of its alternatives. It is, I 
believe, a signifioant faot that the rejeotion of the Aristotelian 
cosmology, whioh sharply distinguished between the terrestial and 
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superlunary spheres of the universe, was followed by the acceptance 
of a cosmology or metaphysio involving an equally sharp dualism, 
that between mind and matter. The Prime Mover, in Aristotle's system, 
sanctified by Aquinas, was otherworldly, and physically unapproachable. 
Similarly Descartes's God was not part of the physical world, but 
was an infinite mental substance. It is important too, that Descartes' 
rationalist system would certainly collapse without the two substance 
dogma:: Locke's empiricist position was much more flexible. 
7. I do not intend to assess the merits of the three views, but 
some of their implications are worth noting. First: the issue itself 
is not an empirical one. All experience is oompatible with all three 
views. The issues are preeminently metaphysical, and to choose 
one rather than another is to make a choice between one metaphysic 
and another. Second: although this is true, empirical evidence can 
be relevant. To give an example: if it were found to be possible to 
give an acoount of human behaviour in purely 'Physical terms, which 
explained all the thoughts, aotions , and experienoes of all htunan 
beings, many would see this as highly important in choosing between 
a dualist and a materialist acoount of reality. Third: the acceptance 
of one view rather than another has implioations some of which are 
important for our oonsiderations. 
The most important is that idealism leads inevitably to positivism 
17 . in scienoe. For, as G. E. ~fuore pointed out, it is fundamental to 
all idealist theories that esse is percipi for all objeots . other 
than minds. This view, first olearly stated in modern times by 
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Berkeley in the Principles of ITWTh~n Knowledge, identifies the 
existence of objects which are not themselves minds, with their 
existence as objects of perception ontologically dependent on 
18 
mind. Nothing, therefore, can be said to exist (except another 
mind) unless it is the object of some mind. Anything which is not 
observed does not exist. Postulated entities which are held to be 
'in principle unobservable', are ruled out as possible candidates 
for reality. Connected with this view is the thesis that there are 
no real causal relationships in the so-called physical world. 
l.!echanistic explanations are at best merely useful analogies, enabling 
the natural philosopher to make predictions, but which can in no 
sense be held to be truths about the world.19 
8. The implications of these points are vital to an understanding 
of the connection between Locke's Essgz and the scientific revolution. 
The optimism of the scientists who produced the scientific revolution 
is reflected in their deep commitment to the possibility of disoovetl 
by the new techniques they produced; discovery of the true reality 
which underlay the phenomena of appearances. They believed, in 
short, that science could and did reveal the true causes which 
actually exist in nature. 
Far from holding any a priori objection to this programme, Looke 
in faot, subscribed to it. The problem for Locke was not whether 
soience oould give knowledge, but what Were the limits to the 
soientist's method. The issue was not whether there were any w~s 
in which knowledge oould be reached, but whioh amongst the oompeting 
criteria employed by the soientists were and were not acoeptable. 
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9. To appreciate this point, consider the main criteria which emerged 
d.uring the scientific revolution. Five of these are easily identified. 
But there was also a sixth, less easy to label. The five basic ones 
we may call (a) empirical confirmation, (b) simplicity, (c) indt~tion, 
(d) necessity, and (e) explanatory power. Probably no scientist of 
those times used any one of these to the exclusion of all of the others. 
It was largely a matter of emphasis rather than of total acceptance or 
rejection. Further, it is not always easy to separate these different 
criteria. How far, for example, can induction be separated from the 
criterion of simplicity? Despite these difficulties the labels will 
place discussion in a. useful fra.mework. The sixth criterion might be 
la.belled the criterion from general cosmologica.l considerations. In 
what sense I wish to use it will emerge when we oonsider some examples. 
10. These examples, as used by sixteenth and seventeenth oentury 
soientists, are merely illustrative, and naturally further disoussion 
of them ooours in the chapters which follow. 
(a) Empirioal confirmation. 
Kepler postulated tha.t the structure of the oosmos was based upon 
the reeular Platonic solids. He made d.etailed observations and 
20 
calculations and on their basis conolttded that his theory was correct. 
(b) Simplioity. 
Copernicus held that the heliooentrio system was superior to the 
• 
ptolemaio system because it was simpler. The criterion of Simplicity 
was not merely a. reason for preferring the heliccen·trio theory, it was 
21 
a reason for believing it to be the true system. 
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(c) Irlduction. 
Newtonia Rule IV, in his 'Rules of Reasonine in Fhilosophy' reads:-
"In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions 
inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or 
very nearly true, notwithstanding any oontrary hypothesis that 
may be imagined, till such times as other phenomena occur by 
which they may be made more accurate or liable to exceptions." 22 
Thus he held that as all observed bodies ten<i to move towards one 
another with a force proportional to their mass, and inversely 
proportional to their distance, we should assume that all 'bodies 
whatsoever terld to behave in th1.s way. 
(d) 
Descartes, in thl') PrinrdplM of Fhi.loMphy, held that ttit is 
contrary to reason to say that there is a. vacuum or space in which 
there is absolutely nothing." (Prinoiple XVI). 23 That is, it is 
necessa.rily true that there are no empty spaces. This followed from 
Descartes' belief that matter a,nd extension are identioal, a view :Which 
in its turn he held to be necessarily true. 
(e) F.1rpl~,nCl.tory Power. 
In his Elements of Philo~oph~, Hobbes recognised that his 
explanations of the behaviour of bodies might not be certa.inly trne. 
Howeve~, he areued, 
"seeing I have assumed no hypothesis, whioh is not both possible 
and easy to be comprehended; and seeing also that I have reasonecl 
aright from those a.ssumptions, I have withall sufficiently 
demonstrated that they ma.y be the true,oausesi which is the end 
of physical contemplation." 24 
Hobbes here suggested that all tha.t can be e.x:pected from physios 
is plausible explanation, 'and that a criterion for acoepting an 
explanation is its explanatory power. 
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(f) Gf'lnl'>.l'al o08molo~ioal considerations. 
It is very likely that one of the reasons why Newton held that 
space was infinite was that he believed God was infinite. Thus in 
the General Scholitun added to the second edition of the Prinn:i.pil't he 
wrote: 
"It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a 
God; a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a trlle, 
supreme, or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it fOllows 
that the true God ie a living, intelligent and powerful Beine; 
and from his other perfections that he is supreme or most perfect. 
He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is 
his dominion reaohes from eternity to eternity; his presence 
from infinity to infinity; he governs all things and knows all 
thines that are or can be done." 25 
Newton would have argued that to accept that space was finite 
would be to attempt to place a limitation on God, which is an 
impossibility. 
How these various criteria should be deployed was a oonstant 
problem in the scientific revolution. In his epistemology Locke was 
to are-ue in favour of an austere empirioist position, and a.gainst 
the more fanciful oonceptions of the Neoplatonists of the turn of the 
oentury, the dogmatics of Desoartes, and the over-optimism of Baoon. 
11. At this stage we should take note of some aspects of Lockets 
work. Already we have seen how Locke thought of himself as an under-
labourer olearing the path to knowledge. Philosophy, he suggested, 
is in great part olarification. Knowledge of the world could only 
be obtained by experience, and by implioation, was best gained by the 
method praotised by soientists such as Boyle and Newton. ~fuoh of the 
failure to appreciate this, Locke suggested, is due to oonceptual 
oonfusion. Thus he wrote:-
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"Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of 
language, have so long passed for mysteries of soienoe •••• To 
break in upon the sanotuary of vanity and ignoranoe will be, 
I suppose, some service to human understanding." 26 
That philosophy is primarily ooncerned with conceptual clarification 
was a suggestion of the greatest importance. It has re~~ined the 
dominent view amongst English philosophers ever sinoe. 
It would, however, be wrong to over-emphasise the modernity of 
Locke's approach. His oommitment to conceptual analysis in the ER~RY 
was linked with a muoh less satisfaotory aspeot: his psyohologism , 
Indeed,it was Locke's conoern to write a 'natural history of the 
soul', to follow the method of Baconian soience in philosophy, which 
led him into some of his worst errors. 
Locke's view of the nature of philosophy was itself undoubtedly 
a product of his view of science. Science was substantially the 
only way in which knowledge of the world could be obtained. And even 
that was limited. The philosopher Tl~ philosopher was not generally 
in a position to give answers to questions about the world. And, for 
the most part, the method of the scientist was not conoeptual analysis 
but observation. And this was so because there was no a priori road 
to knowledge of nature. Indeed, as we know, Locke held that 
ultimately, in some sense, all know1edee was grounded in experience. 
12. Lockets contention that all our knowledge was grounded in 
experience was hardly original. Gassendi, earlier in the century, 
had asserted that "Every idea which exists in the mind or:i.ginates 
in the sensesn •27 And, of course, the empiricist tradition went 
back to the classical Greeks and especially to the philosophy of 
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EPicurus, from whom Gassendi drew so much. Before Gassendi in 
modern times, Leonardo da Vinci had written that "All our kUOldedge 
has its origin in our perceptiontt , and that "a1l sciences are vain 
and full of errors that are not born of EXperience, mother of all 
certainty.n28 Nor was Locke's empiricism of a particularly radical 
Bort. He did not commit himself to the position that all a priori 
knowledee was impossible. But Locke rehabilitated the empiricist 
thesis at just the right moment and with ~lch supportine argument. 
The Rationalism of Desca.rtes, although mnch d,iscussec1, had no 
committed adherents in Restoration England, stronely influenoed as 
it was by Bacon's programme of knowledge and the control of nature 
through experiment. ~fust of the scientists were R~conianst not 
Ca.rtesians. What they r~'Iuired wa,s a su~tai:ned justifioation of 
the method to which they felt temprem'::lnta.lly drawn. That support 
they received from Locke's EReay. Locke argued that the method of 
Bacon was bound to be oorrect'for ultimately it was the only method 
open to man in his estate. 
13. One of the most important of Lockets contributions to a olear 
understanding of the nature of soience was undoubtedly his rejection 
of innate ide:ls. The consequence of this was to rule out of court 
the pretensions of a priori physios. It is a olassic example of 
the way in which philosophioal analysis can dispellvain fiotions 
whioh have cluttered the path to knowledge. The rejeotion of innate 
ideas was entirely in keeping with the oonception of knowledge and 
its limitations which the soientifio revolution generated. It is 
sigrl.ificant that Lockets thesis rests -partially at least - on 
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areuments identical with those that Newton deployed e·eainst Cartesian 
physics. 
14. Although Locke apo1oeised for the frequent use of the word 
'idea' in the Essay such an apoloey was insufficient. The nse of 
the term in different senses29 produoes some of the ereatest 
difficulties in assessing Lockets areuments. 
Locke held that many of our ideas were the product of a cau~al 
chain running from physical objects to the mind. He was thus committed 
to the existence of a physical reaH ty irldependent of the mind. 
Locke believed that this account of the origin of our ideas was 
substantiated on empirical grounds. But the basis on which the 
empirical evidence could be accepted was one which itself presupposed 
an external world. 
Locke's commitment to the existence of matter, of material 
substance independent of our phenomenal experiences, was ultimately 
an axiom upon which much of his epistemology rested. In this 
commitment he was entirely at on.9 with the scientists of the times. 
Locke believed that empirical evidence established that amoneat 
the causes of the order observable in nature were the unobseMTl\ble 
structtlres out of which physical objects were composed. (Though 
what the nature of those structures was, was another matter.)' The 
acceptance of this theory was fundamental to the whole of the' 
mechanistic philosophy of the seventeenth century whether exp~essed 
as Epicurean atomism by Gassendi and Walter Charleton, 30 by Galileo 
in hie distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of 
objects in the A."'lRaYf"r of 1623, or by Boyle in his acoount of the" 
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oorpuscular philosophy. Material Bubstance, with its powers, was 
for the scientifio revolution and for Locke, not simply an after-
thought added to a more or less ooherent theory. More nearly it was 
an axiom upon which the new attitude to nature was founded. Berkeley's 
rejection of Looke's material substance was not only the rejeotion of 
an epistemology but also the rejeotion of oontemporary physios, as 
Berkeley well realised.3l 
15. Looke defined knowledge as tnothine but the peroeption of the 
oonnexion and agreement, or disagreemen·~ and repugnanoy of any of 
our ideas.n32 The definition was soon attacked by Leibniz33 for 
its narrow oonoeption, and the attack was in many respeots justified. 
Lookets definition is, among other things, aotually inoonsistent, 
at least on most possible interpretations, with many of his own examples 
of knowledge. But in an important respeot, one too often underpl~ed 
when oonsiderine the importanoe of Looke, his aooount of knowledee 
and probability in the fourth Book of the ~8say came to ter~~ with 
the developments in the physical soiences more oompletely than those 
of any of his oontemporaries. Looke, typioally, and fairly happily, 
advooated a oourse between soeptioism and doematism with regard to 
the power of soienoe to explain nature. His conoeption of knowledge 
and probability allowed for the important faot that scientifio 
investigation oan approaoh both more nearly to, and also sometimes 
actually arrive at, the truth about partioular areas of the physical 
universe. What Looke does deny is that We can always know when or if 
we have arrived at Bome final truth. On this question Locke was rieht. 
16. Looke,shared with newton the view that the most that could ever 
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be olaimed for muoh of soienoe was some degree of probability. Both 
were also committed to a meohanistio interpretation of the physical 
world. But, equally, they were soeptioal about man being able to 
give a oompletely satisfactory aooount of those meohanisms. "The 
cause of gravity is what I do not pretent to knowu34 wrote Newton 
to Riohard Bentley. And it seemed only "probable" to Newton, though 
no doubt highly probable, "that God in the bezinning formed matter 
in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles.n35 Similarly, 
Looke was oautious in his oommitment to the atomic theory of matter 
as a known truth of the physical world. "The Corpuscular theory of 
matter," he wrote in On F,!lncatiolh should be oonstrued as an hypothesis , 
rather than "a comprehensive scientifical and satisfactory knowledee 
of the works of nature.n36 
On the possibility of natural philosophy revealing knowledee 
Looke and Newton were in agreement. Both made experience the truth 
oriterion for propositions about the physical world. Bothreoognised 
the dangers of generalisation, or of allowing theory to over-ride 
faots. Newtonls famous remark in the Prinoipia that ttl frame no 
hypotheses,,37 echoed not only his own attitude, as expressed in a 
letter to Oldenburg over twenty years before,38 but also that 
expressed by Locke when he wrote oommending Sydenham and his soientifio 
method that he had inoreased our knowledge of disease "by way of 
accurate praotioal observation.". He did not, said Looke, tlby 
speculative hypotheses, fill the world with useless, though pleasing 
visions ... 39 
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Despite the important parallels between Locke and Newton, 
Newton had no ereat influence on Locke, at least through his 
published works , for the very eood reason that they were not 
published until after l..ocke had forrrnllated his own. views. Certainly 
there was some influence, reflected in various chanees and additions 
in suoceeding editions of the F~~ay. But none was fundamental. 40 
If Newton's writines had no great influence on Locke, then neither 
had those of Locke on Newton, thoueh once again there are signs of 
minor influence.4l In general it would seem, therefore, that the 
attitudes of these two men emerged from a common backeround, a 
background that we shall explore. 
11. In contrast, the influence of Robert Boyle on Locke was 
substantial. Doyle's writings not only presented Locke with ma~y' 
of the scientific assumptions that he absorbed into his epistemology, 
but they also contained remarks on such subjects as the limits of 
knowledee which re-appear, sometimes improved,in the EMail;. 
was not, of oourse, the only oontemporary scientist whose work 
influenced Locke. Dut his impact is the most disoernable, and 
probably difficult to overestimate. 
18. I do not intend to give an account of all aspects of the 
, scientifio revolution whioh led up to the production of Lookets 
Boyle 
Essay. Still less is this a history of that revolution. Rather I 
wish to show how oertain problems presented themselves to the 
scientists, how they attempted to deal with them, and then to 
appraise their solutions. In the light of this it should be possible 
to see how Locke's work emerged as a. very real produot of that 
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revolution, as offering a series of answers to questions which llad 
emerged during the course of the scientific revolution. 
In order to appreciate the importance of Locke's work we must 
look in some detail at the methods employed by many of the key 
scientists. This will show how deeply ingrained were certain mis-
taken assumptions: how many false starts were made, in the attempts 
to identify the scope of soientifio enquiry. After looking at 
these historical examples we oan look at Locke's answers to the 
problems presented. Consequently, the second part of this work is 
not a comprehensive treatment of Locke's epistemology. }~ny of 
Locke's most important ideas are hardly touched upon. But it is 
an attempt to see Locke's work in a rather different perspective from 
that which it is normally viewed. I believe that this perspective 
goes some way to explaining why Locke holds such an important position 
in modern intellectual history.42 
Part I 
THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 
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Sxnopsis of Part I 
As the physical sciences developed in the seventeenth century there 
arose a very definite view both of what counted as scientific method, and 
of what counted as establishing something as a fact in natural philosophy. 
This view reached its culmination in the work of Newton. Newton's attitude 
to science, as expressed in succeeding editions of the Principia, in the 
Qpticks, and in his private correspondence an.d papers, crystallized a 
tradition which emerged from the rejection of Aristotelian explanations in 
the physical sciences t by the dominant thinkers of the age in the preceG- . 
ing hundred years. Thus, whilst Newton's views on science are different 
from those of, say, Galileo, Kepler, Bacon, Descartes, and many English 
scientists who founded the Royal Society. there can be traced a pretty 
constant development towards the sorts of views that Newton put forward. 
This development was not a simple prooess. Any brief account is for 
that reason alone likely to leave important questions unanswered. Part 
One of this work, therefore concentrates on illuminating only some key 
aspects of that development. In particular, I have conoentrated almost 
exclusively on what it was that certain oentral scientists took to be 
the scope of scientific investigation. and the possible truth valUe, if 
any, of their work. 
This task is justified on its own merits, quite. apart from any 
light that it throws on Locke's work. There has been oomparatively 
little done, either by historians of.soienoe, or philosophers, on 
the scope that various scientists saw their work as having, or an 
appraisal of their views on this. The work that perhaps comes olosest 
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to covering the same area as I do myself is E. A. Burtt's classi~ 
~he Metapnysical Foundations of }~dern Physical Soienoe (London, 1924, 
second edition 1932). But Burtt's work is more general in conoeption 
than the present one, besides there having been much important research 
carried out in the intervening period. 
~ thesis in Part One is this: The new scienoe arose largely on 
the back of an epistemology whioh was drawn out of Neoplatonio 
conceptions both of nature and of knowledge. Gradually the limitations 
of these preoonceptions were realized. This generated a vacuum as 
to what the possible achievements of science were. The vacuum was 
partially filled by the theories PUt forward, in their turn, by 
Francis Bacon and Ren~ Descartes. But neither of these men succeeded 
in answering satisfactorily the epistemological problems which the 
new soience, because of its obvious aohievements, raised. Baoon's method 
seemed to promise certainty by an empirical method, but failed to live 
up to that promise. Descartes' rationalism also promised oertainty, 
but in practise only provided conjeoture - oonjeoture of a sort that 
was found unacoeptable to the inheritors ot the Daoonian tradition. 
At the time of the foundation of the Royal Society, therefore, there 
were oompeting accounts of the soope and nature of saience, each 
reckoned, for different reasons, to be inadequate. Two scientists, 
especially, responded to this problem, Robert Boyle and Isaao Newton. 
And they responded in much the same way. :Both maintained that the 
pursuit of absolute oertainty in soienoe was a vain enterprise •. But 
the philosophioal justification was not supplied by them. In Part Two 
we shall go on to see that it was in faot supplied by John Looke. 
-~-
Chapter I looks at the Neoplatonic revival which took place in 
later Renaissance scientifio thought. It will show that Neoplatonism 
was an important influence on soientifio development. In particular 
it appeared to offer a justifioation for believing that soience oould 
be oertain. We shall see that in itself Neoplatonism was not oapable 
of providing this solution. 
Chapter II will show that Galileo's conception of soienoe was much 
influenced by Neoplatonic views. Galileo oombined his commitment to 
the speoial role of mathematios in understanding the physical world, 
with an empirioist approaoh, and did so with obvious success. But, 
despite this success, various problems remained about the nature of 
soientifio investigation and its possible scope. It will be shown 
that Galileo's oonoeption of nature, and Neoplatonism generally, rested 
on a particular, and mist&cen, view about the status of scientifio laws. 
In Chapter III we shall examine the Cartesian solution to the 
problem of certainty in scientifio investigation. Descartes, by his 
method, should have ooncluded that all knowledge ot the physical world 
could be absolutely certain. But in fact he was equivocal on this 
central topic. We shall find that Cartesian rationalism was not 
capable ofaohieving absolutely certain knowledge, and that its 
epistemology was inoapable of solving the problems raised by the new 
science. 
In Chapter IV Bacon's method in science will be explored. 
Although Baoon supplied a method for science, his system was not 
supported by an epistemologioal theory of any profundity. There still 
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remained, therefore, the need for suoh a theory, even though the 
Baoonian method was oonsiderably sucoessful in praotioe. 
Chapter V looks at the developments in England immediately after 
the work of Baoon and Desoartes, and illustrates the wide variety of 
views about the nature and soope of soience whioh oould be found in 
England between 1640 and 1680. 
In Chapters VI and VII we shall examine how Boyle and Newton 
oame to terms with the problem of the limits of soientifio knowledge. 
- 28 -
Chapter I. 
The Neoplatonists 
Osiander's Preface. 
Osiander's famous Preface to De Reyolutionibtla 1 is rightly 
reokoned one of the soandals of intelleotual history. Whether or 
2 
not Osiander had the author's permission to inolude it , his suggestion 
that the heliooentrio theory was merely a dubious oonjeoture on the 
part of Copernious was at odds with Copernious's own oommitment. For 
all that, and it is muoh, the Prefaoe oontains some important remarks 
oonoerning methodology in astronomy, methodology in soienoe generally, 
and on the limits of soientifio explanation. These represent an 
important and long standing sohool of thought, to beoome prominent in 
the seventeenth oentury. 
Osiander's rejeotion of a realistio interpretation of the 
Copernioan system may have been based partially on his fear that it 
would be oonsidered oontrary to soripture. But it was not his only 
reason, and it was probably not the main one. Two years prior to the 
pub1ioation of De RfY91utionipup Osiander had written to Copernious:-
"For my part I have also felt about hypotheses that they 
are not artioles of faith but bases for oomputation, so that 
even if they are false, it does not matter, provided that 
they exactly represent the phenomena •••• It would be a good 
thing if you oould say something on this subjeot in your 
preface, for you would then placate the Aristotelians and the 
theologians whose oontradiotion you fear.") 
To assume that tha letter is sincere is reasonable. It was not that 
Osiander simply oomplied with what he took to be the wishes of his 
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ohuroh superiors. (In contrast to Copernious, the church for 
Osiander was that of Luther not Rome.) Rather, he believed, as he 
was to state in the Preface, that there were no good grounds for 
asserting the truth of the Copernican system. 
In the Preface Osiander propounded the objectives of astronomers:-
"it is the job of the astronomer to use painstaking and 
skilled observation in gathering together the history ot the 
celestial movements, and then - sinoe he cannot by any line 
of reasoning reach the true causes ot these movements - to 
think up or oonstruct whatever oauses or hypotheses he 
pleases such that, by the assumption of these causes, those 
same movements can be calculated trom the principles of 
geometry tor the past and for the future too.tt4 
And later:-
"For it is suffioiently clear that this art (astronomy) 
is absolutely and profoundly ignorant ot the oauses of the 
apparent irregular movements. And it it oonstruots and 
thinks up causes - and it has certainly thought up a good 
many - nevertheless it does not think them up in order to 
persuade anyone of their truth but only in order to provide a 
correot basis for caloulation. But since for one and the same 
movement varying hypotheses are proposed trom time to time, 
as ecoentrioity or epicyole for the sun, the astronomer much 
preters to take one whioh is easier to grasp ••• And as far 
as hypotheses go, let no one expect anything in the way of 
certainty from astronomy, since astronomy oan offer us nothing 
certain, lest if anyone take as true that which has been 
constructed for another use, he go away from this disoipline . 
a bigger fool than when he oame to it."5 
Osiander was not a Platonist. But there are shades of Plato 
in some of these remarks. One of the questions set to students of 
the Academy was tt What are the uniform and ordered movements by 
the assumption of whioh the phenomena in relation to the movement 
of the planets can be saved?tt5 Like Plato, Osiander did not expeot 
the true causes of the phenomena to be revealed. Unlike Plato, 
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Osiander believed in the importanoe of "painstaking and skilled 
observation.". 7 
Osiander's emphasis on observation as a basis for astronomy 
is offset by his soeptioism as to the possibility of ever knowing 
the true oauses of the observed phenomena. What in this oontext did 
Osiander understand by "oauses"? From his remarks it would seem 
that Osiander was referring to the actual paths of the sun and planets. 
Possible causes in this sense would be the various different paths 
the heavenly bodies could aotually follow to produce the observed 
phenomena. Two possible oauses, so understood, would be the Ptolemaio 
system, interpreted realistioally, and the Copernioan system, though 
these would only be two among many, indefinitely many, alternatives. 
In one important respect Osiander was olearly right. There was 
no way to ohoose between the two systems with respeot to the then 
observed phenomena. But he was olearly wrong to assume that there 
never oould or would be any way to test between the two hypotheses 
or oauses. Within seventy years Ga1i1eo was to make observations 
with his telesoope whioh were direot1y relevant and important empirioal 
evidence - though never knockdown proof - in favour of an heliooentrio 
theory. 
In the passages we have oonsidered Osiander presents the following 
attitude towards astronomy, and, by implioation, to soienoe in 
genera1:-
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(a) Observation and measurement are the vital first step. 
(b) These should be improved upon as far as possible. 
(c) Various possible systems for explaining these observations 
should be propounded. A 'possible system' is any system compatible 
with all of the current empirioal data. 
(d) There is no way to choose between the possible systems, 
since, ex hypothesis they are all compatible with all of the 
empirical data. 
(e) Given this, the astronomer ought to use the one that is 
"easiest to grasp". 
OBiander's reluctance to interpret oelestial theory realistioally 
was one that stemmed from a long tradition. Plato was of a similar 
view. ptolemy's position is not clear.8 B,y the time that we reach 
the later Middle Ages, the general position was that exemplified by 
Aquinas who wrote in the Summa tijeglogiQa:-
"Two kinds of' argument are put forward to prove something. 
The first goes to the root of the matter and fully proves 
some principle, for instance in natural philosophy there is a 
conclusive argument to prove that celestial movements are of 
constant speed. The other kind doeS not prove a principle 
conclusively but shows that its acceptance fits in with the 
observed effects; for instance an astronomioal argument about 
eooentric and epicyclic motions is put forward on the ground 
that by this hypothesis one can show how celestial movements 
appear as they do to observation. Suoh an argument is not 
fully conclusive, since an explanation might be possible even 
on another hypothesis.·t 9 
Osiander emerges as representative of a long tradition in 
approaching explanations of phenomena, a tradition whioh was based on 
empirioal criteria. If there was no direot confirmation of an 
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hypothesis by observation, then the hypothesis could only be put 
forward'tentatively_ 
Such a position, as stated, is unexceptionable. Yet, in fact, 
it was one entirely at odds with the position of Copernicus himself. 
How was it, then, that Copernicus oame to hold such a different 
view? The answer lies in the intimate connection between the attitude 
of Copernious and the revival during the Renaissanoe of Platonic, 
10 or more oorrectly, Neoplatonio philosophies. 
Elato and the Neoplaton~s~~ 
There were several strands of Plato's thought which gained wide 
acoeptance during the Renaissanoe. Central to this influence was 
the so-called Platonic Academy of F1orence, aotive in the seoond half 
of' the fifteenth century, and its leading philosopher ~~silio Ficino. 
, The elements in Plato's thought which are important for us Were 
the following:-
1. Plato held that knowledge was only obtainable by an intellectual 
process. Knowledge was the intellectual apprehension of' the real, and 
the real was not presented direotly by experience. It transcended 
. 10 exper1enoe. 
2. As a consequence of' this, phenomenal appearances were not 
acoepted as giving knowledge. 
3. Knowledge could only be obtained by following a strict 
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intelleotual eduoation. whioh by gradation led to knowledge of the 
12 Form of the Good - whioh existed timelessly. 
4. The stu~ of mathematios played a oentral role in this 
eduoation. beoause the study of mathematios was the stu~ of the 
eternallyexistent.13 
5. B,y implioation. it is possible to attribute to Plato the 
view that what is knom is neoessarily true. That is. that real 
knowledge is absolute neoessity.14 
These various strands of Plato's thought appeared with differing 
emphases in the Neoplatonio philosophers. Not all of them emphasised 
all of the strands, and some repudiated some of them. Despite this, 
it is fairly easy to reoognise Platonio influenoes in many of the 
key figures of the Renaissanoe, some of whom are vital to our story. 
Amongst the Neoplatonists there were both optimists and pessimists 
about the possibility of ever obtaining knowledge. The pessimistio 
view was perhaps most ably expressed by Nioolas Cusanua in his most 
important work Of te&rned Ignorijnce oompleted in 1440.15 Cusanus 
argued that because there is an impossible gulf between the finite 
. . . 16 
and the infinite "absolute truth is beyond our grasp." Man must 
learn to oome to terms with his finite oondition and not have 
pretensions beyond his station. 
The attitude of Cusanus was not entirely soeptioal. Like Plato 
he believed that we oould approaoh knowledge by an intelleotual route. 
He held further that in some degree knowledge was possible. FOllowing 
Plato again, he thought knowledge was only obtainable by abstraotion. 
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and that ma.thematios was oentral to the programme. He wrote:-
.tOur knowledge of things is not aoquired by oompletely 
disregarding their material oonditions, without which no 
image of them could be formed; nor is it wholly subject 
to their possible variations; but the more we abstract from 
sensible oonditions, the more certain and solid our knowledge 
is. Ma.thematics is an example of such abstraot knowledge ••• 
so that Boethius, the most learned of Romans, went so far as 
to say that knowledge of things divine was impossible without 
some knowledge of mathematios." 17 
The emphasis whioh Cusanus placed on abstraotion, and the laok of 
weight whioh he gave to purely pheonomena1 appearanoes are «amples 
of an attitude whioh was to be of central. importance in the development 
of astronomioal and physioal theory. 
For all their Platonism, the views of Cusanus and the members of 
the Florentine Academy did not seriously oonf1ict with Aristotelian 
conceptions of the world.18 Most of the Neoplatonist philosophers 
borrowed happily from Plato and Aristotle in forming their outlooks. 
Their ideas were wielded into a cosmology whioh nearly always remained 
fundamentally religious in attitude. Questions about the physioal 
truth of a theory, like the heliocentrio theory, were assessed in 
terms of suoh a religious attitude. This approaoh to nature wa.s almost 
as oharacteristio of Copernicus as it was of other Neoplatonio thinkers. 
2. Copernious a.nd the HeliocentriQ IlIPRtaesis. 
In oontrast to Osiander, Copernious was quite olearly oommitted. 
to the truth of his system and thus reveals a very different attitude 
towards soienoe. Copernious, like Osiander, reoognised that the 
orbital motion of the earth oould not be deteoted by ourrent observations. 
But he had other reasons for believing his system to be the true one. 
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He explained how it was that he came to propound his theory thus:-
"Yet the planetar,y theories of ptole~ and most other 
astronomers although consistent with the numerical data, 
seemed likewise to present no small difficulty. For these 
theories were not adequate unless certain equants were also 
conceived; it then appeared that a planet moved with uniform 
velocity neither on its deferent nor about the centre of its 
epioyole. Henoe a system of this sort seemed neither suff-
ioiently absolute nor suffioiently pleasing to the mind. 
Having beoome aware ot these deteots I often oonsidered 
whether there oould perhaps be found a more reasonable 
arrangement of circles, from which ever,y apparent inequality 
would be derived and in which everything would move uniformly 
about its proper centre, as the rule of absolute motion requires 
•••••• the suggestion at length came to me how it could be 
solved with tewer and much simpler oonstruotions than were 
formerly used, if some assumptions (which are called axioms) 
were grant ed me." 19 
An important factor for preferring his system was that Copernicus 
thought it "more absolute and pleasing to the mind." :aut for 
Copelrnicus, unlike Osiander, such oriteria were basis enough to 
assert its truth. In a note to his seventh axiom Copernicus wrote: 
"Accordingly let no one suppose that I have gratuitously asserted, 
with the Pythagoreans, the motion of the earth; strong proof will 
be found in my exposition of the oiroles." 20 Copernious wa.s 
oommitted to his system not simply to "sa.ve the appearanoes". For 
he olaims "strong proof" in the more pleasing arrangement that his 
system offered. The universe must be orderly, it must follow "the 
rule of absolute motion". And for Copernicus this meant that it must 
be explicable in terms of oircular, and only oircular,paths for the 
planets, moving with constant velooities. If such a system oould be 
produoed it would be the true system of the world. And he, Copernious, 
had produoed that system. 
The question arises: why did Copernious aooept the oriteria 
whioh he did as suffioient to establish the truth of his theory? 
The answer, I believe, lies in Copernious's oommitment to oertain 
Neop1atonio views. This attitude is exhibited in a variety of 
p1aoes in his writings, and I shall seek to show that Copernious 
acoepted the he1iooentrio hypothesis, not solely on the grounds of 
its greater simplioity, but also, as perhaps Osiander had rejeoted 
it, as a result of general oosmologioal oonsiderations. 
Rhetious, Copernious's pupil, explained his master's allegiance 
to circular motion to account for the movements of the planets: 
"Following Plato and the Pythagoreans, the greatest mathematioians 
of that divine age, my teacher thought that in order to determine the 
oause of the phenomena oircular motions must be asoribed to the 
21 
spherioa1 earth." Circular paths, the perfeot form of motion, were 
the only aooeptable ones for the heavenly bodies and also for the 
earth. And like the P,ythagoreans, Copernious aooepted the role of the 
sun in the oosmological order. "In the oentre of all rests the sun. 
For who would place this lamp of a very beautiful temple in another 
or better place than this where from it oan illuminate everything 
·22 
at the same time'?" Copernious went on to praise the sun in 
; 
terms not inappropriate for a Pythagorean sun-worshipper:- "not 
unhappily do some oa11 it the'lantern,others~he mind and still others, 
the pilot of the world •.. Trismegistus oa11s it a "visible go~fi 
Sophocles' Eleotra, "that whioh gazes upon all things." Andse the 
sun, as if resting on a kingly throne, governs the family of stars 
whioh wheel around.,,23 
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Is it possible to explain Copernicus's lavish attribution to 
the sun? One simple answer might be that Copernicus thought it 
necessary to use such extravagent language in order to make his 
heliocentric theory plausible. (But plausible to whom?) Alternatively, 
we might think that the words tru~ reflect Copernicus's own views. 
Further considerations will make this seoond option very plausible. 
Rheticus supplies evidence that the position put forward by 
Copernicus in ~ Revolutton1lnw was honestly held by him:-
":r.tr teacher is oonvinced •••• that the rejeoted method 
of the sun's rule in the realm of nature must be revived • 
••••• For his aware that in human affairs the emperor need 
not himself hurry from oity to oity in order to perform the 
duty imposed on him by God; and that the heart does not 
move to the head or feet or other parts of the bo~ to sustain 
a living oreature, but fulfils its tunction through other 
organs designed by God for that purpose." 24. 
There seems no reason w~ Rhetious should lie about his masterts 
oonviotions. Given that he did not, why was Copernious so eager to 
assert the importanoe of the sun's role within his systeml The olue 
to this perhaps is provided by Copernious's reference in DQ aeX01utiQnibna 
to Hermes Trismegistus. 
Hermes Trismegistus was believed by Renaissanoe Neoplatonists, 
such as Fioino, to have been a real person, probably a oontemporary 
of Moses, and an Egyptian magus, who was the author of the Hermetio 
writings. In faot the Hermetio writings were oomposed muoh later, 
in the seoond oentury A~D~ But this was not disoovered until 1614. 
The great influence of the Hermetie writings on Renaissanoe thinkers 
has been admirably reoounted by Franoes A~ Yates in her G1otl1rme Bx:lm2 
And the HetmQtic Tradition (London 1964). It is not my intention 
- 38 -
to summerise her excellent account, but some points about it are 
of importance for us. The tradition of natural magic which formed 
a very large interest for many Renaissance Neoplatonists rested 
to a very large extent on the Hermetic writings. This tradition is 
clearly very olosely connected with the origins of the scientific 
revolution. In the Hermetio writings the sun played a role quite 
different from the one it played in the Ptolemaio-Aristotelian system. 
It was regarded by Hermes as a seoond God: "The sun illumines 
the other stars not so much by the power of its light, as by its 
divinity and holiness, and you should hold him, 0 Asolepius, to be 
the second god, governing all things and spreading his light on all 
the living beings of the world, both those which have a soul and 
those which have not.,,25 There is a fairly remarkable similarity 
between this passage and Copernicus's justification for the heliooentrio 
theory quoted above. I suggest, therefore, that at least a part, and 
probably an important part, of the acoeptance by Copernious of the 
heliooentrio theory was his attraction towards the Hermetio outlook, an 
outlook with which he would have had plenty of opportunity to have 
beoome familiar during his ten years stay in Bologna and Padua between 
1495 and 1505, if at no other time. The Hermetio writings were at 
that time the centre of much interest, especially in Italy, because 
of the attention given them by Fioino and other Neoplatonists. Frances 
Yates has shown that they had a great influence on Bruno's acceptance 
of the heliooentrio system. And there is some evidenoe to suggest 
they had at least a little influence on Copernicus. 
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Given that this view of Copernicus is plausible, the~ Brunots 
verdict on him must be rejected. Bruno wrote of Copernicus:-
UTo him we owe our liberation from several false 
prejudices of the commonly received philosophy, which 
I will not go so far as to call blindness. Yet he himself 
did not much transcend it; for being more a student of 
mathematics than of nature he was not able to penetrate 
deeply enough to remove the roots of false and misleading 
principles and, by disentangling all the difficulties in 
the way, to free both himself and others from the pursuit 
of empty enquires and turn their attention to things 
constant and certain. It 26 
Rather,it is probable that Copernicus did see along the road that 
Bruno took. Only Osiander's Prefaoe and his o~m retioenoe prevented 
it appearing more explioit. 
We can see that the aooeptanoe of the heliooentrio system by 
Copernious is a good deal more oomplioated than at first sight it 
might appear. The commitment refleots some aspeots of the Neoplatonio 
and Hermetio traditions so powerful in the Renaissance. Only on one 
level, and that a fairly superfioial one, was Copernicus operating 
with what can be oalled soientifio oriteria for the justification 
, 
of his theory. True, the Copernioan theory did acoord, pretty well, 
with the movements of the planets. Certainly Copernious employed a 
criterion of simplicity. But even the latter rested on such 
metaphysioal considerations as that oiroular paths are the most 
perfeot form of motion. 
Copernious and Plato 
In Copernicus there were many elements which were \8 beoome 
oentral to the achievement of the scientific revolution. Several ot 
these had Platonic connections. Like Plato, Copernicus was committed 
to geometry and geometrical form. This was exemplified in the whole 
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of his system, and in particular in his commitment to perfect circular 
paths for the planets. But, unlike Plato, Copernicus saw geometry as 
a key for unlocking the actual structure of the physical world. 
With Plato· again, Copernicus rejected appearances as being 
reality. As he said: "The principle arguments by which the natural 
philosophers attempt to establish the immobility of the earth rest 
for the most part on the appearances; it is particularly such 
arguments that collapse here since I treat the earth's immobility 
as due to an appearance." 21 Reality, Copernious held with the 
Neoplatonists and the Hermetio magicians, lay at a level deeper than 
that of the phenomena. It lay at a level whioh could only be reached 
by mathematioal abstraction. 
These key ooncepts were oentral to the whole of the soientific 
revolution. They were carried forward to their logical limits in 
the century which followed Copernicusts death. 
Kepler @tnd the Copernioan Theorx. 
More blatently, but perhaps nn more deeply, Kepler found his 
key to reality in Neop1atonio and P,ythagorean ideas. In his Enitom~ 
Qf Qopernio§D Aptronomt (1618-21) Kepler offered his answer to the 
question "By what arguments do you affirm that the sun is situated 
at the oentre of the world?". He replied:-
tiThe very anoient P,ythagoreans and the Italian philosophers 
supply us with some of those arguments in Aristotle (On thm 
Heavenq, Book II, Chapter 13); and these arguments are 
drawn from the dignity of the sun and that of the place (i.e. 
the oentre, or very near the oentre of the universe) 28 and 
from the sunts office of vivification and illumination in the 
world." 29 
f"--" 
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It is most likely that Kepler's Italian philosophers inoluded 
Pioino who had published an edition of the works of Hermes TrisMagistus. 
(Hermes, as we have seen, argued for a speoial role for the sun 
within the universal framework, but not speoifioally for its oentral 
looation.) 
In the oase of Kepler, unlike that of Copernious, it is not even 
plausible to suggest that he might have been an admirer of Hermes. 
Kepler rejeoted the secret magical traditions of the Hermeticists, 
Paraoelsisians, and Rosioruoians quite explicitly in his controversy 
with the English Hermeticist Robert Fludd. In a letter written at 
the time Kepler wrote:-
"One sees that Fludd takes his chief pleasure in inoomprehensible 
picture puzzles of the reality, whereas I go forth from there 
preoisely to move into the bright light of knowledge the facts 
of nature whioh are veiled in darkness. The former is the 
subjeot of the chemist, followers of Hermes and Paracelsus, 
the latter, on the contrary, the task of the ~~thematioian.tt 30 
There were no overt Hermetio oommitments in Kepler's work. But 
there were strong tendencies to aooept some of the oonclusions of the 
Hermetio tradition. Kepler's views both that the sun deserved its 
privileged position beoause it was in keeping with its dignity, and 
that its oentral looation was important for its funotion in supplying 
the universe with light, were hardly modern oriteria for a soientifio 
theory. They oertainly pl~ed an important part in Kepler's aooeptance 
of the Copernioan system. 
There were other oonsiderations. Kepler, likeCopernious, 
greatly admired elegance in soientifio explanation. Thus he desoribed 
how he oame to advooate the heliooentrio theory:-
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"Already in Tubing-en when I followed attentively the 
instruotion of the famous ~~ster Miohael }~estlin, I 
peroeived how olumsy in many respeots is the hitherto 
oustomary notion of the struoture of the universe. Henoe 
I was so delighted by Copernious, whom Dl¥ teacher very 
often mentioned in his leotures, that I not only repeatedly 
advooated his view in the disputations of the candidates, 
but also made a oareful disputation about the thesis that the 
first motion (the revolution of the heavens of the fixed 
stars) results from the rotation of the earth. I alrea~ 
set to work also to asoribe to the earth on physioal, or, if 
one prefers, metaphysioal,grounds the motion of the sun, 
as Copernious does on mathematical grounds." 31 
Kepler believed that God would not, or could not, oonstruct a olumsy 
edifioe,and the tests for eleganoe were the oriteria of the mathematioian. 
These criteria were most amazingly exploited by Kepler in the 
MvsterluID Cosmoaaphicum whioh he had published in 1596• In it, 
on a more 'exotio 'soaie "than the Copernioan system developed, Kepler 
olaimed to have established a bond between geometry and oelestial 
harmony. He explained: "If for the sizes a.nd the relations of the 
six heavenly paths asoertained by Copernious, five figures possessing 
oertain distinguishing oharacteristios could be disoovered among the 
remaining infinitely many, then everything would be as desired. tt 
Kepler had disoovered that the five regular solids of Euolidean 
geometry appeared to fit the empirioal data. He therefore oontinued:_ 
, "The earth is the mea.sure for all other orbits. Ciroumscribe 
a twelve-sided regular solid (dodeoahedron) about it; the 
, sphere stretohed around this will be that of ~ars. Let the 
orbit of ~~s be ciroumsoribed by a. four-sided solid (tetrahedron). 
The sphere which is desoribed around this will be that of Saturn. 
Now p1aoe a twenty-sided figure (ioosahedron) in the orbit of 
the earth. The sphere insoribed in this will be that of Mercury. 
There you have the basis for the number of the planets." 32 
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Kepler's explanation for the number of planets completely 
accepted a mathematical model. A true a~lanation in astronomy 
was, for him, the identification of geometrical form in nature.33 
Kepler's account illustrates that his assumptions about what it 
was to explain any phenomena were far from simple. For, having 
established that the universe was constructed according to his 
mathematical model, Kepler went on to claim that this explained ~ 
there were .1wU. six planets. 
Lying behind Kepler's acoount were these sort of oonsiderations. 
God, Kepler believed, had made the Universe acoording to a mathematioa1 
model. God, the Great Geometrer, was above all oonoerned to deploy 
this skill in his oonstruotion of the universe. When, therefore, the 
earthly geometrioian disoovered that geometrioal pattern in the 
workinoos of nature he had unoovered the bare bones of the Creation. 
For God to have made more, or less, planets would have been inoonsistent 
with his mathematioal designs, and this by his very nature he was 
inoapab1e of being. To disoover geometrioal form in nature, therefore, 
was for Kepler to disoover the neoessary eternal truths of God's 
oreation. It was for these reasons that he could write:- "The 
reasoning of the Anoients is merely probable, but the demonstrations 
of Copernicus arising from his prinoip1es, bring neoessity",34 and as 
. 35 he remarked "Geometrioal reasons are co-eternal with God". There 
was, then, in Kepler, a oommitment to a form of neoessity.in God's 
-44-
creation of a very particular kind. It exemplifies a considerable 
confusion about the nature of necessity which was to run through 
a vast amount of seventeenth century science. 
~ltimately, I believe, the confusion can be traced back to 
Plato, with his view that knowledge is knowledge of the forms which 
necessarily are as they are. It was a confusion exhibited by many 
of the Neoplatoniets, but also by other important thinkers of the 
soientific revolution. It was exemplified by Cusanus in his obscure 
view that "The 1.~imum is Absolute Neoessi ty" t 36 the view that God, 
truth and neoessity meet in one, a doctrine eohoed often in 
Neoplatonic writings throughout the Renaissance. 
The belief in ~he existence of necessity in nature, as 
G~ de Santillana. has argued, 37 was undoubtedly very important for 
the achivement of the scientific revolution. It was psychologically 
advantageous for the soientists to believe'that they oould know God's 
necessities. Dut to admit the historical importance is not to condone 
the muddled thinking which generated it. It was one of the oonceptual 
points that needed to be oleared before a true understanding of 
scienoe oould emerge. 
We have found that Kepler used three oriteria in his assessment 
of scientifio theory. First, throughout his astronomioal work Kepler 
insisted as perhaps only Tycho :Brahe had done before him, on accurate 
empirioal information. Seoond, he drew into his work general 
oosmological oonsiderations about God and his oreation. Third, he 
employed a test of eleganoe which used mathematioal oriteria, and 
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which was justified largely in terms of the second criterion. As 
with Copernicus, Kepler maintained that it was through the 
intellectual discipline of mathematios that it was possible to 
pieroe the veil of appearanoes and penetrate to the true form of 
nature, the eternal structure of the universe. 
Neoplatonism in England: The Elizabethan AstronOmers. 
In later medieval England the earlier Platonism of Robert 
Grosseteste and Roger Bacon was never oompletely replaced by the 
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-Aristotelianism of Aquinas. The first two English astronomers of 
any importance, Robert Reoorde (1510 - 1558), and John Dee (1527-
1608), traoed their soientifio anoestory back to Roger Bacon. Their 
libraries oontained the works of even obsoure fifteenth century 
scientists, and the reading lists which Recorde reoommended to his 
students included many works by Platonically inolined English 
astronomers.39 F~ R~ Jol1nSon has written: tt~le conception of 
soience which existed in the sixteenth century was fundamentally 
that of Plato, rather than that of soholastio Aristotelianism, and 
it is noteworthy that the sixteenth-century Enelish humanists were, 
on the whole, students of Plato in preferenc~ to Aristotle.,,40 Given 
thiS, we should not be surprised to find that the Elizabethan 
astronomers were inolined to the Copernioan system, and for much the 
same reasons as Copernicus himself had held his theory to be true. 
Robert Reoorde was very attracted to the Copernican system, 
if not an aotual believer in it.4l Thomas Digges (0. 1546 - ), 
a pupil of John Dee, was a Copernioan. He justified the heliooentrio 
system in muoh the same way as Copernious himself had done, as we 
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can see from the "Acldition" which he added to his father's work, 
A Genera.l Prof';nostication for ever (1592). "In this fourme or 
frame may we beholde such a wonderful symmetry of motions and 
situations, as in no other can be proponed." He went on to argue 
that it was more appropriate for the earth, rather than the heavens 
to move because "immobility is so divine." Copernicus offered no 
better reasons himself. 
It is the work of John Dee which best exemplifies the Neoplato-
nism of Elizabethan astronomers. Unlike Kepler, Dee combined his 
Neoplatonism with Hermeticism, and in Yates's phrase had "to the 
full the dignity, the sense of operational power, of the Renaissance 
Magus • .,42 But his attitude towards the possibility of knowledge of 
nature and its justification was very similar to Kepler's. Dee's 
views on these topics were most comprehensively expressed in the 
Preface he wrote to the first English edition of Euclid's geometry, 
published in 1570. (That Dee should write this Preface is in itself 
significant.) He showed, as clearly as Galileo was to do, that he 
believed the book of nature was written in the language of mathematios, 
and he shared with the Neoplatonists the doctrine that number was 
the key to reality. Dee, like Cusanus before him, approved of 
Boethiusts remark that:-
"All things (which from the very first original and 
being of thingss, have been framed and made) do appeare to 
be Formed by reason of Numbers. For this was the principall 
example or pattern in the minde of the Orea.tor." 43 
. Boethius is thus committed to the existence of numbers 
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independently of, and prior to, physioal objeots, but they 
were not identified with God. For Boethius, therefore, there were 
at least three kinds of real things: God, numbers, and physioal 
objeots. This triad was also acoepted by Dee. 
Dee explained how numbers oould lead us to an understanding 
of the world uno~tainable by any other means:-
"Dy Numbers propertie therefore, of uet by all possible 
meanes, (to the perfeotion of the Scienoe) learned, we may 
both wind and draw ourselves into the inward and deep 
search and vew, of all creatures distinct vertues, natures, 
properties, and~: And also, farder arise, olime, 
asoend, and mount up (with speculative winges) in spirit, 
to behold in the Glas of Creation, the FOrme of EQrmc§, 
the ~wn'Qlu.r llumbet of all thinges Numerable: .bot~. 
visiQ~~.~~q.~~y~~;gle: mortall and immortall, Corporeal, 
and Spirituall." 
Dee saw the role of number in ,both knowledge of the Form of 
Forms and also in knowledge of the physioal world. How did Dee 
think this was possible? He explained it in terms of the fttriple 
diversitelt of all things. Reality, he held, consisted of two levels, 
the supernatural, oorresponding to Platonio ideas, and the natural, 
consisting of all the material things. Between these two levels Dee 
said there was a level of "thinges Mathematioall" whioh allowed one 
to move from the material to the forms of the supernatural. He 
wrote:-
"For these beying (in a manner) middle betweene thinges 
supernatural 1 and naturall: are not so absolute and exoellent 
as thinges supernaturall: Nor yet so base and grosse, as 
things naturall; Dut are thinges immaterial: and nevertheless, 
by materialll things hable somewhat to be signified. And 
though their partioular Images, by Art, are aggregable and 
divisible: yet the general 1 Formes, notwith-standing, are 
oonstant, unohangeable, untransformable, and inoorruptible ••• n 
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We can illustrate the position which Dee advooated by an 
example taken from Galileo's physios. Galileo disoovered that a 
bo~ in free fall accelerates in proportion to the time of the fall. 
This can be expressed in a mathematical formulation as d~at 2, 
where'd' is the distance, ta' is a constant, and 'tt is the time 
of fall. Dee would have understood this mathematically expressed 
regularity as the Form of naturally accelerated motion. 
Dee believ~d that the Forms are to be discovered by empirical 
investigation. He offered no hope that they can be discovered in 
any a priori fashion from first prinoiples. He did not anticipate 
the position of Descartes who was to hold that fundamental laws 
of physics could and should be established a priori. 
The law dC(st 2 is not a statement about any partioular body. 
It is a timeless generalization. For Dee a mathematically expressed 
law represented that stepping stone from the single, transient 
occurrenoe, or number of single ooourrences, to the timeless 
universal law, prescribed by God for objects in free fall. The 
timeless laws, Dee believed, were examples of the eternal. 
Deels use of the term 'Form' is signifioant. The Platonio 
Forms were immutable. It suggests that Dee, like Kepler, believed 
or presupposed that there was a form of necessity about the laws of 
nature which arose from their very essence. If this was one of 
Dee's presuppositions, then we would expect him to have believed 
that natural philosophy could reach not merely probable but 
certain oonclusions. This position we indeed do find Dee adv~oating. 
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After arguing that mathematios was oentral to almost all areas of 
human enquiry, Dee disoussed what he called Arcl:,&etl}'1Rtrie "whioh 
name is not so new, as this Arte is rare." He explained what he 
meant by it: 
"This Arte teaoheth to brying to actuall experience 
sensible, all worthy conclusions by all the Artes Mathematical 
proposed, & by true Naturall Philosophie concluded: & both 
addeth to them a farder scope, in termes of the same Artes, 
and also by his propre Method, and in peculiar termes, 
prooedeth, with helpe of the foresayed Artest to the performanoe 
of oomplet Experiences, whioh of no particular Art, are hable 
(Formally) to be challenged." 
B,y this method, then, Dee argued that we oan reaoh oertain, not 
probable, oonc1usions. Dee therefore felt entitled to oa11 it a 
"scienoe", that is demonstable knowledge, "rather than an Arte: for 
the exoe11enoy and Mastership it hath, over so many, and so mighty 
Artes and Scienoes. And because it procedeth by ixperiencest and 
searohes forth the causes of oonclusions, by Experienoes: and also 
putteth the Conolusions Themselves in Experienoes, it is named of 
some, Sp·ientia. ErpQr1mentalis. The Experimental Scienoe." 
D~ets·unde~st~nding 'of a oause was the same as that of Osiander 
and Kepler: to find the oause was to find the eternal law whioh lay 
behind the phenomena under investigation. The only branoh of knowledge 
which Dee ourrently saw as having reaohed that sort of development was 
Optios, a soienoe whioh had from the Greeks onwards utilized geometry 
extremely suooessfu11y. 
CQl'lOlusiQns. 
The oriteria whioh the Neop1atonists used in their aooeptance of 
scientifio theory arose from their general cosmologioal oommitments. 
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Their metaphysics preceeded their physics, and theirphysieswas often 
judged by their metaphysical criteria. This is not to say that these 
criteria were always employed. Often a simple observation would be 
suffioient to establish or reject some hypothesis. But when there was 
no such possible test they had recourse to general metaphysical 
considerations. These often took a very specific form. Causes, for 
example, were generally understood in terms of mathematically 
expressable regularities. But these regularities were not accepted 
as contingent regularities of the physical world. To identify a 
regularity was to identify an eternal form of nature. It was a form 
of nature which in some obscure sense could not have been otherwise. 
To succeed in such an identification, therefore, was both to penetrate 
into the essence of the universe and the soul of God. To find order 
in the Universe was to partake of the eternal. It was for this 
reason that the conclusions of the natural philosophers could be 
regarded as certainties. Such an attitude to the discoveries of 
science depended entirely on accepting the Neoplatonio doctrines. 
Without them there oould be no justification for either the certainty 
or necessity of the conclusions. 
Neoplatonism was to be rejected. But not as a result of a frontal 
assault on the philosophical arguments supporting its metaphySics, as 
it might have been. Rather its rejeotion arose out of a new-born 
confidence in the possibility of pursuing soience without .the need for 
it to rest upon such metaphysical foundations. The maturing child, 
science, felt no further need of such parental protection. 
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Although Plato had argued against the view that sense experience, 
or at least sensation, gave knowledge, he had held, in opposition to 
Protagoras, that objective knowledge was possible, albeit only for 
the enlightened few. The Neoplatonists we have considered took over 
this view. They were optimistio in outlook compared with the radical 
scepticism found in the sixteenth century.44 This positive belief was 
undoubtedly a powerful and important force. Without it one wonders 
if the scientific revolution would have occurred at all. The 
Neoplatonists believed that real knowledge was obtainable by an 
intellectual process. Although observation was important, it was 
necessary to penetrate beneath or behind the phenomena of sensation 
to find the form of reality. This view, modified from the original 
Platonic conception had a vast influence on the development of the 
scientifio revolution. 
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Chapter II 
Introduction 
Galileo's attitude to the physical world must be seen in the 
light of the Neoplatonic tradition which preceded it. Wany of 
Galileo's presuppositions were taken straight from that tradition. 
Until this is recognised many of Galileo's attitudes must remain a 
mystery. Although Alexandre Koyr~ was right to maintain that "the 
Platonism of Galileo Galilei •••• is indeed, quite different from tha.t 
of the Florentine Academy" 1, this is no reason to reject the 
existenoe of oommon links between the two, or to assume tha.t Galileo's 
physics is independent of the meta.physics of the earlier Neoplatonists. 
Quite certainly it is not. Galileo's Neoplatonism is reflected in 
his presumption of a oosmological order which was very similar indeed 
to that subscribed to by Copernious, Kepler, and Dee; thinkers them-
2 . 
selves influenoed by Neoplatonic and Pythagorean theories. This 
commitment has tended to be overlooked, or at best underplayed,by 
commentators on Galileo. Galileo's achivements were so great, and his 
method in many respeots so modern , that it is fairly easy to pass 
over those aspects of his work which are not easily assimilated into 
what we now take to be soientifio. 
To suggest that many of Galileo's presumptions were taken from 
the earlier tradition is in no w~ to detract from Galileo's 
achivement. Galileo was deeply involved in a conoeptual revolution, 
and oonoeptual revolutions of the magnitude of that with which Galileo 
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was concerned take generations to absorb. Few men contributed more 
than Ga1i1eo to its production and it is one mark of his genius that 
he prized physics free from its too close involvement with cosmological 
considerations. 
2. The Acceptance of the Heliocentrio Theoty. 
'It ·was-not'~tii-i6io; 'with-the 'pUbiication of his S1deriuB 
Nunc ius , 3 that Ga1ileo committed.himse1f in print to the heliocentric 
theory. With his telescope he had observed and identified the 
satellites of Jupiter, which in their orbits around the planet .were, 
on the Copernican view, a model of the Bolar system. Galileo wrote of 
them: "Variously mOving about most noble Jupiter as children of his 
own, they complete their orbits with marvellous velooity - at the 
same time executing with one harmonious aocord mighty revolutions 
every dozen years about the oentre of the universe; that is the sun.,,4 
stillman Drake suggests that this is not an unequivooal commitment to 
an heliocentric system.5 But there seems no reason to believe it 
is not. The statement oertainly implies that the sun is stationary. 
It is impossible to see how this could be combined with any other 
position than a heliocentrio one. 
Ga1ileo publioly acknowledged his commitment to Copernious 
only after his telesoopio observations. But he was a Copernican long 
before this. In 1591 Galileo wrote to lCepler: ttl adopted the 
teaohings of Copernicus many years ago, and his point of view enables 
me to explain many phenomena of nature which certainly remain 
6 inexplicable according to the more ourrent hypotheses." Galileo, then, 
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was a Copernioan in his twenties. v~ then did the young mathematioian 
aooept the Copernioan system as being true? The answer lies, I 
believe, in his oommitment to the sort of Neoplatonism whioh We have 
found in earlier thinkers. 
I shall explore this question largely with referenoe to Galileo's 
printed works. In them we shall find many olues about his general 
attitude towards the physioal world. But a word of oaution is 
appropriate. In Galileo's main work devoted to the merits of the 
Copernioan system, the Dialoeyes Conoerning the Two Chief World SYstems,7 
Galileo showed some reluotanoe to aooept beyond question the truth of 
the Copernioan system. "1 have taken the Copernioan side in the 
disoourse," he wrote, "prooeeding as with a pure mathematioal hypothesis 
and striving by every artifioe to represent it as superior to 
supposing the earth motionless - not indeed, absolutely, but as 
8 
against the arguments of some professed Peripatetios." 
Galileo further reoognised that the aooeptanoe . of the Copernioan 
system was not, and oould not be, a straightforward empirioal matter, 
for "all experiments practioable upon the earth are insuffioient 
measures for proving its mob.ili ty, since they are indifferently 
adaptable to an earth in motion or at rest.,,9 But as with Copernious, 
this professed reluotanoe must be oonstrued as a stanoe, and not 
Galileo's own belief. The internal argument of the Two Chief World 
Sypte~ is that of a man firmly committed to the physioal truth of the 
Copernioan system. 
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3. The Method of Soianne. 
- , ' , . ~ ., ...';. ,-
To understand Galileo's commitment to the Copernican system 
we must appreciate his general conception of the physical world, and 
how it could be oomprehended; central to this was Galileo's conception 
of the method of science. The method in scienoe, Ga1ileo wrote, is 
the method of Copernicus, who "stands always upon physical conclusions 
pertaining to the celestial motions, and. deals with them by astronomical 
and geometrical demonstrations, founded primarily upon sense experiences 
and very exaot observations."lO 
Galileo believed that the conclusions which oould be arrived 
at by this method were something considerably more than Humean oonstant 
conjunctions. As Einstein noted of Galileo's method :-
"The antithesis l!lnpericism va. Rationalism does not 
appear as a controversial point in Galileo's work •••• 
Galileo, himself, makes considerable USe of logical 
deduction. His endeavours are not so much directed at 
'factual knowledge' as at 'comprehension'. But to oomprehend 
is essentially to draw conolusions from an already accepted 
logioal system." 11 
What 'then . was . the system which Galileo acoepted and upon which 
he built? FUndamental to Galileo's aooount of the phySical world was 
his commitment to the role of mathematics in nature. In his own most 
famous words:-
"Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, 
which stands continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot 
be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language 
and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written 
in the language of mathematios, and its characters are triangles, 
oiroles, and other geometrio figures without whioh it is humanly 
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these one 
wanders about in a dark labyrinth." 12 
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The key to oomprehension is mathematios. But what is it to oomprehend 
the universe? Galileo gave his own answer. It is to disoover the 
regular mathematioal forms whioh underlie the purely phenomenal da.ta 
with which our sense supply us. To demonstrate something in soienoe 
we have to show that a particular phenomenon exhibits some form of 
mathematioal regularity. Galileo hints at this in reply to the 
critioisms of Sarsi.13 The issue arose when disoussing the paths 
of oomets. Ga1i1eo wrote:-
"lines are oalled regular when, having a fixed and definite 
desoription, they are susoeptible of definition and of having 
their properties demonstrated. Thus the spiral is regular ••• 
So is the ellipse. Irregular lines are those whioh have no 
determinaoy whatever, but are indefinite and oasual and hence 
undefinable; no property of suoh lines oan be demonstrated 
and in a word nothing oan be known about them. Henoe to say, 
'Such events take p1aoe thanks to an irregular path' is the 
same as to say, 'I do not know why they oocur. I " 14 
B.y contrast, to give an explanation in terms of regular paths would be 
to explain why oomets move as they do. 
In what sense, then, did Ga1i1eo understand it to be an explanation 
in soience to show that a partioular phenomenon exhibited a mathematioal 
regularity? To understand Gali1eo's position it is important to see 
that it was not just a simple matter of fact that mathematics applies 
to the world. "The worldtt he said, "is of neoessity most orderly, 
having its parts disposed in the highest and most perfeot order among 
themselves.tt15 And perfeot order for Galileo was the order of 
mathematios. There are more than shades of the attitude we have Seen 
in Dee in the following remarks:-
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"That the Pythagoreans held the science of numbers in 
high esteem, and that Plato himself admired the human 
understanding and believed it to partake of divinity simply 
because it understood the nature of numbers, I know very 
well; nor am I far from being of the same opinion." 16 
FUrther, to reveal the mathematical foundations of the physical 
phenomena, Galileo believed, was to comprehend necessary and 
eternal scientific truths. Thus he criticised William Gilbert's 
method in science:-
"What I might hAve wished for in Gilbert would be a little 
more of the mathematician, and especially a thorough grounding 
in geometry, a disoipline which would have rendered him less 
rash about accepting as rigorous proofs those reasons which 
he puts forward as verae causae for the correot conolusions 
he himself has observed. His reasons, candidly speaking, 
are not rigorous, and laok that foroe whioh must unquestionably 
be present in those adduoed as neoessary and eternal scientific 
conclusions.1t 17 
}~thematics, then, was the key to realty, was the key to unlock 
the secrets of the eternal order in nature. And Galileo was convinoed 
that not only were the heavenl: phenomena amenable to mathematical 
treatment. Acoording to Copernicus the earth was part of the perfect 
heavens. ~~thematical order was as much a terrestial as a oelestial 
phenomenon. Galileo rejected the Neo-Aristotlean conception of an 
imperfect earth totally. 
Connected with this, Galileo also rejeoted the view, held by 
many Aristotelians, that abstraot mathematics could not apply to the 
ooncre~world. He expressed his attitude on both these topios in 
the Two Chief World SIstema. Sa1viati, the spokesman for Galileo is 
in conversation with the Aristotelian Simplicio. 
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"Salviati: "Are you not saying that because of the 
imperfection of matter, a body which ought to be perfectly 
spherical and a plane which ought to be perfectly flat do 
not achieve concretely what one imagines of them in the 
abstract? 
Simplicio: That is what I say. 
Salviati: Then whenever you apply a material sphere to a 
material plane in the concrete, you apply a sphere which is 
not perfect to a plane which is not perfect, and you say that 
these do not touch each other at one point. But I tell you 
that even in the abstract, an immaterial sphere whiCh is not 
a perfect sphere can touch an immaterial plane which is not 
perfectly flat in not one point, but over a part of its surface, 
so that what happens in the concrete up to this point happens 
in the same way in the abstraot. It would be novel indeed 
if computations and ratios made in abstract numbers should not 
thereafter correspond to concrete gold and silver coins and 
merchandise. Do you know what does happen Simplioio? Just as 
the computor who wants his calculations to deal with sugar, 
silk, and wool must disoount the boxes, bales, and other packinga, 
so the mathematical scientist, when he wanta to recognise in the 
concrete the effects which he bas proved in the abstract, must 
deduct the material hinderances, and if he is able to do so, I 
assure you that things are in no less agreement than arithmetical 
computations." 18 
Galileo believed that there were exact mathematical desoriptions of 
nature either already disoovered, as by himself, or awaiting disoovery. 
Disorepancies between theoreotical results and what is found in 
experimental practices were not for Galileo of any great conOern. 
Thus in The Discourse on Two New Sciences (1638) when Galileo is 
considering his oonoeption of inertia and his law of falling bodies, 
he is not at all put out by the faot that his theoreotioal results 
are never exactly reproduced in practice. The conclusions in the 
abstract will be different in the concrete because of extraneous 
influences like air resistance.19 And thus the experimental 
confirmation of a theory "shall be little short of a rigid 
demonstration.,,20 
The method in science, therefore, was this. First we must 
start with accurate empirical data. Then we try to find within the 
empirical data some mathematical relationships. The mathematioal 
relationships would never exaotly be reproduced by experiment 
because of the existence of experimental error. The mathematical 
relationships were examples of the neoessary order which exists in 
nature. 
4. Perfect Circular Paths. 
A good example of Galileo's understanding of order in nature 
is his commitment to the circle as a basic explanatory concept. 
Given Ga1ileo's commitment to a universe whioh is "of necessity 
most orderly", the circle had a very special place within that 
order. Circular motion, Ga1i1eo held, is the only motion which oan 
be entirely uniform. As he expressed it: "this being the motion 
that makes the moving body continually leave and continually arrive 
at the end, it alone can be essentially uniform." 21 From which 
he concluded:-
"only circular motion can na.turally suit bodies which are 
integral parts of the universe as constituted in the best 
arrangement, and that the most which can be said for straight 
motion is that it is assigned by nature to its bodies (and 
their parts) whenever these are to be found outside their 
proper places, arranged badly, and are therefore in need of 
being restored to their natural state by the shortest path." 22 
The justification whioh Copernicus offered for his assumption of 
circular motion is worth comparing with Galileo's. 
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Section Four of Book One of De Revolutionibt1s is headed:-
"The Movement of the Celestial bodies is Regular, Circular, 
and Everlasting - or else Compounded of Circular :Movements." 
Copernicus explained this:-
" •••• we will recall that the movement of the celestial 
bodies is circular. For the motion of a sphere is to turn 
in a circle; by this very act expressing its form, in the 
most simple bo~, where beginning and end cannot be discovered 
or distinguished from one another, while it moves through 
the same parts in itself. tt 23 
Ga1i1eo was a Copernican not simply because he accepted the conclusions 
of Copernicus but also because he accepted many of the assumptions and 
arguments which Copernicus had used to support those conclusions. 
It is a point of interest that, given the commitment to Circular 
motion, a special case has to be made out for any object that does 
not revolve in circular paths. In the Aristotelian system it was the 
earth which did not revolve. Although at the centre of the universe 
it was not one of the perfect spheres. Copernicus had to justify a 
stationary sun, and, as we have seen, he did this partly on the 
grounds of its maje~tI, not its imp~rfecti9n. The Copernican universe 
was more perfect than that of Aristotle. And perfection was exhibited, 
according to Copernicus and Galileo, not only in the celestial order, 
but also by the earth itself. This point, as we have alrea~ noted, 
Ga1i1eo generalized in his physics. 
Galileo's commitment to the circle was a feature not only of 
his astronomy but also his mech4nics. His concept of inertia was 
that an object moving on a great circle of the earth had neither a 
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tendency to proceed or recede from the earth's cen.tre and was 
therefore indifferent as to motion or to rest. In the Two N~w Sci~nce8 
Galileo explicitly linked his inertial principle with the paths of 
the planets. Having offered his proof for the parabolic path of a 
projectile (which uses his inertial principle) Sagredo says:-
"Allow me, please, to interrupt in order that I may 
point out the beautiful agreement between this thought of 
the Author and the views of Plato 24 concerning the 
origin of the various uniform speeds with which the heavenly 
bodies revolve. The latter chanced upon the idea that a body 
could not pass from rest to any given speed and maintain 
it uniformly except by passing through all the degrees of 
speed intermediate between the given speed and rest. Plato 
thought that God, after having created the heavenly bodies, 
assigned them the proper and uniform speeds with which 
they were forever to revolve; and that he made them start 
from rest and move over definite distances under a natural 
and rectilinear acceleration such as governs the motion of 
terrestial bodies. He added that once these bodies had 
gained their proper and permanent speed, their reotilinear 
motion was converted into a oiroular one, the only motion 
capable of uniformity, a motion in which the body revolves 
without either receding from or approaohing its desired goal. 
This oonception is truly worthy of Plato; and it is to be all 
the more highly prized since its underlying principles remained 
hidden until discovered by our Author (i.e. Galileo) who removed 
from them the mask and poetical dress and set forth the 
idea in oorreot historical perspective." 25 
Kepler had been forced to a.bandon perfect circular paths for the 
planets in the light of his discovery of the elliptical path of Mars. 
Circular paths were replaced first by Descartes' straight-line inertial 
principle and his system of vortioes, and then by Newton's formulation 
of the law of inertia and the theory of universal gravitation. 
Galileo, however, never a.bandoned the belief that matter has a 
natural tendenoy to follow circular paths. It was for him a belief 
grounded firmly in his understanding of perfect order, and in his 
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understanding that the universe was of necessity most orderly. 
The acceptance of circular motion was fundamental to his whole 
outlook. Without it it is difficult to see how he eould have either 
accepted the Copernican system or generated his own oonception of 
inertia. The extremely high place whioh Galileo aooorded to uniform 
oircular motion probably goes a long way to explaining why it was 
that he never acknowledged Kepler's disoovery of the elliptical 
paths of ~ars. Suoh a feature of the heavens would have implied 
that the universe was less perfeot than it might have been; a 
oonolusion that Galileo would have been loathe to accept. 
Given Galileo's oommitments we oan now see why it was that 
Galileo accepted the Copernioan system. It was for similar reasons 
to those for which Copernicus himself, Kepler, and other Neoplatonists 
acoepted it. The heliooentrio system provided a model whioh allowed 
the planets to have uniform oiroular paths. It was a system whioh 
oould be interpreted both mathematioally and realistioally. In 
oontrast, the Aristotelian and Ptolemaio systems oould not: the 
Aristotelian system oould be interpreted realistioally, but not 
mathematically; the Ptolemaio system oould be interpreted mathematically 
but not realistioally. The Copernioan system was the only one whioh 
Galileo saw as offering ~ intelligibility in terms of the 
mathematical forms, ~ truth. 
FUrther, as Galileo's empirioal researches oontinued, he 
found what appeared to be - and indeed was - supporting evidence for 
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the theory in his observations of the phases of Venus, and - more 
dubiously - in his discovery of the satellites of Jupiter. Combined 
with this were his successes in mechanics. These in many ways 
shared the same assumptions as his astronomical theory. They must 
have encouraged him to believe that his general conception of 
nature was correct. 
Galileo's own favourite evidence for the truth of the Copernican 
theory seems to have been that it allowed him to account for the 
tides. He himself granted that his account was only a speculation; 
and his speculation was in fact entirely misconceived. Perhaps 
Einstein was right to suggest that "it was Galileo's longing for a 
mechanical proof of the motion of the earth which misled him.,,26 
Galileo's commitment to the view that the only theory worth 
considering was one that could be interpreted realistically is an 
important point about his approach to science. Galileo was 
determined to maintain such a realistic interpretation against the 
'hypothetical' interpretation recommended by Cardinal Bellarmine.27 
If he had been concerned merely to 'eave the appearances' there would 
have been much less point in his arguments from his observations 
with the telescope. Nor would there have been any dispute with the 
Church. 
We have found in the heart of Ga1i1eo's work many common features 
with the Neoplatonic tradition. There is none of the Hermetio mystio 
in Ga1ileo, and little overt sign of a religious interpretation of 
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nature. But he shared many common ansumptions with the earlier 
thinkers. His commitment to mathematics as the key to nature, 
his allegiance to perfect circular paths, and his belief in the 
necessary order of nature, are remnants of the Neoplatonic attitude 
which preceded him. \ihat Galileo understood by'the necessary order 
of nature' we shall consider below. 
Primary ani!. Secondary QtL1.1ities. 
Galileo never offered a fully-developed epistemoloey. But he 
did give an account of the properties of objects. This account is 
important as the first clear commitment in seventeenth century 
science to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
Versions of this acoount remained dominant in science and in 
philosophy throughout the period. Galileo's arguments, therefore 
deserve attention. 
In The Assayer (1623), his most important work on scientifio 
method, Galileo argued that the properties of objects are of two 
kinds. Some properties of objects, he maintained, really are in 
those objects; other putative properties are not, they are merely 
the names of sensations in the observer. Galileo's words are worth 
quoting at length. He wrote:-
"Whenever I conceive any material or oorporeal substance, 
I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as 
having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation 
to other things, and in some speoifio plaoe at any given time; 
as being in motion or at rest; as touohing or not touohing 
some other body, and as being one in number, or few or many. 
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From these conditions I cannot separate such a. substance by 
any stretch of ~ imagination. But that it must be white 
or red, b~er or sweet, noisy or silent, and of a sweet or 
foul odour, ~ mind does not feel compelled to bring in as 
necessary accompaniments. Without the senses as our guides, 
reason or imagination unaided would probably never arrive at 
qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, odours, colours, 
and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in 
which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only 
in the consciousness." 28 
The argument of the passage begins by considering what are the 
necessary conditions for conceiving a material object. Galileo 
in faot lays down what he took to be the defining charaoteristics 
of material objects. And it is by reason (or imagination) that We 
establish what these are. 
So far the argument is unexoeptionable. But Galileo's next 
move must be rejected. The secondar.y qualities, Galileo maintains, 
are not necessary properties of a material object - in the sense 
that they are not defining properties - therefore, he concludes, they 
are not real properties of the object. We oan see the fault in 
Galileo's argument if we consider another example: man may be 
defined as a rational animal. Therefore, on Galileo's argument, 
the contingent faot that some partioular man has hair on his head is 
not a real faot about that man, but a product of the consciousness 
of the observerl 
The point is, simply, that the defining characteris.tics of any 
object do not establish what charaoteristics any object does have, 
(though no doubt it rules oyt some); defining oharacteristics only 
establish what properties an object ~ have, in order to be an 
object of that sort. The properties whioh any object actually has . 
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can only be established empirically. 
Galileo did not rest his case for the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities on the argument we have just 
considered only. If he had there would really be no case to 
answer. He offered further considerations which we shall turn 
to in a moment. But that Galileo did put forward the above argument 
is, I believe, significant. It sUggests that Galileo believed that 
it was possible to establish what things are really by intellectual 
analysis. It shows, in short, that Galilee was no simple empiricist 
in his dealings with the world. But it is also significant, and indeed 
typical of Galileo, that he supports his intellectual analysis 
with Eome further considerations which are drawn directly from 
experience. 
Galileo supported his distinction with some examples. A 
feather, he pointed out, can tickle us. But the tickle is not a 
property of the feather. Rather it is the name of a sensation which 
we experience. Wi thout our experiencing the tickle, there would 
be no such thing as the tickle. 
to us and not to the feather." 
"The titillation belongs entirely 
29 
Galileo is quite correct when he says that 'tickle' is a word 
which is often used to denote a sensation. But to point out that 
some words are the names for sensations does not prove that other 
words are. In particular it does not prove thatthe.words for 
secondary qualities are the names of sensations. Why, then did 
Galileo accept the distinction? 
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The answer, I believe, lies in what Galileo was willing to 
accept as an ultimate explanation of our experiences, and the 
properties of objects. Ultimate explanations, Galileo believed, 
would only be in terms of the primary qualities of objects. Reference 
to secondary qualities, Galileo believed, could always in prinCiple 
be eliminated in favot~ of primary quality talk. To see this we can 
look again at the example of the feather. The sensation of tickling 
can be explained in terms of the structure of the feather, its size, 
shape, and motion of the parts of the feather (and, more complexly, 
in terms of human skin, nervous system and so forth). Ultimately, 
then, the sensation could be shown to be the experience we have When 
objects having only the primary properties are set in a particular 
motion. Galileo believed that if we had enough scientific knowledge 
we could always explain all secondary qualities as really being 
manifestations of primary qualities. 
In fact Galileo gave us an example of just such a reduction. 
Heat, he maintained, is the name of a sensation which can be accounted 
for entirely in terms of primary qualities:-
"Having shown that many sensations which are supposed to 
be qualities residing in external objects have no real 
existence save in us, and outside ourselves are mere names, 
I now say that I am inclined to believe heat to be of this 
character. Those materials which produce heat in us and make 
us feel warmth, which are known by the general name of "fire", 
would then be a multitude of minute particles having certain 
shapes and moving with certain velocities. Meeting with Our 
bodies, they penetrate by means of their extreme subtlety, and 
their touch as felt by us as they pass through out substance 
is the sensation we call heat." 30 
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Unsophisticated though it is, the general causal explanation 
which Galileo offers here is perfectly reasonable. On this model 
causal explanations for all sensations can be given. But it is 
important to see that it rests upon a certain ontology, and certain 
assumptions of what it is to explain a putative property of an object. 
The ontology is simply that ultimately the physical world is 
made of matter which has the primary qualities. If one can account 
for any quality, such as colour, in terms of the primary qualities, 
then the property so accounted for is dismissed as a real property. 
It follows on this sort of argument that if we can explain the 
primary qualities by some other qualities or quality, then they too 
will turn out not to be 'real'. Thus if we can expla.in solidity and 
size (mass) in terms of energy - as modern science does - it will 
follow that there are really no solid objeots in the universe. Such 
a position has in this century often been argued for, by, for example, 
Sir Arthur Eddington in hiB~he Nature of the PhYai,2al World; (1928). 
But such a position as Susan Stebbing pointed out (!h11gBonhl An~ 
th~ Physicist [1937]) leads to absurd consequenoes. If re&ll~ there 
is nothing in the universe but energy, then there is nothing in the 
universe except energy. And really there are no books, people or 
arguments' 
We can contrast Galileo's position with another which does not 
lead us to the same reduetionist conclusions. Granted that science 
has established that there is a causal explanation of perception, 
it does not follow that one is thereby bound to distinguish between 
primary and secondary qualities. Rather We can hold that the 
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properties which an object has are simply the properties which it is 
observed to have (and no doubt other properties which are not 
observed). We can grant that all the properties so observed are 
observed by means of a causal mechanism. But this does not imply 
that what it is we see, hear, taste, smell or touch is a sensation 
'in the mind'. We often, in fact nearly always, see etc. physical 
objects. And it is just by such observations that we establish 
what properties objects have. The scientis~s job, on this view, is 
not to legislate about which properties are real and which are not. 
But he can find out which properties are causally dependent on other 
properties. 
The issues raised by Galileo's distinction will be considered 
further when we turn to Locke's use of the distinction in his 
epistemology. But before we leave the topic there are some general 
points about the distinction which are worth noting. It lolas very 
natural for scientists like Galileo to give a preferred status to 
certain properties of physical objects. Some properties are easily 
amenable to quantitative treatment and some are not. Given the 
Neoplatonic belief that number is the key to reality it was very easy 
to identify only those properties as real which could be treated 
mathematically. Shapes, size, numbers, and slow or rapid movements 
are all such properties. Further, the Galilean theory was not a new 
one. Its reintroduction was in keeping with the high place accorded 
the early Greek atomists, such as Democritus, by seventeenth century 
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scientists. Thus the introduction of atomic theories of matter 
based upon the writings of Epicurus and Democritus tended also 
to encourage the acceptance of their epistemological views. 
Galileo's Theory of Matter. 
Reference to atomic theories of matter raises the question: 
did Galileo accept such a theory? The answer is that Galileo 
was certainly inclined to favour corpuscular explanations, but he 
was not an important advocate of the atomic theory. 
As we have seen, he explained heat as the product of tiny 
particles of matter.3l In th~ ~~o New Soiences he suggested as 
an explanation for metal melting the corpuscular structure of fire, 
which was for Galileo one of the fcur elements. But he did put 
his theory forward in the most tentative manner; "a passing thought" 
rather than "absolute faot.,,32 Certainly it was an oversimplification 
for G. B. Stone to write that "Ga1ileo was no atomist,,33. As early 
as 1590 in his paper 'On )fution' Galileo showed some sympathy for 
Democritean atomism; . 34 and his whole explanation of the strength 
of materials in the ~iO New Sc!~nyes presupposed both the existence of 
a vacuum, which Galileo claimed is established on experimental grounds, 
and also the existence of "very smallest particles".35 
Galileo did not give his reasons in detail for being at least 
partial to atomism. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that they 
were similar to his reasons for aooepting other theories in science. 
Thus, given the distinotion between primary and secondary qualities, 
it follows that the basic constituents of matter must have the primary, 
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quantifiable, properties. Number beoomes the key, not only to the 
struoture of the solar system, but also to the stuff out of whioh 
the solar system is oonstruoted. 
gali1eo and the Soope of Science. 
Some of Galileo's most important oontributions to the soientific 
revolution's sucoess lay outside his particular discoveries. They are 
found in certain aspects of his method, his optimism in the scientifio 
potential,and his claim that scienoe is an autonomous discipline. 
In his method Galileo continually emphasised the importance 
of the particular, in contrast with the general, as the starting 
point for investigation. It is the swing of a pendulum, an objeot in 
free fall, that he investigates. so successfully. "We have decided 
to consider", he wrote, nthe phenomena of bodies falling with an 
aoceleration such as aotually occurs in nature and to make this 
definition of aocelerated motion exhibit the essential features of 
observed acoelerated motions.,,36 
Although Galileo's method involved presumptions which went far 
beyond the particular, and we oan sometimes doubt that he oarried 
out all the experiments that he claimed, he never attempted to 
justify - exoept inoidently - his method by appeal to metaphysioal 
or oosmologioal prinoiples. He oould oalou1ate when a beam would 
break, he oould tell the gunners where to aim their oannOn. lIis 
scienoe oould be judged by its achievements. 
Science, for Galileo,explained why things happened. But there 
were limits to what oould be expeoted. The soientist must set himself 
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limited, but possible, objectives. Entirely in keeping with this 
approach Salviati is made to say:-
"The present does not seem to be the proper time to 
investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion 
concerning which various opinions have been expressed by 
various philosophers •••• all these fantasies, and others 
too, ought to be examined; but it is not really worthwhile. 
At present it is the purpose of our Author merely to inveatigage 
and to demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated 
motion (whatever the cause of this acceleration may be)." 37 
In areas where we cannot establish our conolusions, Galileo 
maintained, it is better to reserve our judgement. But this does not 
rule out the possibility of conclusions not yet known one day becoming 
so. His discoveries relating to acceleration, Galileo said, open the 
door "to a new method fraught with numerous and wonderful results 
which in future years will command the attention of other minds.,,38 
Galileo's optimism, his belief in the autonomy of science, 
combined with a recognition of its limits, were all expressed by him 
in a letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany. In 1615 
Galileo wrote to her in defence of his belief in the Copernican system. 
He said:-
n •••• among physical propositions there are some with 
regard to which all human soienoe and reason cannot supply 
more than a plausible opinion and a probable conjecture in 
place of a sure and demonstrated knowledge; for example, 
whether the stars are animate. Then there are other p~opcsitiona 
of which we have (or may confidently expect) positive 
assurances through experiments, long observation, and rigorous 
demonstration; for example, whether or not the earth and the 
heavens move,and whether or not the heavens are spherical. 
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As to the first sort of propositions, I have no doubt 
that where human reasoning cannot reach - and consequently 
where we have no science but only opinion and faith - it 
is necessary in piety to comply absolutely with the strict 
sense of Scripture. But as to the' other kin,d, I should 
think •••• that first we are to make certain of the faot, 
which will reveal to us the true senses of the Bible, and 
these will most certainly be found to agree with the proved 
fact (even though at first the words sounded otherwise),for 
two truths can never contradict each other." 39 
Galileo believed that science could arrive at truth, and that 
the scientist, not the theologian, was the best judge of when that 
truth had been discovered. Science, Galileo maintained, was not 
subservient to other disciplines. But science cannot supply the 
answer to every question. Human reason has its limitations. 
Conclusiono 
I have argued that much of Galileo's thought can only be 
understood in terms of the Neoplatonio tradition of whioh he was 
undoubtedly a part. Central to Neoplatonism in science was the view 
that the cosmos was created by the Great lathematician. The form of 
nature was the form of mathematics. To identify the mathematical 
form was to identify the causes of the phenomena. This oonception of 
the relationship between mathe~~tics and the physical world was not 
one that was justified empirically -although the successes of the 
scientist~ undoubtedly confirmed their views. Rather, it arose from 
the faith of scientists in the role of number and geometry in the 
universe. 
The Neoplatonists believed that the laWs of nature ordained by 
God must exhibit the most perfect form. The most perfect form must be 
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the most perfect form mathematically. Therefore God, by his nature, 
could not produce a universe other than one exhibiting the most 
perfect mathematical structure. Contingent alternatives to its 
actual 'structure could not exist on pain of denying God's perfection. 
As a consequence of this it was very natural for the Neoplatonists to 
beli~e that their discoveries, the laws of nature expressed in 
mathematical form, were not simple contingent faots about the World. 
They were eternally necessary statements about God's creation. This 
attitude is clearly one which rests upon much more general conSiderations 
than simply empirical evidence. Indeed, I have argued, that general 
cosmological considerations were fundamental to the whole of the 
Neoplatonic approach to nature. 
We have seen that this tradition relied predominantly on 
cosmological considerations, simple empirical confirmation, and an 
appeal to order and simplicity. There was little attention given 
to purely inductive criteria to justify the acoeptanoe of a partioular 
law as being true. And the reason for this is not hard to understand. 
If you oan establish that a law of nature, or form, must be as it is, 
there is no need to rely on inductive evidence to support it. 
Inductive criteria only become important when you reoognise that 
there are no grounds for assenting to the necessity of a law on the 
basis of cosmolOgical oonsiderations. The problem of induction, as 
• 
it is olassically oonceived, only beoomes a problem when other oriteria 
to justify a general oonclusion about the behaviour of physioal objects 
are found unacceptable. This is not to say that, for example, the 
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repetition of experiments was oompletely ruled out by the Neoplatonists. 
Galileo claimed that he repeated an experiment "a full hundred times".4°But 
the role of experiment was not to show that the events alw~e occurred. 
Rather, it was to show that an accurate result had been achieved. 
The Neoplatonists were committed to the discovery of truth. They 
rejected completely the implied programme of Osiander that they were 
concerned only with 'saving the appearances'. The emphasis on discover,y 
was handed on from Galileo to his successors. Though not always accepted, 
it was an important inheritance. The olaim that truth can be reached 
by scientific means forces the question: how do you lcnow when you have 
reached truth? It raises questions about the limits of human Ul'lderstanding. 
Galileo's commitment to the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities raised further epistem~logical problems for, impliotly 
at least, it raised the question of the existenoe of the external world. 
If we oan only be aware of the seoondary qualities, themselves only 
sensations, how are we to justify our belief in the existence of an external 
world at al13 Implioit in Galileo'$ soience was the ohoice between 
Cartesian dualism or Berkeley's idealism. Furthermore Galileo's distinction 
itself drew attention to the role of experienoe in acquiring knowledge. 
All these aspeots, and others, of the early days of·the new soience 
were to be the subject of further re-evaluation for the rest of the century. 
Galileo, more than anybo~ else, placed before the world examples of 
the suooess of the soientist's work, and exhibited its potential. 
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Chapter III 
Cartesian Rationalism 
Introduction. 
Descartes' . role in the scientific and philosophical revolutions 
of the seventeenth century was of the utmost importanoe. His work 
in mechanios, mathematics,and optics was outstanding_ His metaphySics 
and epistemology were the foundation for Spinoza, Leibniz, and in some 
important respects, Locke. It was Descartes who established the 
mechanistic conception of nature in modern Europe. It was Descartes 
who supplied the basic categories in terms of which epistemological 
questions were pursued until the contemporary era. 
Yet, somewhat paradoxically, many of his specifio views were 
soon ,to be rejected. B,y the beginning of the eighteenth century it 
was not Cartesian rationalism, but Lockian empirioism which was most 
influential in European philosophy; it was not Cartesian, but 
Newtonian, mechanics which was accepted most widely. But it is some 
indication of Descartes t stature that it required two men of genius 
to overthrow and replace his theories of matter, motion, and knowledge. 
Fundamental to the whole of Cartesian science and philosophy, 
as Descartes oonstantly emphasised, was his theory of .method. 
Descartes had discovered "~ method of rightly oonducting the reason 
and seeking for truth in the sciences". If Cartesian science and 
Cartesian philosophy were to go, it was likely that it would be 
because of a rejection of its method. Indeed it was largely this 
that produced its downfall.1 It is, therefore, largely with 
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Cartesian method, and its limitations, that this ohapter is 
oonoerned. 
The influenoe of Desoartes on Newton and Looke was oonsiderable.2 
Thus Newton, for example, was direotly influenoed in the oonception, 
as well as the formulation,of his first law of motion by Desoartes' 
lJ;:inoiples of Philosophy.3 Although Looke was hardly forward in 
aoknowledging his debts to other thinkers in his published works, 
he did admit that it was reading Desoartes whioh first gave him 
fa relish in philosophioal things,.4 
Desoartes, then, is important for understanding the oonneotion 
between Looke's Essay and the soientifio revolution. And this is 
not simply beoause of the general importanoe of his theories, but 
also beoause of his direot influenoe on Looke and his oontemporaries. 
The exaot extent of that influence is more problematio. In general, 
I believe, there has been a tendenoy to overestimate the Cartesian 
influence on Looke's epistemology.5 
One of the most signifioant aspects of Descartes' system is that 
it was the first large-scale attempt sinoe'Aristotle to produce a 
unified account of knowledge: a metaphysios and epistemology which 
generated a physics. It is important, therefore, to see Descartes' . 
work as a whole. Too often, espeoially in teaching him, Descartes 
is seen as either an epistemologist or as asoientist (though generally 
the former), with the oonsequence that the full power of his system 
is unfairly underplayed. 
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Despite its many merits we shall find that Cartesian theor.y 
did not live up to its pretensions. The method Descartes evolved 
was inadequate to the stated task. It was very much as a response 
to these inadequacies that Empiricism, as an alternative, came into 
its own. 
In this chapter I shall make some reference to Descartes' 
younger contemporary and disciple, Rohault. Rohault represented 
most clearly the continuation of the Cartesian tradition in Physics; 
but he introduced important modifications from Descartes' own 
position as to the possibilities of physical soience and the status 
of soientifio disoovery. He was, too, one of the most influential 
of Cartesians in the period immediately preceding the publioation of 
Locke's Essa~. 
Cartesian Method. 
We have seen that Galileo believed in the possibility of 
obtaining knowledge in the natural sciences. He waS also, in a 
modest degree, an epistemologist, as well as a mathematioian and 
physicist. In all these interests Descartes followed him. But in 
one vital respeot Descartes differed from Galileo. Galileo never 
attempted to present his account of the world as a deduotive system. 
Indeed he often failed to expand fully his basio premises and relate 
them to the method he actually employed. Although Galileo was a 
mathematical physicist, he presented his work largely in the form of 
dialogues. Descartes, in contrast, presented most of his work in 
deductive form. He is the disciple of Euclid rather than Plato. 
Descartes himself explained the different between the two of them 
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in a letter he wrote to Mersenne in 1638:-
ttl will begin this letter with ~ observations on 
Galileo's book. 6 In general I find that he philosophises 
much better than the average, in that he abandons as far 
as he can the errors of the Schools, and tries to examine 
physical matters by the methods of mathematics. In this I 
entirely agree with him, and I believe that in no other way 
can truth be found. But it seems to me that he suffers 
greatly from continual digressions, and that he does not stop 
to explain all that is relevant to each issue, which shows 
that he has not examined them in order, and that without 
considering the first causes in nature, he has only looked 
for the reasons of various particular effects, and thus 
built without foundation." 7 
And as an example:- "As to what Galileo has written on the balance 
and the lever, he explains ver.y well what happen~ but not whX it 
8 happens, as I have done by ~ Principles." 
The quotation is signifioant on many counts. Descartes 
welcomed Galileo's discover.y of regularity in nature. But to 
discover regularities was in itself, Descartes held, to explain 
nothing. What was required was some account of why those regularities 
do occur. And the answer which Descartes required was one founded 
on oertainty, not oonjecture; an answer which can be seen as 
necessarily so, not merely oontingently likely. He was oommitted 
to the view that explanations in the physioal sciences must be 'complete' 
in the same sense as a theorem in Euclidean geometr.y can be oompletely 
explained by referenoe to the rest of the system, and its derivation 
from the initial axioma.9 
About the status of his axioms Descartes was quite olear: . they 
were true. He explained the reason for his oonviotion in the 
Author's letter to the Prinoiples of PbilQsoPhx;-
- 80-
"After having made these matters very clear, I should have 
desired to set forth the reasons which serve to prove that 
the true principles by which we may arrive at the highest 
point of wisdom in which the soverign good of the life of 
man consists, are those which are put forward in this book. 
And only two are requisite for that, the first that the 
principles must be very clear, and the seoond that from them 
we ~ deduce all other things; for there are but these two 
conditions that are essential to true prinoiples." 10 
What exaotly did these two conditions mean for Descartes? ind 
was he correct to see them as justifying the weight he plaoed upon 
them? To consider these two points we must understand what Desoartes 
meant by "olear and distinct ideas", and his conception of deduotion. 
Clear and Distinct Ideas. 
In the third Meditation Descartes explained why he aocepted 
olear and distinot ideas as his oriterion for truth. He wrote:-
"I am certain that I am a thing which thinks; but do 
I not likewise know what is requisite to render me certain 
of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there is 
nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the olear 
and distinct perception of that which I state, whioh would 
not indeed suffioe to assure me that what I say is true, if 
it oould every happen that a thing which I conceived so olearly 
and distinctly oould be false; and acoordingly it seems to me 
that alrea~ I can establish as a general ~e that all things 
which I perceive very olearly and very distinctly are true." 11 
Vital to an understanding of Descartes' whole philosophy is 
the recognition of the fact that the criterion for truth which 
Desoartes employed is a psychologioal, no a logical one. Although 
it is "the natural light of reason" whioh informs us of the truth 
of the propositions so accepted by Desoartes, reason itself is not 
subjeot to logical, but psychological, oriteria. No doubt Descartesf 
reluctanoe to employ logical criteria is in part explained by his 
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opposition to syllogistic inference, which Descartes held only made 
explioit what was already implioitly oonceded in the premises. No 
doubt, also, it could be explained partially in terms of the 
peouliarity of his first disoovered 'truth', the oertainty of 'I think 
therefore I am', a proposition which is not itself logically neoessary, 
but whioh must be true if it is ever asserted by anybody. But it 
is not here my intention to explore this question, though further 
exploration it certainly needs.12 
Because Descartes used a psyohologioal oriterion for truth he 
was led into grave diffioulties in his aooount of mathematios, and 
in his aocount of logioally necessary propositions generally, as 
we shall see. 
Desoartes held that those propositions Wllich are reoognised as 
olear and distinct, are so reoognised by an intelleotual intuition 
whioh is itself impervious to further analysis. All propOSitions, 
whetherneoessary or contigent, which exhibit this olarity are beYond 
doubt, and are oertainly true. 
It oan, and has been, argued that the reooBnition that a 
proposition is beyond doubt does not in itself establish that the 
proposition is oertainly true, only that it oannotbe doubted. It 
has further been argued that this was a point which Descartes 
recognised. l3 But if he ever did, he certainly did .not let it worry 
him very much: the French edition of the Etl~c1ples o£ elil?~nph~, 
prepared just before his death, asserts in the passage which has . " 
been quoted above (p.60,toW that olarity is a suffioient oondition 
for truth. 
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Descartes would have probably argtted that clarity is 
sufficient for truth once we know that God exists. And certainly 
if it is true that God does exist, and also true that he would not 
deceive us if we ~~e our intellectual faculties properly, and if 
to use our intellectual faculties properly is to accept only as 
trt1e ~ropositions that we clearly and distinctly perceive, then 
clarity and distinctness are suffioient grounds for p,sserting truth. 
But, notorio1lsly, God's existence, eto., can only be known to be 
true if we already have a criterion of truth.14 
Noting but not pursuing these difficulties at the heart of 
Descartes' system,we can notice further that knowledge is for 
Descartes something entirely within the intellectual consciousness. 
To apprehen~a clear and distinct idea is to have knowledge, is to 
comprehend the truth. Nor is this apprehenSion oonfined to 
hypothetical knowledge. Descartes did not say "if I thiruc, then I 
must existll , nor did he say "if God is an intelligible ooncept, then 
it must be substantiate~'. The first two premises of Descartes' 
system are unequivocally categorical and existential: ' a thinking 
substance exists, God exists. 
Given the existence of self, given the existence of Ood, giVen 
the criterion of truth, Descartes saw himself ready to prooeed. 
From them he went on to show that ttthere are bodies extended in 
length, breadth, and depth, which have'diverse figures and move in 
diverseways.n15 
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'll1e J1fx;ternal ltorld. 
Given the existenoe of God, Desoartes argued, it follows that 
our belief in the external world is justified. We are aware that 
there is something "extended in length, breadth and depth, and 
possessing all those properties whioh we olearly peroeive to pertain 
16 to extended objeots." 
There is an external world. And Desoartes held that its 
properties are to be disoovered not by observation, but by an 
intelleotual prooess: by applying the oriterion of olarity to our 
oonoept of a three-dimensional objeot. Like Galileo, Desoartes 
held that it was the intelleot that led us to a knowledge of the 
nature of matter. 
When we apply Desoartes' oriterion we find, not surpriSingly, 
that bo~ has only those properties whioh oharaoterise three-
dimensional space. Not surprisingly, beoause if one attempts to have 
a olear and distinot idea of an objeot extended in length, breadth, and 
depth, ~nd no other prgpertiea, whioh is what Desoartes asks us to 
do, then it is not very extraordinary that these are all the properties 
that we assign, or oan assign, to it. We oould equally have had a 
clear and distinct idea of an objeot with the three-dimensional 
properties plus weight - or any other oompatible property - and that 
too would have as equal a olaim to be "the nature of bo~n. Desoartes' 
justifioation for aSSigning body the properties he does is oompletely 
circular. Why did he make suoh an error? 
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I believe that the explanation lies in Descartes' total 
commitment to the mathematisation of mechanics. It is an excellent 
illustration of the way in which Descartes' physics and metaphysics 
were interdependent. Unless matter and space could be identified, 
the possibility of subjecting all phenomena to geometrical analysis 
would stand in jeopar~. If matter had other than geometrical 
properties, then mechanics could not be reduced to mathematics. 
Objection to the Cartesian identification of matter and 
space was made very forcefully by Descartes' contemporaries. 
Descartes' answer to them is very revealing: 
"Several excellent thinkers, say (your friends), believe 
they see clearly that Mathematical extension, which I point 
as the principle of my Physics, is nothing other than my own 
thought, and that it has, and can have, no other subsistence 
outside my mind, being only an abstraction that I make of 
physical bo~; and in consequence, that all my Physics can 
be only imaginary and feigned; as are all pure N'Jathematics; 
and that, in the real Physics of things that God has created, 
a real, solid and not imaginary matter is necessary. That 
is the objection of objections, and the abridged form of all 
the doctrine of these e.xcellent minds here cited. All the 
things we can understand and conceive are only, according to 
them, imaginations and fictions of our mind, which have no 
subsistence: from which it follows th.l.t there is nothing that 
one can in any way understand, or conceive, or imagine, 
that can be admitted as true, that is to say that the door to 
reason is completely shut, and one must content onself with 
being a r,!onkey, or a Parrot, and no longer a 1-1an, in order to 
merit being ranked with these excellent minds. For if the 
things that can be conceived must be judged false for the 
simple reason that they can be conceived, what remains, if not 
that only those must be accepted as true that are not 
conceived, and from the basis of one's doctrine, imitating 
others without knowing why one imitates them, as II'Ionkeya do, 
and in proferring only the words the sense of which is not 
understood, as Parrots do? But I have something to console 
myself' with, beoause my Physics is here joined to pure !:athe-
maties, which I particularly wish it to resemble. t' 17 
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The paragraph is a classic example of Rationalist dogmatism. 
The sophistical nature of Descartes' rhetoric seems to suggest 
that the objections bit deep. Descartes presents no Br>~mpnt in 
refutatio~, except, significantly, the appeal to mathematical 
resemblance. Mathematics, Descartes believed, must be the key to 
physics, and to reject his account of matter is to reject that 
programme, a price which Descartes was quite unwilling to pay. 
The passage also hints at another aspect of Descartes' system. 
It suggests that Descartes assessed his system, not only - or even 
not at all - in terms of its truth, but for its explanatory power. 
This point we shall explore below. 
The identification of matter with space supplied Descartes 
with the basis for his distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, though Descartes never actually used that terminology. 
Once again, in justifying the distinotion, Descartes' argument is 
unsound. Weight, hardness, and colour, Descartes said, are not 
part of bo~ in its universal aspect. He argued:-
"For as rega.rds hardness we do not know anything of it 
by sense, excepting that the positions of the hard bodies 
resist the motion of our hands when they come in contact with 
them; but if whenever we moved our hands in some direction, 
all the bodies in that part retreated with the same velocity 
as our hands approached them, we should never feel hardness; 
and yet we have no reason to believe that the bodies which 
recede in this way would on this acoount lose what makes 
them bodies. It follows from this that the nat~e of body 
does not consist in hardness." 18 
All that Desoartes' argument in faot establishes is"that it 
is only a contingent faot that we have disoovered hardness to be 
~ 
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a property of material objects. As it is a contingent fact, 
we might not have discovered it. But that we might not have ever 
attributed hardness to bo~ is in itself no reason,one way or the 
other, for deciding that hardness is or is not a property of body. 
The same, or similar, arguments, Descartes claimed, establish 
that "weight, colour, and all the other qualities of the kind that 
is perceived in corporeal matter may be taken from itlt.19 And all 
such arguments are equally fallacious. The basis of Descartes' 
system of the external world rests squarely on confusion. 
Descartes' was totally committed to the view thatttthe simple 
natures" of all substances could come to be known by his intellectual 
method. n ••• there is always one principal property of substancelt 
he wrote, "which constitutes its nature and essence and on which 
20 
all the others depend." Descartes was thus diametrically opposed 
to any view which held that essences were unknowable. Knowledge 
of the essences of mind, matter, and motion, were all Cartesian 
claims upon which his whole system of the external world was based. 
All of this knowledge, Descartes held, was gained by intellectual, 
not empirical, investigation. 
Necessity and Contingency in DeReatte~t S}~tem. 
As we have seen, the oertainty of the intuited olear and 
distinct ideas of the Cartesian system did not depend upon their 
logical necessity. But this is only one aspect, the tip of the 
iceberg in fact, of Descartes' oonception of the lack of conneotion 
between certainty and logical neoessity. As Emile Drehier has 
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21 pointed out, Leibniz wrote in the Monadoloe;v: (Section 46):-
"We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that beca.use 
the eternal truths are dependent on God, they are therefore 
arbitrary and depend on His will, as Descartes, and after 
him M. Poiret,seem to have thought. This is true only of 
oontingent truths, whose principle is fitn~ss or the choice 
of the best; whereas necessary truths depend solely on His 
understanding, of which they are the internal object." 
Leibniz was right to believe that Descartes held the eternal 
truths to have been created by God. In his reply to the Sixth Objection 
22 to the 11f1ditations Descartes made the point very clearly. To 
suggest that the eternal truths existed from all eternity unchangeable, 
Descartes argued, would place a limitation on God's choice. But 
this is impossible. Rather, he held, it is because God ~ills the 
three angles of a triane1e necessarily to equal two right angles 
that they do so necessarily equal two right angles. It was God's 
choice which made certain propositions necessary, not necessity 
which dictated God's choice. 
This explains why it was possible for Descartes to imagine, in 
the 1,~editati2nSt that an Evil Genius lih? cQ.Uld dQ anythlnr.:, could be 
deceivine us about the truths of mathematics or. the possibility of 
the existence of a mountain without a val1ey.23 If, that is, the 
eternal truths were the product of a will, then they could be 
otherwise, and those that I take to .be necessary truths, could. in 
fact, given the Demon, be. false. 
Once the demon is vanquished we do not ~~ve to doubt that the 
eternal truths are or could be false. God's known existence 
guarantees their certainty. But the thesis that the eternal truths 
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have been created leaves Cartesian method with certain cr~onic 
problems. If all truths are equally dependent on God's will, then 
all have an equal status. There is no room within Descartes' 
system for a distinction between contine-ent and necessary truth, 
even though Descartes himself sometimes makes use of such a 
distinction.24 The truths of mathe~~tics and the truths of physics 
are entirely on a level;. all contingent on the will of God; all 
necessar,y, eiven that God has so decided. Thus Descartes was able 
to write to lftersenne:-
"As to physics, I should consider I knew nothinz about 
them were I only able to explain how things misht be, 
and were unable to demonstrate that they could not be 
otherwise. For having reduced physics to the laws of 
mathematics, such demonstration is possible." 25 
The effect then of Descartes' views on the creation of the 
eternal truths was to produce confusion about the distinction 
between the necessary and the oontingent. It was a oOnfusion whioh 
ran through much of Descartes t own work, and it was to re-appear in 
the work of later thinkers. But it is important to see that the 
confusion in Descartes had an entirely different basis from the 
similar confusion which we observed in Galileo and the Neoplatonists. 
Whereas the necessity which the latter attributed to r..ature arose 
from consideration of Godts perfection, and his oreation of the 
world aocording to the forms of Euclidean geometry, for Desoartes 
the ba.sis of the necessity whioh existed in nature arose directly. 
from the total freedom of God, and his criterion of clear and 
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distinct ideas for truth, a criterion which itself confused and 
conflated the necessary and the contingent. 
The Role gf Ez:pcrienc§ in Descartes' System. 
Descartes was never opposed to experiment in the physical 
sciences, and he expressed much admiration for the experimental 
methodology of Bacon. But he held that experiment in itself gave 
no knowledge. It is only from the relation between experiment and 
the whole system of the Principles ot tbilosophy is it possible to 
extract knowledge. As Descartes explained it:-
"The prinoiples we have found are so vast and fruitful 
that there follow from them many more things than we see 
to be oontained in this visible world; indeed many more 
things than lie even in the power of our mind to traverse 
in thought. Let us set before ourselves a short history of 
the principle phenomena of nature (the causes of which are 
to be investigated here); not however that we should use 
them as if for reason to prove anything; for our desire is 
to deduoe the reasons of the effeots from causes, not 
contrawise those of oauses from effeots; but only in 
order tha~tout of the innumerable effeots which we judge 
can be produoed from the same oauses, we may determine our 
mind to be consideration of oertain among them rather than 
others. tt 26 .•. 
Observation is neoessary to find out what has to be explained. ]ut 
observation itself, Desoartes maintained, can explain nothing. 
Ex:planation and knowledge only occur when the data is shown to be 
explioable by the Principles. As he explained to :Mersenne:-
"You ask me if I hold what I have written on refraction 
to be a demonstration; I think it is, at least as far.as it 
is possible to give one in this matter, without havi~ 
previously demonstrated the prinoiples of Physics by Metaphysics 
(which I hope one ~ to do •••• ) 27. 
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This letter, written in 1638, antioipated the putative sucoess 
of the Principles of Philosoph~ published six years later. 
The role of experienoe in Cartesian method was the direot 
antithesis of that to be proposed by Newton. The whole approaoh 
of the Newtonian method placed total weight on experiment and 
observation. General propositions, Newton was to argue, mtlst be 
28 based only on observation. Desoartes, in oontrast, releeated 
observations to an entirely subordinate role. Knowledge, he 
maintained, oould only arise from knowledge of prinoiples known 
with oertainty by his oriterion of truth. Explanation oonsisted 
in showing how partioular phenomena were related to those general 
prinoiples within the total system. 
Desoartes was justly proud of the explanatory power whioh his 
total system generated. Thus he wrote in the 111sco'lrfl~ 211 the, 1!&thod:-
"In subsequently paSSing over in my>mind all the objects 
whioh have ever been presented to my senses, I can truly 
venture to say that I have not there observed anything which 
I could not easily explain by the prinoiples whioh I have 
disoovered." 29 
But in what sense t if a.rry ,did the total system produce true 
explanations of the phenomena? On this question Descartes' 
position often appears to be strangely ambivalent. On the one 
hand he olaimed that the method led step by step from one certainty 
to the next, implying that truth peroolates through the whole. 
system. On the other l~d, Descartes often maintained that he had 
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made use of explanatory fictions, false h3rpotheses, to account 
for phenomena,30 but that this was justified because of the 
explanatory power of the whole system. 
It might be thought that Desoartes' references to 'false 
hypotheses' is just a front; fear of the treatment meted out. 
to Galileo, it might be suggested, encouraged Desoartes to believe 
that discretion was the better part of valour; undoubtedly Desoartes 
was much troubled by the theological implications of many of his 
views. But because the problem runs through parts of Desoartes' 
work which have only the most distant oonneotions with any theo-
logical questions, this explanation see~~ inadequate. The truth 
seems rather that Descartes chaneed his criterion for the 
acceptability of the truth of propositions. Desoartes lowered 
his standards from the high ones of olear and distinct ideas, to 
the oomparatively low one of explanatory power, with the question 
of knowledge a.nd truth pt"tse • reoedinefrom the oentra.l post tion 
'" "" - ... '" ... 
of being the major objective of the whole enterprize •. Desoartes, 
in muoh of his physics, is more concerned with being a.ble to 
explain phenomena than with the question of whether or not the 
explanations are true.3l 
Desoartes' attitude is illustrated by a seotion at the end 
of the Prinoiples of Philoson~~. We. find Desoartes desoribing 
"how we 'nm; 'ro:ri';'~ '~t 'kn~';i~di~ of the figl1res, magnitudes, and 
motions of the insensible partioles of bodies· ... n f,.notdp,<1,r"r;, not 
probable knowledge, can be obtained, Desoartes arguedJ the method, 
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basically, is by analogy. The passage is rather long, but worth 
quoting in full:-
ltBut since I assign determinate. figures, magnitudes 
and motions to the insensible particles of bodies, as if 
I had seen them, wher~as I admit they do not fall under the 
senses, someone will perhaps demand how I have come to my 
knowledge of them. To this I reply that I first considered 
generally the most simple and best understood principles 
implanted in our understanding by nature, and examined the 
principal differences that could be found between the 
magnitudes, figures and situations of bodies insensible on 
acoount of their smallness alone, and what sensible effects 
could be produced by the various ways in which they impinge 
on one another. And finally, when I found like effects in 
the. bodies perceived by our sense, I considered that they might 
have been produced from a similar concourse of such bodies 
especially as no other mode of explaining them could be 
suggested. And for this end the example of certain bodies 
made by art was of service to me, for I can see no difference 
between these and natural bodies, excepting that the effects 
of machines depend for the most part on the operation of 
certain instrtunents, which. since men necessarily make 
them, must always be large enough to be capable of being 
easily perceived by the senses. The effects of natural 
causes, on the other hand, almost always depend on certain 
organs minute enough to escape every sense. And it is 
certain that there are no rules in mechanics which do not 
hold good in physics, of which mechanics forms a part or 
species (so that all that is artificial 1salso natural); 
for it is not less natural for a clock, made of the requisite 
number of wheels, to indicate the hours, than for a tree which 
has sprung from this or that seed, to produce a particular 
fruit. Accordingly, just as those who apply themselves to 
the consideration of automata, when they know the use of a 
certain machine and see some of its parts, easily infer 
from these the manner in which others which they have not 
seen are made, so from considering the sensible effects and 
parts of natural bodies, I have endeavoured to discover 
the nature of the imperoeptible causes and insenstbleparts 
contained in them." 32 
Typical of much of Descartes' science, the initial claim to 
knowledge appears partially withdrawn in the last sentence. 
The objections to this form of inference as a way to obtain 
,. 
oerta.in knowledge were to be made in the seventeenth oentury by 
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many thinkers, including Glanvill, Boyle, Neli'ton and Looke. The 
most important objeotion is that explanations by analogy cannot 
give us certain knowledge unless we can, independently, examine 
both that which is explained and the objeot with whioh it is 
compared. I take a simple example. I ~3y wish to explain cricket 
to an American. Knowing his familiarity with baseball, and also 
myself knowing baseball, I explain crioket by analogy with baseball. 
As a result, the American comes to understand some of the more 
obvious points about cricket. ·But he cannot infer from some feature 
of baseball to a corresponding feature of cricket unless he can 
check that inference, for example by asking me. "Can you be out 
at cricket by being caught?" he asks. "Yes"', I reply. In that 
respect the analoe;y holds. "Must the pitcher throw the ball full-
toss to the batsman?" "No," I reply. Here the analogy breaks 
down. There is no wa.y of establishing how far the analogy holds 
a priori. There is no other test than empirica.l observation. 
In the example that Descartes ha.s offered, between the 
mechanical workines of a clock and the hidden mechanisms of 
nature, CA~~Qthcsi there is no possibility of anybody being 
able to ob~~;;~#boih sets of mechanisms, and so there is no way of 
knowing, (as opposed to supposing) that there is such an an~locy. 
Descartes was in fact aware of this important limitaticn. Thus 
he wrote:-
"But here it mn.y ,be said tha.t a.l thoueh I have sholrm 
hOltr all natural things can be forma<.t. we have no right to 
conclude on this account that they ''lara produced by these 
causes. For just as there may be two clocks made by the 
sarne workman, which thoueh they indicate the time equally 
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and are externally in all respects similar, yet in 
nOllise resemble one another in. the composition of 
their wheels, so doubtless there is an infinity of 
different ways in which all thine? that we see could 
be formed by the great Artificer.tI 33 
Descartes explained that he would be fully satisfied if "the 
cause~ I have assigned are such that they correspond to all the 
phenomena manifested by nature without inquiring whether it is 
by their means or others that they are produced. It 34 
We have a moral certainty of the truth of his findi~~, 
Descartes maintained, because of the total cohorence of the whole 
system:-
"But they who observe how many thinc,n-s regarding the 
magnet, fire, and the fabric of the whole world, are 
here deduced from a very small number of principles, 
although they considered that I had taken up these 
principles at random and without good grounds, they 
could yet acknowledge that it could hardly happen that 
so much could be coherent if they were false." 35 
Yet of course they could be. Indeed some of them were false. 
Had not Descartes admitted as much himself in proposincr to accept 
false hypotheses? We can see, then, when we turn to the detailed 
application of the physics, that Descartes used an entirely different 
criterion of acceptability from the one proposed in the Di~QOllrae 
IO!"" -,!,,# "' ... .;.",. 
on the Method. Descartes no longer claimed to establish the 
£aotua!#certainty of his conclusions by an appeal to their olarity 
and distinctness. Rather it is in terms, and almost solely in 
terms, of their explanatory power. 
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The penalty for this move is severe. Descartes cannot 
claim certain truth for his principles of the physical world. 
Theory has become heuristic. It was a penalty that Descartes was 
extremely reluctant to pay. He attempted to reject the charge 
against his science by once again asserting the general grounds 
for the acceptability of his philosopby:-
"as God is supremely good and cannot err, the faculty 
which He has given us of distinguishing truth from false-
hood, cannot be fallacious as long as we use it aright, and 
distinctly perceive anything by it." 36 
Descartes, in his discussions of our knowledge of the physical 
world, vacillated between, on the one hand, dogmatically asserting 
the truth of his conclusions because they appeared clear and 
distinct (to him), and on the other, acknowledging that even if 
his conclusions could not be accepted as certainly true, they at 
least explained a lot more than other people's theories. Only the 
latter claim was oertainly justified. 
Rohllul t' s Scientific 1,1ethod.. 
No such wavering was exhibited by Descartes' disoiple 
Jacques Rohault. On the question of' certainty in scientifio 
knowledge Rohault was unequivocally committed to the conjeotural 
nature of scientific discovery. 
It is worth oonsidering Rohaultts oomments on soientific 
method in general for a number of reasons. Among such oonsiderations 
a.re that he was widely read in Cambridge, 31.Locke when in France 
read him,38 and most important of all, Rohaultts method shows 
clearly that Descartes' influence on him was not towards a.n a priori 
Rationalist soienoe. Rohault made full use of Desoartes' method 
and disooveries, but he dropped all olaims to certainty in his 
findings, indicating that Cartesian physics was accepted largely 
for its e~planatory power, rather than'its agreed truth. Given this, 
Desoartes' importanoe as a soientist was b01.md to diminish if and when 
a more powerful system of physics could be discovered. 39 With the 
publication of Newton's Pr:tncipia, for many, that moment arrived. 
Rohault steered a course between dogmatic rationalism and 
uncontrolled and unordered experiment. In the Author's Preface to 
his Treati,se on PlwFJics (1671) he wrote:-
ttA third defect I have found in the method of philosophers 
is that some of them are wholly for reasoning, and depend so 
much upon the strength of their arguments (especially if they 
are borrowed from the AnCients) that they judge it superfluous 
to make a.ny experiments." 40 
Others, he said, "think everythill8' ought to be reduoed to experiment, 
and tha.t there should be no reasoning at all." 
Both methods are equally faulty. The only correct method, Rohault 
recognised, was to combine reason and experiment. He went on to 
describe his version of the hypothetico-deductive method:-
. '.' . 
nThe third sort of Experiments are those which are made in 
. Consequence of some Re~,f.lonine' in order to discover whether 
it was just or not. As when after having oonsidered the 
ordinary Effects of any particular Subject,. a.nd founde. true 
Idea of the latu~e of it, that is, of thlt in it whicb mak~s 1t 
c~pable of p'Y'QgucinO' those EffMt~: we oome to know by our 
Reasoning, that if what wEl.believe ooncerning the liatyte of it 
be true, it must neoessarily be, that by disposing it.after a 
certain tv:.9.nner, a new Effect will be produoed, whioh we did not 
before think of; , ,and in order to see if this Rea.soning holda 
good, we dispose the Subjeot in such a manner as we believe it 
ought to be disposed in Order to produce suoh an Effect.". 41 
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The Cartesian Rohault, in fact, propounded just that scientific method 
utilized by Newton.42 Rohaul t was equally clear about the status of 
scientifio enquiry:-
"If that which we fix upon, to explain the particular 
Nature of anything, do not acoount clearly and plainly for 
every Property of that Thing, or if it be evidently contradioted 
by any one Experiment; then we are to look upon our Conjeoture 
as false; but if it perfectly agrees with all the Properties 
of the Thing, then we may esteem it well grounded, and it may 
pass for very probable. tt 43 
Furthermore, Rohault accepted that many causes could produce the same 
effects:-
"Thus we must content ourselves for the most part, to 
find out how Things may be; without pretending to come to 
a certain Knowledge and Determination of what they really are; 
for there may possibly be different Causes capable of produci~ , 
the same Effect which we have no means of explaining." 44 
Thus we find that the 'Cartesian' Rohault held a position with 
regard to the certainty possible in the natural soiences entirely 
different from that put forward by Desoartes in his meta.physics. 
Descartes ha.d mainta.ined that we oan discover independently the oauseS 
of phenomena by the method of clear and distinct ideas. developed from 
the most simple to the most oomplex. No such possibility is held 
open by Rohault. We observe the effects, and oan at best only offer 
tentative hypotheses as to their causes; hypotheses which we may have 
to abandon at a later stage, and which we oueht to be willing to 
abandon in the light of empirical falsification. 
It is remarkable that such an attitude should emerge from such a 
source at such a time. It suggests that the method of the Mrd1t~t1Qns 
was not in detail accepted by Desoartes' scientific followers,tha..t 
the victory of empiricism in opposition to the high priori road for 
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science was in large measure achieved within the framework of 
Cartesian physics itself. One is reminded that a Cartesian, 
Christian Huygens, was singled out by Locke. as one of the masterbuilders 
of the age. 
Rohault did not expect science to give certainty.45 But he 
was noOsiander. He did not believe that truth was unobtainable in 
science, that discovery was not the goal. Rohault denied the sceptics 
oharge that knowledge was impossible. If an explanation aooounts for 
many different properties, Rohault argued, "we shall find it very 
difficult to believe that they can be explained in two different ways. 
In which case our oonjeoture is not only to be looked upon as highly 
probable but we have reason to believe it to be the Truth.n46 Thus 
Rohault olaimed that explanatory power should itself be a criterion 
of truth. 
In making this suggestion Rohault set the soene for a whole new 
conception of knowledge, a conception whioh was by no means immediately 
acoepted. Put ,simply, what Rohault asked us to do is to be willing 
to predicate "is truett of propositions whioh it is agreed could be 
falsified by further experience. In so doing he was clearly breaking 
with the Cartesian ideal. For Descartes, truth and oertainty meet in 
such a way that the possibility of doubting what is aocepted as true, 
of conceiving its falsity, is strenuously excluded. 
In opening this door, in rejecting the neoessity of absolute 
certainty as a requisite for knowledge, Ronault cut himself away from 
his past, and performed a servioe for soienoe and knowledge. However 
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it was not a move that was easily accepted. The spectre of absolute 
certainty as the criterion of truth was to haunt philosophy for a 
long time t.o c.ome, even if the scientists were in practice to abandon 
it. 
R.ohault's position illustrates very clearly how the impact .of 
the new science was pr.oducing a crisis in epistemol.ogy. He, a 
scientist, was calling fer a redefiniti.on of kn.owledge and truth. 
Yet no phil.os.opher was at hand to supply that redefiniti.on. What was 
required was a rethinking .of the nature of kn.owledge, a statement .of 
its possible f.orms, and a justification of the scientist's method. 
Alth.ough not alIef these tasks were to be achieved immediately, an 
important start t.o their solution was already under way when the 
Traite de PhYAigu~ was published. It was at this time that Locke 
was beginning the Essay. 
R.ohault differed from Descartes in an.other important respect. 
He did not claim fer his physics the sort of c.omprehensiveness that 
Descartes accepted for his. Thus, he argued that just "because we 
cann.ot up.on the sp.ot explain by it [the c.onjecture] a property, which 
appears from s.ome new experiment f or which we before did not think. 
of" the pr.obability .of the conjeoture is not lost, "For it is one thing 
to kn.ow certainly, tha.t a conjecture is contrary to experience; and 
an.other thing net to see how it agrees to it, for although we do not 
all see the agreement,lt does net from thence fellow that it is 
repugnant.1t 41 Implicitly at least, Rohault was committed to a 
piecemeal programme of disoovery in science. Neither eanal'al principles 
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nor particular hypotheses can be accepted or rejected on a prj.ort 
erounds. It is hOii far pa.rticular principles or hypotheses stal''lll 
,up to the acid test of experiment which is crucial • 
. 
In many \-lays the passages from Rohaul t which I have so far chosen 
to comment on show him in too modern a light. There were many aspects 
of Rohault's work, includi~e his actu~l practise in science, which were 
much closer to Descartes than. might be supposed from what we have so 
far considered. For example, he argued, in his discussion of light, 
for its instantaneous propagation in a very Cartesian fashion. But 
again, unlike Descartes, he recognised the conjectural nature of his 
th i 48 es s. 
Again, when arguing for a distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities there are important Cartesian overtones, an.d 
Rohault's remarks on this topic are worth considering for they 
clearly express the mood in which the whole discussion of primary and 
secondary qualities was set in the second half of the seventeenth 
century. He argued that those who attribute heat as a real property 
of fire are guilty of an unsubstantiated inference. which is a result 
of their uncritical assent to the evidence of their senses. Thus 
he wrote:-
"They •••• deceive themselves ••• who, in order to prove 
that there is in the fire something, I know not what, like 
that heat which it excites in us, bid us go near it a.nd 
try. Now, though we go near it a thousand times, nay, 
though we were scourched by it, all that this demonstrates 
is only what the fire does to us, and not what it is in 
itself. When.we speak therefore of the~, or~, 
or SmAlls, or SmmQ,..'h or Lia-ht, or QQ10m:liJ, of bodies, 
to say .that they are really lOir4Q which are properly 
objeots of our senses, ia a ~~~~.mistake. Forha who says 
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this, must imagine that we come to the knowledge of them 
by bare sensation only, which is absolutely false." 49 
The implication is that we have independent a priori reasons for 
drawing a distinction between the properties of objects, though 
Rohault also thought that standard cases of illusion were good 
empirical evidence for wishing to draw a distinction. 
In many ways, then, we can see that Rohault remained a Cartesian. 
But, on the vital question of the possibility of the Cartesian 
programme being carried through in all its a priori glory, he was 
not. 1.!a.ny of his views about the nature and limitation of soientifio 
method were to be taken further by thinkers who followed him, as 
we shall see. 
COpglllRd one. 
We have seen that Descartes' attempt to place knowledge on firm 
foundations failed on several oounts. His epistemology and metaphysics 
relied too heavily on his oriterion of olear and distinct ideas which 
itself generated oonfusion about the status of necessary and contingent 
propositions. Even Desoartes himself was unsure how far his oriterion 
could take him along the path to knowledge in the physical soiences. 
In fact it could take him very little way as Rohault recognised. 
There is not, nor can there be but one criterion for truth. There 
are at least two such oriteria. They are that a proposition is true 
if either it is logically necessary, or t it describes a state of 
. . 
affairs which actually pertains, in which case the usual method of 
establishing this is by observation. In neither case .i8 it simply 
a matter of psychological certainty. 
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But for a.ll its faults, the Cartesian programme was certainly 
worth attempting. Descartes' commitment to the possibility of a 
unified system of knowledge, the view that all knowledge was one, 
with the implication that the same criterion could be used to test 
all cases of purported knowledge, forced men to consider how far such 
a programme was possible, and where it would break down. In short, 
the Cartesian programme was a stimulus. It encouraged the exploration 
of new paths, many of which were to lead not only to great achievements 
in the sciences, but also to a deeper understanding of knowledge and 
the limitations of science. 
Descartes, too, had succeeded, with his sharp distinction between 
mind and matter, in affirming the belief that nature could be 
understood entirely by rational procedure. The physical world, 
created by God's intellect, was capable of being understood by man's 
intellect. After Descartes it seemed only a matter of time before· 
all the secrets of the universe would be unlocked. Before him, such 
an aspiration was possible only when supported by a metaphysio of 
a very different order, suoh as we found in the work of the Naoplatonists. 
Further, Descartes had changed once, and perhaps for all, the 
idea of what it was to understand the physical world. It was no longer 
necessary to seek mystic or moral order in its parts. lnlat was 
required was to understand the cogs of a great machine. The teleology 
of Aristotelian science had been moved to a seoond ord.er of abstraction. 
This said, on qualification is in order. Descartes undoubtedly 
gave to mathematios a paradigmatio role of the highest order. The 
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attractions of this paradigm for a mathematical physicist are 
obvious. But the justification of the use of the paradiem is another 
matter. We have seen that the special place allocated to mathematics 
by the Neoplatonists was drawn from their conoeption of God as the 
great mathematician. It is perhaps not too far fetched to see some 
of that thinking in Descartes' work. 
- 104 -
Chapter IV 
Introdnct:i.on. 
Before we turn to consider the attitudes towards science and 
knowledge of Lockets scientific contempcrari.es We must look at the 
work of one of the greatest figures in the whole landscape of the 
scientific revolution, Francis Bacon. 
Bacon's importance in either philosophy or science is a matter 
of consid.erable dispute. Some writers see it as difficult to over-
estimate his contribution1f for R. F. Jones "Sir Francis both expressed 
and moulded his age",2 and Benjamin Farrington writes: "With Bacon 
we enter a new mental climate.n3 Opposed to this high ratine, it 
can be argued that Bacon was not a great original philosopher, and 
that he made no important discoveries in any of the natural sciences; 
because of these two rather major limitations he was of no great 
consequence, compared, s~ to Galileo or Descartes. 
The truth is that whilst Bacon was neither a. philosopher of 
genius, nor a great workine soientist, he did express a very new 
attitude to the possibility of obtaining knowledge of the physical 
world. Furthermore, some important parts of that attitude were to be 
acoepted oompletely by the great scientists of the seventeenth century. 
Before we turn to Bacon's contributions some explanation is 
in order as to why I have chosen to treat him after Desoartes, when 
in fact all his great works were completed before any of Desoartes' 
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were published. ~~ reason is that in many respects already 
considered Descartes' work fits more naturally with the tradition in 
science which proceeded it than it does with the work of Bacon or 
the English scientists who followed him. From now en in our 
historical survey of attitudes to science we shall find that all 
the major figures drew more upon Bacon than any other single source, 
in short I did not wish to separate post-Baconian English science 
from its natural heritage. 
Bacon's novel attitude towards the physical world antioipated 
Descartes' in important respects. His position oan be summarised 
under three heads, the first two of whioh were also fundamental to 
the Cartesian programme: 
1. Reject past teaching because it is either prejudiced, 
unsubstantiated, or both. 
2. There is a method of investigation, open to man, whioh will 
lead to knowledge of nature. 
3. This knowledge oan be used for man's betterment. 
In promising a programme which will lead to knowledge 13aoon 
anticipated Desoartes. But the programme he advocated was very 
different from Cartesian rationalism, for Bacon placed central 
emphasis on experiment, unfettered by preconceptions drawn from 
the mind. But in other respects his attitude had muoh in common 
not only with Desoartes, but also with Galileo, for it was essentially 
a programme looking not to the past, but to the future. In this 
respect all three thinkers were remarkably different from the 
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tradition of Renaissance Humanism which largely saw itself as 
returning to the attitudes and achievements of the olassical world. 
If Descartes gave mechanism to the modern world, then certainly 
Bacon gave optimism: a belief that man was not simply at the mercy 
of nature, but rather that man could master nature and make 11 his 
slave. 
Bacon offered no detailed epistemological theory, and for this 
reason alone he cannot be considered the founder of the modern 
empirical tradition. But what he did was to make modern empirioism 
possible. If experience was, as Bacon maintained, the basis for 
knowledge of nature, why could it not be made the ba.sis of knowledge 
in general? It was, indeed, the generalisation of the Daoonian 
conception that we find in Locke's EEsa;y at the end of the oentury. 
Bacon's methodology for science can be, and has been, critioised 
on many oounts. Science in general has not progressed acoording to 
the Baconian programme. Bacon never fully appreoiated the importanoe 
of conjecture in science - or in faot ever appreciated the importance 
of theory at large. But his failings in this direotion Were in 
oonsequenoe more therapeutio than harmful. It enoouraged ooncern 
with the particular, rather than the general, it ourbed the fl1ehts 
of fanoy which, as Bacon readily pointed out, had dominated manta 
concern with nature. 
It has been held that Bacont s importance for the soientifio 
revolution is not as great as is sometimes supposeli beoause :a"con's 
oonoeption of oertainty was different from those of his suooessors. 
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Henry G. Van Leeuwen has argued that "though the problem he [R'l.con] 
set out to resolve rese~bled that encountered by his successors, 
the solution he proposed was essentially different from theirs, 
and that consequently it was not R~conts theory of knowledge which 
became the basis for empirical soience and philosophy in seventeenth 
century England.,,5 
This olaim appears to me to rest on a false assumption.. It 
was not the case that Bacon offered, in the relevant respects, any 
theory of kn01ileclp'~ at all. Bacon side-stepped the philosophical 
questions almost totally. In so doing he left the road open for such 
a theory to be propounded. It was j\wt this vacuum that Locke's 
EnpAY. was to fil1.6 \ihat Bacon did was to supply a practical method 
'lt/hich, for all its faults, could be u-Wized to achieve soientifio 
knowledge. How far the results could be construed as absolutely 
certain knowledee when subjected to philosophical scrutiny Bacon 
did not see fit to explore •. In fact it was only when the method had 
been tried did it becone obvious wh~t the epistemological questions 
l'lere whioh could be asked of it. 
As with previous thi~~ers so far considered I shall not attempt 
to give a summar,y of all of Baoon's views in this chapter. Rather 
I shall try to point up those aspects of his thought which bear 
most direotly on the questions of the limits of knowl~dge and the 
nature of the scientific enterprise. 
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Be.con. Theolor.r and Sct€'nc~. 
Bacon, even more explicitly than Galileo, divided human 
knowledge into autonomous sections. He believed that it was vital 
to progress in science that it be separated from questions of 
theology or morality. But for Bacon this did not mean that there 
were no common elements which appeared in all branches of knowledge, 
for the branches all had a common trunk. This Bacon called the 
Phi12F9Phi~ Prina which would consist of "all such axioms as are 
not peculiar to any of the particular soiences, but belong to several 
of them in cornmon.tt7 Bacon offered as an example of such axioms: 
II if equals are added to \mequals the reeul t will be 1.l11equal", which 
he said held of both mathematics and distributive justice. It is not 
too inaccurate to think of Bacon 1 s PhilQSQl1bia. Prima as covering 
roughly the subject of what we now call logic. 
The three main branches of knowledge, Bacon believed, were of 
God, of Nature, and of 1~. It is worth noticing that Bacon did not, 
in any important sense, regard these three branches as forming a 
hierarchy; just as with a tree one branch being above another does 
not, for that reason, make it a better branch, so knowledge of God, 
natural theology, is no better WJA knowledge, than natural 
,.,. ,. 
philosophy, or the philosophy of man. Given this, it was possible for 
Bacon to maintain that a mants religious beliefs were irrelevant to 
assessing his worth as a scientist. This is not to say that Bacon 
went so far as to maintain that an atheist could make a good 
scientist, rather all men, inoludingscientists, must recognise their 
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mortal nature before Godts majesty. But,as ~~jorie Purver has 
8 
shown, Bacon was anxious that differences on religious grounds 
would not prevent Catholic and Protestant scientists working 
together. 
Not only did religious belief not conflict with science, Bacon 
positively believed that it was of the utmost importance to separate 
science and theoloB'Y. He wrote in the J-rOV;l.\:11l Ormnwn:-
"But the corruption of philosophy by superstition and an 
admixture of theology is far more', widely spread and does the 
greatest harm, whether to entire systems or to their parts. 
For the human understanding is obnoxious to the influenoe of 
the imagination no less than to the influence of common 
notions. For the contentious and sophistical kind of 
philosophy ensnares the understandir..g; but this kind being 
fanciful and timid and half poetical, misleads it more by 
flattery. For there is in man an ambition of the understanding, 
no less than of the will, espeoially in high and lofty spirits."9 
Theologioal preconoeptions were likely to mislead the enquiring 
intellect, Baoon believed, as they had misled P,ythagoras and Plato, 
and as they were currently misleading those who ttattempt to found 
a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, on 
the book of Job, and other parts of the saored writinu~, seeking for 
the dead among the living_nlO This partioular fault, Bacon held, is 
no less dangerous to theology as to natural philosophy, for it is 
likely to produoe "a heretioal religion". Natural philosophy,Jl"\oon 
argued, haa its own criteria for success, its own criteria for 
knowledge. To link it with other areas of human enquiry suoh as 
religion is likely to do harm to both. 
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Bacon and Gilbert. 
One way in to an appreciation of Bacon's whole approach to 
nature is to look at his attitude to the Elizabethan scientist 
William Gilbert. It is often alleged that Bacon misunderstood 
Gilbertll ; it has even been sueeested tfu~t Bacon did not read 
Gilbert t s most influential work De 1.rl:roete.12 But the truth is the 
other way around; it is Gilbert's supporters, and &~con's detractors 
who hnve done the misunderstanding. 
In the history of English science Gilbert provides the 
stepping-stone from the highly Neoplatonic doctrines of Dee to 
the anti-Platonic outlook of the Bacon of the NmQ.lm OrCltmm,. Al though 
Gilbert was not a great mathematician (the one#p~i~t;·~~·~ill remomber, 
on which Galileo faulted him)13 he was a great experimenter. 
Ex:perimen.t t he believed, gave sure results. In the Preface to 
De: Ulc:ncte (1600) he wrote:-
#~j/#"",,..~;,,. 
uin the discover.y of secret things and in the investigation 
of hid.d.en causes, stronger reasons are obtained from sure 
experiments and domonstrated areuments than from probable 
conjeotures and the opinions of philosophical speoulations 
of the common sort." 14 
Gilbert, then, ''las oomm:i.tted to detailed ex:amination of the 
particular before pretending to any general conolusions, an attitude 
one would expeot to find in a dootor of medicine. Thus he argued that 
starting from detailed observations of the loadstone it would 
eventually be possible to learn truths about the earth, and indeed 
all the planets, though he did admit that in sUCaestine this he is 
allowing himself to ttphilosophize freely, a.s freely as in the past." 
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lIe compared his method to geometry in a \'lay that is by now 
very familiar to us:-
"And even as gecmetry rises from certain slight and readily 
understood foundations to the highest and most difficult 
demonstrations, whereby the ingeneous mind ascends above the 
aether: so does our magnetic doctrine and science in due 
order first show forth certain facts of less rare occurrence, 
from these proceed facts of a more extraordinary kind; at 
length in a sort of series are revealed things most secret 
and privy in the earth, and the causes are recognised of 
things, that in the ignorance of those of old or through 
the heedlessness of the moderns, were unnoticed or disregarded." 15 
Gilbert's suggestion that geometry allows us to ascend "above 
the aether" is reminiscent of Dee's threefold classification of thines 
whereby mathematics allows us to reach eternal knowledge of the 
physical world. His description of the method allowing us to 
proceed from common facts to the causes of the most "secret and 
privy in the earth" looks forward to the Baconian aspirations of 
the New Instauration. 
Surely, it can be areued, Gilbert's method and achievement was 
modern, was entirely in keeping with the new soience that Bacon 
wished to see established. Why, then, did Bacon repeatedly single 
out Gilbert for adverseoomment? .. Bacon very clearly gave the 
answer himself; it is surprising that so often his reply has been 
overlook. "The Empirical school of philosophy", Bacon wrote, "gives 
birth to dogmas more deformed and monstrous than the Sophistical or 
16 Rational school." A:3 examples of the Empirical school Baoon 
took alchemy and Gilbert's science. The reaSon Dacon held this 
school so dangerous was because it based its conclusions nin the 
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narrowness and darkness of a few experiments.1t 17 Constantly, Bacon 
attacked theories based upon a very limited range of observations: 
"For as Aristotle saith, that children at the first will call every 
woman mother, but afterward they come to distinguish accordine to 
truth, so experience, if it be in childhood will call every philosophy 
mother.nlB 
For this reason Bacon was not willing to accept as true any of 
the current theories of the structure of the universe, inoluding the 
Copernican system. Both the ptolemaic and the Copernican system 
agreed with the phenomena, and therefore neither had the right to 
be accepted as true.19 
Bacon did not deny that one of the theories may be true. What 
he did deny is that the possibility of a theory being true 'is an end 
to the matter. What he demanded in natural philosophy was certainty, 
20 
not conjecture. The object was "to discover true causes and axioms" 
not possible or merely probable ones. He expressed his position very 
clearly when discussing astrono~:-
"The truth is that, without meaning to throwaway the benefit 
of former inventions, I am attempting a far greater work; for 
it is not merely caloulations or predictions that I aim at, 
but philosophy: such a philosophy I mean as may inform the 
human understanding, not only of the motion of the heavenly 
bodies and the period of that motion, but likewise of their 
substance, various qualities, powers and influenoes, according 
to natural and oertain reasons, tree from the superstition 
and frivolity of traditions; and again suoh as may disoover 
and explain in the motion itself, not what is accordan~ with 
the phenomena, but what is found in nature herself. and is 
actually and really true." 21 
- 113 -
Now, it is entirely within this oontext that we must see 
Baoon's rejeotion of Gilbert's approaoh to nature. Gilbert, by 
his own admission allowed himself to "philosophize freely"; and 
this is patently obvious in the latter half of De l~"1.enet~. From 
the faot that the earth appears to be a large loadstone Gilbert 
concluded that the earth rotates, that the planets rotate, and 
indeed that the earth has a soull Baoon rightly held that such 
speoulations went far beyond the evidenoe. In Baoon's eyes, Gilbert 
had beoome fixated on the loadstone t and attempted to use its 
properties to explain far too much. It was just such "few experiments" 
leading to grand oonclusions that Bacon deplored. People were too 
easily seduced into thinking that their Ovln pet theories oould explain 
all sorts of phenomena which had nothing to do with each other. 
~~con and Certaint~. 
As we have seen already, Baoon required that the new method 
which he professed should give oonolusions that were both true and 
known to be true. His method of induotion was not to be l1the 
induction of which the logioians speak, which proceeds by simple 
emuneration.n22 Suoh induction nis a puerile thine; concludes at 
hazard; is always liable to be upset by a contradictory instance; 
takes into account wllr'lt is knm'ln and ord.inary; and leads to no 
2" 
resul t. tt .) 
To reach certainty in the concluGions, Bacon said, "what the 
soiences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall analyze 
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experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of excluoion 
and rejection lead to an inevitable cono1uoion.,,24 Bacon was thus 
totally and completely opposed to construing the function of 
science as one of f saviJ"l.g' the appearances t • ITe t1aS totally opposed 
to the sort of attitude which "Ie have found cxhibite(l in Osiander's 
Preface to ]~ Reyol'n.tiQnib'li3, and ",hich '!rIC have seen NaB to be 
echoed in some respects in Rohault's approach to explanation in the 
natural sciences. 
We wish to know, then, 14hat Bacon's basis was for such certainty 
in the new philosop~. But here, unfortunately, R~con is not ve~J 
helpful. It is much easier to establish what sort of certainty it 
is ~, than what sort of certainty it ia. that Bacon expected his 
method to generate. Clearly Bacon was opposed to the psychological 
certainty which often accompanies simple induction, always open to 
"upset by a contradictory instance". E::J:tk1.lly certain is it that 
Bacon was opposed to any form of certainty derived a priori fl~om 
self-evident axioms. Bacon believed that knowledge of the world 
must begin always from experience, and experience was always of the 
particular t never of the general. Only gradually )ms it possible 
to arrive at the most general axioms, and these last of all. Thus 
he wrote:-
"There are and can be only two ways of searching into 
and discoverine truth. The one flies from the senseS and 
particulars to the most general axiOms, and from these 
principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and 
immovable, proceeds to judgement and to the discovery of 
middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion •. The other· 
derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by 
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a gradual and unbroken assent, so that it arrives at the 
most general axioms last of all. This is the trtle way 
but as yet untried." 25 
And certainly there is no hint in Bacon that the certainty of the 
conclusions which can be reached by his method are because we 
recognise the conclusions to be logically necessary. 
If we are to approach an understanding of what Bacon understood 
by certainty in the natural sciences it is important to realise 
that he did not expect "the most general axioms" to be reached 
over night. His whole programme for science was one which would 
occupy men for a very great time, and he never suggested that the 
road would be easy. We must start by examining particular phenomena, 
and in such cases Bacon believed that certainty could be reached 
by the method of exolusion; if one can find an exception to any 
particular general proposition about anything, then the proposition 
must be rejeoted. ThUB in attempting to discover the form of heat, 
Bacon listed fourteen "exolusions" from it: light is not part 
of the form of heat, beoause the moon's rays are light but not hot; 
rarity is not part of the form of heat because air is for the most 
part cold, and so on. Then he says: "In the process of exolusion 
are laid the foundations of true induction, which however is not 
. . 26 . 
completed till it arrives at an affirmative." ]ut when he does 
arrive at an affirmative, he recognises that it can only be 
regarded as an hypothesis about the form of heat, which Dacon called 
I1the Indulgence of the Underatand.ine, or the Corunenc~rnent of .In,te,r-
nretntion or the Firat Vintaf,;e". ]acon then went on:-
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"Let us now therefore proceed to the first vintage concerning 
the form of heat. 
"From a survey of instances, all and each, the nature of 
which heat is a particular ease, appears to be motion.1t 
The form of heat, then, Bacon suggested, is motion. He arrived 
at this conoluaionby examining a wide sample of cases of heat, 
and excluding other suggestions for its form by disoovering counter-
examples by observation. But this is ~ a First Vintage. He did 
not claim any certainty for his conclusions at this stage; this 
would have to await further experiment and attempt at falsification. 
Unfortunately Bacon did not take us any further. He never explained 
how we could ever get beyond First Vintages in our enquiries into 
nature. Nor did Bacon eve~ explain what it was that was in motion. 
And clearly, on his own principles there were very good reasons why 
he should not, for the candidates are likely to be objects such as 
atoms or aetherial flui~~ which are not themsolves directly observable, 
certainly in practice, and perhaps, also not even in principle. 
If this were so then some of Bacon's forms would indeed never be 
discovered by a direct empirical method. Others, however, suoh as 
the form of naturally accelerated motion, might be discovered 
empirically, as indeed they were by, amongst others, Galileo. 
There were then, ver"J important limi tatiol1s to the !I.-'l.Oonian 
method as it was presented. Bacon promised certainty in the 
conclw:lions of natural science, but he failed to explain ,,,ha.t sort 
of certainty would. be rev~aled or hON' knowled.ee in certain area·s 
could be obtained. "¥hat then are we to Dk'lke of the Ie.oonian 
aspiration? The answer is, I believe, that Bacon set an ideal 
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towards which science cOlud aspire. Scientific investigation can 
constantly move towards a higher degree of certainty, even if it 
never arrives at that total certainty that Bacon hoped for. In 
settine a target towards which scientists could always aim Bacon 
broke completely with the view that since science could never 
reach certain knowle~e of the physical world, it was not,therefore, 
worth attempting to approach it. 
It might be objected that to construe the Baoonian oonception 
of certainty as un unobtainable ideal is to misltnderstand what it 
was that Bacon had in mind. It might be maintained that all that 
Baoon sOttght for in scientific knowledge was the sort of certainty 
which we attach to those discoveries in science which are called 
laws of nature; laws of nature, after all, are just those propositions 
about the physical world which are normally taken as unquestioninely 
true; that we are willing to call some of the propositions of 
natural science, statements of laws of nature, indicates that we 
aocept them as being certainly true. 
Bacon, no doubt, would have agreed with this. But the difficulty 
with this formulation of the issue is that it does oonflate the 
important distinction between propositions which are accepted as 
being true, on the basis of evidence, and those propositions which 
in some unqualified way could not turn out to be false. It was 
just this distinction which needed to be Rk~det but which Dacon 
failed to make, as indeed did Descartes and all the soientists we 
have so far considered. 
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Thus although Bacon was in a sense right to emphasise the 
importance of aiming at certainty in the results to be achiaved 
by science, his very formulation of that objective bypassed the 
important question of the nature of the sort of certainty to be 
expected from the scientific programme. The issue was to remain 
open until the end of the century. 
~~con and Episternolo,zy. 
I have suggested already that Baoon failed to look closely at 
epistemological questions in his philosophical writings. We lk~ve 
just seen that on a central topic, that of supplying criteria for 
identifying certain truth, his answer is obscure and inadequate. 
In other areas, too, there are only hints at a theory of knowledge, 
not a cogently established position. Thus we find that whilst 
Bacon emphasised the oentral role of experience for gaining 
knowledge of the physical world, he never presented any sustained 
argument against a Rationalist programme for science other than to 
condemn a priori prinCiples tout court. Nor is this very surprising. 
No great rationalist physics had as yet presented itself, as it was 
to do later in the century with the work of Descartes. 
Not surprising though it is, it does mean that ]acon gave no 
great consideration to a variety of topics which were to emerge 
as central issues in the identification of the nature of scientific 
enquiry and its possible scope. Thus Bacon did not examine whether 
or not there were such entities as innate ideas in the human mind 
which might supply the foundation for our ~owledge. Nor did Bacon 
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attempt to give any general 'account of the relation between 
phenomenal experience and the physical world, even though he did 
deny that the physical world and its properties can be inferred 
uncritically from sense experience.27 Thus we find that whilst 
Bacon utlized a rather crude distinction between primary and 
seoondary qualities in muoh of his disoussions of soientifio 
method, for example, in his discussion of heat, he never attempted 
to supply detailed arguments to justify such a distinction. 
In general one can say that Bacon offered no well-substantiated 
answers to any of the traditional epistemological questions. What 
he did do was to propound a method for obtaining knowledge of nature 
which is predominently - one oould almost say totally - ernp~rical 
in oharacter. This approach was then put into praotioe by working 
soientists, and especially by those working scientists who were 
conneotedwith the early days of the Royal Society. Once this method 
was in operation, it was possible to see what were the unanswered 
problems which were inherent in the programme. 
It is often maintained that Bacon did not understand the 
importanoe of mathematics for the development of science. Certainly 
we find in his wri tinge none of that venera.tion accorded to number 
by the lJeoplatonistsj nor is there in his works a firm commitment 
to the possibility of explaining nature in terms of geometry, as 
we find in Desoartes or Galileo. But this 1s not surprising. To 
believe that number was the key to reality, or that the language of. 
the universe was geometry, would be , on Ik~con's own assumptiOns, an 
,r '. 
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unfounded belief, until proven by vast empirical testimo~v. The 
attitude of the Neoplatonists exemplified for R~con one of the 
things wrong with contemporary natural philosophy, not what was 
right, even though in particular areas their resea.rches were 
fruitful. 
There was in fact a very real daneer in Bacon's belief that 
it was possible to approach nature without any presumptions at all, 
for ar~ and every science must have some ontology, and som~ basic 
presumptions from Hhich it must begin. But, given the general 
danger, B~conts lack of commitment to the role of mathematics in 
science in the strong lJeoplatonic sense was itself an important 
counter to the powerful influence of the 1Teoplatonic trerHl. For 
one thing, not all science was - or is - amenable to qu.':l.ntified 
treatment; and for another, the lack of commitment in Bacon 
encouraeed a. critical attitude to the a.ctual role of ma.thematics 
in the physical sciences. Hathematics was undoubtedly useful in 
science, Bacon agreed, but it did not supply the ~alpnn ~.q~re 
of scientific investigation. It is worth noting that the 
introduction of the ·Corpuscular Philosophy' as tho most important 
theory of matter in the seventeenth oentury was achieved largely 
by men such as Oassand! and Boyle who were not particularly inclined 
. 28 ~ 
tOvlards rna;thematics. Further, Boyle rightly thoUQht of his 
scientific method as one which owed mtlch to Bacon. 
If Bacon did not have that hieh regard for mathe~~tics which 
many seventeenth century scientists had, he was by no meana opposed 
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to it. Pure mathematics should be advanced, Bacon held, and 
pointed out that geometry had hardly advanced at all since Euolid. 29 
'Waxed', that is, applied, mathematios, he said,was essential in 
"Perspective, Music, Astronomy, Cosmography, Architecture, 1,!..1.chiery, 
and some otheres." Bacon also predicted the advance of mixed 
mathematics "for as Physic advances farther and farther every day 
and develops new axioms, it will require fresh assistance from 
I\i.a.thematics in many things, and so the parts of Mixed l/jathelTh'ltics 
will be more numerous. tt30 
~hthematics, then, Bacon held, was not to be neglected, let 
alone rejected; but as with his treatment of epistemological issues, 
Bacon did not attempt any sort of ana.lysis of the nature of mathe-
matics, he provided no sustained case for the downgradine of the 
role of mathema.tics against the contemporary Neoplatonic trends. 
The nature of mathematical truth and the certainty of mathematical 
propositions still stood in need of explanation. 
In emphasising, as one must, the empiricist outlook which Bacon 
fostered there is a natural inclination to assume that reason as 
such was not an important element in Bacon's method. But nothing 
could be further from the truth. There is a strong but misleading 
tendency, encouraged by anti-empirical philosophers, to construe 
the introduction of empiricism as an attempt to devalue reason in 
place of experience. But it is important to remember that reason 
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remained a central aspect of all empiricist philosophy until 
the demolition it received at the hands of Burne. Furthermore, 
even Bume's attack on reason as a key to knowledge was essentially 
a rejection of the view that reason, understood as lIJu:e dQ1uc~:iQn 
could supply a~ knowledge of the world. Reason, as understood 
as "that intellectual power or faculty which is ordinarily 
employed in adopting thought or action to some end; the guiding 
principle of the human mind in the process of thinking" (O.E.D.) 
was never rejected by the Empiricist philosophers - indeed it 
is hard to imagine how any philosopher could rejeot reason in this, 
its most usual t sense. But the Empiricists were concerned to 
give reason its proper place within the framework of hUDk~n knowledge, 
and this was as true of Bacon as it was to be of Locke later in the 
century. 
For Bacon, reason was that faculty of the mind whioh was 
essentially concerned or conneoted with philosophy. "History 
has reference to the Memory, poesy to the Imagination, and philosophy 
to the Reasontt31 he wrote. He explained its role thus:-
"Philosophy discards individuals; neither does it deal 
with the impressions immediately reoeived from them, but 
with abstract notions derived from these impressions; . in 
the composition and division whereof according to the law 
of nature and fact its business lies. And this is the office 
and work of Reason." 32 
For Bacon, then, reason was essential to science. It was its 
funotion to ruminate upon the impression~ of the senSa, and then to 
classify them, to supply an order; and that order would be the 
discoveries of scientifio investigation. 
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But, as with Ga1i1eo, and indeed Locke too, there were for 
Bacon some areas which reason could not hope to comprehend. For 
Bacon these were in the field of religion, and he gave a warningf-
"out of the contemplation of nature and elements of 
human knowledge to induce any conclusion of reason or even 
any strong persuasion concerning the mysteries of faith, yea, 
or to inspect and sift them too curiously and search out the 
manner of the mystery, is in my opinion not safe. nGive unto 
faith the things which are faithts n ••••• And therefore it were 
a vain error to attempt to adapt the heavenly mysteries of 
religion to our reason. n 33 
For Bacon, then, reason ha.d its place, indeed a central role in his 
whole programme. But it also had its limitations. In natural 
philosophy, given that men applied themselves, there were :n.o a priori 
limitations; but religion remained for Bacon almost entirely a 
matter of faith. 34 
CopQlmdopa. 
Bacon, undoubtedly, was largely responsible for what T. S. Eliot 
called "the dissociatjon of thE'! sensibility" in English thoueht. 
After recon, poetry J relie;ion, and natural philosophy tended to be 
vie,...red as autonomous areas of human endea.vour with their own 
pa.rticular and peculiar contributions to mal\:e to the totality of 
human understanding. Poetry was linked to the imagination , and 
imagination was not only irrelevant to science, it was in fact held 
to be a hindrance, flights of fancy were the enemy of true 
philosophy.35 Religion transcended reasoll t a.nd therefore the oanonll 
of rationality were not appropriate to it. It was in natural 
philosophy especially that reason and knowledee lit~ed arms. 
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In thus dividing the areas of human intellectual enquiry 
Bacon precipitated the rejection of the Neop1atonic attitude 
towards the physical world. For if one accepted the Baconian 
programme, there was no possibility of justifyir~ one's conclusions 
in science by a.n a.ppea.l to God's Eternal order. Science had to 
justify itself by criteria. independent of theoloeyj natttral 
philosophy had to be secular. \f.aether soience could justify its 
method without transcendental support l'1aS a problem whioh had. still 
to be faced. 
Although Bacon never supplied the areument to refute all 
a priori olaims to knowledge of the physical world, he presented 
a programme which was entirely opposed to such possibilities. In 
Baconian terms the programme would be justified if it led to true 
knowledge of nature which could be used for the benefit of man. 
The programme needed testir~, and it was so tested by the scientists 
who followed Bacon. In some ways the Baconian ideal was found to be 
lackine. But its main message, that knowledge of nature could only 
be obtained by observation and experiment tempered by reason, was 
in general accepted. There remained, however, ·the philosophical 
questions: how tar could the method be justified?, did the method 
rest upon firm foundations? In short, did the Baconian programme 
generate certain knowledge? 
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Chapter V 
EneH~h Scit"'Ylce in thf'i! Post-&,coni~n 1)eriod. 11540 - 168q 
Introduction 
In this chapter we shall consider some aspects of the development 
in science in England prior to the publication in 1687 of 
Newton's Principia. and Locke's El'lsay in 1690. We shall be ooncerned, 
therefore, with some of the ideas of men who were either oontemporaries 
of Locke or his immediate predecessors. 
Once again, in no sense could this chapter be considered a 
comprehensive survey of the period. Undoubtedly for the richness 
of its talent it is one of the most important in the history of 
English science, and indeed of science generally. About it many 
volumes have alrea~ been written and many more await conception. 
What I shall be attempting to do is to show how certain methodological 
problems, arising both out of the Baconian method and the impaot of 
Cartesian science, were constant issues lying at the very foundations 
of the scientific programme. 
Because of the great growth of interest in the physical sciences 
around the middle of the seventeenth century it is not easy to select 
individuals for particular consideration. I have tended to draw on 
examples which i1luatrate the general theme of uncertainty about the 
scope and nature ofscienoe, rather than those scientists who either 
saw no problems of method, or raised none. But the bias so exhibited 
is,I thinkljustified, for many problems did arise, and even tho$e 
who ignored them did so at some peril: their work was always in 
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danger of being undermined by those more conscious of the problems. 
The publication of Bacon's works did not i~nediately herald the 
New Atlantis of scientific learning for which Bacon hoped. It took 
at least a generation for his real impact to be felt. Indeed, partly 
because of the Civil ~r, the interest in soience which grew rapidly 
from 1640 onwards did not manifest itself powerfully until the 
Restoration in 16601• However, there were some important works 
published in the period to 1660, which emerged both as a result of 
the developing general interest. and also as an effect of the impact 
of Cartesian views on English thinkers. 
Most of Bacon's views on science were not shared by his 
contemporaries, ma.l\Y were not even accepted l)y his successors. Thus 
Bacon's hope of achieving certainty in the sciences, shared for 
different reasons by Dee, was not always the view of the Elizabethan 
scientists. Sir lia1 ter Raleigh, for example, in his History of th~ 
Yorld (1614) maintained that reason was important in science, but 
he held that reason was powerless to understand essence, as distirlgUished 
2 from accidents. This view was one that was sustained throughout the 
period that we are considering by many thinkers, and was ~iven 
empirical and philosophical support by, amongst others, lterl':"Ienne in 
his Ia Verit~ des Soienops (1625), by G1anvill in ~R~ Vanity of 
Do&;m9.tizif'{,; (1660), by Boyle in his OrlP;i!1s of Forms and Q".J'llUie1i, (1666), 
and by Locke in the Essa;y. 
If Baoon's vieHs on the certainty possible ill natura.l philosophy 
were not universally adopted, neither was his rejeo'thm of 
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Aristotelian views, or Greek philosophies general1y. n'1con, for 
example, rejected Epicu:rean atomism as an lU1founded hypothol3is, 3 
but many scientists were attracted to the theory, and <:'t large nUl'nber 
e,ccepted it as true.4 .\nd many mid-century soientists quite. clearly 
show a great admiration for Aristotle and for his thecries. One 
such person wes the intrie'J.ir)~ Sir Ken.?lm Die-by (1605 - 1665). 
There was, then, no imm.ediate wholesale adoption of the 
Baconia.n methou. or teachines. Even the mont devoted of Eaconianl1 
among the founder members of the Royal Society were, as we shall see, 
11.ot all of one mind as to what the 13aconian method implied. But 
equally, almost none in the mid-century escaped the influence of 
Eacon's thought. 
Undoubtedly the most important scientist of the peri.od v!as 
Robert Boyle. In this chapter we shall not consider him - he d€'8erv~s 
one to himself. 
Sir Kl?flelm Dlrrby. 
Digby managed to be a great admirer and advocate of Descartes, 
Galileo, and Bacon all at the. same time, but his theories are largely 
a mixture of Cartesian and Aristotelian views. Aristotle, he said" 
was "the greatest logician and metaphysician and universal scholar 
peradventure that ever lived". But theadmirati.on was mixed with 
caution: "Yet witha:l.l We are to consider that since his reign was but 
at the beginning of sciences, he could not choose but have soma defects 
and shortnesses among his lllal"Jy great and admirable perfections.US Gone is 
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the great admiration for Plato, the dominance of Ueoplatonic and 
Pythagorean views from English science; the general conception of 
nature fOlmd in the Neoplatonists never survived as an important 
force in science after the Cartesian and Bc'lconian secularisation of 
that 
nature. And Digby showed none oflreliance on the Ancients which 
charaoterised so mttch Renaissance thinking. 
In his description of his method, Digby was influenced by 
Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes:-
"In delivering any Science the clearest and smoothest 
Method and most agreeable to nature is to begin with those 
thines which are most oommon and obvious, and by disseotion 
of them to descend by orderly degrees and steppes (as they 
lye in the way) to the examination of the most particular 
and remote ones." 6 
He was equally Baoonian in his distrust of theory:-
"We must narrowly take heed lest, refleotine upon the 
notions we have in our mind, we afterwards pin those aiery 
superstruotures upon the nk~terial things themselves that 
begot them, or frame a new conception of the natura of any 
thing by the negotiations of our understanding, upon those 
impressions which itself makes in us; whereas we should 
aoquiesoe and be oontent with the natural and plain notion, 
whioh springs immediately and primarily from the thing itself: 
whioh when we do not, the more we seem to exoel in subtl1ity, 
the further we go from reality and truth. tt 7 
In praotioe, however, Digby often failed to adhere to his 
sta.ted principles. Thus, he a.ooepted Aristotle's view that motion < 
in a. vacuum is impossible, writing, "Aristotle haa demonstrated that 
there oan be no motion in avaouum. tt8 He also accepted Aristotle's 
four elements, and argued that light was identical with fire.9 
With regard to hypotheses, Digby adopted a thorouehly Cartesian 
position. He explained many phenomena in terms of atoms, in a manner 
- 129 -
clearly much influenced by Descartes, thus presupposing their 
existence to account for phenomena, and taking the satisfactory 
account as evidence for the atomts existence. Thus we find him 
explaining the fact that a loadstone lines up north and south as an 
empirical confirmation of his general theory about floods of atoms 
10 
moving from the north pole to the equator. 
Digby, like Bacon and Descartes, believed that science would 
lead to a vast increase in man's knowledee, and he showed no signs 
scepticism about possible limits to the programme, or the certainty 
possible for scientific conclusions. It is not, therefore, 
surprising to find him firmly committed to the view that demonstration 
is possible in the natural sciences. Whoever shall be, Digby argued, 
"as exact and orderly in treating of philosophy and theology, 
as mathematicians are in delivering their sciences, I assure 
myself that demonstrations might be made, and would proceed 
in them as currently, and the conclusions be as certain and 
full, as in mathematics themselves. But that is not all; these 
demonstrations would have the odds exoeedingly of the other, 
and be to us inestimably more advantageous: for out of them 
spring much higher and nobler effects for mans use and life, 
than out of any mathematical ones." 11 
Digby thus shows a faith that natural philosophy can be as certain 
as mathematics. But he did not offer any rationale of this position, 
and it is unclear what his grounds were. Indeed within Digbyts system 
it seems little more than a pious hope. The hope was linked with 
a Baoonian commitment to the utility of science. 
Digby's exaltation of soience over mathematics illustrates hO,"f 
unaffeoted he was by the Neoplatonic ideas of such figures as Dee. 
As with :Bacon, Digby rated mathema.tics not as a key with which to 
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reaoh the ideal forms of nature, but rather as an aid within the 
bo~ of science. Despite this, and somewhat paradoxically, it is 
the mathematica.1 conception of demonstration which he believed it 
was possible to transfer to the natural sciences. 
In Digby, then, we still find the commitment to the mathematical 
paradigm of certainty that we found in the Neop1atonists, but 
without the supportir'e' metaphysics. There is no sup!"orthg theory 
to substantiate the hope of certainty in science, but the hope is 
still maintained. l~o doubt the optimism was sustained by the promise 
of the Baconian and Ca.rtesian programmes. Th..rt, as we have seen, 
the prom:i.se of those methods was at best obscure, and at worst, i11-
founded. This optimism was a marked feature of the period, but 
nobody was able to supply the supporting argumen"t to justify it, 
a problem which troubled many thinkers of the time. It was an 
optimism which Locke's Eq~i'W did much to put 1.n its true perspective. 
Digby can hardly be rated a, scientist of the first rank. Dut 
he is of interest not only for the points we have considered, but 
also because he was the first Englichroan to be strone1y influenoed 
12 by Descartes, whom he knew personally. 
ThomlS Hobbes. 
Another person to be strongly influenced in his conception of 
scientific method by Descartes was Hobbes (1588 - 1619). Hobbes 
not only knew Descartes, whom he admired as a mathematician and 
scientist - if perhaps not so much as a philosopher - but he was a.leo 
a close personal friend of Digby, despite the fact that the latter 
. 
wa.s a. Catholic. (For Hobbes the Catholic church w'as anathema.) 
- 131 -
As with Digby, Hobbes is another representative of that way of 
looking at science which derived from Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes. 
Generally, for him, explanations in the physical sciences were to 
be esteemed according to their explanatory power, and their utilitarian 
consequences. Thus, unlike ~~con, but like Descartes, whether the 
postulated causes of a given effect were ~ causes was only of 
secondar,y importance for Hobbes. Hobbes explained his position thus:-
"The Doctrine of Natural Causes hath not infallible and 
Principles. [~.] Fbr there is no Effect which the Power 
of God cannot produce by many several ways. 
"But seeing that all effects are produced by 'Motion, 
he that supposing some one or more motions can derive from 
them the necessity of that effect whose cause is required, 
has done all that can be expected from :Natural Reason." 13 
The most that we can expect from natural reason, Hobbes maintained, 
is to know that a certain effect "may be producedt ' in a certain way; 
and "may be produced" meant for Hobbes that the effect will occur 
if those causes are present, even if we do not know that they really 
are th,tl causes, "which is as useful as if the ca.uses themselves were 
known." The identification of causes was for Hobbes la.rgely an 
empirical matter. He held, also, that we are only to be concerned 
with causes which will produce the particular effects. Hobbes saw 
no point in being sceptical about whether putativeoauses are really 
the causes of particular phenomena, so long as the putative Causes 
are always sufficient to produce the particular effeot. Hobbes did 
not concern himself with the fact that the putative causes cannot 
be guaranteed to produce the effect unless they are the real causes. 
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Hobbes's treatment of the possibility of a vacuum illustrates 
very clearly his method in science, and also contrasts him with both 
Bacon and Descartes. Both the latter argued., or asserted, the 
impossibility of a vacuum, Bacon for reasons that remain obscure14, 
and Descartes as a consequence of his belief that ~~tter and space 
are identical.15 
Descartes ruled out the possibility of a vacuum on a priori 
grounds. In contrast, Hobbes deployed both argument ~ experiment 
to prove that there is no empty space. The experiment he oites is 
n a connnon one, but I think unanswerableU • 16 It is that water will 
not flow out I of a hole in the bottom of a vessel unless there is a 
hole open at the top of the vessel.11 Hobbes was, of oourse, unaware 
of the existence of air pressure. 
In his Elements of Philosonht Hobbes argued that the phenomena 
of the heavens oan be aocounted for by various assumptions which he 
lists. But he was quite olear that they were only assumptiOns, and 
he oonoluded:-
"And though the oauses I have here supposed be not the 
true oauses of these phenomena, yet I have demonstrated that they 
are suffioient to produoe them, aooording to what I at first 
propounded." 18 
Hobbes, like Baoon, saw the funotion of physics a.nd the soiences 
generally, as the oontrol of nature for the better estate of man. 
But, unlike Bacon, he did not envisage the results of man's enquiries 
reaching the sta.tus of absolute oerta.in knowledge. fIe held out no 
promise of reaching Bacon's forms. In this attitude he shared muoh 
with Oslander, and anticipated some of the approach of R.ohault. 
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nut, as with Digby, Hobbes made no detailed or profound analysis 
of the conditions for knowledge, or the general connection between 
physics and philosophy. 
Dewon's influence on Hobbes was considerable. The emphasis 
on the possibility of the control of nature through physical enquiry 
was all-important, the epistemolo{,;ical considerations remained of 
minor interest. Dut, unlike B.1.con, Hobbes had no fear of conjecture; 
hypotheses were for him of first rate importanoe. Hobbes sa1f the 
danger not in conjecture, but in assuming that one's conjectures 
were certainly true. 
Given that no satisfactory epistemological account of natural 
philosophy 'Has accepted by the mid-seventeenth century scientists 
(except for a very small group of Cartesia.ns) th(!!re was a.lways a. 
danger tha.t the Bc'1conian programme would. foun<ier on the scep'tical 
arguments doployed by the s'tO.pporter&1f Sextus lThnpiric'Us. It is not 
therefore surprising to find. various thi~\:ers urGing that men should 
not be led by soeptical argtuuents into rejcctitJ.G' out of r.an!i 
plausible conjectures simply because they were not esta.b1ished beyond 
doubt. A good example of this a.tti tude is to be found in the lvork 
argued that "a.s credulity is the oause of' error, so incredulity 
offentimes of not enjoyine- truth." 19 God, said Browne, tthath prop-
osed the world into our knowledge, and thereby the notion of 
Himse1f.n20 Therefore:-
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"if aT1.y affirm, the earth [ioth move, and ~till not 
believe with us, it standath still; because he hath probahle 
reason for it, and I no infallible sense, nor N~ason azainst 
it, I will not quarrel with his asse·dion. But if, 111<0 Zenn, 
he shall walk about, and yet deny there is any mo'Hon in 
Nature, surely that man was constitute(l for Antic€'ra. t1 21 
Browne was a man of common sense; plausible conjectures must be 
allowed their due, absurd ones must be rejected. 
John WilkinPl. 
Similarly, John 'VUl1dns in his m,SCovl"'r;r of e, N~w WorJ..1. (1638) 
argued that it is plausible to think that the moon may be inhabited., 
though he did not offer any "necessary proofs". Wilkins urged his 
readers not to dismiss an idea. simply becaUSe it was unusual. 
He showed a. similar purpose in his A nifGOVrS~ o~nQ~r~inr. a 
New Pl~n~t tending to that (it 113 probJ'lble) our E"'!.rthis one of th,,, 
Pl~a";~t'~ "(1640)"; " ';' "t'i't'le' ;';hlc"h 'i'ts'~li "~rn"pha~i~~dt'he' 'imp;r"t'a:~c'~ 'of"' 
conjecture in our thinking about the physical world. 
In his l<t1.them'3.tioal Ivictl':ic (1048) <e!" subti tIed of the wond.ex:s 
jhat may be performed by Mechanical Geometr~ - liilkins, like many 
others, showed his oommitment to the utilitarinn ends of science 
without attempti~ to give any epistemological justification for 
Pursuing it as an enterprise. Mechanics was seen by Wilkins as a 
discipline "whereby nature is· •••• quickened or a.dvance<l in her defeots.n22 
And Wilkins blamed Plato for not enoouraging the applicaticn of 
23' ' 
mathematics to nature. Under the impaot of Bacon, the reverenoe 
shown to Plato had all but disappeared. The justification for meohanios 
Was not in terms of a stepping stone to divine knowledee, but is seen 
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almost entirely in terms of works. 
With regard to the possibility of reaohing certainty in 
sOienoe, Wilkins held generally that certainty could be obtained 
in those areas of science which were capable of detailed quantitative 
the "demonstrations of astronolJl-Y are as infallible as truth itself",24 
25 and he believed that mechanics was a branch of mathematics, his 
attitude being very similar to that of Descartes. 
Like all his contemporaries Wilkins was eager to show that 
science was entirely compat.ible with religious belief. Like Galileo, 
Wilkins argued in lliflCcyeO p:f' 11 t!"t;{. \!Tor) d that the Copernioan theory 
was conformable both to reason and religion. Indeed the book is 
26 
actually based on Campanella's ApolClp;ia pro Galileo. And in perhaps 
his most important work, published posthumously in 1675, or th~ 
Prinoiples and Dut! M of Natural R~liej.on. Wilkins argued that religion 
can be founded upon as sure a footing as reason oan offer, and 
steered a middle course between scepticism and dogmatism. 
Wilkin's attitudes are worth noting because he was one of the 
lnost important, if not ~ most important, person. in the group from 
which the Royal Society took its foundation, as Aubrey described 
him, he was the ~'Principal Reviver of Experimental Philosophy at 
Oxford.,,27 It is fairly certain, too, that his views are 
representative of the ~irlDOni of the period. 
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Henry P01>1er. 
Another person with similar views to \lilkins waB Henry Power 
(1623 - 1668) who became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1663. His 
Experimental Philosophy in Three BOOKS (actually published in 
1663, thoue;h dated 1664) propol.mds both "deductions, and probable 
hypotheses raised from them in Avouchment and Illustration of the 
now famous Atomical Hypothesis." 
According to Power:-
"This is the age wherein (me-thinks) philosophy comes 
in with a spring-tide ••••• These are the days that must lay 
a new foundation of a more magnificant philosophy, never to 
be overthrown: that will empirically and sensibly canv.~ss 
the phenomena of Nature, d.educing the causes of things from 
such. originals in Nature, as we observe are pozsible by art, 
and the infallible demonstrations of mechanicks: and certainly 
this is the way and no other to build a true and permanent 
philosophy ••••• And to speak vet more olose to the point, I 
think it is no rehetorication [.:::.1.2-] to say that all thines 
are artificial; for Nature it self is nothinz else but the 
art of God. tt 28 
Power exrH~cted nat1l!'al philosophy to yield certainty i lrut he 
was quite rE>ady to admit tha.t much of science was BUll conjeo'ture. 
Like Wilkins, Power bE>1ieved in the certainty of mechanics and 
astronomy, but he would not eo so far in his support of atomism, eVE'ln 
thoueh he expected that in the future it would be oonclusively 
established. T11US he wrote:-
"Lastly, many more hints might be taken from the former 
observations to make good the Atomical }~pothesisi which I 
am oonfident will recei va from the mioroscope some furthor 
adva.nta.ge and illustra.tion, not only as to its first universal 
matter, Atoms; but a.lso a.s to the necessary attributes or 
essential properties of' them, as motion, figure, magnitude, 
order and disposition of them in several oonoretes of the 
. vlorld. tt 29 
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Observation, then, Power held, would lead to a knowledge of 
the struoture of matter, and would probably lead not only to the 
vindioation of the atomic b.ypothesis, lmt also to an understandine 
of the essenoe of atoms. Power believed that soienoe, based on 
observation, would lead to knowledge of the B:'lConian forms. 
Power's conjeoture as to the possibility of obtaining knowle\~e 
of the essence of matter was a very common form of speculation in 
the period. Indeed, just such a possibility as Power propound.ed 
was to be one of the subjects that Locke considered in the EM:.:t..l~i 
and it is not even too far-fetched to conjeotu~e that Locke had 
Power in mind when he turned his attention to this topic, for he 
certainly read Power's work. 30 
Another person who shared Power's optimism about findir€ 
certainty in natural philosophy as Bacon had promised, but who did 
not yet see it as accomplished, Was Robert Hooke (1035 - 1703). 
Undoubtedly Hooke was one of the very great soientists of the 
seventeenth oentury; and,as Curator of the Royal Sooiety,he was 
exoellently plaoed to be aware of the general attitudes of scientists 
in the early years of the Society's foundation. 
Those writings of Hooke which were Pl1blished during his life-
time tell us oomparatively little about his aspirations for soienoe. 
But in a colleotion of works published after his death there are 
many interesting rem~rks about the nature and scope of natural 
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philosophy)l Throueh them we can see how close Hooke was to 
the position we have seen Power to have held. 
Hooke recognised that the then-present state of natural 
philosophy did not guarantee true knowledge, only conjecture. 
Nevertheless, he looked forward to the day when true knowledge 
would be established. Hooke (any more than Bc~con) never appreciated 
the logical difficulties to such an accomplishment a.s long a.s 
mathematical knowledge remained the paradigm towards which science 
should move. The title of one of Hooke's work is indicative of 
his approach and is entirely Baconian: "A General Scheme or 
Idea of the Present state of Natural Philosophy and how its defeots 
may be remedied by a methodical proceeding in the making Experiments 
and collecting observations. vlhereby to compile a Natural 
History as the Solid Basis for the Superstructure of True Phi1osophy.n32 
Hooke stated that Uthe Business of Philosophy ie to find out 
a perfect knowledge of the nature and properties of bodies, and of 
the Causes of Natural Productions." Bacon could not have put his 
objective more clearly himself. He would have agreed,too, with 
Hooke's justification of the pursuit of knowledge in science, which 
was to improve man's position in relation to his environment. 
Natural philosophy, Hooke maintained, could be made a.bsolutely 
certain on the model of mathematics. As he wrote:-
tiThe grea.test a.nd most accomplished Wits have not been 
able to bring forth any greater Effects than Probabilities: 
whereas I cannot doubt but that if this Art be well proeecuted 
and made us of •••• even Physical and Natural Enquiries as 
well as )~thematica.1 and Geometrioal will be capable of 
Demonstration." 34 
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Hooke, then, believed that certain knowledge would be possible in 
science. We have already seen that Power and t'lilkins held 
similar views. 
In the light of this it is impossible to accept the general 
contention of Van 1,eeuwen.35 Van LeeUt!/'en argues that Baconian 
science was different from the science of the Royal Society because 
the former expected absolute certainty from his method, whereas, 
typically, the members of the Royal Society did not. Thus he writes:-
"for Bacon scientific knowledge is demonstrative and 
is absolutely certain, a theme in the sequel We shall find 
to be unacceptable to the leading members of the Royal Society. 
Further, since a mechanical method •••• can be provided for 
the discovery of forms, no extraordinary genius is required. 
of the soientist and certainty of the results is assured." 36 
Thlt, as the quotation from Hooke shows, the Curator of the Royal 
Society shared the Baconian a.spiration. This is brought out even 
more clearly if we continue the passage from Hooke whioh goes on: 
"so that henceforward the busirless of invention will not be so nmch 
the effects of acoute wit, as of serious and industrioml pros€tCution.H 
Van Leeuwen is wrong to maintain that ttl ce>;e-r"tl there was 
a non-B.3.conian attitude among the Fellows of the Royal Society. 
t~i1kinSfPO\yer, Rooke and Thomas Spratt, the Societyts first 
historian, were all very Baconian in their ideal and in their 
practice. Rather, there were tvl0 schools of thought within the 
Royal Socie'ty about the possibility of demonstrative and cart,ain· 
~nlkins and Hooke t subscribed to Baoon's view. Others were more 
31 
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sceptical and. i.nclucted such men as Joseph Glanvill t Rol)(~rt 11oyle, 
and. John Locke. These latter, as we shall soo, expected lef~s of 
the scientific enterpri~et but were no 1e28 co~nitted to its 
importance. 
It is clear from the membership of the eroups tho.t there is 
no correlation between ability and commitment; Uooka and. Doyle, 
two of England's greatest scienticts were in d.ifferent camps. 
But it was the more philosophically inclined members who tel'!ded 
to be sceptical of the Baconian prozramme.38 It was, then, I 
have suegested, for philosphica.l reasons that some members of the 
Royal Society did not wholeheartedly support the Baconian programme. 
It is to one of these thinkers that we must now turn. 
Although Glanvill was not a great scientist, he was a 
staunch defender of the Royal Society and the New Philosophy.39 
He was much influenced by Henry !,Iore, and Cambridge Platonism generally, 
and Glanvill'g writings show at least hints of a return to a much 
more authodox Platonism than that exhibited by the Neoplatonists 
of the Renaissance. 
One of the main contentions of Plato's philosophy had been 
that man cannot obtain certain knowledee of the world of experience. 
and it is with this attitude of Plato's that the views of Glanvill 
on the possibility of knowledge through natural philosophy have 
much in common.40 
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Glanvill saw the limits to man's knm>11edee in theological 
terms. Like vlilkins, he saw mants ignoranoe as a produot of the 
fall of Adam. Before the fall, no doubt, Glanvill believed, 
Adam's "knowledge of natural effeots, might probably arise from 
his sensible perception of their oatlS9s. n41 But since then, man 
had had to have artifioial aids to penetrate to the causes of 
natural phenomena, such as "Galileo's tube". 
Despite his avowed scepticism, Glanvill d.id not hold that 
all knowledge was impossible. Indeed. his sceptical programme 
was designed to lead to knowledge; "my endeavour is to promote 
it" he wrote, "confidence in uncertainties, is the greatest 
enemy to what is certain, and were I a 6ce~tick I'de plead for 
Dogmatizing: For the way to bring men to stick to nothing, is 
. 42 
confidently to persuade them to swallow all th1ve;!h" Glanvill, . 
like Descartes whom he greatly admired, saw the possibility of 
establishing YJnowledge only after men had come to see the limitations 
of the specious, currently aooepted, roads to truth. 
For Glanvill, knowledge was equivalent to demonstration. 
But, importantly, Glanvill introduced a different 0 riherion front 
Descartes' . concept of clear and distinot idea .. for deciding when 
demonstration was successful. It was only successful for Glanvill 
when it established its conclusion to be necessary; "we hold no 
demonstration in the notion of the DoematiElttt, he wrote, ttbutwhere 
the contrary is impossible: For necessary is that whioh cannot be 
otherwlse.,,43 As a consequence of this, Glanvill argued that moot 
of what we normally assume to be knowledge is not knowledge in 
fact, merely opinion. 
Glanvill offered us no account of what it is for something 
to be necessary. But it seems fairly clear that he would employ 
a logical, rather than a psychological,criterion. That he 
offered no explicit criterion illustrates that the issue was still 
not appreciated by him: the problem remained both as to what 
constituted necessity and what contingency. 
That alanvill was not clear on the issue can be seen if we 
return to consider What he could have possibly understood when 
he a,ssumed that Adam before the fall had a. knowledge of cau.sea which 
had since escaped man. alanvill maintained that through his senses 
Adam had knowledge of causes. If we accept that to have knowledge 
is to know that some proposition is logically neeessary, then we 
can easily show that such knowledge was impossible for even Adam 
to have, sim~ly throu.;lJ, }:lis senres. Glanvill believed that a. know-
ledge of causes can lead to knowledge of effects. Thus, if I know 
that the only cause of heat is atoms in motion, then it follows 
that if there is heat, then there are atoms in motion.Snoh know-
ledge, alanvill would have argued, is the sort of knowledee for 
which scientists were searching_ But how coald we or Adam know 
that ~ atoms in motion produce heat? Even 1fAdam, thrOUgh his 
~,,,.,.. 
superior senses, could see ato~q, how could he know that he was 
witnessing the real cause of heat, rather than 60meintermediate 
step in a chain, or simply consta.nt conjunction? 
- 143 -
only know this on either of the follmving suppositions (or sim:l.lar 
ones); (a) God told Adam that he was wltnessirJ,g' the causes -
hardly a normal un(lerstanding of empirical knowledee - or, a priori, 
he knew that (b) 'Atoms are the cause of Heat t is logically 
necessary. But (b) is false. There was, therefore, no W3.y in 
which Adam could have the sort of knowledge which Glanvill claimed 
for him. 
If Glanvill had been fully aware of his criterion for knov:1edce 
he would have realized that he was wrong to make such grand.iose 
claims for the power of Ad.~m. But Glanvill did recoenise the 
limitations for ordinary mortals, and for this he certainly deserves 
oredit. liis position emerges most olearly ill his remarks on 
causation which must be reckoned some of his most significant. 
He wrote:-
n All knowledge of causes is deductive: for we know none 
by simple intuition: but through the mediation of its 
effeots. Now we oannot conclude any thing to be the cause 
of another but from its oontinual accompanying it: for the 
oausality itself is insensible. Thus we gather fire to be 
the cause of heat and the sun of daylieh:t: beca.use where-
ever the. sun is, liGht a.ttends it and e contra. But now to 
argue from a conoomitancy to a causality, is not infallibly 
conolusive: Yea in this way lies notorious delusion. Is't 
not possible, and hOlO[ know we the contra.ry, but that some-
thi~, whioh always attends the grosser flame, may be the 
cause of heat? a.nd may not it and its supposed. cause, be 
only para.llel effects?" 44 
Out of oontext this passage might well be trucen to establish 
Gla.nvlll and not Hume as the first great analyst of the ooncept·· 
of causation. Undoubtedly Glanvill's remarks are extremely 
important, but for all their clarity, it would appear that Glanvil1 
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himself did not appreciate their full import. \fuy he did not, 
I have sucgested, is because Glanvill failed to analyse the 
concept of necessity with any great profundity. Despite this 
liIni tation, Glanvill was quite clear that all so-call ell causal 
, 
knowledge must be conjectural, and. his argtlment for his conclusions 
was entirely correct. 
Glanvill's views on mathematical knowledge are also of 
considerable importance, and, like his views on causation, may 
even be original. iathematics, Glanvill held, does not really 
give us knowledge, becau,'39 it is essentially of our own prod.uction, 
and it is not necessarily connected with anything external to 
ourselves. Thus he said that "the knowledge we have of the 
Nathematicks, hath no reason to elate us; since by them we know 
but mmWe~G, and figures, oreatures of our own, and are yet 
igno;~~'t" ~f our l.1a.ker t s .n45 
" Glanvill appears to have held the view ,that the mathematical 
entities with which we are familiar are some sort of oopies of 
eternal mathematical entities to which only God has access. ~t, 
if the numbers with which we cperate arecopiea of ideas in the 
mind of God, Glanvill held that we have no way of knowing this; 
we therefore knew nothing for certain except our Olm idea.s. 
There are at least shades of some form of Platonism in 
Glanvill's soeptioism here, which would not be out of keeping for 
a disoiple of Henry ~lore. But, the passage also shows that Glanvill 
had no deep understanding of the nature of mathematioal, truth. 
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However, in suggesting that mathematics, or at least the mathematics 
with which we are familiar, h~s no known reference to anything 
independent of the mind, Glanvill implied that mathematical truth 
required no independent justification from the mind. In this sense 
he was anti-Platonic, for there was no appeal to the eternal forms to 
justify the propositions of mathematics which we actually use. 
Glanvillts views on mathematics point towards the aocount of 
mathematics which was to be put forward by Locke. Like Glanvill, 
Locke was to argue that we had no need to transcend the human intellect 
to account for our understanding of mathematics. As with his conception 
of causation, Glanvill was opening the road to the view tha.t much of 
what we take to be truths a.bout reality, a.re in fact more a question 
of how it is that we, as human beings, construe reality. 
With regard to scientific knowledge, Glanvill was exactly as 
one would expect, a conjecturalist in the tradition of Oaiander, 
Hobbes,and Rohault. He maintained that Descartestsystero was intended 
by its author only as an hypothesis,46 and in general held that no 
further account can be expected from humanity "but how things possibly 
mav h~ve been made oonsoTh"l.ntly to sensible nature .... For to say 
the prinQiple§of nature must be such as our PUilosoDhy makes them, is 
to set bounds to omnipotence, and to confine infinite power and 
WiAdoTll to our shallolv !1'lodels. tl41 
,~"" ~~,#~~ 
Glanvill's use of the word 'roodel' is both interesting and 
instructive. It shows that Glanvill was committed to seeing the 
theories of men about nature as always open to revision i.nthe light 
" .. '--:;' 
of further empirical enquiry. It also shows an acknowledgment of 
the role of analogy in scientific explanation, a point which we shall 
see i~ the sequel, fully grasped by Locke. 
Glanvill, then, was committed to a view of mlln which placed. 
very severe limitations on his possible knowledge. Like Bacon, he 
went to very considerable lengths to outline the causes of our 
misunderstandings about nature. He wrote, for example, of "the 
"8 impostures and deceits of our senses",~ and the dangers of the 
"0 imagination which "impresses a persuasion without evidence,,'-l-) 1..;111ch 
"a,n ungrounded credulity cry'd up for faith • .,50 Like P"::1.con, he 
believed that such limitations could be overcome; but unlike r~con, 
Glanvill held that it was not possible for man to reach certain 
knowledee of nature. 
Glanvi11 t s commi tmant to the impossibility of knowleclge of 
nature was tempered by his very clefinite criteria for what should 
count as rational belief. These were either simple empirical 
confirmation, or else the acceptance of an assulYir>tion. even thO'l.l$h 
it could not be d.irectly confirmed, beoause of its explanatory pOi.fCr. 
Thus he vTrote: 
"And. nOi'l since a €,Tcat part of our scientifical treas1..U"e 
is most likely to be!.;Or3.'~lt'1'''''I.t?t th01;lgh all bears the image 
an/i. s1..1perncription of yl";:;,~t~r; the only \vay to know \'lhat is 
sophisticate anl\,lhat isnQt is to brine £1.11 to the ~"'.'1'in 
of the T01.lchstone." 51 
And Glanvill recontrneniied us to f0110\'1 Descartes' method - ahm.ys 
l'emcmberine that Glan.vi11 believed that DcscartM held his cOllclttsiono 
to be only hypotheses. 
\ 
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Itrpotheses, Glanvill held, oan be rationally 11clieved, 0\fen 
thou.ch they are recocniscd as h;:lpotheses. Thus he recor.uncnded. U:3 
52 to believe that all sensitive perception is derived from motion; 
r,-:! 
"This I conceive to be an hypothesis well worthy of a rational b,~1icfll"''') 
he ",rote. Perhaps significantly, Glanvill attributed this thesis to 
Descartes without any mention of Gassendi or any othor th1.rlkers. 
Quite correctly, Glanvill saw that certain of Descartes' 
hypotheses were not open to empirical confirm:;?tion of falsification. 
Thus, he held that the choice between accepting and rejectine the 
Cartesian form of the primary and secondary quality distinction 
could not be settled by observation, "for if it would be as Descartes 
would have it; yet S CDR0 would constantly present it to us as ,Unti. ,,54 
,. .-11 , _ .. :i,i> 
Here, the basis of choice l'faS to made in terms of the fruitfulness 
of the outcome in terms of the explanatory power so eenerated. Thus, 
on the choice between Descartes' wave theory of light and Gassendifs 
atomic theory Glanvill wrote:-
"lihether sensation be made by corporal1 emissions and 
materia.l t. i:,. S f4) >- a... or by motions impressed on the aetheria1 
matter, a.nd carried by the continuity there of to the Common 
Senses It11 not revive into a dispute: The ingenuity of the 
latter fu~th alrea~ given it almost an absolute victory over 
its rival." 55 . 
Glanvill's whole tone was empirioist, and he believed that 
rational belief should always be proportioned to the evidence in 
its favour. It is an important feature of many, perhaps all,of the 
English scientists strongly influenced by Descartes, that they 
nevertheless were of this frame of mind. The lessons whioh the English 
learnt from Descartes were generally not inclined to make them a priori 
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in their science. 
To class Glanvil1 as an empiricist is reasonable, though many 
of his religious views would not settle happily in that oamp_ But 
even here Glanvill often argued for his belief in the Christian 
religion by means of empirioal evidenoe. Thus, to our minds bizarrely, 
in his fir"" Wir-!'1JlJ::3 Tri J1mJlhiltll~ he maintained that wi tohes were 
empirioal evidenoe for the existenoe of the .Devil, and that the 
existenoe of the D.evil was evidence for the existence of God. 
Though an empiricist, 'Glanvill shows few, if any, signs of 
denying the rea~y of postulated, but unobservable, entities, as 
Berkeley and Hume were to do; and though a soeptic in conventional 
terms, Glanvill did not draw any soeptical conclusions about the 
possibility of rational belief. What he did do was to Challenge 
the complaoency of th08etoo eager to accept the aspirations of the 
full-blooded l3aconian programme. Iris funotion was to temper the 
enthusiasm of those who were inolined to rest too smugly on the 
aohievements of the new science, and this, at any timet is no bad 
thine. 
The Carnbridffe Pla:tonis.ts. 
Although not unconnected. with the New Scienoe,the Cambridge 
Platonist were primarily theologians. DirectlYt they contributed 
nothing of importanoe to science, though indirectly, they could 
56 . be held to have had some influence. The objective of the Cambridge 
Platonists was lar~ely to supply a ratior.al theology, and in their 
thinkir~ they were greatly influenced by Descartes. 
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The most important of' their number was Henry More. More agreed 
with Descartes on most q\lestions, but he disagreed on the rather 
important one, whether spiritual substance was extended. Primarily 
for theological reasons, I·jore argued that spirits were exten(led, 
but physical reasons played a large part in his case. More, per}~ps 
better than anybody elr-e, illustrates how closely ccnnected were 
physics and theology for seventeenth century thinkers. 
In his Immortality of th~ Soul (1659),More argu.ed that not 
all physical effects are produced by mechanical causes. Thus he 
said that gravity, that is, the tend~ncy of a body to fall towards the 
centre of the earth, cotud not be explained on mechanical grounds. 
Gra.vity, he a.rgued, is n some power more than mechanica.l". On purely 
mechanical erounds, he said, p~rsical objects ought to fly off and 
recede from the earth. l,iore was not opposed to mechanistic explanations, 
but he believed that their limitations should be recoenised. Onto-
logioally, N:ore held that spirits anil eravity were in th(~ same class. 
More tried to steer a middle course between the rigld <lna-11sm 
of Descartes, and the mc~terialism of Hobbes. 
was primarily with the nature of substance. 
Ind.oing so, his concern 
On the limits and nature 
of knowledB'~ he had comparatively little to say. Usire th.e eohola-ettc 
terminolocy of faculties, he maintained that truths are confined to 
(a.) "Common lTotionstJ f whle" oorr4~ponded. rouehly to J3...1.con f s tFirst 
Philosophy't and. inoluded such truths as that the whole is greatl,'fr-
than the parts; (b) "External Sense", which included besides 
knowledge by sensation, memory as well i and (0) ttDed.uctions of 
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reason". He held that tfwhatever is clear to anyone of these three 
facul ties is to be held und.oubtedly true, the others havin,:; no·thine 
to evidence to the contrary.n57 But he did not give a.n. account of 
the nature and limits of knowledge beyond. this, and he did. not 
consider the sorts of epistemological problems with which \19 have 
been concerned, arising out of the soientific developments. 
The general attitude of the Cambridge Platonists to the Ne\1 
Science was well swmned up by Ralph Cudworth in a letter to 
Robert Boyle written in 1684. Cudworth wrote:-
"The writers of hypotheses in natural philosophy will be 
confuting one another a long time, before the world will 
ever agree if it ever do. But your pieces of natural history 
are unconfutable, and will afford the best grounds to build 
hypotheses upon. You have much undone Sir (ra.neis Baoon in 
your natural experiments; and you have not Insinuated 
anything, as he is tho'1.:t8'ht to ha.ve done, tending to irreligion, 
but the contrary." 58 
The slightly patronising tone, the general impression of uninterest 
in natural science, the belief that theology was still Queen of the 
Sciences, are attitudes which I believe are all discernable in 
Cudworth's remarks. 
Al3 one would expect from their name, the Cambrid,ga Platonists 
were committed, in one way or another, to a doctrine of innate ideas. 
But their views on these matters were not of central importance to 
scientific developments, except in so far as they encouraged a 
tendency to believe in the possibility of an a priori system of 
natural philosophy.59 But such a tendency never developed strong roots 
in Eneland, if it did anywhere else. The only great attempt towards 
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such a system was the work of Leibniz, and the influence of l.eibniz 
in Eneland, in either epistemoloeical or scientifio matters, was 
never very great; the controversy with Newton over the priority of 
the invention of the calculus was enough to see to that. 
Conclusions. 
~le central thesis of this chapter has been that the 
achivements of the scientists of the period was not accompanied by 
a solution of the epistemological problems which the new soience 
generated. The Baoonian expeotation of oertainty in soienoe, whilst 
subscribed to by many, was not wholeheartedly supported, and nobody 
suooeeded in providing a justifioation for the R~conian aspiration. 
AI though Desoartes' influence was vast, few, if any, of the English 
scientists adopted his epistemology, and they believed that his 
science supported a oonjecturalist view of natural philosophy. 
But, if these issues remained unresolved, the progress was 
oonsiderable. Virtually all of the soientists of the period, with 
the possible exception of the Cambridge Platonists, oame to aooept 
a meohanistic view of nature: the key to natural philosophy was matter 
in motion. Thus Hobbes oould write: ttGali1eus in our time •••• was 
the first that opened the gate of natural philosophy universal which 
60 is the knowledge of the nature of motion." 
Descartes' sharp distinotion between mind and ~~tter was just 
another aspect, though an important one, of seeing a.ll problema of 
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the physical world in terms of mechanical cause and effect. The 
causes of change were physical 0 bj ects t whose exact Th'lture had yet 
to be established, producing effects by virtue of motion. Already, 
too, the possibility of qualitative changes being accounted for in 
terms of quantitative changes of matter in motion was becoming 
accepted. 
But, this granted, it is as well to remember that many were 
also opposed to such raclical new thinking. We have only taken account 
of those who argued for the new science, but at least as many people 
were actively opposed to it as in its favour. The issue was by no 
means decided with the foundation of the Royal Society, though 
royal patronage helped the victory, and it is worth remembering that 
as late as 1703 there was a movement in Oxford to ban John Locke's 
F.GQay for undergraduates, because the new philosophy "wa.s too much 
61 
read" • 
The science of the period was almost totally devoid of the 
Neoplatonism of the earlier phase of the scientific revolution, and 
indeed, as we have seen, there was a very definite oompartmentalisation 
of knowledge developing under the influenoe of Bacon. This in 
itself meant that the scientific enterprize could not so easily be 
justified by an appeal to a religiously-based metaphysio t . science 
needed a justification within its own terms. The dominant. oriterion, 
for lack of any other, was to point to the success of the scientists 
in accountine- for various phenomena, and their ability to prediot 
(in advanoe) the outcome of variou.s ev~mts.But, as Glanvill had 
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shot'ITl1, the foundations of such a justification t'lere at least 
sha¥~f if not downright rotten. nut in general the optimism of 
the age discouraged ar>.y profound disbelief in the rationality of 
the procra.rnme: observation and experim(mt, it '-las generally held, 
could and diel bring knol'lledce. 
Chapt<":!' VI 
Intr0~.'.1(~:ti ~m. 
No thinker better r0flected the irltellcdual cl:i.m"ite l;lM.eh 
aocompa,nied the arri V11 of the ri~1W scietK!('l i.n Th1,:::;1 and thrill nobt:n~t 
Boyle (H~27 - 1691). Doyle W3S not only the €,'1'eateF1t :in:3'11.Gh 
scientist of the e.:l.rly days of tht::l llOY111 t:c'ciety, and. the one who 
areued most effectivel~r fOr the 'Corpuscular Fhno~ophyt, but he 
n.lso vrrote \.vid.ely on theo1oeicsl and. philosophical topics. In his 
theology and his philosophy, Boyle sho'i~ed hot" e;reat Has the imp'lot 
of science on his t'1hler thirJ:ingi if the E'oience of the Neop! at(mists 
of un earlier ace was shaperi by their theology and metaphysics, th~m 
it was, for f'lOyle, science which shaped. his theoloey 8,1'Id metaphysics. 
Perhaps nothin.g is more indicative of the mod.ern mind than this 
profound shift. 
This is not to say that the chn.ng~ 1'128 total: Boyle llever 
oonceded that the method of science was the only road to knOt'll edge. 
But Boylets whole thinkir~ was pervaded by an empirical outlook, 
in some respeots even more comprehensive them J1.'loon~e. Thus, Boyle 
argued that the Christian religion was substantiated largely by 
"the testimony of d.ivine miricles", and the "great effects produced 
in the world by ittl (i.e. the Christian religion) •. ,'1.nd Boyle 
acoepted this as correct because these justifications "a.re bottomed 
upon matters of faot, a.nd consequently are likely to be the most 
prevalent upon those that have a great veneration for experience, 
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and are duly disposed to frame suoh pious reflectionB, as it warrants 
1 
and leads them to rna.k:e." For Descartes, God had jUI3tified 
accepting empirical evidence: for Boyle, empirical evidence justified 
accepting God. Such a basis for a belief in Christianity was to 
become very common in the later seventeenth century , and, incidentally, 
it is one reason, among several, why Hume's chapter 'On Mirioles' in 
his first Inquiry was suoh an important critique of early eighteenth 
century religious attitudes. 
Boyle, like Glanvill, offered no general panacea for the 
problem of certainty in science. He held that ill-founded optimism 
in the certainty of science was a danger to true progress; but, as 
we shall see, this in no way placed him in the camp of the dogmatic 
sceptics. His scepticism was of the sort which should accompany all 
good scientific work, a recognition that no matter how strong the 
evidence in favour of a particular hypothesis, it must remain open 
to the possibility of either revision or even rejection at some 
later stage. 
Boyle, more than any other Englishman, was seen by his 
contemporaries as supplying the evidence to support the Corpuscular 
view of matter, against any Aristotelian account of matterts 
properties. He was particularly concerned to show that properties 
such as hot and cold were capa.ble of bei.ng expla.ined by mechanical 
principles, rather than that they should be accepted as irreduoible 
properties of matter, and in favour of this view he gathered a 
great deal of experimental evidence •. How conclusive this evidence 
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was is still a matter of dispute,2 but it could not be dismissed 
easily. Certainly, in this respect we can say that John Looke 
worked in a world which Boyle had done much to make. 
In his work to substantiate the atomic view of matter Boyle 
produced a great deal of evidence to support the distinotion between 
the primary and secondary qualities of matter, and much of Locke's 
case for the distinction as he presented it in the Essay can only 
be understood against this background. Nany other aspects of Boy1e t s 
work were also important to Locke's theory of knowledge: Locke's 
concept of method, his views on the possible ex.tent of human inquiry, 
and classifications of the types of knowledec, all reflec·t aspects 
of positions for which Boyle argued. The importanoe of Boyle , 
therefore, is central not only to the development of EngUsh science t 
but also to English philosophy_ 
Boyle claimed that he was not much influenced by earlier 
thinkers. Thl.tS he wrote in 1661 in regard to Descartes' works 
that he "purposely refrained, though not altogether from transiently 
consulting, about a few particulars, yet from seriously and orderly 
reading those excellent (though disagreeing) books, or so mtloh as 
Sir Franois Bacon's No~~ Or~an~~, that I might be not prepossessed 
with any theory or prinoiples, till I had spent some time in trying 
What things themselves would incline me to think.»3 But, ol~~rly, 
much of Boyle's later thinking at least drew on the work of Galne~, 
&~con, Gassendi, and Desoartes. Indeed, Boyle went on to say that 
he was just ttbeeinnine fj.OW to a.llow myself to read those exoellent 
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books," and acknowledged that "if I had road them before I began 
to write, I might have enriched the ensuing essays wHh divers 
truths, which they now want. tt 
In this chapter we shall look at Boyle's conception of science, 
a.nd his vielr.rs on the possibility of knowledge. fill I have already 
S'lJ.ze;ested, we shall finel in his works both caution and optim:i.sm, 
the middle ground, between the certain·ties promised. by Bc'1.con and 
Descartes, and the scepticism of the P,yrrhonians. 
The Limite of Re~son. 
An appropriate road in to Boyle'S thinking on the limits of 
knot'lledge is by way of a paper by Richard S. Hestfall. As Westfall 
is an influential historis.n of science i.t ,,,,HI be worth oonEdderi:n~ 
his art;lunent in a little detail. His claims about Boyle's a .. ttitude 
towarcls the status of scientific theories are, I believe, funCl.amentally 
mistaken. 
In his fUnpublished Be:;!e Papers Ra1atine to Scientific l'Iethod. 4, 
'Hestfall argues that there is a. contradiction in Boyle's atti tmle 
towarcls thlZl atc-dua of his theories. On the one hand, l'lestfall claims, 
Boyle reoognise(i that the Corpusoular Philosophy could. only be 
construed as an hypothesis when he was disoussing metaphysical 
questions; but, on the other hand, Boyle wished to olaim absolute 
certainty for it when oontrasting the new Corpi1.soular philosoph;y 
with Aristotelian physics. Westfall writest-
"vlhen he was denounoing the Aristotelian philosop1'lY, 
Boyle had no doubt of the necessary truth of the meohanical 
philosophy, while he was never more sure of the limitaticns 
of human und.erstanding than when he was defending religiOUS 
truths above reason. It 5 
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Contrary to this, I believe that to argue as vigorously as 
Boyle did for the Corpuscular Philosophy did not in itself commit 
him to the view that whatever truths it did embody t1ere rwcgr.rm,ri J y 
true in any sense, nor is it even to corumi t him beyond all 
possible recall to the mechanical philosophy. Rather, what we find 
in Boyle is the same sort of attitude that we found in Glanvill, 
that is, an acceptance of the mechanical philosophy as a rational 
belief, established as certainly as a theory which involved an 
appeal to entities which could not be observed might be established, 
without any sl~gestion that the theory might not, at a later stage, 
be replaced by a more adequate theory. 
In support of his view, Westfall quotes from Boylets Sqp~tic~. 
"I do not with the true Scepticks prepose doubts to 
persuade men that all things are doubtful and will ever 
remain so (at least) to htunan understandings; but I 
propose doubts not only with design, but with hope, of 
being at length freed from them by the attainment of 
undoubted truth; which I seek that I may find it ••• H n 6 
Westfall takes this as evidence that Boyle believed, with the 
Aristotelians, "that a science should be more than possible hypotheses, 
that it should be a system of truth demonstrated through neoessary 
causes. tt7 As further support, he refers to one of Boyletsoriteria. 
for an "Excellent Hypothesis", viZ., that it is the pnl"I hypothesis 
that can explicate the phenomena, with the implicit assumption 
tha.t there are such hypotheses. Let us, then, turn to these two 
pieces of supporting evidenoe for the Westfall interpretation, and 
- 159 -
see if they really go any way to establishing Westfall's cla.im. 
I shall take the second point first. Amant! Boylets unpublished 
papers to which Westfall has drawn our attention,8 there is one 
in which Boyle lists the "Requisites of a Good Hypothesis", and 
also "The Qualities and Conditions of an Excellent E'ypothesis.,,9 
The requisites of a good hypothesis, Boyle said, are these:-
ttl. That it be Intelligible. 
2. That it contains nothing impossible or manifestly false. 
3. That it suppose not anything that is either unintelli.gible, 
impossible or absurd. 
4. That it be consistent with it self. 
5. That it [be] fit and sufficient to explioate the ~henomen~, 
especially the chief. 
6. That it be at lest consistent with the rest of the 
phenomena it partioularly relates to, and do not oontra.dict any 
other known phenomena of nature, or manifest physioal truth." 
We can see from this, that, consciously or not, ~1ylets position 
was anti-Cartesian: there is no room in Boyle's ooncepti-on of 
science for ffalse hypotheses', acoeptable as long as they explicated 
the phenomena. Boyle wa.s committed to the view tha.t the object 
of soientific work was discovery of the truth, in so far as that was 
possible. In several respects his oonditionsfor a. fGood Hypothesis' 
are like the conditions that we have seen Hobbes la.y down for a 
scientific explanation. We can also see that Boyle was not ~ 
rigorous Baconian for he layed much more Weight on the usefulness 
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of hYrotheseB than B~con would have accepted. 
The qualities and conditions of an excellent hypothesis 
Boyle listed as follows:-
ttl. That it be not precarious, but have sufficient grounds 
in the nature of things itself, or at least be well recommended by 
some auxiliary proofs. 
2. That it be the simplest of all the good ones we are able 
to frame, at least containing nothing that is superfluous or 
impertinent. 
3. That it be the only hypothesis that can explicate the 
phenomena, or at least that does explicate them so well. 
4. That it enable a skilfull naturalist to foretell futur~ 
phenomena, by their congruity or incongruity to it; and. especially 
the events of such expts. as are aptly devised to examine it; 
as things that ought or ought not to be conoequent to H.ft 
Doyle presumably held that "a.n excellent hypothesis" had all 
the properties of a "good hypothesis" with these fou!' extra. ones.· 
In the list of conditions for "an excellent h..'Vpothosistt , that 
of simplicity was not a feature of the TIaconian tradition, though 
we will remember trJB,t it wa.s a. f(~ature of the oriteria. employed 11Y 
tho l~eopla.tonists. 
lJone of the criteria, or even all of them together, is 
offered as a guarantee of truth for the hypothesis; a.ll that Doyle 
1'1.:113 offering were reasons for believine a. hypothesis is likely to 
be true, am1 sorne r!'\1'\sor.s, he maint,~il1ed., rrre ·l}etter th:m oth,!':r's. 
vlhen tJestfall quotes the third. crit0:rion of an p~{(;el1€:nt l;~rl'()f;hr,piG 
as indicatinc that 30;r10 '2':'Cpeoted soiE-ncn to cive ctlH301ute oortninty, 
it is s:i.enificant that he a.oes not quote the H!101c of that COftdition, 
for the qualification in the second part of it must surely 11,:) takon 
as an indication that 130yle ~'IaS far fro!':! sure that there could be an 
hypoth0sis vlhioh tvas the 01'11;: hypothesis that could oxplain tho 
phenomena. 13ut, more in1portant, to claim thCit a particular hypoth';Bif:' 
is the only hypothesis that can explain cortain phenoncna does not 
neoessarily imply that the hypothesis 1s itself nf3cessarily true, that 
is, that the h~Yl)othesis COtlld not, 103'ieally, be false. Ther(~ is a 
very s,traie;htfor'l>lard sense in which a p3.rtioular hypothesis might b(~ 
accepted as the only l1.ypothesis to expla.in some phenom~na. without 
implyine that the h;:tPotheais must be, logically, necessarily true. 
Thus, if I know th~t a nt~ber of eleotric light bulbs are oonnected 
in series in a circuit, that the oircuit is properly conneoted, and 
the ammeter shows a. positive reading when it is tlsed to test the 
circuit, then. if the bulbs do not light, I can conclude that the only 
possible hypothesis to explain the facts is that at least one of the 
bulbs is faulty. There is, then, a clear sense in which cne may talk 
of there being only one hypotheSiS to explain the facts which does 
not imply any commitment to the necessary truth of the hypothesiS. 
tiestfall then, is , I believe, mistaken in citing Boyleta thirfl 
condition as evidence for the view that Boyle ever held that it 
wa.a possible to identify necessary causes of events. 
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~{e shall now return to H'estfall' s other argument dr.;nm from 
the passaee already quoted from the Sceptical Chemist. For this to 
count as evidence in favour of tV-astfall's interpretation of Boyle 
then l30yle t s word.'3 tithe attainment of undoubted truth" must be 
interpreted as meaning the attainment of necessary truth. But 
Westfall offers us no reason for suoh an interpretation of Boyle's 
words, and I shall argue that it is much more plausible to support 
another readins of the phrase. 
First, let us note that the passage is very similar to 
one already quoted from Glanvill (Chapter V, page 141). Glanvill, 
it will be remembered, was soeptical because scepticism of uncertain-
ties would be an aid. not an hindrance, to truth. Boyle, too, argued, 
for the same role for scepticism in the path to knowledge; true 
scepticism, Boyle held, was the ener~ of natural philosophy, but 
there was a healthy scepticism which all natural philosophers should 
show, namely a scepticism of unsubstantiated hypotheses, and it is 
Next, it is important to realize that what counted as an 
undoubted truth in the physical sciences was, for Doyle, quite 
different from what counted as an undoubted truth in metaphysios. 
He was very clear about this; in his ~onsid:p;rfl]ion!1 ~bQu.t :Uta 
~econoi1eableness of RelMOn and Religi~~' {i6755; * h~' ~;pi~i~~d 'the 
three Borts of certainty that he thought there were:-
tlThere are amonc philosophers three distinct, whether 
kinde or degrees. of demonstration. For there is metaphysioal 
demonstration, as we may call that, where the conolusion is 
manifestly built on those generalmetaphysioal adoms that 
can never be other than true; such asnibH· ;po1tef'lttl!:\Iiml. ('H'H'';!! 
... - .•....... , .... ~ ... 
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& non essei no entis nullae Bunt proprietates realest etc. 
'llhere are also p~Bical demonstrations,where the conclusion 
is evidently deduced from physical principles; such as are 
ex nihilo fit: 11'ulla substa.ntia in nihilum redigiture, etc. 
which are not so absolutely oertain as the former, because, 
if there be a God, he may (at least for ought we know) be able 
to oreate and annihilate substanoes; and yet are held 
unquestionable by the ancie~t naturalists, who still suppose 
them in their theories. And lastly there are moral demon-
strations such as those, where the proof cogent in its kind 
or some concurrence of probabilities that it cannot be but 
allowed, supposing the truth of the most received rules of 
prudenoe and principles of practical philosophy." 11 
Boyle did not expect natural philosophy to rise above £hysical 
demonstration, though, equally clearly, he did hope that it would 
rise as far as that. And physical demonstrations could never yield 
neoessary truths in any tough sense of that expression, because, as 
Boyle pointed out, this would require a knowledge of God's intentions, 
and, even more, though Boyle did not point this out, a Leibnizian 
type of determinism governing God's ohoioes, whioh would in faot 
remove God's freedom of choice. That is, the only way in which 
physical demonstration could become metaphysical demonstration would 
be if we knew that all the things which do occur, oocur aa a matter 
of logioal necessity. 
It by no means follows from this, however, that Doyle d.id not 
believe the Corpusoular Philosophy to be true; quite certainly he 
did. And, no doubt, he did so because he believed that it matohed . 
up to his oriteria of "an e."lCcellent hypothesis". Similarly, he 
accepted the heliocentrio theory, whioh he continued to describe 
as "the Copernican hypothesis". The reasons which he offered for 
its aoceptance were that it avoided many difficulties of other 
hypotheses , it It doth ren(ler as good an aecet.mt as the otherll 
(the ptolema.ic system), it was simpler, and. it was suppor"tecl 1);;, 
the discovery that Jupiter and Saturn a.re planets circling thFl 
12 
sun. 
Consistently, Boyle maintained. the conjectural status of 
natural philosophy, and not only, as liastfall implies, in his 
theological wri tines. In The lTsefnlnAFlI~ of Natn!'l'tl Phil,oROn\"'£ 
• ":"'" ~ ." #I .. .. 
(1663) Boyle pointe(l out the dangers of assuming that onets t11Ml'y 
did embody the truth::-
"A.'3 confidently as many atomists, and other naturalista, 
presume to know the true and genuine causes of things they 
attempt to explicate; yet very often the utmost they can 
attain to, in their explications, is t that the explicated 
phenomena may be produced after such a ID1'tnner, a.s they deliver, 
but not that they really are so." 13 
vlliat is more, even if we cannot find another hypothesiAto explain 
all the phenomerla it does not follow that there is no such explanat:1om-
"For supposing the argument to be conolusive, that 
either the supposed explication nrust be allowed, or ml?,n 
can give.none at all that is intelligible; I see not what 
absurdity it were to admit of the consequenoe. For who ha.s 
demonstrated to us, that men must be able to explicate all 
naturats phenomena ••• And how will it be proved, that the 
omniscient God, or that admirable contriver Nature, oan 
exhibit phenomena by no ways, but such as are explioable by 
the dim reason of man?" 14 
Boyle's reference to "that admirable contriver l1ature' was a dig 
at the Aristotelians, many of whom, like the doctors of Moliere'S 
l,e r,!alade Imacina.ire, found answers to problema simply byrephraaing 
the problem and asserting oategorically what had been originally 
interrogative,thuB, Why is fire hot? Because it has a hot quality. 
A whole and very interesting work of Boyle's was devoted to showing 
up the absurdity of such forms of explanation.15 
Boyle, then, was committed to the view thlit science c:\n arrive 
at two sorts of explanation. First there were those that could be 
taken as certa.inly true (but not necessa.rily true); second, there 
were those that were only probable. On this basis all scientific 
knowledge was hypothetioal, and any physioal demonstration might 
turn out either not to have the soope that it was originally thought 
to have, or even, on further investigation, to be totally false. 
Boyle understood by a physical demonstration nothing more than that 
there was substantial empirioal evidenoe for a partioular oonolusion 
about the world. This cono1usion might be either a statement 
expressing a regularity such as Archimedes prinoiple - in Boylets 
own words~ - "That a solid body weighs less in water than in air, 
16 by the weight of water equal to the bulk of that body" ; or it 
might be the analysis of a particular property, say hea.t, in terms 
of motion. 
Even when a particular conclusion wa.s deducible from more 
general principles, the more general principles could not be accepted 
as true until and unless they were substantiated by empirioal research. 
Boyle was thus completely out of sympathy with Cartesians who found 
total confirmation of the general principles solely in terms of 
their success in accounting for less fundamental ones. Boyle wOl.lld 
have been the first to argue that the axioms of any system of 
physios were not necessarily true. :But, given the Q..'Cioms, established 
by the best pOssible experimental means, he believed that it was 
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possible to demonstrate the properties of various objects. Boyle's 
paradigm for such inquiries was Galileo's Two New Scie~ceR.17 
But Boyle never showed any tendency to construe Galileo's findines 
as anything other than contingent empirical truths. 
Boyle wa.s certa.inly corruni tted to the vie\1T that it was 
possible to establish with at least moral certainty basic explanatory 
causes of phenomena, but, interestingly, he did not wish to call those 
Laws of Nature. Laws, Boyle held, were prescriptive, not descriptive, 
and prescriptions could not be applied to flim,nimate botHes." He 
saw the important point tha.t "The a.ctions of inanima.te bodies ••••• 
are produced by powers, not by laws, though the agents, if intellieent, 
1° 
may regulate the exertions of their power by settled rules. n LI For 
Boyle, the ultimate rules were those ordained by God.. Arhl the objec't 
of natura,1 philosophy was to d,isoov8r the rulf~s and the powers which 
ex:ist in nature, by empirical means. The ul tim3.te pllysical sources 
of those pow~rs were thoueht by J30yle to be urJmowable, though we 
could mn],;:e plausible suegestions as to what they m:teht be. 
The 'rules t, which Descartes had. called laws t \"ere primary the 
la,vlS of motion, at this, pre-I~0Htonian, staee of mechaniCS, still 
only imperfectly understood.. nut, given l'l'lf.ttter, God could th"ili 
supply it with atlY form of motion~ The fact that ITi; seem/:!lcl to give 
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Boyle recocnised that our knowledge of the univ0rs0 \-1:lf. vcry 
limited. There was, for example, no reason to believe that t,h'~ la.'lI8 
of nature (Boyle did sometimes use the ter~) held for all parts of 
space. Thus Boyle wrote:-
"Now if we grant, with some mod.ern philosophers, that God 
has made other worlds besides this of ours, it will be hil;hly 
probable, that he has there displayed his manifold wisdom in 
productions very different from those wherein we have admired 
it •••• In these other worlds we l'lKly suppose tha.t the original 
fabric or that frame, into which the onmiscient architect at 
first contrived the parts of their matter, was very different 
from the structure of our system; besides this, I say, we may 
conceive, that there may be a vast difference between the 
subsequent phenomena and productions observable in one of 
those systems, from what regularly happens in ours, thot\gh we 
should suppose no more, than that two or three laws of local 
motion, may be differing in those unknown worlds, from the 
laws tha.t obtain in ours." 19 
Such a view is only compatible with construing laws of nature as 
contingent truths about our world. 
Entirely in keeping with this approach, Boyle expressly 
repudiated Desca.rtes. attempt to deduce the laws of motion from 
metaphysics. Boyle said that he thought Descartes' laws of motion 
were generally accepted because Descartes was such a famous mathe-
matician, rather than "anyconvictive evidence, that aocompanies 
the rules themselves; since to men ••••• some of them appear not 
.. 20 
to be befriended either by olear experience, or any oogent reason." 
Purther, Descartes' proof for his mosl useful law, viz~ that the 
quantity of motion in the world remains constant ttbeing drawn from 
the immutability of God, seems very metap}~sical, and not very oogent 
to me, who fears, that the properties and extent of the divine 
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immutability are not so well known to us mortals, as to allow 
21 Cartesius to make it, in our present case, an argument a priori." 
And although this cannot be taken as a total repudiation of a priori 
science, nowhere did Boyle ever attempt to deduce phJsical conclusions 
from metaphysical premises. 
Generally, in contrast to Descartes, Boyle emphasised the limited 
scope of mants ability to comprehend the solution to all the 
problems which he can postulate. Thus he said that "we know not the 
manner of operating, whereby several bodies perform what we well 
know they bring to pass", for example "the cause of the cohesion of 
the parts of I!}:ltter". Nor do we know "whereby the rational soul 
can exercise any power over the human bodylt, or how the will and 
the understandi~ can act upon each other, or how the memory can 
22 
operate. But the limitations of man's ability did not mean that 
all knowledge was impossible, and Boyle attempted a rudimentary and 
rather confused classification of the sorts of knowledge that he 
believed there were. He held that there was both i.ntuitive knowledee 
and demonstrative knowledge, and that it was possible for both of 
these sorts to be either empirioal or a priori. Thus he wrote:-
"as the understanding is want to be looked upon as the 
eye of the mind, so there is analogy between them , that there 
are some thines, that the eye may discern (and does judea of) . 
organically, if I may so-speak, that is, by the help of 
instruments: as when it judges of a. line to be stra.ight, by 
the application of a ruler to it ••••• But there are other things, 
whioh the eye does perceive, (and judge of) immediately and 
by intuition, and without the help of oreana or instruments, 
as when by the bare evidence of the perception, it know, that 
this colour is red, and tha.t other bhle ••••• ForthtlS there are 
Borne things, that the intellect judges of in a kind of 
ore-anical way, that is by rules, or hypotheses, such as are n 
ereat part of the theorems ami conolusions in philosophy and 
divinity. But there are others \vh1ch it knows l.Jithout the 
help of these rules, more immediately, and as it 'vere, 
intuitively, by evidence of perception; by whi.ch way W'f~ know 
many prime notions and essata or adorns meta.physical, etc. as, 
that contrad.ictory propositionB C8nnot both 11e true ........ And 
it is also upon this evidence of perception, that we reoeiv9 
with an. 11ndoubted assent many pr~mitive idel'ls and no'tions, 
such as those of extended substance or bo~r, divisibility, 
or local motion •••••••• " 23 
Boyle'S conoeption of the role of intuition in knmdedel'! ia not very 
clear, and his list of examples is not very h\~lpfll1. But it is 
si,gn:ificant that he thought that intuition had a. place not only in 
formal inference, but also in empirica.l kno\'lTledee. Loc1'::9 in his 
account of knowledee wa.s to lay considerable weight on intuition, 
and it is of interest that before Locke's Ji!m;ny was published, 
in·tuition a.lready had a place in English thou.ght on epistemological 
issues •. 
Boyle was proba.bly influencecl by Desoartes in his think:ine 
about intuitive knowleclgp., a.s undou.btedly he ,vas in his use of the 
word tidea', which, a.lthough not a frequent one in his scientifio 
writings, occurs in his philosophioa.l and theoloeioa1 works.24 It 
illu.'3trates tha.t the Cartesian influenoe, whioh undo\lbted.ly existed 
in Looke, could have come not only directly from Desca:rtes' O1.m works, 
but also distilled through the English empirical tradition. 
- 110 -
The COTpu80'11~T' l'hi1f'18o'l"){W ?nd th~ di~tjmt:i.(ln bfi;h\te~n Pri.m'lr;:[ 
and. Sf'conri'1ry QWl,litiel'l. 
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In many flays one of the most inf1u'3nti3.1 of Boylets works 
was his Origin of Formg ami Q'J.?lities (1666). In this, Boyle a.r&"V'~d 
against the Aristotelian, or, more a.ccurately, the Scholastic version 
of Aristotle's theory of the nature of physical properties. 
Although the theory which he was a.ttacking was very obscure, 
Boyle felt that in general outline it could be shown to be unsa.tisfactory, 
and that the Corpuscular theory was both easier to und.erstand and 
was supported by a great deal of empirical evidence. 
The scholastic theory which Boyle rejected may be crudely 
represented as follo\lTs: all the properties of objects aI'a due to 
their innate qualities, and there is a one-to-one correlation between 
the perceptually-identifiable putative properties of an object and 
its act~~l properties; thus an object is blue because it haa the 
property of blueness, or hard because it haa the property of hardness, 
and so on. According to this theory, if it may be ao called, when 
we say that an object is blue because it has the property of blueness, 
we must be understood to be aase~ne a causal statement, not, as 
it might be interpreted, a tautology. The implication of the 
theory is that we cannot analyse one property, say colour, in terms 
of some other properties which are not colour properties. nut it 
was just such an analysis, Boyle was to arena, which was 1norder. 
Blueness, for example, Doyle would argue, should be analysed as 
a product of an interaction between light, object, and observer, 
rather tha.n beill8 thou.eht of as a.n irreducible property of an objeot. 
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Th~ Orirdn of Forms and Q;qalities is divided into two sections. 
The first, Boyle called the theorectical part, and in it he outlined. 
the areuments which he believed supported his case for qualities. 
In the second, the "historical part tt • he produced the experimental 
evidence for his account. Significantly, it is the experiments '''hioh 
Boyle believed clinched the case in his favour: "But in the second. 
or historical part of it [the book] he [the reader] will be invited 
to grant that we have done that part of physicks we have been 
treating of some little service; since by the lovers of real learning 
it was very much wished that the doctrines of the new philosophy 
(as it is called) were backed by particular experiments; the want 
2~ 
of which I have endeavoured to supply •••• " ./ 
The theory of the origin of forms and qualities, therefore, 
for which Boyle argued, was a physical hypothesis, justified by the 
test of experiment, and not, in any straight-forward way, an episte-
mologioal theory to be judged entirely by a priOri criteria. But, 
this granted, Boyle was quite willing to allow that hie oase rested 
upon certain assumptions. The most important of these he expressed 
right at the beginning of the historical part:-
"I agree with the generality of philosophers so fa!' 
as to allow, that there is one catholick or universal matter 
common to all bodies, by which I mean a. substance extended, 
di~isiblet and impenetrable." 2' . 
Boyle did not attempt to justify this assumption, he takes it to be 
the common ground between himaelf and. his Aristotelian opponents. 
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Because Boyle included impenetrability as a. fundamental property 
of matter, his assumptio11 \\Tas at odds with the Cartesian c011ceptiol1 
of the physical world, a point which Boyle could hardly have faile(l 
to notice, and given the prevalence of Cartesian ideas, it is 
surprising that Doyle did not make any attempt to argue for his vi.eN'. 
The assumpticn tv-hich Boyle makes divides in fact into two; the 
first is that there is a universal ma.tter common to all bodies, the 
second is that the nature or essence of boclies is extension, 
divisibility, anrl impenetrability_ It coulrl be argued that 'both 
these assumptions are justified by experience: all the objoots that 
lve are ~li11ine to call boclies do in fact have these properties, awl 
anybody who dili del1Y the general propositions HOU) d b;t flying in 
the face of ovort1helmir.e; (~mpirical evidence. No c1.oubt. if he had. 
been challeneed, it \IQulri have been such a justifion:t:i.o:n vlh:tch 
Eoyle 't'ionld h.ave offered, but it was not in fact until the w('rk o:f' 
Followine from his first aNJU111ption Boy10 had a second.:-
"Eut because this matt~r beine inlts O1.m l" .. a:turo bu.t one, 
the di versi ty tva see in bodies must neoessarily arise from 
somctrlha:t else than the matter they consist of. And since l'le 
see not how there ooule1 be arw ohanee in matter. if all its 
(a.ctual or des ignabl e ) parts \'tore perpetu,dly at rest arnong, . 
themselves, it will follot1 tha.t to disori.minate the oatholiok 
matter into variety of na.tural bodies, it must have motion . 
in some or all its designable parts: and that motion must have 
various ten(iencies, that which is in this part of the matter" 
tending one \--Iay f and that whioh is in tha.t part tendine a.nother; 
a.s we plainly see in the universe oreaneral mass of matter, 
there is really a. ereat quantity of motion, and that V<lriotlsly 
determined, a.nd that yet divers portions of ma.tter are a.t rest."27 
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Motion, then, Boyle identified. as the cause of the differences 
bet\.leen various parts of matter. It was, Boyle aclrnitted, only an 
hypothesis, but one for which he intended to offer consid~rable 
evidence; "Local motiontf he said, "seems to be indeed the prinoipal 
amongst second cau.'Ses, and the grand aeent of all that happens in 
t ,,28 na ure •••• 
Natter and motion, then, Boyle held, are the two "most grand 
and catholick principles of bodies", and all matter had the basic 
properties of magnitude or size, shape, and either motion or rest. 
These primary properties of matter were, Boyle held, to be 
distinguished from "those less simple qu.."'\li ties (as colours, tastes, 
and odours) that do belong to the body on their account.,,29 The 
"less simple" qualities are less simple because they are a produot 
of an interaction, as we have already seen, anll are not inherent in 
objects in any, straight-forward, and, indeed, simple sense. 
To substantiate the claim that secondary properties cannot 
be thought of as simple properties, Boyle offered many examples 
which he intended to illtmtrate the difficulties inherent in the 
Scholastic view. Thus he pointed out that modern goldsmiths use 
as a criterion for gold the fact th:!l.t it will disol ve i.n aqua regis. 
but not in aqua fortis, "yet these attributea are not in the gold 
anything distinot from its perouliar texture, nor is the gold we have 
now of al'lJ" other nature than it was in Pli]"'l~ts time, when aqua 
fortis and aqua regis had not been found out •••••• And this @xample 
I have rather pitched upon, beca~~e it afforda me an opportunity to 
"'" .. 
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represent, that unless we admit the doctrine I have been proposinc, 
we must admit, that a bo(\y must have an almost infinite number of 
new real entities accruing to it without the intervention of any 
physical change in the body itself. tt30 
Boyle's argument is that if we accept the Scholastic account, 
then we have to postulate a corresponding property, as a real 
entity of the object, for every property that an object manifests, 
and that this is surely implausible. Rather, ]eyle held, it wm:l 
much more reasonable to assume that the newly-diacovered property 
was a product of the interaction of the parts of the body and, in 
this case, aqua regis or aqua fortis. 
Boyle also pointed out that we should not be surprised that 
the great variety of properties which objects appear to have can 
be accounted for on the assumption of the theory he propounded, 
"For we must consider each body, not barely, as it is in itself, 
an entire and distinct portion of matter, but as it is a part of the 
universe, and consequently placed among a great number and variety 
of other bodies, upon which it may act, and by which it ~~y be 
acted on, in many ways ••••• each of which men are wont to fancy 
as a distinct power or quality in the body •• ••• ,,31 
iihen Boyle distinguished bet''Ieen the primary and second.ary 
qualities of size, shape. ane! rest or motion, and the secondary 
qualities of colour, taste, and smell, he did not make the mistake 
of denyil"..e that it is perfectly correct to talk of bodies hav:i.ng 
a colour or being colottred. He did not, that is, constrtte the 
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secondary qualities as beine subjective - to use a far from 
satisfactory "lord. He 9..'<:plained the point like this:-
"But there I foresee a difficulty, which beine perhaps 
the chiefest that we shall meot with aeainst the oorpuscula.r 
hypothesis, it will deserve to be,before we proceed any 
farther, taken notice of. And. it is this, that whereas tie 
explicate colours, odours, and the like sensible qualities 
by a relation to our senses, it seems evident that they 
have an absolute beine irrelative to us: for snow (for 
instance) would be white, and a elowine coal vlOu1!l be hot, 
though there were no man or animal :i.n the world. And it 
is plain that bodies do not cnly by their qualities work 
upon other, and those inanimate, bo(lies; as tht'} ooal will 
not only heat or burn a man's hand. if he t01Jr~h it, but w(')nl,l 
l:lk€n..,ise heat "Tax (evon so much as to melt :l.t and. make it 
flow) and. thaw ice into water, a1 thou..:;h all the mtm a1'l11 
sensative beines in the world were annihilatetl. 1t 32 
To this difficulty l30yle offereel the correct anower. The 
seoond.ary qualities, he said, must be construed as (Uspositiol'l8,l 
qualities of objects, not simply subjective properties. F\)r Boyle, 
the seoondary qualities ,,'ere not, as they were for GalilM, the 
romes for sensation.s only. They were the names of real proporties, 
althot~h they did not have to manifest themselves on all ocoasions. 
"Bod.ies", he wrote, ttmay be said in a very favourable sense to have 
those qualities we oa11 sensible, thouZh there were :no animals in 
the \«orld: for a. body in that case may differ from those bodies 
vlhich now a.re quite devoid of quality, in its having such a. 
disposition of its constituent corpuscles, that in case it were 
duly applied to the sensory of an anima.l, it would produce such 
a sensible quality which a. bo~ of another texture would not ••••• 
And so we say, that a. lute is in tune whether it be exaotly pla.yed . 
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upon or no, if the strin....~ be all so duly stretche(l as that it 
would appear to be in tune, if it were played upon.,,33 
It is importa.nt to note that Boyle's a.cceptance of the 
objectivity of secondary qualities is linked with a denial of 
any similarity between the sensations which an observer has and 
the quality in the object. That is, whilst Boyle accepted that 
it is correct to talk of snow beine white, he denied that there is 
a property 'whiteness' in the snow which is any thine over and above 
the arraneement of the parts of snow which cause it to reflect 
light in a particular way. Thus, for Doyle, to say that snow is 
white is a. shorthand wa.y of saying that the matter which is 
called snow has the dispositional property of reflectine, ~ay, 
sunlight, in such a way as to cause a.n observer with normal vision 
to see \,lhi tee 
Much of the "speculativett first part of The Orif~in of Fo'r'wO and 
Quol Hi AS is devoted to an attack on the Scholastic d.octrine of 
",,',..,/111,,;;It#, 
substantial forms. Boyle expressed the difference between him and 
the Peripatetics like this:-
"the sum of the controversy betwixt us and the achools is 
this, whether or no the forms of natural things (the souls 
of men always exoepted) be in generation educed, as they 
speak, out of the power of the m~tter, and whether these 
forms be true substantial entities, distinct from the 
other substantial principle of natural bodies, namely 
matter." 34 
Boyle rejected this view of the relation between matter and form. 
Form, he ar&pUed, could not in any sense be separated from matter, 
and, indeed, there was no need to introduoe any such ooncept as sub-
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stantial form at all: "matter and the accidents of matter being 
sufficient to explicate as much of the phenomena of n~ture as 
we either do or are like to understand." 35 His own view was tha.t 
the form of a natural body was u a converltion of the bigness, shape, 
motion (or rest) situation and contexture (together t'lith the 
resulting qualities) of the ~mall parts that compose the body, as 
is necessary to constitute and denominate such a particular body.n36 
The form of a body was, then, for Boyle nothing but its 
properties, and since most of those properties were dispositiona.l, 
and could therefore be expla.ined by reference to the primary 
properties, the form of an object was its parts and their movements. 
He supported this interpretation by citine va.rious experiments. 
These experiments established that one substanoe could be changed 
into another by chemical means. Boyle claimed that such a result 
would be impossible on the theory of substantial forms. 
Conneoted with the substantial forms theory wa.s the dootrine 
of 'real speoies t • Ra.ther than there being ~ such real speoies, 
Boyle argued, "it was very much by a kind of taoit agreement that 
men had distinguished the species of bodies, and that those dis-
tinctions were more arbitrary than we are wont to be awa.r~ o~t.37 
Distinct species as commonly aocepted, Were often just those 
... 8 
"that have had the luck to have distinct names found out for them.fl3~ 
This view of species was to be much more fully advooated bylooke. 
In the· 'historioal part' of the work Boyle listed nlany 
experiments \-1hioh he believed were incompatible wi th the Soholast:i.o 
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account of forms and qualities, but which he believe<l could. be 
easily accounted for on his own theory. Some of these were very 
simple, thus, by beating an eeg white it is possible to change its 
properties, illustratir.g that mecha.nical action alone can in some 
ca.ses produce a change of properties; others were much more 
complicated, drat-line on Boyle's considera1)le alchemioal interests. 
The total effect is to produce a very large body of evidenoe ,\}'hic11 
could not be accotmted for (or at least was not) by any current 
hypotheses other than the mecha.nistio one that Boyle aclvocated. 
i{e have spent some little tim{~ il' examining Boyle's vieNS 
on matter, 110t only because they are of interest in themselves, 
but because a.n apprecia.tion of them is erssential for a correct 
understanding of Locke'S epistemology. They represent, more 
clearly than th", works of any other think:er, the conterl in \l1hich 
Locke was operatinz when he 't>Trote the Enfl~,;Z. Boyle l'Va.S the advocate 
of a theory about the nature of chemical a.nd. pr,ysicalchanee which 
was accepted by Locl::e a.s being probably true, if not all of it \'l<lS 
actually proven. The e.ctun.l extent of Locke's debt we shall explore 
later. 
He have seen that 130yle "las cOtnr!litted to an empiricist accou,nt 
of science in several particulars. Not only did he acoept that 
theor,y should always be tested against experience, but he also 
believed that theory should take as ita starting point assumptions 
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or ~rpotheses which lIere drawn from experience. In this he was 
totally opposed to the Cartesian tradition of soience, and. a 
follower of l3a.con. Bttt, unlike l3a.con, Boyle wa.s not committed to 
the vie~'1 that science could arrive at necessary truths about the 
world - if, indeed, Bacon himself \-las ever so coromi tted. Boyle 
believed that scientific certainty could never rise above physical 
demonstration, and the t~lths of science could never be known 
liith that certainty found in metaphysics. 
The contrast between Boyle and the Cartesians is perhaps 
nOlihere better illustrated than in the conflict of approach to 
nature in letters exchanged between Henry Oldenburg, (representine 
Boyle), and Spinoza. 39 Constantly, in this correspondence, Boyle 
insisted that science must be grounded upon experimentally justified 
premises. Spinoza, on the other hand, following Desoartes, was 
concerned to ground science upon metaphysical axioms, and to justify 
the conclusions of soience by logical areument rather than empirical 
test. 
IfBaoon had freed science from an unhealthy awe of established 
authority, and had set it on the path towards an enlightened 
empiricism, then it was Boyle who showed, more than anybo~ before 
Newton, what the fruits of tP.a.t empiricism oould be. Most 
\ 
particularly, Doyle supplied the evidence and the argument for 
an empirically grounded account of change in physical objects. 
Although it was Galileo, Descartes, and,finallYt Newton, who 
produced the phsrsicist· s understandil".g of motion, 1 t was to a 
, 
- 180 -
very large extent Boylets achievement to give an account of ~~tter. 
Although Boyle wrote many works which touched on epistemological 
problems, and although his whole approach to science presupposed 
a theory of knowledge, he never devoted a t'lork e:x:olusively to 
that issue. Boyle's epistemologioal theory has to be inferred from 
his theological and scientific writings. This is in itself 
significant. It was soience and religion whioh forced into the 
open oonsiderations of a general epistemological nature. But, as 
-,~~,~""~"",-,, 
oonoerned. exolusively with epistemological problems. There \'las 
olearly a need for a general account of the natu~e of knowledge, 
whioh, whilst takinz aocount of the achiev~ments of sCienoe, 
would also place science "Ii thin a wider epistemological framowork. 
The time was ripe for the production of an essay concerning human 
tmderstanding. 
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Chapter VII 
Newton's Concention of Science 
= t 
IntY,'orluct ion. 
The zen! th of the scientific revcluUon was reached. in 1687 
with the publication of N'e1rlton t S Philosophiae Naturalis Principi.a 
Ihtr"lTlry,ticl),. newton's work was important not only because it accounted 
for a larae number of phenomena, both on the earth and, in tlvi' heavens, 
and enabled man to predict an indefinite ntunl)er of physical events; 
it was also the vindication of one tradition over another in natural 
science. It was the triumph of the methOti of 13:I,00n and !loyle over 
that of Descartes. tnlat is more, the vic·tory was achieved in an 
area in \vhich the rationalist tredi tion vIas recl<:oned to be at its 
stroneest, in the cuI tiva.tion "of Mathematics as far as it relates to 
philosophy". 1 The method. which Doyle anel others had recommended. 
anfl folloN'e rl in the pur sui t of an understandinc of ma'tter, Has 
eon0raliz0cl lW neHton to cover both m,~tter an(1 moti()l1, tho tNO fi.):'st 
principles of the phySical vmrld. as cOl1ceiv€'cl by Cartesian Emd pont-
Cartesian soience. 
Nev-lton, of course, was lnol~T, e\S i1.11 ereat sotentists are; 
much of the eroundwork for his o.chi('v~ment had be"Jl1 aocomplished by 
other men. not only ha.d Kep1er, Galileo. and, nescartes d.iscovered 
meoh,:mical laws vlhich applicct to partioular parts of' the universe, but 
Desoartes espeoia11y, hall sho\.;n the pm'1er of a meoha,nistic 
il1terpret;1tion of nature. By the time that liewton turned to the 
problems of the universe the conceptual victory had bp,0n IIJOn; 
the cosmos was already oonceiwHi as a vast maohine. !,jechanical 
explanations were accepted not only for macrocosmio phenrmena, 
but also for the microcosmic; and since Harvey's . diE:covery of the' 
circulation of the 11100(1, for the human boUy also. 
~ve shall not consider lJe,non's achievom0n'ts in <latail. Once 
a€;8.in, the main emphasis will be on method. As I ha,ve already 
S1.lCZASterl, \'le shall fincl that larzely Newton contirnwrl the trad.i tion 
of En.glish scienoe which ha.d developed durine the preceding half-
century. 
There wa.s a neeative aspect to l~m>1ton's achievement which it is 
important to note. 110thing that Newton produced helped to break the 
hold of two Cartesian doctrines on either Eng-lish or Continental 
thought, at least in the immediate post-Newtonian period. These 
were Descartes' par,-a.r1ie;m.'3 of knowledge, whioh were the propcsitiofJS 
of Eu.clidean eeometry; and Descartes' fundamental distinction 
between mind and body. Indeed, if any thine, Newton's work cOl'l.aolidated 
these two aspects of Cartesian thoueht within the Drropean tradition. 
So, if Newton's achievement in vindicatilll5' empiricism in soience was 
a viotory over Cartesian rationalism, it was not a victory over the 
Cartesian world-view. 
This said, hovlever, an important qualifioation1sin order. 
Hhilst it was oer·tainly true that the philosophioal para.diem for 
knowledge remained the propositions of mathematios, thepractioe 
of scientists was eenerally to accept as knowledge propositions 
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about the world which had no such comparable C!ertainty. The 
Success of science in explaining and predicting was to eenerate an 
intellectual schizophrenia in which the Cartesian paradigm plaYEld 
Hyde to the scientists' Dr. Jeckyll. Nowhere did this confu.sion 
emerge more clearly than in Lockets FiBM;t. 
On February'8th-i6iili2-~-p~per was read before the Royal 
SOCiety from IIh'. Isaac Newton containi:ne his new theory about light 
2 
and colours. The paper areued that white light was a mixture of 
rays of different colours which each had their own particular 
refractive index as against those who maintained that, for elCample, 
white light was itself a simple and not a. compound. The paper.s 
importance in the history of optics is central, but its immeliiate 
impact was to cause controversy, not helped by Newton's own response, 
Which, sometimes at least. did less than justice to his critics.3 
In the paper Newton claimed to show that his account of light 
was not an unsubstantiated hypothesis, a oonjecture dra:#"n from the 
skies, but a well established faot. He made his own position very 
clear in reply to one of his critics:-
tt ••••• the doctrine whioh I explained conoerning refraotion 
and colours, consists only in certain properties of light, 
without regarding any hypotheses, by which these properties 
might be expla.ined. For the best and safest method of philo-
sophizing seems to be, first to inquire diligently into the 
properties of things, and establishing those properties by 
experiments and then to proceed more slowly to hypotheses for 
the explanation of them. For hypotheses should be subservient 
only in explaining the properties of things, but n~)t assumed 
in determinging them; unless so far as they ~~y furnish 
experiments. For if the possibility of hypotheses lato be 
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the test of truth and reality of things, I see not how 
. certainty can be obtained in any science; since numerous 
hypotheses may be devised which shall seem to overcome new 
cUfficul ties. Hence it has been he1'9 thought necessary to lay 
aside all hypotheses, as foreign to the purpose, tha.t the force 
of the objection should be abstractly considered, an(l receive 
a more full and. general anS\ier." 4 
At this comparatively early stage in NevTton's career we find 
him clear about what the method was for science. He was concerned 
to find certainty", and he was antagonistic to at least one sort of 
hypothesis because their employment will lead neither to certainty 
nor truth. But lV'hat did Newton understand. by certainty, anti what 
exactly were the sort or sorts of hypothesis to which he objecteil? 
Let us turn first to Newton's conception of certainty. 
Newton explained his position with regard to the certainty 
of physical science, and optics in particular, in his famous lett a}" 
to Oldenburg following the controversy over his papers on light 
and colours. There Newton wrote:-
It.... I said ind.eed, that the scienoe of colours was 
matheITk~tical and as certain as any other part of optics; 
but who l<.ncws not that optics, and. m9xlY other ffi!l.thematicaJ 
sciences, dep'?l1{l as well on mathematical demonstra.tion? And 
the absolute certainty of a. Bcienee cannot exceed the cf.~:rtainty 
of Us principles. Hmi the evidence by which I a.Rserted th!1 
propositions of colonrs is in the n~K:t words pxpro8sed to 
lH~ from experiments, a.nd. eo but physical, whence the proposi ticmf.! 
themselves can be esteerned. no more tha.n phyr::ioal prinoiples of 
a science. And if these principles be Stich that on them a 
mathematician may determine all the rbenomena of o.jlours th,1.t 
can be 01:1.118<9d. lW r~:f'ractionfl and that, l1y disp1..l.ti:ns- or d.'3m<.J11-
stra.ting after \lI'ha:~ rrt3.nnor end how mu.ch, those refraotions do 
separate or mingle the rays in ~"'h1ch several colours are 
orieina,lly inhercnt, I surpose the ecienoe of coloUl~s Hill be 
granted. Mathematioal and as certain a~ al~r part of optics. 
And this may be done, I have g0Cd. 1'<'::'1Son to believe.beoauoe 
ever since I became first acquainted with these principles I 
have, with oonstant success in the events, made use of them for 
this purpose .. ft 5 
To say that the opticsl discoveries hI} 11::v1 mUi]e Iv0re certah, 
Hewton arzu.ed, is to Srty th;).t they haz:1 bE:en comprehcm:j.v,:"ly confirmna 
experimentally to consist of rays differently refrar,zib1et and to tho 
sarno degree of refraneibility ever beloreeti thl~ same colour. !'itrt 
lJe,\'1ton claimed no other certainty for this conclusion tha.n physical 
certainty. It was, simply, a. brute fact about ,,,hite light. It was, 
for Nel'l'ton, a contingent true empirical proposition; a.nd phyf'.:ics 
was built upon such foundations. 
ive can see, then, that Ne'''rton at this sta,e'e did, not expect 
anything grander from science tha11 Boyle had claimed for bis "phynioal 
demonstration". Certairlty in science clid. not for Nm'lton mean 
anything more than ,.,.ell-tested physical fact. i'lliether or not Newton 
was correct to see all of his propositions as physical facts, or 
whether they embodied hidden hypotheses, is t for the moment, beside 
the point. 
The same outlook wt\s exhibited by Newton in his later works. 
Thus in the Principi?\ lre\'lton explained a.gain that the star-ting 
point for arrivin& at truths about the physical world was empirical 
observation. In the General Scholiwnt added to the second edition 
of 1713, Newton wrote: "In thts philosophy (1. e. experimental 
philosophy] particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena 
6 
and afterwards rend~red general by induction"; and he went on 
to list the basic facts about bodies whioh had been arrived at by 
this method, and which were the bedrock upon which the K~jncip~a was 
built. "Thus it was", he wrote, tfthat the.impenetrability, the 
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mobility, and the impulsive forces, and the laws of motion and of 
gravitation, were discovered.,,7 
Newton was .fully alrlare that this method did not gtlarantee any 
sort of metaphysical certainty. The kind of certainty that was 
eenerated he illustrated in his 'Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy' 
which he placed at the beginning of Book III of the Pr:incipil. These 
rules are of fundamental importance to an understanding of Newton's 
position, and we shall return to them later. 
The first rule reads:-
"We are to admit no more causes of material things than 
such as are both true and sufficient to explain their 
appearances." 13 
Newton thus had two conditions which had to be satisfied for the 
identification of a cause. The first condition was truth, and what 
Newton meant by a ~true cause' was not simply one that might be 
true, but one that was known to be true; and. to know that a cause 
was a true cause required having substantial empirioal evidence for 
it. The second condition is a criterion of simplicity in explanations. 
"For na.ture t., Newton wrote in justification, nis pleased with 
simpliCity, and affeots not the pomp of superfluous oausee. lt 
It might be thoueht that this second oondition was nothing 
more than a pious hope on Newton's part. But I think that in faot it 
was more than this. He would .• I think, have justified the con<1i tion 
of simplicity on inductive grounds. If pressed, he would have said 
that as a matter of fact the simplest explanation always has turned 
out to be the true explanation. and for this reason we a.re entith~(i 
to accept it as a working principle in scienoe. \ihether Or not this 
; i 
, 
, '. 
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is true of scientific explanations, anti if it is tru.e, in what 
sense we are to understand the concept of simplicity is another 
question, thoueh undoubtedly an importan·t one in the philosophy 
of soience. 
There could be another explana.tion for Newton' s commitm~mt to 
simplici ty. n is possible thll.t Newton believed, for other than 
empirica.l rM.sons, that If Nature is pleased with simplioity". He 
mieht ha.ve believed that God would not have created anythir~ other 
than the most simple system consistent with the phenom~ma.. If this 
\olaS newton's reason for acceptine the principle of simplicity, then it i\ 
would appear that right at the heart of New'ton's scientific mAthoo. 
there was a theoloeical element. 
If Newton believed that the rule of simplioity oould be 
justified in.ducti vely, then he wou.l d ()e wrong to think that trH; 
criterion of simplicity could. justify induction, for clearJy this 
\'IOuld involve a. circularity. Yet in tht3 Rules of Reasonine this \'18.8 
exactly what Newton did, for the second Rule reads:-
"Th"'ro::;fQr:e to the sa.me m,tural effects ive must, as far 
as possible, 'assien the same causes.u9 (My emphasis.) 1i:tnt Nevrton 
should have done, I am sueze13ting, is to hnve justiri~(l th"" critr,-r:ion 
of simplicity by refer.enc€! to il1duotion, and. thus mn.ke the inductive 
principle the more fu .. 1"Idrunental. If Newton had done so, then thf;l!,(:\ 
woulct h:lVe bMn no need. to speculate as to \.zhether or not there '<¥~re 
any theoloeical elements involved in the Rules of Reasonine.10 
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th(m h8 vwuld still ha.ve been faoed with an U1'1SUpporteu. firs"!; RUJf', 
ml,mely, the principle of induotion, but this "lOuld have b0Al'l c()rli::lidr~'t'l't 
with his whole approach to nature in which inductive arZ"lJ1lents, in 
pra.ctioe, were much more d.ominant than appeals to a prinolple of 
simplioity. Thus, induction \-las fumlamental to Nevlton's t\-TO further"' 
rules which read as follows:-
Rule III. nThe qualitiM of bodies which admit neither 
intensification nor remission of deerees, and which are 
found. to belong to a.ll bo,lies wi thin tll(~ reach of our 
experiments, are to be esteemed. the universal qualities of 
all bodies lihatsoever." 11 
Rule IV. "In axp('!rimental philosophy we are to look upon 
propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena 
as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any 
contrary hypothesis tha·t may be imagined, till such time 
as other phenomena occur, by whioh they may either be mt.l.de 
more accurate cr liable to exceptions. T1 12 
Induotion from particular phenomena was fundamental to the 
'Vlhole of Newton's soientifio method. Bnt Ne\'lton was well aware that 
induction did not guarantee truth. It is just this poin't that is 
broueht out by Rule IV. If induotion did guarantee truth then thfire 
Would be nO possibility of further phenomena. occurring which would 
make induotion "more accura.te or liable to exoep·Uons. tf 
Newton, then, was committed to the total contingenoy of 
~~perimental science, a.nd committed, also, to the oorresponding 
lack of absolute oertainty in the findings of the natura,lscientiet. 
Bu.t he clid want to dra.w a. sharp distinotion between empirioal fact, 
whether generalized by indltction or nct, and specula.tive hypotheses. , 
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It is to this second question of ours, what did Newton understand 
by hypotheses, that we must now turn. 
Newton's use of the word 'h.,vpothesis' has been the subejct of 
much debate. Koyr~ has drawn our attention to the fact that the 
first edition of the Princil)ia made much more frequent use of the 
....... ; -13 
term than subsequent editions, and he has sU-B'e-eeted that Newton 
construed the term in two senses, a good, and a bad.14 Koyrlwas 
undoubtedly correct about this, and it will be worth our while to 
identify these two senses. 
In its traditional sense a hypothesis was an assumption or 
a fundamental supposition of a theory. ~t...r:rs- theory will have such 
hypotheses, and Newton's was no exception. But, from what we have 
alrea~ seen of Newtcn's views, only certain sorts of assumption 
Were for him permissible, namely those based upon empirical observation 
in the way we have con.'3idered. Other forms ~lere not perm iss i ble, and 
it was these other forms to which Newton took such strong exception .• 
On some occasions Newton actually restricted the word tbypothesis' 
to its use to apply to bad hypotheses. Thus he wrote to Roger Cotes 
in 1713 discussing the second edition of the Pripcj,pj,a:-
"I had yours of Feb. 18th and the diffi;'~ity~you 
mention l-,hich lies in these words, "since every attra.ction 
is mutual", is removed by considering that, as in geometry, 
the word 'hypothesis' is not taken in so large a sense as to 
inclucle the axioms and postulates; so in experimental philosophy t 
it is not to be taken in so large a seflf3e as to include the 
first principle or a.xioms, whioh I call the laws of motion. 
These principles are deduced from phenomena and made genera.l 
by induction, which is the highest evidence that a proposition 
oan have in this philosophy. And the word 'l~pothesis' is here 
- 190 -
used by me to signify only such a proposition as is not a 
phenomenon nor deduced from any phenomena, but aSS1IDled or 
supposed - without any experimental proof ••••• 
"And for preventing exceptions against the use of 
the word 'hypothesis', I desire you to conolude the next 
paragraph in this manner: "For anything whioh is not 
deduced from phenomena ought to be called a h~~othesis, 
and hypotheses of this kind, whether metaphysica.l or 
pl\ysical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have 
no plaoe in experimental philosophy ....... 15 
According to Ne\V'ton, then, IIRypotheses of this kintl •••• " were bad 
hypotheses, and were not to be accepted in experimental philosophy. 
But surely, it has been urged, Newton himself, especially in 
the Queries added to the second edition of the O:ntlg1\s, (1717), did in 
",.;, J# ,"" 
fact propose various hypotheses, about the nature of lie-ht, the 
cause of gravity, and other topics. Hotv W,:lS it possible for a mo.n 
to propose such hypotheses, and yet to eschew them, as Ne\"1ton ha.':l 
done, not only in the Prin~ipiaz but also in the first sentenoe of tIle 
.9ptir::ks itself, where he had written.: tlMJr clcsien in this book is 
not to explain the properties of light by hypotheses, but to propose 
IS 
antl prove them by reason and experiments."? 
The answer is, I believe, very simple. \lhen lTeiflon \<-laS concerncel 
to produce '''hat he held could be shown to be true, he esche,,,ed 
hypotheses: the Principia, the O;rticks, excluding the Queries, were 
such. The Queries lvere not; they could flot yet be proved, and, 
could not, therefore, be proposed as true. Newton eJCplain~,l(l his 
Position at the end of the 31st Query:-
"As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy. the 
investiea,tion of difficult things by the metholl of analysis, 
ought ever to precede the method of composition. The analysis 
consists in makine experiments and observation.~f and in dra;winz 
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general conclusions from them by induction, am! admitting of 
no objections against the concl~~ions, but such as are trucen 
from experiments, or other oertain truths. For hypotheses are 
not to be regarded in experimental philosophy. And although 
the arguing from experiments and observations by induction 
be no demonstration of general conclusions; yet it is the 
best way of arguing which the nature of thinea a~~its of, 
and may be looked upon as so much the strop~er, by how mttch 
the induction is more general. And if no exoeption shall 
occur from phenomena, the conclusion may be pronounced 
generally. But if any time afterwards any exception shall 
occur from experiments, it ~~y then begin to be pronounced 
with such exceptions as occur. B,y this way of analysis we 
may proceed from compound.s to ingreclients, and from motions 
to the forces producing them; and in general, from effects to 
their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, 
till the areument end in the most general. This is the method 
of analysis: And the synthesis consists in assuming the causes 
discovered, and established as principles, and by them explaining 
the phenomena proceed.ine from them, and proving the explanations."17 i 
Ha.ving thus stated his general position, NEn-rton then went on to point 
out how he had followed this method in the Opticks. But in the 
third book, he explained, the book that conta.ined the Queri~s, "I 
have only begun the analysis of wha.t remains to be disoovered about 
light and its effects upon the frame of nature, hinting several 
thil'l6"S a.bout it, and leavip.g the hints to be examined and improved 
by the fa.rther experiments and observations of such as are inquisi t-
ive .... ,,18 The third book of the 0pticks, that is, largely con-
tained suggestions which Ne.-rton hoped could be resolved by further 
experiment. The Queries were a series of hypotheses, in a third 
Sense of that term; they were hypotheses which Newton hoped would 
sugzest experiments to discover whether or not they were true. 
(Cf. Newton's remarks of 1672 quoted above, pages 183-4). 
, 
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So considered, we can see that the method of analysis which 
Nel.-1ton recommended was not to be carried out in an arbitrary way. 
It wou.ld consist in conducting experiments, some at least of which 
would be attempts to veri(y (or falsify - Newton was B~conian 
enough to recognise the significance of falsification in seienee) 
various conjectures such as those contained in th~ Queries. 
There were, then, t\-1O senses of the word "~pothesis" to "'hich 
Newton did not object. These were, firet, hypotheses un(ierstoo(l as 
first prinoiples which had the support of experiment to justify their 
use as first principles; second, hypotheses which sue-gaster'!. exper-
menta which could lead. to the discovery of facts, themselves 
supported by experiment and observation. 
The type of hypotheses, as we have !Seen, that Ne\>tton objected 
to. were unsubstantiated conjectures, used to supply a theorectical 
explanation of the phenomena, which might be true, but, for all the 
scientists knevl, might equ.'llly well be false. And, undoubtecUy, 
newton had espeoially in mind De8cartes' F:r1J1o:1pl",s of PhiJ.of\oph(, 
in \'iThich Descartes appeare<l to be content to aocel,t even false 
hypotheses within his s;ys·tem as lone as -their asstunption led to a 
coherent explanation of the ph<momena. 19 For Hewton, the goal ·of 
(' 
science was the disoovery of truth, and a1 thoueh he recot.."fli~o('t that 
the degree of certainty possible in 'the natural sciences '",as not 
equivalent to that obtainable in nk~thematlcs, he did .believe that 
it could be, ~nd. ind.eeci must be, hicher than the sort of confirmation 
supplied 'by a theory or hypothesis simply because it succe£lIied in 
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aCCOtL'1tine for the phr3nomena. IJe,rton, that is, beld. thnt th(~ 
expec·tation of the scientist could an(l E;hould 1)0 11.ieher tlKI,):'1 th0 
exp0ctation which Osiand.er or Hobhes 11£1,11 offerod. Ire belieVf'~(l that 
the wod;:: of Descartes, in so far as it only succeeded in ac(~ou.ntirle 
for tho phenomena, 1rli thout empirical confirmatton of its S1.l.C'50stci(1 
lavlS and physical causes, was no better than Hork in proeress, and 
he stronGly objected to those vlho believe(l that such Hork in proCt'ElsG 
\'i'as the end of science, for he held that it \..jas merely the beeinninc; 
of the analysis, merely 'Queries' ,which had yet to bf-) supplied lofith 
their justification. 
Newton's opposition to the Cartesian approach to -the physical 
\mrld can be illustrated by considerinc the contrast between. NEMtOl1 t S 
posi t10n Em! that of the model"ate Cartesian, Roh,~u1 t. The differenoe 
can be brought out by comparing netrlon t s Rules of Reasoning \,li th 
one of Roha.ult's method.ological principles. Roha.'lllt had written:-
"If that which we fix upon to expla.in the particular 
nature of any thine, do not account clearly a.nd plainly for 
every property of that tIline, or if it be evidently contra-
dicted by any one experiment; then we are to look upon our 
conjecture as false; but if it perfectly agrees with a.ll 
the properties of the thine:. then we ma.y esteem i 1. wf~ll 
grounded, and it ma.y pass for very probable. tt 20 
Rohault, like lIC'l-lton, clearly did not expect certainty, and 
placed great importance on the agreement between axperiment and 
theory. But such superficial similarities in :tact cover a. gigantio 
differenoe of approaoh between the two men. FbI" Rohault, the oa.use 
which we are entitled to assume to be probable need not be empirically 
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observable; any conjectured cause, as long as it \'las conformable 
to all the data, was allowable. In contrast, as we have seen, 
Newton demanded that cau .. '3es themselves mu.."3t be in prinoiple 
identifiable, and must in faot be so identified, if we are to talk 
at all of our explanation being true. Newton would have aereed that 
we could not always so identify conjectt~ed causes, but in so far 
as this was so, then it was a part of science to try to find ways 
in which those causes could be brought under the umbrella of 
observa.tion, by, for example, the invention of such things as 
telescopes and microscopes. 
It was this sort of point which lay at the centre of the 
controversy between Newton and Leibniz over the nature of gravity. 
Leibniz claimed that Nemon's gravity lva.S "a chimerical 'thing, 
21 
a scholastic occult quality." To this Clarke,on behalf of 
Newton,replied:-
"Tha.t the sun attracts the earth, through the intermediat& 
void space; that is, that the earth and sun gravitate 
towards each other, or tend (whatever be the cause of that 
tendenoy) towards eaoh other, with a force which is in a 
direct proportion to their masses, or magnitudes and~lensities 
. together, and in an inverse duplicate proportion of their 
distances; and that the space betwixt them is void, that is 
has nothing in it which sensibly resists the motion of bodies 
passing tra.versely through: all thiS, is nothing but a 
phenomena, (sic.] or aotual matter of fact, found by experience. 
~1at this ph~mena is not produced sana moyen, that is without 
some cause capable of producing B\~h an effectl isundoubtedly 
true. Philosophers therefore may sea.rch after and discover 
that cause if they can; be it mechanical or not mechanical. 
But if they cannot discover the causel is therefore the 
effect itself, the phenomenon, or the matter of fact discovered 
by experienoe (which is all that is meant by the w9rds 
attraction and gravitation) ever the less true?" 22 
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Newton was prepared to allow, by his second Rule of Reasoning, 
that the cause of gravitation would be the same for all objec·~st that 
all objects tended to move tOl'lards each other according to the 
inverse square lato1, as objects near the earth could be observed 
to move towards the earth according to the law. But what caused 
them to do so he did not pretend to know, though he did venture 
to suggest to Boyle in a letter that the ether might be the cai..1.se,23 
a suegestion "'hich Neirlon made again in .the Queries. 24 
no d.oubt Hewton believed that truth and certainty in sci(mee 
vlere vlOrth pursuing for their own sake, but he also had another 
reason. He believed that the perfection of natural philosophy by 
the method he propounded would lead to a. greater knm·lledee of God., 
and. thus to a. greater a-~iareness of out' moral duty. ThUG, he C011-
eluded the Opticks by saying that IIso far as "Ie can knolll by natural 
philo8orhy what is the first Cause, what power he has over us, and. 
what benefits He receive from him, so far our tluty tOtiarc1s him, as 
vJ't;l1 as that towards one another, \'1i11 appear to us by th(3 Licht 
25 
of Nature." Hatural philosopby, as propounded by Um,lton, lecl 
both to a knovtledge of God, an(l of man' a moral responsibilities. 
Scienoes required. truth, therefore, not only "for its 01'ffi sake, but 
also becatwe through it it was possible to arrive at theological 
and moral knoiofledee. And since science restart on experienoe, 
experience was the key not only to tho: t'forld but also to Ood. As 
- lq6 -, 
'Hith oonsiderine men for the bolief O! a Deity, and nothinc 01'11'1 
?6 
rejoice me more than to find it uSI'):ful for thi\t purpose. w- It 
\'l~S not pOGsible, lTevrton beli0ved, to aocc-unt for tho UniverG('> 
e.xcept on tho D.Bsumption of a Gorl,27 and it HO.8 th(~ Ar,s"'llll1r:nt fX'om 
D • 1 t1 A_ t t ..., . 2[', t hi 1 
'cr-ncn t or, more :rrop~r" ~r, ... 18 ~l .. r.;::u..rnen ~ l)eSlcn ,0 H. C 1 
lTm-rton often appealed. to justify his belief in God. 29 
It is hforth notine that Newton's poni.tion Hith recard. to the 
juntification of God's exist0ne8, and its relation to his seienee, 
is entirely contrary to that of Descartes. Descartes jUDtif:i.ed 
his science in terms of tb: e:dstence of Goel, knOtm a priori; lToHton, 
lil::e Boyle, justifierl his belief in God in terms of his science. 
Perhaps nothing better exemplifies the difference botvJ0E"n the tHO 
men. 
There is a further aspect to the linlr:: betweBn Hewton t S f5cience 
nn(l his theoloeyj it is tha.t 1ieiiton IS argtlr.lent for the e::dstence 
of God is in fact in co:r.flict "11th vihat he maintaine(l about 
hypotheses. If IJevnon were to be consistent, he could not infer 
or postula.te a God to account for the order "1hioh he had discoverect 
in the universe, because, !i.'X. hVl;Iothpf;li, this would be to account 
for the phenomena by appeal to an hypothesis not Bubstantiato(l on 
indepenclent ground.s. As liTe'iton sa.id of gravity ft.... . the ca.use 
of gra.vi ty I do not pretend to knOl1 •••• u30 so he Should ha.ve 
said about the cause of order in the universe. 
On this basis, it can be seen that David HTh."!1e's attack on the 
Argument from Design in the first Inl't't11"Y \'las a.n attempt to 
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apply consistently Ncvlton' s otm criteria for rational belief. 
It l'laS the fate of Ne\non' s own achievement that it was ·~o be 
used to undermine the very belief that he thought his work 
substantiated. 
jewton' F.I Theory of' JTatter. 
Newton was no exception to the general run of seventeenth 
century scientists in Ilk"lintaining a distinction bet\veen the primary 
and secondary qualities of matter. Dnt newton's formulation of the 
distinction was in important respects different from those of 
earlier scientists. For Newton, the distinction was based entirely 
on empirical considerations, together with the ubiquitous principle 
of induction. 
Netrlon expressed his version of the distinction in the third 
Rule of Reasoning of the second edition of the Princip!~ as follows:-
"The qualities of bodies, which adm.it neither intensi-
fication nor remission of decrees, and which are fotmd to 
belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are 
to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies 
whatsoever. It 31 
In his justification and explanation of this Rule, Newton 
was totally and unequivocally empiricist. The qualities of bodies, 
he asserted, nare only known to us by experiments, anrl such r qua.lities) 
as are not lia.ble to diminution can never be quite taken a,1.;ray.u32 
It is, therefore, only empirically known properties tp~t can be 
attributed to objeots; and all properties which are found in all 
bodies, can, by induction, be assumed to be the universal qualities 
of all bodies whatsoever. 
- 198 -
.. 
But what exactly did Ue\"lton understand by his first condition? 
tfuat are qualities "which admi t neither intensification nor 
remission of degrees"? Newton explained what he meant vThen he ~iw.lJ 
considerine whether or not gravity was a universal quality of 
bodies. The gravity of an object, Newton explained, was not a 
quality in the relevant respect, because the gravity of bodies 
"is diminished as they recede from the earth". In other words, 
what an objeot weichs is entirely dependent on its location in 
respect to the earth , and, therefore, is not a quality which is 
immutable. The properties or qualities which lTewton identified 
as the primary qualities were: extension, hardness, impenetrability, 
mobility, and inertia. All these properties, he olaimed, are 
ones we know by experience that all physical objects ha.ve. By 
omission, we are left to oonc1ude that co1o'lU', taste, and od.our 
were not either \U1iversal, or they 'VIere considered by Ne'Vnon to 
admit of intensification aml remission of deerees. 
There is one other property which lievl'ton also considel'ed for 
his list of qualities; but, significantly, he did not include it 
with them, and that Wile divisibility. Surely, it ca.n be ar€,'Ued, 
divisibility is a quality which satisfies n~nrlonta criteria. hlhy 
did he not include it? 
After 1istine the properties that he took to be "the fOl.U1da.tion 
of all philosoJ?hy", Newton continued:- . 
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"I.iorcover, that the (livide(l but contiguous l:k"1rticleB 
of bodies may be separated from one another is a matter 
of observation; a.nd in the particle8 th.:l.t remain umlivl.dod, 
our mincls are able to distingl'tish zret lesser parts f as i8 
ma.thema.tically demonstratorl. BIJ.t 'tvhether the parts so 
distinzuished and not yet divich'>.(l may, r)y the p(}\'wrs 0:[ Fatur0., 
be actually divided and. Eleparated. from anI'! another W0 cannot 
certainly determil'le. Yet hacl \,1e the proof of but one e;qH~rj­
mont that any tmclivided. particle, in brea..'ldng a h,,"\x'd and 
soliO. body, suffer8cl a division, we mie-ht by virtu.e of this 
rule [i.e. Rule III) conclud.e that th~ 11 .. ndivided as well as 
the divided partioles ma.y 1)(0) divicle(l ancl aotually separated 
to infinity.n 33 
But surely, many experiments do establish that a particle can 
be so di,vided; often the collision between t.viO objects has ju.st 
the effect that Newton is looking for, and newton could not have been 
una.~·lare of this. Either, then, newton meant by 'particle t somethine 
other than 'small body', or he was d.eliberately overlooking the 
empirical evi(lence. 
The expla.nation of Newton's position seems proba.bly to lie 
in the fact tha.t Newton, on other grounds, stronely Rtlsrected that 
matter was not capc"ble of infinite (livisibility. !t was this 
position which he expreesec1 at the end of the Queries to the .QrtickFl 
where he wrote:-
ft •••• it seems probable to me, that God in the beginnine 
formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable 
particles, of suoh sizes and fieures, and with such other 
properties, and in such proportion to space, as most conduoed 
to the end for l-ihioh he formed them; and tha.t these. prima:tive 
particles being so11els, are incomparably h"lrder than any 
porous bodies compounded of them; even so very hard,as 
never to brealc in pieces; no ord.inary power being ablato 
divide what God hirn.'3elf made on in the first oreation." 34 
Therefore, lrewton held, ltthat lTature Ilk'ly be lasting, the changes 
of corporeal things are to be place(l only in the various sepa.rati.ons 
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d i t · d t· .. th t t1 1 ,,35 a.n ne,'! assoc a lons an mo lons or ese permanen par c es. 
It would appear from this tha.t lIewton held divisibility 
not to be a primary quality of bodies because he was committed to 
an atomic view of matter which itself held that atoms were not 
capable of physical division. Fllrther, at least a part of Ne\'lton's 
rea.sons for accepting such an atomic view of matter were conneoted 
wi th his cOllception of the orie-inal creation of the universe. This 
cloes not imply that Nel'lton t s conception of the creation vIas derivell 
from his theological preconceptions alone. Undoubtedly they were 
drawn out as an extension of his physics and. chemistry. But it is 
interesting that it is possible to traoe this link between his 
physics and his theology in the fairly austere environment of' the 
Rules of Reasoning. 
The Lim! tf'! of Newtorri,::!.l'l. Thl'l)irici~m. 
\-le have seen that Newton constantly asserted a link between 
empirical evidence and grounds for aoceptin« an hypothesis as true. 
But it has been often pointed out that Newton's work oontains several 
assumptions which either were not, or could not be, grounded on 
empirical evidence. It says much for newtonts influence that these 
assumptions were largely taken over by both science and western 
society generally for the next two hundred years. The metaphysics 
of newton became the metaphysics of the world. 
I do not intend to examine these assumptions in detail; to 
some of them we shall return in the seoond part of this workfbut 
it will be worth listing them. Some of Newton's assumptions 
we can now see to be false; others cannot so easily be dismissed; 
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still others are inclispensible for any conceptual Bcheme that is 
to do just ice to our e:x:perience. r,!any, but not all, of Ne\iton' 1'3 
assumptions are to be found in Locke's theory of knowledge. 
Clearly, fun~~mental to Newton's physics was a belief in 
matter. Lirked with this l-laS a belief in the existence of motion. 
Both of' these assumptions Newton took to be hard facts, beyonel 
dispute, about the world. Despite this, both of these asswnptions 
'\i'ore inunediately challenged, by Leibniz and El~rkeley, who each 
presented poy.lerful and. persua.sive argum"?nts for their rejection. 
Par't, at least, of Berkeley's attack on lJekJtont s conception 
of the world took as its starting point another assumption to 
b f d · l~ t' it' . 11 . tl "t·' 36 It e Ourl 1n 'il3\v on s WI" l11gS, espec1a y 1n ,1e \'f.\ .1(1):S. 
vias that Nei-lton took for granted a sharp distinction bett~eon mind 
and matter. Although it is unclear that !~f)t..,tont s vi(~ws on th"'l 
nature of mind W/:'H'e the same as Descartes' t118re is at least S0n18 
evidence to sho\IT that they llTere probably very similar to those of 
Locke, \-Iho also uac1e this sharp distinction. 37 In several 'pa.8~ag(~S 
in the Ontiob'J Umrlon put forward a causal .?vccount of peroeption 
.,0 
\ihich implie(i such a distinction betvleen mir!'i and body • .)u 
Uewton's acco1L'rJ,t of perception '>las only 01').e of the areas of 
science in which lJewton. employe(l causal explanations j clearly tht') 
Hh01e of hio physics assumed the via-bili t:r of such mrph,nati<:)T1s. 
Du.t the conoept of cat1~ation was one '\.1hioh ha(l rec~ive(l l"em:'lrkably 
IHtle attention. from either phi1()('Hyphers or physioints.. ~~ain It 
was Berkeley, and, more importantly, Hume, in the period tol1owinc 
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!'Tewton's acceptanoe, vlho tu..rnecl their a:ct!:mtion to this CO!1o!'.pt • .,;,; 
FtmCtamental, too, to Hewton's whole method was the viahility 
of inductive argument. 1'..8 'frle have alreaC'lY seen, all of Ne1tltOl1' fl 
Rules of Reasoning W0re connected with, or employed induotive 
inference, with tlv~ possible exception of thlSl first. But, perhapc 
wisely, N'el.non never attempted. to offer a justification of this form 
of inference. All he did t>las to maintain that th0re Has no othf?!' 
method open to the scientist by lfhich he may proceed.. He certainly 
never marle the mistake of thh.king that induotive inference either 
did, or could, approach the certainty of deducUve reasonine. Once 
aeain, it was Htune who most clearly recoenised the central importance !, 
of inductive inference, and subjected it to critical analysis. 
As an issue in the philosophy of science it has remaim'lfl central .,. 
ever since. 
Another feature of the Prinoipi~ which is generally reckonorl 
an important part of Hewton1 s metaphysics ,-rae the commitment to 
absolute space and time. Undoubtedly one of the reasons l'lhy Newton 
accep·ted these notions was theological in origin, but he also 
believed that there was empirical evidenoe to justify them. It was 
one of the topics which fea.tured in his disputes with IJeibniz , 
. 40 41 
who, with Descartes, - and, indeed, Locke as well, - wished to 
treat epMa and time entirely as relat1ons.42 
All of these aspects of Neli'tonts work remained issues arlsiTl€ 
both out of the mechanistio concel'tion of natu.re and of' l{ewton t s 
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basic empiricism; indeed, they were to dominate the philosophy 
of the eighteenth century. Sinoe ~any of them did not emerge 
as real problems cot11lected with the new science until !~t')wtonf s 
achievement had been digested, it is not surprising that Locke's 
Esr:;,'w did not present answers to them all. It was Hume ancl Yv.mt, 
the two great philosophers who 0\1ed most to Newton, who were to 
focus most attention on the issues. In this sense the Newtonian 
achievement is not central to the philosophy of Locke, \lI'ho dreirf 
his problems and his solutions largely from an earlier period of 
the scientific revolution. It is for this reason that I have 
passed over the proble~~ and achievements of the Newtonian 
synthesis of mathem3.tics and the empiric.al tra(li tion rather rapirlly. 
COf1clusions. 
Hennon, following :Bacon, attempted to set science Elntirely 
within the empirical traclition. Experimental philosophy, he 
maintained, was concerned with the discovery of truth. A."ld trtlths 
about the physioal world could only be known by axperience. ~Ul 
olaims to knowledge must, therefore, be j\ldged by the ori tarion of 
observation. Dut such claims, he held, even when so supported. 
provided no guarantee th~t the conclu~ions ~lat be true, for 
fundamental to science was generalization by the mt~thod of in(luction, 
and induction, he recoenised, did not guarantee certainty. Science 
was conoerned with the discovery of thl':! oonti1",zent struoture wh1.ch 
God had placed. upon the world, but there was no lndepen(lent· 
guarantee th-'lt the explanations which soientists produced were 5.n 
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fact thf'l truth about God's creation. Revision, in the lieht of 
further experience, mieht always 1)1? necel3s'lry, and cE:lrtainly it 
ahfays remained a possibility. lJewton's achieven)(mt is a COlistnrlt 
reminder that there are no short wa.ys to obtaininG' knmdedge. 
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The scientific revolution produced three quite distinot 
conceptions of the nnture and, sccpe of scientific enquiry_ J:".c'\oh, 
\'las, in its turn, a powerful factor in the advancement ()f acl.enoe. 
The first tV-TO of these vif>.tiS were, phi 10sophical1y 8'p'''laking, 
rationalist. It was the thirel only vJhlch attoml)ted to be lUlE1quiv0():lUy 
empiricist in its outlook on natU!'8. 
The first of thcs(~ outlooks "las 'l.mclcrpinne il by a N'coplatonic 
cosmology and a l:eoplatonic epistemology vlhich assumod that theri~ 
was an eternal and. necessary order 'l.md.erlyinz the world of phenom(mal 
appeare,nces which could be penetratecl by the applioation of 
m-'lth(~ma.tics to the empirioal data.. The !('oopla.tonists expocted to 
diflcover, with the aid of mathe!1k1.tics anti obsp.rvation, the necessary 
ord.er which God had. imparted to the \'IOrld. Mathe-rnatics was central 
to this proeramme because it suppHed not only tho criteria of 
truth for what counted as the discovery of that order, but also 
because the t1111 versal timeless truths of mathematics were the 
stepping-stones from the transient appearances of the world to 
the eternal truths of God.. It wa.s in such an atmosphere that the 
first important steps of the scientific revolution were ta.ken. 
The attitudes associated with the !J~"0l'latonic rev! val of the 
later Renaissance outlasted the sixteenth century, and penetrated. 
deeply into the seventeenth.. Indeed. Galileo was in marlY ways tho 
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last great representative of the N~}oplatonic outlook in seienee. 
But at the same time his genius looked foniard. tm"1ards the nntch 
more secular atti tu(les toward£l science which emorg0d during thf'l 
seventeenth century. 
The men most responsible for -the seoularizat:i.on of science 
were l3c"con and Descartes. God's creation, Descartt';;s held, was 
divided eternally bet\veen mind and ma.tter, and the phenomena, of 
m-atter could be almost entirely accounted for on mechanistie 
principles; (not "entirely", for Descartes held that God interven()s 
in the Universe to preserve a constant amount of motion. Cf. 
Principles of· Philosophy, Principle XXXVI). l.an, he believed., CQuld 
come to understand the causes of all change, and indeEhi he offered 
his system as the trtle account of the world , derived from a clear 
comprehension of the only possible principles which could 6~vern the 
phenomena. 
Cartesian science rested on the method of the DiMonrsA, which 
beea.n with the certainty of coeito err> Flum, and finished with the 
certainty of the nature of body, a certainty which was to percolate 
through the Pril'loiple~ of PhiloROphy. l3a.con, in con-trast, offere(l 
no initial certainties asparadiems for know-ledes, but he did offer 
the expectation of reaching truth through diligent experiment. 
}fuereas the discovery of truth was, for Descartes, an intellectual 
process, for Bacon it was an activity to be pursued on field course 
on in laboratory. 
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For all its ineenuity and elegance the Cartesian system, 
especially in England, was less than wholeheartedly accepted.. For th(~ 
Enelish it was only a theory, to be admired_ as such, but not {.."rasped 
as the truth about all. r;jeam{hile, it was held, the only W'A.y that 
one can in fact discover truths of the world was by the B:tconian 
method. Central to the Cartesian programme was the belief that it is 
possible to discover essences by intuition: the essence of mind,of 
body, of motion. In contrast Bacon offered no such possibility; 
the essence of anything could only be discovered by investigation. 
On these issues the English scientists of the mid-seventeenth 
century all sided with &.con. Theory no doubt could be brilliant, 
and often useful, but it was no substitute for truth, and truth, 
if it could be obtained at all, cou~d only be reac}led by means of 
observation. 'rtl.US Boyle and Hewton rejected the pretensi.ons of 
a priori scien.ce and liith it the possibility of absolute certainty 
about physical matters. 
The Cartesian progranune, then, was rejected. nut upon what was 
this rejection based? And if it was to be replaced by the approach 
to nature of Doyle and Newton, why should anybody ple.ce more 
confidence in the approach of the la.tter than in the rationalist'a 
programme? If the inheritors of Bacon t s method pIa,oed so much 
weight on experience, could they justify reliance on suoh a notorio1:lsly 
fickle support? Or, from the other side, was the inherent pessimiElm 
in the possibility of reachir..,~ absolutely certain knol41odge of the 
world in the natural philosoph;:; of Boyle anc1 N'e-i:rton r(~al1y justified? 
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These qnos-tiom:;, a.nd others, arOS0 natur:llly from an 0l'l'1uiry into 
the Nmrlonian conception of science. It Has theRe Rnd. rela.t,~d Clnl"':':l 
that Locke attempted to anr::\ier in the :r~~.f':.':. 
Part Two 
Lock~1R Theor~ of Knowledge 
-.; .. 
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IntrQH1'oti0l1 to P'1Y't Tw) 
JI..fter our investigation of the aspirations of the scientists 
of the Revolutio:n,,,re are 110\,1 in a position to turn to Locke's Egs:c!v 
to see hO\'1 it \-laS that the developments we have consldore.l had an 
impact on Locke's thought. 'lie shall find that Locke borrOi·red. 
SUbstantially from both the method and the discoverieg of science 
in his enquiry into the limits of human knot'llea.ee, and that the total 
effect of his argument is a recommenclation that the only substantial 
\vay to knowledge of the vlOrld is to follow the method employed by the 
later Ene-Hsh scientists whom we have considered, such as Boyle 3.nd 
newton. 
I believe that much of Locke's argument cannot be appreciated 
either for its achievements or its limitations without an understandi!~ 
of this background. It is, therefore, worth looking briefly at some 
of th~se connections now~before we turn to a more detailed examination 
of his 'l-lOrk. 
We have already seen that althoueh the effect of Cartesian views 
about the programme for science did not enoourage English scientists 
to accept an a priori road to knowle(~e of the physioal world,there 
Was a. strong tendency, exemplified by such thinkers as Digby and Hooke, 
to believe that certainty in kno\'1ledge was possible in na.tural 
philosophy. This attitud.e, we have also seen t was enootU'ae-ed 'by the 
&.conian programme for science, and extentled back beyond :Bacon to the 
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Neoplatonists, \iho bad held, for very different reasons, that man 
could reach certain knowledee of Godts creation. In several important 
respects Lockets Essay can be seen as a critique of that programme. 
To begin with, Locke argued that one possible justification of that 
aspiration was unfounded in his attack on the possibility of knowlec1ee 
through innate ideas. Innate ideas, lJOcke argu.e(i, could not be the 
foundation for any of our knOtiledee, anti a. fortiori, could not be the 
basis upon "1111c11 knowledee of nature could be based. Instea(i, he argued, 
We must turn to experience as the only possible fountiation upon which 
knowledge oould rest. But experienoe,he maintained, "tas severely 
limited in what it could substantiate. Ex:perience could only lead to 
knmdedee of particular truths, and even these "lare limited by the 
nature of our senses. Thus~ he argued that We could not know the 
nature of the structttre of physical objeots when our conjectures went 
beyond our experience; l'l'9 could not be certain, for example, what 
the essence of gold is, thotteh we could know what it is not. But this, 
for Leoke, did not mean that the scientific enterprize was doomed to 
failure, because he held that the natural philoscpher co\ud aspire to 
probabilities. Probabilities, Locke held)were both rational and 
important; and the foundation of probability lay in induction by 
simple enum(~ration, and lIlaS therefore grounded in experience, even 
though it went beyond e~t:perience. Further, such probabilities were 
for Locke cancUdates for knowledge, even if we lUd not kn01.I1, nor perhaps 
could ever know, whether or not they were true, in Lockets rationalistic 
and restricted sense of 'know'. 
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If we are to establish tha.t l.ocke's Ti':r;Fln,y arose in large part 
from both the prern.tpposi tions anlt problem:3 or conteroporar:,' science 
then lie Tl1'llst shm'l that Locke ''las in fact faMil iar t-Ji th the achievom;:;ntn 
of the scientists an(l hacl a knm'lledee of their ''1ork. I have theref()r(~ 
elevated the first chapter of this second part to just that task. :Jecond, 
vIe shn.ll look a-t Locke's arguments for th" rejection of the thosis of 
innrl:te ideas, as beine for him a necessary preliminary to his exposi tioD 
of his posi"Hve aooount of the natu.re of the origin 0:(' OtU' ide!J./i and_ 
his thesis about the :nature and limits of knmvlc(lee. He shall then 
go on to consider Lockets positive th<'\sis. concentratinG' especially 
On those themes lr1hioh h4.vO so far conoer:ned us. 
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Chapter VIII 
Intrl)(lu('lt1 on. 
-
There is quite a lot of evi(lence thut Locke \';':18 pr(1tty \.fe11 
ac,!uaintecl with contenporary sCience, and f ind.E't~d, with ·t118 d.Gvo1oprn.mt 
of Bcienoe thro'ttghout the seventeenth o fmtury , )'lOt only 'tJi thin tho 
Il0ClP,'T itself, but also in a variety of other works aTHl in his p1:'i va.-to 
pape:rs and. letters. But Looke ra.rely referred to particular nciel"'tistn, 
Or to particular scientific discoveries; even more raNlly (lid hI"! refer 
to po,rticular books.. Generally, therefore, the extent of 1,ocke's 
kl10\'11edee of the ,·mrks of scientists hus to be inferretl. Sometimen 
the evidEmce for arl inferen.ce is sul)stantial; at other times it is 
slender; but there is suffioient to establish that Locke was ~/e11 
acquainted with most, if not a.ll, areas of contAmroral'Y sCietlce, ami 
had a knowlede"e of the cla.ssica1 scientific tex:ts. In on(-'l a!,pa there 
oan be no doubt about Locke's kno\<11edge. In meclicitle, and in medicine 
alon~.Locke can be reckoned to have been by contemporary standards a 
master. I..ocke has been described by disti~rPUished medioal historia,nr:; 
as !Ian experienced and ski1fu.l physioian of SOUllll judgement and 
advanced vim'ls".l As pl\,vsician to the first 'F.'lrl of Shaftsbury he 
was truly a professional, and he collaborated. with the great Thomas 
SYdenham in research, ancl possibly also in writing some of Syd€mhamts 
important medical works. 2 
Locke was elected a member of the Royal Society in 1660, and 
801 thoW:h the recoras show that he wa.s not a frequent attend.er at 
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meetines he was undouhted1y a respected orie. Soon aft(-'Jr joinine 
he starto(l a smaller club which met ntBx:eter House to discuss 
scientific, theological, and philosophical questions.) It was at 
such a meetine in 1671 that the Essay Concernine Hunv"m Unde-rstanrline 
began its long gestation. 
Locke could count ma,ny of the greatest scientists of the period 
among his friends; he Wt\S acquainted with many more. It was from 
within the great circle of English science at perhaps its most prolific 
period, that l.ocke ca.me to grips with the fund,amf:'!nta1 problems of the 
extent of human knowledee. 
The extent of Looke's merlical knowledge ha.s been thorouehly 
explored by Kenneth De .. lhurst, 4 so here I shall only outline Lockets 
accomplishments. His serious interest in medicine seems to have 
begun in 1664 when he attendEHl the lectures of Thomas tUllis. Hillis 
was then a physioian of l'loarly twenty years standing an,d Sodleian 
Professor of natural Philosophy at Oxford. Looke's full notes on 
lallis's leotures on therapeutios are still preserved. At the same 
time he became interested in the physiology of respiration whioh was 
currently the subjeot of investigation by \li11i8, Riohard Lower, 
Robert Boyle, and Robert Rooke, and Locke worked. with these men 
who were all then at Oxford. Conourrently he started experiments in 
medical ohemistry, conducted with another doctor, David Thomas. 
In 1666, again with Thomas, l,ocke began medioal pra.otioe, and 
asa result oame to meet Lord Ashley, later to be the first E3.l"l of 
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Shaftsbury. Locke rna.de such a. favourable impression that Ashley 
asked him, in 1667 t to become his personal physician, a post \1hich 
Locke gladly accepted. In London, with Ashley, Locke soon beGam~ 
closely associated with Thomtl,8 ::>ydenham with whom he not only clid 
clinical work, but also cooperated with him in produ.cing Sydenham's 
medical books. AI though l,ocke had ma.ny other interests he conth;nerl 
wi th medical '!tlOrk, graduating :&l,che10r of IJ'edicine on 6th February 
1674/5, and throuehout the rest of his life he maintained his 
interest, and indeed, to practise. 
As one would expect, Locke's whole approach to medicine was 
one entirely within the empirical tradition. But more than this, 
it was one characterized by a very definite method in science, a 
method with which, by now, He shall be familiar. It ,,,;::I.S the method 
commended by Thomas Sydenham which had much i11common with the approach 
of J30yle and Newton, and which h:\d much in common with that of 13.:1.oon. 
As on\3 writer has expressed it:-
tI[ Sydenham t 8] philosophy of science lies squarely \d thin 
the trad.! tion of :Sri tish Empiricism, whicJ1 bce-an, to ta.ke a 
convenient fi.,ettre, v;ith Francis )3.3.(lon. For ex,;1mple, I think 
that a historian of this traclition could. find in SydEmham's 
writirt8'S the employm.:?nt of many of 13a.oon'8 m~tho(lo1ogical . 
cloctrines. such as: the development of a ~latural IUBtorYt 
the importance of stu.dying abnormalities, the requirement· 
that experiments support ina seneral statements must be 
repeatable and. hence tOf:ltablA, the E:'.xistenoe of a sm'll1 numl)cr 
of "natrtral classes" f the dance!'sof the 1,101:::: of tho Tribe, 
and the celebrated inductive Tables." 6 
Syder>.hamts oonception of causation in medioine "f,'!fas e:JCpres!:led in 
a Nay 'lrlhioh anticipa:ted the approllchof >~re\.j'ton as expref:lf.H.~'l in the 
first t\'I'O Rules of Reasonir.g' in Philosophy:-
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"lTature, in the production of disease, is v.niform and 
consistent; so much so, th.::.t for the same disease in 
different persons the symptoms are for the most part the 
samei and the 13elfsame phenomena. that you 1-1ill observe 
in the sickness of a Socrates you will observe in the 
sickness of a simpleton." 7 
Sydenham, like Newton, and entirely within the Baoonian 
tradition, eschewecl speculative hypotheses in medicine. l,ocke 
described Syclenha.m's method in a letter to HilHam lIolyneu.'C in 1692:-
"That which I always thought ot: Dr. Sydenham living, 
I find the world allows him now he is dead, and that he 
deserved <':1.11 that you say of him. I hope the Age has Ina!'l.y 
who will follow his Example, and by the way of accurate 
practical Observation, as he has so happily beeun, enlar~e 
the History of Diseases, and improve the Art of Physiclq 
and not, by speculative Hypotheses, fill the 1'lorld with 
useless, though pleasing Visions. Something of this kin,l 
permi t me to promise my self one J),3.y from your ju(licioU8 
Pen." 8 
Sydenham eschewed hypotheses in a pre-1Te"Ttonian age, and Locke followed 
him.9 Lockets clearest statement of method in medic ina follo\~ed in 
another letter to Holyneu.'C a few months later. It is rather long', 
but as it shows that Locke, as a practisine soientist, accepted 
oompletely the method of Boyle and Syderiham, and the method that 
vias to be clearly expounded by Newton, in oppeai tion to the 
Cartesian approach to nature, it is worth quoting in full. Loelte 
wrote:-
UBut I perfectly aeree with you concernina ceneral Theories, 
that they are for the most part but a sort of wakinc Dreams, 
wi th which, when men have warmed their own Heads, they pass 
into unquestionable Truth:::l, and then the ignorant l1Iorld 
must be set right by them; Thoueh this be, as you rightly 
observe, beginning at the ~irone End, '-Then I'~en lay the Foundation 
in their own Fancies. I wonder, thataftcr the Pattern, Dr. 
Sydenham has set them of a. better vlay, gon should return 
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again to that Romance Hay of Physick. Dut I see it is easier 
and more natural for I;len to build Castles in the Air of their 
own, than to survey "Tell those that are to be found standinz. 
lUcely to observe the History of Diseases, in all their 
Char~es and Circumstances, is a Work of Time, Accurateness, 
Attention and Judgement; and wherein, if !>Ten throueh Pre-
possession or OscitancYf mistake, they may be convinced of 
their Error by unerring ~rature and ll:'1.tter of Fact, which leaves 
less room for the Subtlety and Dispute of ~Iords, which serves 
very much instead of Knowled.ge in the learned t-J'orld, where 
methinks Wit and Invention has much the Preference to Truth. 
Upon such grounds as are the establish'd History of Diseases, 
Hypotheses mieht "Ii th less Danger be erected, which I think 
are so far useful, as they serve as an Art of Memory to direct 
the Physician in particular Cases, but not to be rely'd on as 
Foundations of Reasoning, or Verities to be contenlled for; they 
beine, I think I ~~y say of all of them, Suppositions taken 
up gratis and will so remain, till we can discover how the 
natural Functions of the Body are performed, anli by what 
Alteration of the Humours or Defects in the Parts they are 
hinder'd or disorder'd. To which purpose, I fear the Galenists 
four Humours, or the Chymists Sal, Sulphur and I':erour"J, or the 
late prevailing invention of Acid anrl Alcali, or whatever 
hereafter shall be substi tu·ted to these with ne," AJ.'plause, \-Iill 
upon Ex:amination be found. to be but so llk'lny lea.rm~d empty 
Sounds, with no preciEH~, determinate Sig'11ification. Hhat ",e 
know of the iiorks of nature, especia.lly in the Constitution of 
Heal th f and the Oporations of our :Bc)(lies, is only by the 
sensible Effects, but not by any Certainty we can have of the 
Tools she uses, or the "lay she 1>lorks by. So that tbere is 
nothing left for a PhYSician to do, but to observe well, and 
so by Analozy are;ue the like Cases, and. thence make to himself 
Rules of Practice: And he that is in this way most sagao10us, 
Hill, I imaeine, make the best PhYSician, ·tbough, he should 
entertain d.istinct IJj'potheses concernine; d.istinct Species of 
Diseases t subservient to this Enel, that were inconsistent one 
with another, they.beingmade us~ of in those Several Sorts of 
Diseases, but as clistinf')t Arts of r!lemory in those Cases. Ancl I 
the rather say this, that they might be rf~lyt (1 on only as 
artificial Helps to a Physician, and. not as Philosophical 
Tt'\lth to a. naturalist. Dut, Sir, I run too far, and tT!.tst beg 
your Pardon for talking so freely on a Subject you understand 
so much beUer than I do. I h.ope'l the Hay of treating Diseases. 
wh:ich with so Tm"lch Approbation Dr. Syder~':tm had intro(iucecl into 
the ~lorld would have beaten the other out, and turne(l men from 
Visions arvl ~'Iraneline to Observation, and endeavoUl"ine af'ter 
settled Practice in more Diseases, such a.s 1 think he han eiven 
us in some. If my zeal fcr saving I,Tens lives, and preservine 
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their Health (lihich is infinitely to be preferred to any 
Speculations ever so fine in Physick) has carried me too 
far, you will excuse it in one who \vishes well to the 
Practice of Physick, thoueh he me(ldles not l<1ith it.tf 10 
The last sentence of this passaee can only be attributed to ch3racter-
ietic Lockian modesty, for his involvement with matters medical 
outlasted 1692 by some consiclerable time. II 
Clearly, Lockets attitude to the possibility of' knovdedge in 
medical soience, as revealed in this letter, is entirely within 
the R'1conian trad,i tion, as exemplified in the philosophy of science 
of Boyle and Newton. It is a s'tatement, almost as forthrieht as any 
of Newton's, of the rejection of speculative hypotheses as a method 
in science; the view that science itself is concerned with the 
discovery of truth in natt1l'ej anti, equally, there is an insistence 
on the fundamental role of observation to the proeramme of dh;:covery. 
Locke held out no promise of certainty by the method; it was 1areely 
by analogical argtunent that diaenosis would be achievec1 f and such 
12 
areuments, as Locke had pointer! out in theF.ssa.'l, are only proba.b1e. 
Dewhurst summerises Lockets position admirably:-
"Such was the extent of Locke's empiriCism, that after a 
lifetime of study, praotice, and experi.ment, he had come to 
disoard all hypotheses in favour of careful olinical 
observa"tions from Which a diagnosis could be made by analoe;y. 
His treatment was a.hrays simple and sa.fe. lIere again he 
bel iaved .tha.t judgement firmly tempere<l on the anvil of 
experience should replace book knowledge, as the physician's 
sure guide •••• \Uth his plain, histor.ica.l a.pproach to clinical 
problems, and his analogous rea.soning from similar cases, 
Locke showed physiCians that medicine could be placed upon a 
basis of probability. He was unable to do more than this •••• " 13 
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Hhat, historically, the effect of Locke's philosophy of 
medicine was is difficult to judge, but in so far as it was insep~able 
from-Syderu1am's, it is worth remembering that it is said of Hermann 
Boerha,ave of Leyden (1663-17313), one of the greatest clinical teachers 
of all time, that when he lectured at Leyden, he always raised. his 
hat on mentioning the name of Sydenham.14 
If Lockels medical knowledge can be rated very highly, then his 
knowledge of chemistry was certainly very good. A sound chemical 
back:ground was required for producing medical preparations, and this 
Locke possessed. 
On 23rd April 1~63 Peter stahl, a prottg6 of Boyle, and the 
first public lecturer in chemistry at Oxford, started a course of 
chemistry classes which Locke soon join.ed.15 According to rlood: 
"This John Locke was a man of turbulent spirit, clamorous and never 
contented. The club wrote and took notes from the mouth of their 
master who sat at the upper end of a table, but the said J~ Locke 
scorn'd to do it; so that while every man besides of the club were 
16 
writing, he would be prating and troublesome." But, as Dewh1..U'st 
points out,17 by this time Locke a1reac~ had more chemical knowledge 
than the other pupils, and 1.ocke'9 notebooks ShOlf that he ivas in fact 
an excellent student. 
l.ocke's knowledge and research in chemistry developed rapidly 
from this time; not only di<1 hEl reafi a lal'e;'0 ntunber of book.s on 
I • 18 the subject, he a. 80 conducted. ma.ny e=cperlInents. Included in his 
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readinG Nero the book:s of 130yle as they viera publish0 fl, on "'hich 
• lCi he made extensJ.ve notl')s. " 
As a result of such readine Locke undoubtedly became well 
versed in the atomic viEnols of matter which \'lerp. rapidly bccomine 
domiI'l..ant in chemical and physical theory. lTot only vias Boyle' 8 
Origins of F0rms 8.nl1 Q\1t.'1lities one with which Locke was very 
familiar, but almost certainly he later read Francois Bernier's 
Abre0'l de In. Philosophic de Gassencli, which presEm-~ed the modified 
Epicurean atomism which Gassendi put fo~vard as an account of 
. 20 
matter and change. Bernier became an acquaintance of Locke in 
Paris in 1678, soon after the publication of the former's '-Iork.21 
Locke was not only knowledgeable about ohemical theory, but 
also of ohemical practice. Both Boyle and Nevrton reokoned him 
a colleague in ohemistry, a point well ill\wtrated by a letter from 
lJewton to Locke written in 1692 whioh 8ho\'19 the coopera.tion batl'Teen 
the three men in chemical experiments. Although the top of the 
letter is mi8sir~, the remainder is in the Lovelace collection of 
Locke manuscripts. In it Uewton wrote:-
" •••• as I can. You ha.ve sent much more ea.rth than I 
expected. For I desired only a specimen, having no inclination 
to prosecute ye process. For in cood earnest I ~~ve no opinion 
of it. Bttt since you have a mind to prosecute it I should be 
glad to assist you all I can, having a liberty of communication 
allowed me by 1,Jr. D [oyle] in one case wch reaches to you. if 
it be done under ye same conditions in which I stand obliged 
to ~~. D. For I presume you. are alrea~ under the same 
obligations to him. Eut I fear I have lost the first and 
third part out of my pocket. I thank you for what you 
conununicated to me out of your o\m notes about it." 22 
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In chemistry, Boyle, Newton, and Locke oollaborated in their 
work, though, no doubt, Boyle was regarded as the hie-her authority 
by the other two. 
1.o(:ko a,l1d r.Tr:tthemat:i.cs. 
It is sometimes stteeested, I believe unfairly, that Locke 
knew hardly any mathematios. The basis for this sugeestion is 
Brewster's remark that "the oelebrated Locke ••••• was incapable of 
understandine the Pri110i:ria from his "rant of geometrical knowledgett 
and "inquired. of Huygens if all the mathematical propositions in 
that work were true.,,23 But such a remark, even if true, does not 
establish that Locke waG poor at mathematics. Ee was hardly alone 
in not beine able to appreciate all the mathematical proofs of the 
Principia, and we might remember that, aocord.ing- to Condultt, Sir 
Edmund Halley went to see Nmofton because he coultl not <Io the necessary 
mathematics to establish that the paths of the planets would be 
ellipses on the suppos! tion that gravi ty diminished as the square 
-
of the distance. 24 Ne\ofton \-laS himDelf atiare of the difficulties 
in followine all of the proofs, as he noterl in the Introduction to 
Book Three of the P:rt110i.n;Q. He did tlot recommend anybody to study 
all the propositions of the preced.ine books, he '-trote, flfor they 
abound with such as mieht cost too mtlch time, even to rea.ders of 
(;00(1 mathelTk'ltical learnine. ,,25 
The case, then, for Lockets laok of m"l.thematical knowledge is 
n.ot proven, and there is a't least some evidence to 8hm1' that he had 
at least a morlerate unclerstancline of the flUbject. To bec;in ldth, 
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as an undergra,duateJ Locke attende(l John Uallis t s lectttres on geometry. 
l1o.l1is was then Savi1:i.an Professor of Geometry t and a man of con-
siderable reputation, and his lectures, given tvrice a week, were 
attended by Locke for the last two years before his e;racluation in 
lIallis's lectures not only included Thlclill, Appolonius, fmd. 
Archimedes, but also arithmetio, meohanios, praotical e(~ometry, and 
the principles of music; 
h . 1 t . t 26 sp er~ca r1gonome rye 
possibly, they also includerl pla:n<'l and. 
Fur·thermore, Looke continued to attend 
'Hall is 's lectures for a. yea.r after his election to a Studentsh:i.p 
at Cht'i.f'1t Ch1U'oht an<t he also obtaineri instruction :i n a8tronO!!l~T 
from Seth liard, the S:lvilian Professor of .Astronomy. 27 
Even allovline that Locke "1as not greatly attracted to !!lath'?matios 
as a subject, he mWilt have learnt a fair amount from these stwUes. 
Certainly his later notebookc reveal an interest in pt1..r8'llirJe 
mathematics beyond the level that he achieverlas a stutlent and. yotme 
don. Thus l'le find that much later, in Hi93, t.ock.e enterecl in his 
notes the opinions of his friend an(l patron, the Ea,1'1 of Pembroke, 
28 
on variotm math8matioal "Jorks. (Tho :8<:1.r1 ifas Pr~1sid.ent of the 
Royal Society in 1690, and he helped Locke eroatly in tlH1 publication 
of the Er::f-lBN to "lhom it was (i?:ldioatorl.) Thn,t l.ocke l)othered to malce 
Lt 
such entries in his private notes seems to indicate at least a mod-
erate . interest in mathematics, an(l a desire to increase his knf'M"leclee. 
Undoubted.1y I,ocke believed that a know1ed.ee of mather:ta;Ucs was 
important. 
both arithmetic antl eeometry highly_ Of' ari tl1met:i.c he wrote, f l !J.1hin 
"0 is certa.in, a man cannot have too much of it, nor too perfectly ••• n.) 
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... 1.nd even a. youne gentleman going into business 8hou1,1 have !'!1:tstere(l 
the first six books of Ellclid. 3l 
On the evidence available".i t would 1)(3 abBu.rd to pretenll that 
Locke was a eOOu. mathematician. His major interElsts in science, 
such as medicine and chemistry, did not require a ereat mathematica.l 
backeround, and there a.re no matbematical pa.pers in his manuscripts. 
But, equally, there is some evia.enr':le to shm", that Locke was familiar 
with much of the subject, and intereste(l in its progrAss. 
Locke was familiar TrlHh contemporary physical discoveries, 
and was always interested in the work of scientists on mechanics and. 
optics especially, but there is no reason to believe that he could 
he,ve been describecl as a physicist in any sense. His fa.miliarity 
Trlith oontemporary work is well testified by his authorship of his 
Elements of Natural Philosophy in which he very succinctly stated. 
not only the fundar:Jental lat·JS of Nel'ltonian mechanics t but also the 
empiricist philosophy of nature. As a summary of oontemporary 
mechanics, both terrestial and celestial, it can hardly be faulted, 
and it shows that Locke not only fully understood the principles of 
Net'lton's physiCS, but also shared his philosophy of scienoe. 
The first Ofu9.pter, enti tle/! t Of }.Tatter and Motion' defines 
-"2 
ma.tter as "an extended solid substance"- 'Motion, Locke says, is 
so well known that it does not require definition. Follm'linc this 
is an explanation of inertia, which, whilst entirely taken from 
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Newton, does not actually mention him. Then IJocke wrote: nIt 
app~a.rs as far as htl.l'nan observation reaches, to be a. settled la,vl 
of Nature, that all bodies ha.ve a tendency, attraction, or gravitation 
towards one another.,,33 Gravita'tion, Locke accepte(l, was foun(led 
in observation; his inclination 'VIaS not at all towards the 
Leibnizian interpretation that gravity was an occult quality_ As 
he expressed it: t'Tvw bodies at a distance, will put one another 
into motion by tho force of attraotion; which is unexplicable by 
us, though made evident to lW by experience, and so to be taken as 
a principle in natural philosophy_,,34 
The Elemf'ol'lts of Natural Phi1o~o:phy \vas clearly ~fl'i tten after 
the publication of Newton's Principia.. It was first published in 
1720 in A Collectj,on of Several Pieces of Mr_ John Locke b~r P. des 
!.~aizeauxt und.er the direction of ,Anthony ColHns. In the Dedication, 
des Haizeaux: explained that Locke had dictated these ElpMPnts for 
"the use of a young Gentleman whose education he ha.d very much at 
he art It • Des lTa.izeaux rightly added that although only very brief, 
"in its kind, this piece is no way to be despised. Ne wanted such 
a work in English; a.nd it would not have been a.n easy matter to find 
any such person, who could have comprehended so many things in so 
feH' words, and in so clear and distinct a. manner." 
That I...oake wa.s a.ble to express so neatly the fundamentals of 
natural philosophy in(licates a mind that had fully grasped the latest 
developments in the field; it is a.lso worth noting that the 
pedagogical advantages of the work must ha.ve been appreciated, for 
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al though the El.ements vlas not published until 1750 (except in 
des lTaizeau..'C' s colleotion), it then became extremely popular. It 
stu(1j;r for a Gelltlemrtn, anel "lent through five eilitions in fourteen 
years, testifying to its relevance late into the eighteenth century. 
Another pieoe of evidenoe \'1hioh oontributes to our pioture 
of 1,ooke's knoTtTleclee of phY13ics i13 a. paper by lJeivton among Locke's 
. 35 manuscr~pts. The paper, in the ha.nel of l,ocke's amanuensis,. Sylvanus 
Brownover, is a demonstration that the plannts move in elipscs, but 
the proof is a c.lifferent one from that offeree::. by IJovnon in tho 
P:!'inrlini"l.. It has been suggested that the paper \'1as composed. for 
Locke by newton because Locke \·11sho<1 for a simpler d.emonstration than 
that found in the Prj rdTlj n. This conjecture, though just posGible, 
has no documentary evidence to su.pport it, and hOt" the paper in 
BrmvTlover's hand originated remains a mystery. TIut, 'Hl1atevor its 
origins, it seems unlikely that l.ackf'!! l>1ou1(1 h.~ve 't-lcl.l1ted the copy 
( 36) at all, for it is clearly a copy from some other. cloot'Lrnent, unless 
Locke expected to be able to follow the cOT':.plicated mathematical 
areument which it contains.~Phe existenceof the document, that is, 
a hope to \"1h1ch sOffi;;body not familiar wi.th both mathe!.2'lltics and 
p{!~rsics "lOuld hardly have aspired. 
A1 thou..e;h Locke t s practical scientific w.n:"l: \'las larecly cor..:fined 
to medicine and chemistr~' I there is some eviclence tha.t Locke micht 
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havo conductecl some physical experiments. In Locke's f.!n.nnscriptr:l 
there is a paper ~'1hich eX3.mines tho concept of donsity, and seems 
to imply that Locke carried. out \-,hat might have been orieinal 
exporiml'mts, of a oomparatively simple sort, on the nat;U'e of 
de:nsity, a.nd how', ass1.;unil:'l-C a oorpt'.soular theory of matter, it Inay 
be explained. Although the paper may have been copied from sorno 
other person's work, this is unlikely; Looke almost ahla~Ts eave the 
SOlu~oe of a~~ quoted notes. 37 
There is very little evidence of Looke's interest or aocompHsh-
monts in other l>ranches of physios. D..tt his library did contain 
3~ 
such volumos as Huygens' Trait& de 10. L\uniore and. Gali1M's "lOr1,:s. ',) 
It is also Horth noti:rg that tho, library included 240 booh-: on 
natural science (exoluding medicine) and 69 of these were on physics, 
the largest sin,3'lo sub-croup.39 E011 far he '\ttas a IT'.aster of their 
contents we can only euess. 
I.,o~k~ r\Tlrl othE':Y.' acienoes. 
Locke's interests tiOre not limited to the four major soiences so 
far considered; his library contained. volu .. l1\~S on natural history (61). 
zooloey (29), botany (13), astronor.tT (11), and mineralo~r (9).40 
.. u thoueh tho1'o is .little evidence to establish Looke t s expertise 
in these various fields, he clearly harl some knm'lledee, as eg:u.:1.11y 
olearly he did in almost all branches of intelleotual enquiry. Indeed, 
althoueh Locke is primarily remembered as an important philosopher, 
if he had written no philosophy at all he would surely have a. place 
in history as an exoellent example of an English yjrb,~i"!f!()J for not 
only was he well acquainted 'ltd th the various branches of science, 
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and an acknOlv'led.ged master in at least ol1e, he 1-vas, as well J a 
theoloeian, an economist, and political theorist of deserved rppute. 
The Scientif1.c Influences on Locke. 
Undoubtedly the greatest scientific influences on Locke were 
Robert Boyle and Thomas Sydenham, to whom, wi th Huyeens and lIeN'ton, 
Locke paid special tribute at the beeinnine of the F.s88.Y. tie have 
already considered Sydenhamt s direct influence; that of' Boyle "laS 
at least as great, and stemmed from their acquaintanceship in Oxford, 
\1here they met in 1660.41 Al though at this stage they were not close 
friends, 42 in subsequent years their mutual reea,rd ere"l, and they 
remained firm friends until Boylets death in 1691. At that time 
Locke "vas attendine to the publication of Boylets A Q"r,p r"!l Ei8t()!'y 
of the Air, and Locke, with Hewton, tvere two of Boyle's literary 
executors. Locke folloi.,red with interest the pUblication of each 
new t-lork of Doyle, 43 and in Locke's library catalogue for 1697 
there is a list of sixty two \'1orks hy Doyle, far the largest number 
of books by any single author.44 
Nmvtonts influence on Locke was not great. )..1tho\.lZh Lockets 
views on space lilera probably al teretl as a. result of readine the 
Princiria,45 Locke's general conception of knowledge and scientific 
method was developed from a. tradition from l-lhich ~rewton himself clrevl. 
Locke anrl Newton first became aoquainted in 1689, after Locke's 
return from Holland, where he had. been sinoe 1633. 
three years, and thus Newton's major work published in 1637 t \Olas 
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also not an influence on Locke's l'Tritinc;8, though, as \-1e m::.ve seen, 
succeedine editions of the Bssay were ronrei~~lly modified as a 
result of Locke t s reading of Newton t s work.46 The attitude tovlards 
hypotheses in meclicine, therefore, which we have seen Locke support, 
whilst beine very much the attitucle of :Ne1<-1ton also, was not a 
product of the latter's influence. The full significance of 
this has not been ahrays appreciated by cOr:Jmentators on Newton: 
Nmrton's rejection of ~rpotheses was one that lvas entirely con-
sistcnt \-d th tIll) empirioist approach -to nature exhibited by such 
men as Sydenham and Locke. Uovlton 'vas merely the most faMOUS 
spokesman for an atti turle, rather than its orieina.tor. 
Undoubtedly it i-Toull1 be a mistake to identify any particular 
person, or persons, as.:!:.b!l scientific ifl.:fluence on t-ocke. lie spent 
muoh time talkine an an errua1 with the £Teat est ~1ish scientists 
of this greatest period in English scientific histo1"'J. 
Locke's scientific 13'tandine is vle11 ill nstraterl by his record 
in the Royal Society. l.ockA \1TaS elected a FellNi on 26th november, 
1668, when he tlTas thirty-six; D, year later he WlS electe(l to. its 
C '1 47 t hi I .... 1 t· t· 1.i1 1671.48 d onnCl ,ow. C 1 bOy e V13,S rlC . appoln au.. Uln. • an 
al thOl1Ch Locke "!:las not a frA'1uent attender at neetines. he was reo-
1 t 1 · 16"'2 1.9 e eo ae ln . I .' AlthouCh this refleots primarily a reco£:nition 
of Locke as a m3.n of sense and general intellieence, his stan<ling 
as a scientist 't"ould undonbtellly lmve been relevant. Ire "ms, as 
John Twelyn describecl him ·in his Di 0!,~r 1 "an excellent learnc(l 
- 'f ... 
eentlor:lanlt ;50 his learnirJg covercrl not only tlw o1assicsbut also 
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almost all areas of intellectual el'l,"!ui.ry. 
The ermeral ethos jn Hhich L00ke moved l';~S ex;>resse.:l by Eooke 
in a pap"'!' on the b'\.'!.S1ness and ctesicn of the Royal Society, to "'hich 
is appended the <'late 1663. The RoJral Society, Hooke 83.i(1., e~dst(,,1. 
"to iJl1prove the knowledce of mt1.tral thincs, and all u.sE>ful arts, 
m::muf;;l,ctl'U'8S, mechanic practin8S, eneines and inventions by 
experiments •••• " Hooke ,,,,ent on:-
If ••• in the meantlmo this Societ;;r i-Jill not ovm any hypothesis, 
system, or doctrine of the principles of natural phi1osoph~r, 
proposed or ncntioned. by any philosopher ancient or mo\lern, 
nor the explication of any phenomena l'Jhcse recm_ITS(~ must 1)(1 
hac1 to orie-inal causes (as not beine explicable by hoat, cold, 
vleieht, fiCilre, and the like, as effectn prodl1oed. thereby); 
nor dOCJ1atically define, nor fix axioms of scientifical thil\,.trS, 
b"trt \'lill question and canvas all opinions, adopth'l£; nor ad-
herin.:; to none, "Gill by mattITo delKl.te anci clear al'C'l1.ments, 
chiefly such as are decluced. fron 1 eei tif.1."l.te p.xporiments, the 
truth of such experiments be demonstratccl invinoib1y. 
"And till there be a su.fficient collection made of' 
experiments, histories and observations, there are no debatos 
to be held at the weekly meetincn of the Society, concernina 
an;r hypothesis or principal of philosophy. nor any discottrses 
mad.e for explicati.ne any phenomcm1),. except by special appoint-
ment of the Society or allowance of the President ••• " 51 
The atmosphere of the Roya.l Society, del iborately created lW its 
members, \1aS one opposed to metaphysics and speculation, entirely 
opposed to u.nsnbstantiate(l hypo,thetical expla.nation, entirely in 
favour of undogmatic investigation of natu:re. It was the attitude 
eXl?ressed by the young' Professor Newton in correspondence arising out 
of his first paper to the Royal Soclety;52 it was entirely the 
attituue of Locke himself. 
Of the influence on Locke of those who were not his contemporaries, 
the avid.once is never vO!"'J conclusive. Clearly the impact of !lacon. 
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on all the early members of the noya.l Society ,,,,as grea.t, but there 
is very little evidence of a direot Ba.conian influence on Locke. 
In his wri tines Locke r<'l.rely referred to B.:1.con, but neither did he 
to Boyle or Descartes, who were undoubtedly influential. Locke 
recommendecl J3acon once, but as an historian, not a natural philosopher, 
(in Some ThouehtR ConcArninq Reacline and Study for a Gentleman). 
HOlvever, in one of Lockets notebooks, in which he quote(l various 
authors' views on other v~iters, opinions about R~oon are q\\otcd as 
often as those about anybody else.53 Further, in Locke's library 
there were, not surprisingly, severa.l of Bacon's works. IUs list 
of books for the year 1687 inoludes the Ho"trum Orea.num, De Augmentis 
Sc::tl"nt:t.'lr11ft1, S(\rMon~A Firleles, and. H:l.storj.::t Vitae at 1,~ortis.54 
But Locke no more was, nor saw himself as, a disciple of Lacon, than, 
say, IItune was, or thoueht of himself as, a disoiple of l.ocke. 
liuch the Same applies as reeards I~ckefs relationship to suoh 
oontinental thinkers as Desoartes and Cassendi. Although I~cke 
admi tted to IJC~dy l.Ja.sham that it was reading Descartes which first 
eave him Ita relish in' philosophical thingslt t 55 the extent of 
Descartes' influence is a matter of speculation, though clearly 
large parts of the fourth book of the ERfJay derive, at least 
indireotly, from Descartes' Inetaphysics and epistemoloeY, and 
s6 Desoartes is often the subject of attack in other parts of the :Rssax .... 
Of Cassendits direot influence there is much less evidenoe. 
Even though Fox Bourne, in his biof,Taphy of' l.coke suggeste(l th::3.t it 
was Gassendi "to \'1hom unquestionably Locke owed most, ,,57 there is 
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no evid.ence that Locke saw himself in such a clebt, and it is nmch 
more plausible to maintain that Gassendi' s vieT/1S became acceptecl 
by Locke only after they had received further support from the 
English atomists such as Boyle. Locke was hardly the man to accept 
the lates"t theories simply becaurse they were ne"ltl; indeefl, in all 
things he was a conservative revolutionary. In many respects Locke's 
epistemology matches that of Gassendi, and no doubt Fox Bourne 
was right to see Gassendi as a precursor of many of Locke's views, 
but there is no evidence that Locke borrovTe<l directly from him. 
It could be l11'1intained that Locke could, and probably did, (liecuss 
Gassendi with Francois Ilernier, the F1"cnch populariser of Gassendi's 
philosopby, for 1.ocke met Bernier in France in 1611. Yet Lockets 
c:" journal entries on Bernier are exolusively about his travels.)U 
Of other scientific il"l..fluences on Locke there can be nmch 
interestinG', but inconolusive, speoulation. L-ocke read vlidely and 
assiduously; he enjoyed diseuse ions on almost any intellectual 
l1k1.ttel", and beine suocef"Ji-vely at the focus of the scientific circles 
of Dngland, F-.C'ance, and. Holland, he was both able to, and certainly 
cUd, absorb from a. groat variety of sources. 
Enoueh has been sahl to establish that l.ocke '"las olearly a man 
of science a.s \,lell as a man of letters. In an' age when such 
distinction.q were barely formed, too rigid comparting of Locke's 
place within our present categories of learning would be iThippropriate. 
Locke Has a di81;ingu1she(1 e,mateur in science; he vias not a lrL>ister 
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builder, an'l had. no 8p~cial ax:e to eril1d in dE'lfence of his O1:m 
particular exp0rtise. In such a posi tiou he vIas a(~.rlira1)ly placed 
to supply judicious assAssnent of the method of' science, to examine 
h0".'1 far Ban Co\11.:1 expect to go alone the road to knowle(lee, and. 
where he H011..1(1 have to acknowledge his ie;norance; the ta>::k, indeed, 
Introchlotion. 
In Part I lie tracerl the t'tfwelopment tow3.rrls the oOl;ception cf 
~lci~!nce \'Ihich existed. in Enelanct at tho ond of the seventeHlth 
century from th'3 b(:girmin':;9 of thfJ scientific re\rolution. He S2.H 
hQH, espBcially in Er.tgland., there ltJ~G a gradual r'3coeni ticl} of th8 
linli tatio11S of science :::tnrl the potentic.l of m3.n to unf~er8tand na.ture. 
Coupled "-1i th this "las the comrni tment to the vie"ti th3.t th~ onl~r 'rjay 
in VIhich n'lt1.1.re' s secrets OOilld 1)0 r8vcalea. W3.S by careful obI:H~rva.tion 
8.n(l experiment. As a eorolh.ry of this attitulJ.8, it H,W held. that 
theories or hypotheses abou·t the mechanisms of I1;;ttu.re, ungrour.1ed in 
obsfn'vation, could no·t, for thi'lt rea30r, be acc0pted C'..fJ bd:r.e true, 
even if, as they often did, they Vlere capal)le of E'!.:Dh,ini.:r~ the knOim 
facts. r.phis ce:n0L'al attitude found its most able expression in th'3 
Hork of lTowton. But Nevrton confined bims0lf to tho sp0cific p:r(1)lem 
of tho limits and. n~ture of science; he did not attempt to place his 
consider3.tions in a more ';:;011.01'3.1 epistemological framework. One 
important re:?.son why lie.fton never h').Q to attempt this task was becauGo 
thlSl proeramme was cart'iE'Hi throue;h by his friend John locke. 
The ;?,rgum'?nt of l,ock~ts ~888.::r is, in OfH!'f;;:t1Ce, very simple. If we 
are to inquire into the oxtent unfl limits of hum!'tn understanding, 1,0011:0 
said, then we must recoe;nise that tho cor~cepts - ! deli beratoly d.o n·")t 
'J.r;"" tho word 'idea' - with which tho h'l1.m::m mi.nd can operato, are {l<'!rivei.! 
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from exp~rience: there is no otht?r SOurCB froM Hhich thlOly Tr'clY come. 
Our experiences are of va~rine sorts, but the v~st majority of th0m 
are the prociuct of our senses. tie can, in faot, shoH how all onr 
concepts are der! vecl from experience if \ie make a careful analysis of 
them. Ot~ conoepts are used to stand for, or represent, things as 
they are, but the only way to establish whether or n.ot Ot~ concepts 
in fact represent thines as they are is by comparing them with our 
experiences, thus, if we Hish to know whether our coneept of gold 
really aocurately represents gold as it is, then we must find out by 
experi mont anel observation whether or n.ot gold has the propertiAs 
which our concept of gole1 implies_ The extent of human knowledge is 
demarcated. by the extent to which we can match our concepts against 
experience; when we can so match, then we have knowledge, when the 
matching cannot take place, then we have something' less than knot..r1edee, 
We are up asainst the limits of human understanding_ W11~re we do not 
as yet have a m3.tching, but where there is no reason why th~ matching 
cannot take place; then there is room for scientifio investieation an(l 
scientific discovery to bridge the e:ap in 0111' knowledge. This, in 
crude and bold outline, is Locke's argument. The remainder of this 
work will examine some of the key points of that argum(!nt and sho\'f 
how the Er:H'PlY succeeded, and how far it succeeded, in justifying the 
approach to nature which had emereed from the scientific tract! tion 
Which we have already considered. 
In this chapter we shall look at Locke's rejection of the doctrine 
of innate id.cas f to establish exactly what thesis it was that Locke waS 
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areuing for, and to take special note of the method. ''l!v-lreby Locke 
hoped to justify his conclusion. Before we turn to l,ocke 1 s aretl.ment, 
hOHever, there are one or ttiO points which! wish to make by way of 
a preliminary. 
For those too eager to fincl a connection bet\!veen the scientific 
revolution anci the first Book of Locke's F.ssay it might appear trot 
the rejection cf innate ideas implied both a rejection of Cartesian 
epistemology and of Cartesian physics. The areument for such a view 
would be tha.t since Descartes· epistemology, an(l therefore his physics, 
beean from certain a priori truths, held to be true without reCOUl'se 
to experience, and Locke d.eniecl that there are any such truths, 'because 
he hel(1 that all knm-1ledee has its orieins in experience, it follNis 
that the rejection of inm.te 1d.ea8 enota,ils thG rejf'lc'tion of the Cartesian 
prozramme. But suoh a. view will not stand critical examination, for 
Lockl3's rejection of innate id.eas <1iel not, in itself, :rule out the 
possibility of all a prlori knowled.ee, in the sense in which DeSci;l,rtes t 
sy~3tem W'1S based. upon 61.1ch knOl-l1edee. l,ocke riehtly hel(l that th"'Jre 
are ffic'tny propositions which we can know a. priori to bH true i bu·t 
What he did deny, in a. confused an(l (}onfusine '/fay, was that we cOllld 
kncn"1 the eSBEmce of thine;s, as opposed to the E'ssen()e of conoepts, 
except by experience. vIe could only knol'lf what the essenoe of a thing 
",aA a priori f therefore, whE!n the thine and the conoept VlIere idemtical .. 
In all other cas!~s we 001.11(1 not knm'l1 a priori that our conor:;pt 
acc'lU'ately represented. the tldne, et:ml even a pOJ1teriori it vEl,S B,:~l <lom 
€;:u~YJ usually d.ifficult, an,.\ oftil\u impossible, to d.iscover. 
But if the acturtl f:\.rt;ument of 1.0')\::8 t 8 firHt Book is not i1'1 
is v.:.ry different from any thine which Descarte8 l'lr(lte. FnrtlJe'!:', vibat 
sic;nificanne. Locke itl!'listerl, as ~.e:tinst D~Acartes, an,l all subscribers 
01"1 terion as to whether a1'1.y person has a ;partir)ular pieot:! of k!1owl~Hlce, 
rrnuTt it2elf be ;),n empirioal, not "11") a priori, o7']t",r:i.on. Thrl only 
test, l.ocke insisted., that enables us to attribute kno\iledge, iB 
ass(mt to the statement purporierl to be true. Hf.) d.0nie<1 th", 
p()ssibili t~r of knoN'lne a pri0ri tha.t anybod~l f includine ones(~lf , kn01:l!3 
a.nything. Tht3 irnplica-tiom:; of this point, thOUS-fl g<?:nerally ullnotiG01, 
are consiclerable, a poin'~ Nhioh, in the RerI\v'.l, He Rhall eJCplol'~. 
Lnck .. ,t s Th('>sls. 
-
with the fol1owine words:-
tilt i13 an I')wtablir:herl opin:i.on amongst som~ men that th,,,,r~} 
ar."! in the unJ.':'J."'r::tand.ine, c(~rtain innate principli~sf some 
primary notions, K.0L~o..l e\IVOL().\.., ch};u:'acters, as it were, 
stamped 1.l1)on the min(l of m.an, which the s()u.l receives in its 
very first being ancl brines into tbe "forld with it.t! 1 
It is this thesis that the first :Book is conc"!lrl'1od to reject. It is 
to be replaced by I.ocke's own positive thesis which he put fo!,\y;).rd 
at the be$innine of the second Book of the :0:RAa:'t t where he areuod 
that the source of all of our ideas is "Experience. In that all our 
" knowledge is foundod; and. from tha.t it ultimately derives itself."'" 
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Al thouch it trias only comparatively late 1n the writing of the 
't:nl';;:\Y that Locke decid.ed that a long section should. be concern!'!;) with 
shovline the falsity of the innate icleas thesis, (the early dra.fts 
) 3 of the work give very little, but inoreasing, attention to the issue , 
it was certainly no strawman that Locke '--las attH~cking. It has been 
I 1 1 
,1 
c ear y shown by Yo ton' that there were m.3.ny advocates cf innate 
idel'l,s theories of kn.o-r.dedge both before and after the publication of 
the 17:P,8~.;Y, and, no doubt for this reason, Locke felt that he had to 
devote a fairly lone section to refuting them before turning to 
his own positive idea.s. ThOBe who advocated. innate ideas were of 
varying sorts. Some, like Sti1lingfleet, later to be one of Lockets 
ereat antaeonists, arg'l.te(l as crulle a version as onH coulti fintl with 
which to contras·t Locke's own position. (In Stillingfleetfs Oriein."!s 
f)<"'I,nr0,~ publishe(l in 1662). Others, like Descartes, put forward a much 
more subtle, if vaguer account. 
Even if there ha,(l been no advocates of an innate ideas thp.ory 
there is a clear sense in which it would have been necessary for 
Locke to argue that a.ny innate ideas account of th.e origin of the 
"furnishings of the mind" \'lfas mistaken.. For. given that ideas must 
enter the Tuind at some stags. they must either enter at the mindts 
creation, or at some later stage, and if Locke could show that it 
vTaS not the case that they entere(l the mind at its creation, then he 
would be a long way to showing that his ovm positive thesis was correct. 
Locke's rejection of innate ideas was not only seen by him as 
a stepping stone to establishing his O~~ theory, however. He also 
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hael a moral reason llThieh went to th0 heart of his intellectu,9.1 attitude. 
The belief in innate id0as, Locke held., had and flid encourage men to 
accept unquestioningly principles which ought to be questioned. It 
encouraged an uneri tical aoceptance by the weak and an :i.ntole!'able 
dominance by the strong where no such atti tucles should prevail. He 
explained the point toward.s the end of the first book as follows:-
"trIlen men have found some eeneral propositions that could 
not be doubted of as soon as understood, it wa.s, I know, a 
short and easy way to conclude them: innate. And it was of no 
small advantage to those who affeoted to be masters and 
teachers, to mak.e this the principle of principles, - ~ 
T'l"incinl P!'l m11!'lt rot. hp nW"l"t~ OJ"l""ri. For havine onoe established 
the tenet, - that there are innate principles t it put their 
followers upon a necessity of receiving ~doctrines as such; 
which was to take them off from the use of their o,~ reason and 
judgement, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust 
without further examination: in which posture of blind credulity, 
they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some 
sort of men, who ha(l the skill and office to principle and. guide 
them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to 
have the authority to be the dictator of prinCiples, and teacher 
of unquestionable truths; and to make a man swallow that for an 
innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth 
them. tf 5 
The moral fervour should not go unnoticed. Lock:e understood as 
few, if any, hall clone before him, the connection between intellectua.l 
arrogance and moral bieotry. This is only OlJe of the many conneotions 
6 betvioen Locke's epistemology an,:1 hi.s political theory. 
The argument of Book I of the E8P,A,~r attempts to establish that 
the acceptance of the dDctrine of innate ideas. is, on three basic 
counts, 1.lnsound. First, the suggestion is implausible; second, it 
is unnecessary; third, to accept th0 iloctrine in fact 108.,18 to 
contra,lictions. Let us, tlv3n, turn 1;0 Lockets argumrmts to rehearse 
and assess them. 
Sienificantly, from th~ beginnine of the 
the tlv~sis of iYmate ideas as an h,ypothosis. Thus, aeainst those 
who justify inn9,te idea8 from univers~'l,l cl)nsent, he reasoned in th8 
following vmy:this are-ument, Locke 8'11c1, "has this misfortune in 
it, th'9.t if it Here true in mq,tter of f'9.ot, that there Nere oertain 
truths wJ1(~retn all mal'lkind aereed., it Hould :not provll'. th81:1 innate, 
if therl'l can be r:U1y other Hay shm-rn how men m'9.y cone to that univerfml 
a:3'1'cerlCnt, i:n the things they do consent in, whioh I pl'E\GUme may l)e 
done." 7 The hypothesis of irmate ideas, Locke areu.~d, is put fortvard 
to acoount for univerr'lal consent. nut eV0n if hfA er;:mt th'lt ther~ 
is 'I.tnivers3.1 consent (which J,ocke beli.eve,i there was not) still this 
woulcl not establish that innate ideal"l Here th~ only h;:rpothesis that 
could explain such a.cr9cmcnt. Tho supposfld acreement mig11t be, inc108d, 
could be, equally \'Tell ex:plained by BOrV'? other hypothesis. mlat 
that other hypothesis itl:lS we shall oond.cl.er lat'?r; 1'~hat is 1'10';-( to 
the point 113 that Locke's are;.unent here is loeically th~ e2~1')e sort 
of arL,"Jment that Newton, and Lock"" h1.!'lself. employed. against those 
scientists who attempted. to base both science and. truth u!'on hypotheses. 
The theory of innate ideas 'IIlaS f for l.ocke, an ft.ypothesis in just 
that sense which lTewton later 1dentifiedin his letter to Roeer Cot~)S 
" 
in 1713 'lt/hen he. '-.frote: "the word 'hypothElBis f is here ttsQcl by me 
to sien1fy only such a 1'ro,081 tion an is r.ot a phenomenon nor de(iuccr:l 
from any phenomena, bu-t assu'TIed. or supposed '1--11 thol.lt ar~r experim>?n-tal 
1"1 
rroof."v Innate iOElt:l.S, IJocke h(~lcl, were por:;tulaie(l f.'.S th~ cause of 
thE) rheno!l'l.enon of uni vernal a":;'Tcement, but til", cause wa.s not 
independently id(~ntified.t and. fot' all we kno,., the cause might ",Tell 
be something else. 
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The theory of inX',,-1.te ideas, therefore, ",as treated 0:' L-ocke 
as an hypothesis \'1hic11 exemplific(l just th:.:it fault to whioh Locko 
himself showeo_ opposition in his med.:i.cal lrrritin,::;"S, a point lV'e noted 
in tlv~ last chapter. It wa.s t too, just that sort of hypothef:ds 
vlhich we discovered Ne,,non Has so hostile tmrarcis. The theory of 
innate ideas ,.ras an hypothesis which hacl no direct foumlation in 
direct confirmation: it \'Jas just the sort of theory which Baconian 
science and its most able practitioners ,,-rere most easel' to reject. 
It "TaS a. postulate,l cause, not independently identifiable, just 
as for Bacon was the Copernican s~rstem, or, for Newton the vortices 
of Cartesian physics. 
The phenomena for ''1hich the hypothesis of innate ideas was 
to account varied. They included the acceptance by men of 
such principles of demonstration as the tat., of Identity, 'whatever 
is, ist; the belief that all men knew the same moral code; a.nd. the 
belief that really all men knew that there was a Deity. From his 
wide readine of travel booka, Locke had no difficulty in showing 
that the supposed facts were not as the supporters of innate ideas 
would have thenl; the St~posed universal phenomena.were by no means 
universal. Children and. idiots do not subscribe to the La\ffl of 
Thou.ght, Locke said, they do not even v..nderstand them. !jJ3 for innate 
moral principles: nThe virtues whereby the Touopinambos believed 
they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abundance of their 
enemiesu • 9 Nor were they a.lone in not recQsnJsin.e any God, for 
there were "whole natio~~ at the bay of Soldc~nia, in Brazil, in 
Boranday, and in the Caribbee islands, etc., amonest whom there was 
,,( 
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to be found no notion of a God t no rolieion.tllO 
The facts, then)that required explanation were not those that 
the supporters of ir~ate ideas imaeined. If it was a mistake to 
invoke hypotheses and construe them: as truths, then it was doubly 
mistrucen to accept the hypothesis as true when the facts it was 
S'l1.pposed to explain were not as the hypothesis required. 
The olaim that innr-1.te ideas (L'1Cist, like all existential olaims, 
cannot easily be disproved. (For this reason, if for no other, the 
burden of justification for existential claims oueht always to lie 
with the propounder, rather than with the rejector, of al1.y such 
claimA.) But if it oan be sho"t\l'n that no empirioal observations 
substantiate the claim, and if it can be shown that any facts 
purportedly explained by the claim, can be explained without invokine 
the claim, on grounds of simplicity, the latter explanation oueht 
to have preference over the former. Part of the argtunent, therefore, 
which Locke deployed aeainst innate ideas was identical in metho(l 
with the recommendations which were conta.ined. in Newton's first and 
second Rules of Reo.1-30ning in Philosophy in the second. eclition of the 
Pr:tYlr:tpia, and, more relovantly, were also oonta.ined in sliehtly 
(lifferent form, in the first edition of 1687. There, at the 
beeinning of the thircl book Newton listed variou.s hypothnses which 
v18re the fundamental assuMptions of the work. The first two of 
these were: "He are to ad_mit no more oauseS of r..atural things than 
such as are both true an(l fJufficient to explain their appear.;lrices", 
and. "therefore the causes of natural effects of the same ktnd are 
the sam0.n 
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The phenomena of ideas in the human mind can be explained, 
Locke 'urgeQ, by one cause, experienoe. And. that oaUF1e could. be 
knoirm to be true by induction, beoause nobody i;.;rished. to maintcdn, in 
the face of the empirical evidence. that all ideas NCX'e the 1'roduct 
of innate ideas; ideas of colou.r;.:;, sounds, tastes, 2,1".(1 so on 
vJere, para(li[,"lTl8.·tical1y, experiential. 
One strand. of Locket s art;1ment aeainst irNoking :i.nnate ielBag, 
then, was ru'awn entireJy from the rnetho('t of the neN ~ci.ence. 'rhe 
principle that entities shoulcl not be mllltiplied heyond nAOE'::Jsity, 
sienificantly knovm by the name of an e01,rlier ;;x.C1ish empirical 
philosoph"!!' as o.~~dl~m' s Ra'7,Or, was employeu by I,ocke both in bis 
science, <:.~,S irTC Imve seen in hi-s med.ioal method, and in his phi1oGoph .. y_ 
Ockham's Razor, lW itself, as Iteploye(l ()y 1.001<e, did. not 
establish that there at'~ no innate i(lea8. All it eliA. w~rS to thrm'lf 
back the burden of proof on those that itrished_ to 3,(lvoc::l.te their 
exietenoe. Dut Looke areued. f'Ltrther that the 8upposi tion of innate 
i;:leo.s itself If:lads to contrad.ictions, $, nO\TE~, which if suocem:;ful, 
r8n.dero the ooncep·t not only unnecessary bu'c also absurd. L.ocb:~ t s 
areument \V'as this: if inna.te id.e;\,1'.! are to serve "my 1.V-:\,~ful function 
at all in explainin.g m:,),n's beli!3fs, then they rnl .. 'VJt bo reckoned. 
univ,'?roal to all men. Given that some men {10 not ackno\1J.edee that 
th.-:'~r have thes(~ ideas, as is well establi shed empiric(\11y, i't tn'1J .. st 
be the case that they ha.ve them wHhout beine m..rare of them. But this, 
Locke claimed., is a contradiction. TIe !!lIJ.de the point, often m"1o.e 
later aea.inst F!'t?u(Uan psychoan"l.lJ1tio theory, that the conoept of 
1.l11consciotlf;! i(leas is self-contradictory. Those uho bi3lieve in 
innate i!leas, believe, Locko said, "that thflre are truths imprinted. 
th 1 1 • h . t i 't' ttt 11 on e sou H nc 1 perce Vf!S or uno.ers arms no • But this, 
saiel l,ockp., is absurd, beCc'1,use "lTo proposition can be said. to be 
in the minti which it never yet 1<:nOi'1, ''1hich it ,,;as neVAr ~ret consdouB 
f ,,12 o .• 
As lone as it is eranted that ideas ca,n exist only as objects 
of consoious avJareness, then Locke t s argument is sound. It 11:1 
worth notin;::- that Locke's su1Jsoription to this vie"l vms itself 
thorO'l.'t.:;:hly Cartesian, for Descartes hOod himself defined I thinking' 
1'" in terms of' every and any mode of consciousness • .;) But it mieht 
be held., a,::ainst both Locke and Descartes, that thore is no coo(l 
reason to restrict the concept of an idea to somethinl; 'Vihich is arl 
object of conscious awareness. 
Areumrmt on this point could. ve~r eaaily re.mify into a 
discussion of severa.l fundamental (!uestions in the philosophy of mind 
1tl11ich \vould take us far from the consideration of I..ocke t s theory 
so I shall restrict comment on this topic to one pOint. Even if 
we did a.llow that ideas could exist without the person who had the 
ideas being avlare of them, viC should still Hish to draw a d.istinction 
between ideas that are cOnBciouslyknown about anti those that are not .. 
Further, we iiould need some criterion for attributing ideas of the 
second sort to individua.ls, including ourselves, which, ex hypothesis, 
could not be the criterion of introspection. iihich we can use in the 
cD-se of conscious ideas. The only cr1 tarion which we could. use 
would be tha.t the person was capable of ma.kir,g conscious the idea 
"/hich previously he only ha.d unconsciously. :But then to attribute 
inna.te ideas to an individual turns out to be nothine more than 
establishing that the person ha.s the ca.pacity to ha.ve certain 
conscious ideas. nut, this eranted, it follows that to attribute 
innate unconscious ideas to individuals is only to attribute the 
capacity to have ideas to them. But if \-"10 are to do that, then 
it follows that all ideas are innate, an(t therefore the clistinction 
behleen innate and non-inna.te id.eas disapPf'lars, though \ .... e are 
left with the distinction between consciolw and unconscious ideas, 
that is, the icleas we do have and those that we are capable of 
having. 
It might be held tha.t this is to oversimplify the issue. 
For surely, it might be held, the distinction between irffiate ideas 
amI other idea!;! can be upheld on other grounds. Thus, innate id.eas 
can be understood as ideas which a person can have even if he has no 
other experiences. On this conception of innate ideas, any truths 
known a priori would be examples of innate id.eas. :But to this 
line of arg1mlent Locke offered a reply. First, when considerine 
the possibility of maxim.'3, such as the !..a, ... s of Thoueht, being 
innate id.eas, l,ocke saia th3.t if it is ar€.,iled tha.t they are i.nnate 
because man recognises their tru.th when he comes to the aee of 
reason, then this \>lUI hold for all such neoessary truths, but this 
can hardly be alloNed, for Ilk1.ny necessary proposi tio:ns are ones 
\>lh1ch most of u.s only l€:arn with difficul ty , fOl~ example the more 
obstruse propositions of Ellclid.ean geometI'"'J_ Thus he wrote:-
"If it be said, the 'l..U1(lers tandine 11a th .8.n ff~1i cit 
knm-lledge of these prinoiples, nut not an AXn::LCit, before 
this first hearinG' (as they rrm.st Hho say 'that they are in the 
und.erstandine before they are kno\in 1 ,) it v-1111 be haril to 
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conceive 1'ihat is me;).nt by a. principle imprinted on tho 
understandine implicitly, unless it be this, ~ that the 
mind. is capable of understarHling ana. assenti:ng firmlj" to 
such propositions. And thus all TI1'lthomatical demonstrations 
as \'10311 a3 first principles, must be receivecl as na.tive 
impressions on tho mill.); which I fear they \..rill 8cn.rce 
a1101tl them to be, H:l0 find it harcler to <.lemonstrate a 
proposition than assent to it Nhcn ilemonHtrated." 14 
Looke, of oours8, clid. not wish to deny that the t'ffiy in which vm 
oome to kno~v that t"" nooessary proposition is true is clifferent from 
the way in "1hioh He come to knovl that a contineent prop08i tion :I.s 
true. Ilut \vhat he did vlant to deny Has thnt an accoP.rlt of hOVT it 
is that 1'18 can knOVT 1that a n800S80.r;:,' truth is tru.c rcq'dres th0 
postu13:tion of innat~ ideas. He s.rguecl that even in the C1.se of 
ma:x:im3 t the vlOrds h:::v1 to be 1 earnt, and if t-le construe the words 
is especial1~r true of general ideas suoh as are involved in the mo.x:im 
that "it is impossible for tho same thine to be anrl not to ben, a 
proposi tion v1hich Locke held involved. ideas that could onl!T be 
1" knOim after we have knOltllerlce of particular ideas from experience. :; 
Lock0 t:"3 ar.:;ument here is actu3.l1y circt:.lar. He preoupposes 
that no g8l:).eral il:leas arc ir..nate, that they are all ultimately derived 
from particular ideas, l'lh1ch a!'o th'3I!1selv0s the product of partic1..1.1a.r 
experiences, in order to sul)stantiate his claim that there 8,1"0 
no innate ideas, itself required. by him in order to estal)lish that 
all ideas a.re de1"ivecl from experience: But this cha.rec ca!'.J1ot be 
made aeainst the earliel" ar.;:uments vIe have cO'flsio.ered. 
The total case aeainst irmate ideas l'Jhioh Locke pref~ented. 
includeo not only the ar[,"Ur1ent of Book I of thl'3 Y"tme,y, but also his 
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o,m positive account of the oriein of iclBCts in nook II. I~.lt 
this acknol;vledgell, the case that Loc1:e amrtsses In jJnok I alone 
is formidible. The hypothesis, he ar~led, is unnecesRa~T, and 
is, al".yway. self-contradictory. But his arg'u .. rnent depemls upon 
assumine a certain vim'1 of ideas, namely, that ideas are all-lays 
necessarily the objects of consciousness. It is worth notir.e 
that Descartes. for one, did not understand ideas in this sense. 
I wich, therefore, to dit,Tess slightly to conrdder Descartes' 
doctrine of innate ideas, in order to brine out this point, and 
also because, by contrast it will brine out an important aspect 
of Locke's argument. 
Th~ Cartesi.13n Conc~rtj,on of Inn.ate Id.eal'h 
~vhen Descartes, in The 1:iAditations of 1641, first introduced 
the concept of innate ideas, he used it to help draw a distinction 
between three kind2 of idea. He wrote:-
"But among these ieleas, some appear to me to lnnate, 
some adventitious, a,nd others to be fortRt3d [or invented] 
by myself; for a,s I have the power of und.erstandine wha.t 
is called. a thing, or a. truth, or a tho'l.te'ht, it appears 
to me that I hold this power from no other so'\.~ce than my 
own nature." 16 
Descartes admitted that he was uncertain of these distinctions, 
but in his NOtp8 a;J';1.:i.nst a Procrmnme, written a few years later, 
his position emerged more clearly. Descartes' opponent, RcZius, 
had l'1ri tten: "The mind hath no need of innate ideas, or notions, or 
axioms, but of itself the faculty of thinkine suffices for the 
accomplishment of its processes."l7 To this Desoartes replied:-
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"he appears to dissent from m~ only in lvords, for 
\-,hen he says that tl11"! mi1'ld. h!l8 110 1'lp~(l. of inrm,tl'! loM,R, 
or :notio:n~ I 01' nX:1.()!"')8, anti at the sar.le time a1101"'s it the 
faculty of thinking (to be considered natural or innate) 
he m~~es an affirmation in effeot identical with mine, but 
denies it in 'lrlOrds. For I never ,,,,rote or concluded that the 
mind required innate ideas which Nere in some sort different 
from its faculty of thinking; but ,.,rhen I observed the 
existence in me of certain thou.ehts 'lrlhich proceeded, not 
from extraneous objects nor from the d.etermination of I!\Y 
will, but solely from the faculty of thinking \-1hich is 
within me, then that I might distinguish the ideas or 
notions (which are the forms of these tho1.1.ffhts) from other 
thoughts cv'v0ntHi our.: or fa/':t it 5 O't8 I termcll the former 
'innate t ." 18 
Inn.ate ideas \lIere, for Desc:lrtes, to. be understood as ill.eas 
which a porgon .£B.!l have, not necessarily .lo0Q. have, at any particular 
moment, which are causally indepenclent of any sense experience. 
Thus, Descartes believed that knol11edee of Goo. was innate in this 
sense because it was possible for man to have an idea of God simply 
as a result of contemplating the concept of perfection, itself not 
derived from any io.ea.::: causally depen(lent on the five senses, but a 
product of the intellect's recognition of tho limitations of the 
pONora of the mind. 19 DC8cartos' use of the term 'innate idea', 
therefore, t'iaS not intend0u., except in a neg.::ttive sense, to indicate 
a caufJal explanation of the oriein of some of our ideas. A,.g he 
used the expression, innate idEl.:),S \-10rO sinply icleas ll~derived 
from sense experience, Hhn.t they \.f0re deriverl from he diil not explcdn. 
Prom this tHO differences emerze b\1tt\feen what it was that 
Dencartes supportecl a:ncl t'ITha:t Looke attack81l ,dth re[,,'n:r'cl to irmate 
prOpOS0(1. inna.te ielAa8 as a oan:::a1 o}:planation of f)(Jr:10 of oUl' i(;00,:] , 
but, ::\s we have E'80Yl, for Descartes inn.3,te Ll"'3a:1 H::'re not 
cOl1ntI'ued as caufJal aeents, but simply 'lUldcr:3tood as idt3as de:d v0d. 
a priori. Seoond, DG8Cartes VIC.C cOnJ'l1Jtted. to su~·ir\..: that I:lOn 
h"lve an i1'lr:~ate idea of', say, God, beco.t1.S0 he hel(I that m?n can 
COl!l(~ to know that there is a God a priOl'i. Thu£! Descartes \'/as 
an actuality of the mind, only a potentio.lit~r; HlJereas, as He h:J,v8 
already oo(-'n, Looke c1enie(l that \'Je oa~\ call an idea innate simply 
1)0Ca118e by reason alone Plan is c:lpable of recoenisinc certain 
proposi tiona to be trtv:.. 
Given this, the question arisen: ",bat exaotly were thf] 
implications of' Looke's rejection of innate icleas fer thE! p(Jssibilit.y 
Tho Rojeotion of Innat~ ldM,Sa aml the rossi,hili t;r oJ' A Pri.ori 
}'noV11 8! 1{:?~. 
The full implicationr; of tho rejection of innate i,uBas for 
the possibility of a"priori knoitiledee in lockets work ,·.,rill only 
become evidAnt after we have com:liclere(l his c,(~co'mt of knowlA(tee 
in the last Dook of the :r,f:1~:;.y. But SOr.1e prelirnino..ry points c~n and 
should be ma,ia before l-le leave the topic of in..'1ate idea.s. 
It mig-ht be areued. that if any a priori knovrledee i~~ possil)le , 
then there mist be, in some sense, innate ideas. The argument to 
support thin position nd.eht :run like this: a priori knmdedee is 
knmvledge independent of externally de:dvell experience (thn.t this 
phrase is undoul)tedly itself obscu1"0 neBcl not for the moment delay 
us). But any knoNle{lee is kn01rlledee of somcthine. It follolm th3.t 
somethifl"z' must exist (in the mind), ex hypothesi not clerivecl from 
experience, for there to be a priori kno\'Tletlee of it.. That which 
so exists, is \,111at is meant by an innate idea.. Therefore, if there 
is a priori knoHledee, then there are innate ideas.. I believe that 
on the basis of 'l'That vie have already consi(lered Descartes would 
ha.ve subscribe(l to some such areument, ancl certainly Leibniz ilid, 
for he held that the eternal truths "must be grouncted in the 
existence of a necessary sub:::tance .. ff That is, eternal tru.ths m'J.st 
exist in the mind of God, for they must exist somewhere, an(l their 
existenoe is "anterior to the existenoe of contine-ent baines .. " Such 
20 
truths, Leibniz held, \OTere "graven in our soulstf • It was this 
conception of innate ideas, afld therefore this conception of 
a priori knowledee to which I~oke was 80 opposed .. 
This conception of a. priori. kno'i"led.ge is not, hOvlever, the 
only possible one. He can, and philosoph~rs do, talk of knowing 
something a priori when we come to know a new truth, not by experience, 
but by decluction. Thus, by way of an eXa.r:1ple, I may know that Jones 
is a. bachelor by experience.. From this, '>lithout recou:rse to a.ny 
further experience. I can infer that Jon8s is male. In so fa.r as 
I obtained the knowled.ge that Jones is male by deduction t anti not 
from experience, it Ha.S not empirically derived... I came to k.rl0W 
it a. priori .. 
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In this S0nBC of the possibility of a priori knm-rledee there 
is clearly no need to introduce any concE'pt of innate icleas to explain 
hOH the a. priori knotvled.ee is possible. There is, then, a perfectly 
clear sense in 1-lhich one can talk of a. priori knot-dedee in which, 
a1 thouc-h the knmderlge is not unconnected with experience, it 5.9 
no·t derived from experience directly. !nlether the a. priori 
knowledge so obtained is synthetic or analytic is not in question; 
the point is simply that the rejection of innate ideas is itself 
not inconsistent with the possibility of a priori knowledge. For 
this reason a10n8 it is not, or should not be, surprising to find 
, 
that Locke is cOJllltlitted to both. h11:l.t vmuld be surprisine is if 
Locke were both to maintain that th~re were no innate ideas, and 
that j.t was possible to derive all knowledge ind.ependently of 
experience, but this absurdity is not one he approaches. 
The sense in which I have indicateei that a priori knmvledee 
is not ruled out by the rejection of inmlte ideas can be iclentifierl 
by drawing a distinction between two questions which it is easy to 
conflate. These tvlO questions are: (a) Hhere (lid I get the 
idea?, and, loosely, (b) How do I knoi'lf that the id.ea or proposition 
is true? Locke's answer to the first question is, obviottsly, 
'by experience'. J3ut it does not follow frcm this that all 
propositions must be verified by experience, if we are to knoH that 
they are trt'te. The senne in which a priori knowledge is not 
ruled out is just that serlse in which IC.:1.nt allov,red a priori 
knm-fledee. Kant t e position on thIs has b<:~en clearly e:{plain8d. by 
Arthur rap as folloHs:-
!!Kant's explicit o.efil1ition of a priori hK>w1eJze is a 
negative ono: "ICnmvledge that is inllf'penc,ent cf experienoe 
and ~ven of all Bense irrr')r0flSions." (Cr1.t:VIU.P of Pl'1""" Rf'A8on, 
'l't' it r' m' ,., n'" " • [. secane.\. 0( 1. 1.on, n 1'0. J. .uw Kl!lfl 01 lfH,l.f'll)enll('mce l11 QU8f:Hi1.01'1 
is not, of course, een8'tio, for Ka:r.t ex:plicitl~T S3..~TS tInt 
ilundoubtedly all our knmrledge bGines Hith experience. " 
i4h3.t he had in mind is that a judgement is a priori if tho 
(.>'rUr'Yl~p on which it is aocepted is not empirit)::ll." 21 
This sense of a priori knmvledt;e, Pap points out, rests sq1.1.arely on 
the notion of necessity. Thus, for Y.ant, a, priori kno\>lledge WaS 
kno\,leds'e which was absolutely necessary, i.e. kllo'Nledge to which 
"no exception is admitted even as a possibility.1I 22 
Granted, then, that Book r of the B<1S"'IT does not have the 
effect of ruling out all a priori knoHlec1ee, it foll(1~19 that Locke 
has either to finrl some other way of ruli:r1.g it out completely, Ot' 
accepti~c: that perhap3 ultimately all kno\.;ledee is a priori, or , 
thirdly accepting that some, but not all, knoi'fledee is a priori. 
It "Ja8 the latter path that liOcke in fact follmved. To (10 so he 
h:td to find a criterion for disti!1vC1"(.u$hing between acceptable and 
tmacceptable claims to a priori knowledee. And this f in a sense, is 
\1hat quite a la.rge part of the 0F'!B?,.Y is about. 
Before we leave Locke's treatment of the topic of innate ideas, 
I wish to draw attention to certain features of Locke's ar~unent 
which, r believe, have not been noticed by OOTTh"llentators ani! critics 
of the Essny. These features are important not only of the method. of 
];'ook If but also re-ocour throuehout the work. 
vIe have seen th,~;t, like a natural philosopher, Looke approaohed 
the problem of innate i(leas as if it were a scientific or para.-
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scientific causal hypothesis about the origin of some of our ideas. 
~ adoptinc this approach Locke ma~es it plausible to think that 
it can be rejected if it does not match up to th~ requirements of 
such an hypothesis. Locke implicitly argtled. that by this test the 
hypothesis of innnte ideas fails. The point can be brotl.ght out by 
comparine the hypothesis of innate ideas with the conditions whioh 
hacl to be m8t if an hypothesis were to be accepte(l by the men of 
ErJelish science of the later seventeenth century. Hore specifically, 
we can compar'3 the theory of innate ideas ~d th the con,n tiona laid. 
down explicitly by Boyle for a gOOtl scientifio hypothesis, condi tiona 
,-{hich we considered \'>lhen lookine at 13oy1e t S l'lork in Chapter VI. 
Doyle's first requirement for a good hYJ)othesis W'lS th!3.t it 
shouJ.d not be "precarious, but have sufficient grounds in the 
nature of the thine itself tf •••• The hypothesis of innate ideas 
did. not fulfil this condition, becaMe, as Locke argued, there are 
no tmiversal ideas cornmon to all men \'Ih1ch cou.ld be candidates 
for examples of innate ideas. 
The hypothesi::: of innate ideas also failed to eati.sfy Boyle's 
second criterion, that of simplicity, for Locke believed that the 
phenomena of idea8 could be explaine,l by a sinpler h ..ypoth(~sis, 
namely that all ide(.',s ar~ the prod1.lot of experienoe. The thMries 
of knoifrledee ".hieh appl"alc<l to innate ideas did. no·t deny that some 
id.eas are the product of expe:r'ience, they therefore postulated t,vo . 
cau .. <;;()s, wh8re l.oOcke was oont<?!nt with one, ;;md. therefore did not 
satisfy Boyle's second criterion, that of conta.inine "nothinc; that 
io superfluous or impGrtinent." 
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By the SI1!'!P, tob,m, I,ooke i?!',:w'l<l that it I<),!?,S not flth"l only 
hypotlv'lsis tha:~ can explioate the phenomeml"; !k)~jle' S thir,l 
conl11 tion. And, intero8'Une1y, r,nyl",' s fourth condition Nne tlot 
met eHher, thQu,zh l-001::e only ha,lf ad::n()~dec1.3'e:l this. The f011rth 
condi tion Has that the h;~;rpothesis "enable a sldlful1 naturalist 
,to foretell futur8 ph8nornena". Thn:t the theory of innate ideas 
had no pred.ictive power can br~ easily sbolrTn. Since Locke a,emon-
stratocl that to h:.wo an inmd;e idea turne(l out to be nothinc other 
than the caIY3.city to ho.ve certain id.eas, vJith no spccif:i.c criterion 
for beine able to test that capacity, to attributf:) inna.te i(10!3,9 to 
an individual euaranteed nothin& about his professed beliefs, his 
fut1:lre behaviour, or, i11(lee<1, any thine at all. Locke ha.lf rBco.:;:nisBcl 
the p01nt when he sho~led. that there appear to be no actions \'\Thich 
have not been thone-ht good by some people or other, even thoueh 
comlemnerl ()y most ::iu.ropeans; cannl hal ir:;m, for e.xampl e. Dut 
Locke never clearly maclethe point that thf:l attribution of innate 
ideas had no predictive power. 
Given that I.,ockets rejeotion of inna'tl3 ideas is achieved by 
tl'ecl.tine the theory as a scientifio hypothesiS, amI showing th;:t.t it 
dill not matoh up to th(~ cri ter1a for an hypothesis that were 
accepted by the empirical scientists, oannot it be areued that 
Lockets rejection of the theory in orIleY.' to substantiate the empirical 
method i 8 circular? Diel not l.ocke presuppose the metholl for whioh 
the B~~",y lias intendeti as a vinlUcation? Undoubtedly there is some 
substance in this oharce. Locke hail himself describerl his approach 
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to the issues consid.ered in the ~f~!'1~? 8.S "this historical, plain 
metho(1',2 3, but it is importan.t to remember that Looke (lid. not 
con.fine himself only to that method. for, as ttle have seen, he 
did not reject the theory of inTh'1te ideas only on the arcument 
that it is an unsatisfactory hypothesis in the way w!!) have just 
considered., for he also argu!!)cl that the concept of an innate idea 
is an incoherent one.. 'll}lEl theory \-1hioh Inoke attacked maintainerl 
that there were ideas in the mind of which the minel \>113,S not aware • 
./I.c:ai.nst this, Locke held th!lt ideas must be C0118cion>'3 if they are to 
be sai(l to exist a,·t all. This is a logical poin·t about the concept 
of an idea, and has nothine directly to do NUh Hheth(3r or not 
inTh'1te ideas are acceptable as soientific hypotheses. 
Given thiS, it appears that the crucial argtlment acainst innate 
ideas is whether or not they are a coherent notion. It is not rny 
i,ntention to peraue this topic at any leneth; the arC'lunent on thiE'" 
topic, althotleh important, is more far-reachine than the scope of 
this work; but one argument is worth ureinz in favour of t.ocke'a 
position. In the normal use of the wor& 'idea', it makes sense to 
ask 'tvhen any particular idea was acquireJ.. Acquisi tions of ideas 
are thot~ht to be datable, and their dating is tied to the time 
at which the holder of the idea became conscious of the idea. 
Expressions like 'Aristotle was the first man to h3ve the idea of 
drawing up the rules of formal inference' seem both intelligible, 
decidible, and often true. But, if we "lere to e.ccept the theory of 
innate ideas which Locke attacked, no fluch e..'tpressions could be 
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known to be true, for on the theory, all that we could say vms 
that Aristotle was the first m;~n vlho became conscious of the idc1a, 
not that he was the first to have it, because for all we know, 
somebody else mic;ht have hll.d it before unoorlsoionsly. But \-lhat 
would be the advantage of so talking? Tae anf3wer is 'Hone'. It 
wou.ld be a w:ty of talking introduoed just to preserve a th~o:r.y, 
namely, the theory of innate ideas. Further, the theory itself 
l'iOuld have no useful function; it i'iould complicate our languaee 
vd thout explaining anything. In<.leed. it liould be worse th<"ln this, 
because whereas before to have a11 idea. ,·;as Iinko(l Ni th some 
clcfinite criterion, namely consoiousness, tlv:;re would. 110it1 be no 
cri ter'ion for havine ideas: their status waul(l 811;1.8 into 
obscurity. There is, then, nothing to be gained, and muoh to 
lOGe, by accepting the theory, ana. this is sufficient reason for 
rejectinG' it. 
Und.oubtedly pa.rt of the difficulty in al:lsessine Locke t fl 
contention that the oonoept of an innate idea is incoherent is 
that seventeenth century philosophy tl1rne(l the Hor(l t il'tea t into a 
technical term. It beoame, under the influence ofD('sca!,·t,~s and 
Locke, a specialist term of the epistemologist, \'ihilst still 
retaininc rik'1.ny of its flon specialirit im~lic;;ttions. Technical 
tEyrmS can 1)9 used by th(~ir eml)loyer13 in ar,y "my tht>y see fit, 
as lon~ 8J3 tlll?ir f';mp1oynent is consistent. Th1t the Barrh3 is not 
true of non-technical terms. They c1\nnot be ulsetl in any H:?,y 
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a pl1rticul8,r perSOll thirlcfl fit, in Humpty Th.1.ll1pty faf?~"lion";\ l)"';r~?<llrie 
their meaninc: is not (lepondent on the fiat of a.n Gxpert, hut on 
the USG which they l'1orm"111y 1vw~ Hithin the lan"laee of .. hich 
they are e. part. Undoubtedly, a e'r{''1,t ,1(',a1 of confusion, l)oth 
for the '\vri tor ancl the rC3..rier, of s(w0nteel1th cl:mtury philc,}"';ophy 
is the pro.luci of the nse of the tern 'idea. t in both a technioal 
ancl non-teehnioal sense in the samE: 'flor?: b~r the same Hriter. 
The first P{)ok of thl'l :S8G2.~r c(lncludes l-Iith a series of rer!'!arks 
-
"lhioh I believe are sienificant, not only for the ar~'1lent 
ne;ainnt innate ideas, but also for the Hholo of the ~r-~!'!:l:r. Lod:e 
caicl that since SOf:l0 of the ar[;'t1.In.ents uC0d a.:;ainst the notion of 
irm·:::1.te principles tlrise from corrJ::1on reoeiv('(l o:pir:ions, I have been 
forc0 rl to take several thines for arant,.,,!lj Hhich in ha.rd.ly avoid.able 
c 2"-
of any tenet." J But he l.rent on to promise that the r€lItlainder of 
the ?;~;'.w ,rIould not be flO depr:mtlent on a Tnul ti t1.lt'l.e of t-'.Ilproven 
assumptions. Hewrote:-· 
"ThJ.t in the fUtur0 p'lrt of this Discourse, (1.csig;:J.ine 
to r-'lise an edifice unifor!:! and cOl'lsistent Hi th i tSf)lf, as 
far as my mom experience anel observation Hill assist W~, 
I hope to erect it on such a basis that I shall not nocI} to 
shore it up with ;props and. bu:ttresses, le<'lnir.,;: on borroVJEHl 
or begec(l foun(lations: or at least, if Mine provo a castle 
in the air, I will omlE'!wour it 8ha11be all of a piece e.nel 
hare tOGother. U 26 
Locko held that 0vcn if thfl :premises of his arG'tlr:'!'3nt "H.n~e net all 
acceIrtable to other !'.'len, he still believed that the rem!1l,inr10r of his 
arcumont would supply a coherent accou.."l.t of the extent of human 
knovll e dee. 
But Hhat of tho premir,e of the rCI'KlJ.rl'l"ll" of the HI»).'l:: C1hE'~r, 
IJocke said, are clerivod from experience. "..111 I shall say for tht~ 
DrincipleG I proceed on is, that I can only appeal ·to !:'len's 
unprejw1iced experience and ob8cr~,ticn Hhether the~r be trl1.C or 
not j" Locke wrote, !land this is encJ1.lc'h for a fl1til'l who professes 
no more than to lay dOim caniiclly and. freely his oun conjectu.res, 
concerninc a su1)ject lyi!1-e;' somm'fhat in the chrk, without a:r.y 
other dosic;n than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.,,27 
We should not, of course, be surprised to find t~~t Locke 
construe(l his axioms as experiential. (ThoUCh, unfortunately, he 
never attempted to set them dOHn in any ordered Hay.) If all 
our i<leas are derived. from experience, then this nmst also be 
true of the ideas "lhich are used to compo:::::e the axioms of any 
account of knowlecJee. But it interesting an(l important that 
Locke's statE;Hl position with recr.'l.rd to the a.'domn of his system 
or account of kn01"l1edee should be the sa.me as those from which I~ewton 
alGo beea.n in the Fri. pd nj '1,. .As l;ewton claimed for the axioms of 
his physics that they were deduced from the phenomena, so Locke 
1')1'\ 
also appealed to "men's O1m unprejudiced experience an(l obser\ra.tionJ,"-Q 
BU't if Lookets axioms are all experiential oannot the crorge 
of oircularity be made once a;:;ain'? If all the a'doms are experiential, 
then su.rely they cannot be used to establish that all knowledee is 
ultimately the product of e.xperience, for, surely, the conclusion 
is presuppose(l in the premises'? I think tha.t Locke mieht have 
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been tempted. to reply to this oharge a1011..[; these lines: 'Very 
vrell, if you wish to press that point you may have it. Dut at 
leas·t allow that my aooount is intel~na1ly consistent. If it is 
only u a castle in the air, I \>1i11 endeavour it shall be all of 
a piece and. hane tocetherfl t • Dut if this would have been locke's 
reply it would not in faot have done justioe to his ''own oase, 
for it is in f'aot considerably stronger than this, for tHO, rather 
different, but subGtantial reasons. 
First, Looke's thesis thrtt all our kno\v1edee is ultimately 
derived from experience is a l)(~tter hypothesis, judged. by the 
criteria of tho m~w science, than a!1-Y of the alternatives, or 
rather, the alternative, for Looke believerl that the!'e was only 
one, fu~me1y, the theory of innate ideas. This, in itself, does 
not eliminate the oharee of oiroularity, but it does malee the 
oirole 1areer, for it exemplifies that Locke's account of knNllecLze 
is oonsistent with the method of the not-l science. Further, Locke 
harl areuo<.l tha.t the a1 ternative to his accOlmt had. a.t le·?st one 
internal contracliction. Givan th;).t the theory of innate 1c1eas is 
unsat isfactory for thin reason , a.nd as lonC' as 1.ookl;'\ t S o"m theory 
is not also inconsistent, and there are no other possible explanations, 
'thEm Locke's account r.n.tst ue In general, if not always in p::;rticu1ar f 
correct. 
Conclusions. 
A large part of the sienificance of Lockets ar~lm0nt in :Book 
One lies in his adoption of tho approach of a scientist to a 
problem in epistemoloGY. It exemplifies, in a. Hay charaotor:l..stic 
of' ·bh(-:! ne\·l science, the rotural philosoph!?r's approach to an 
existential chdm about an hypothetical entit:r • Perhaps for the 
first time 1.n the history of philosophy, and. certainly for the 
first tim'~ in a. e;r'8a.t Node, the methocl of science as N8 lvwe como 
to undorstand H, domina.taB a piece of philosopl\Z.'. :BefoI'c thG 
seventeenth century it NaR charactc:rintically pllilosop!\;' Hhich 
dominated seier!ce, awl this is to a !l1:1rkorl do.::7';;o true 0v(.>n of 
sueh a mOlleI'll scientiat a.s Dencartcs. lU'lll, eql.lall~r important, 
t110 transference of tlv:, methoc1 of sciencA to philosorh~' is 11(;1; 
f01lYl.ct t:m,ntil1£:'. The 1~rpothesis 101:11.c11 V:loke nttacke\l oou111 not 
Hithstand. the onolau.zht of th8 n<::~'l intellectual HCo..POllS. 
nut the cffoet of u)cke t s 8:t;tC',(~k or; innate 1(1(>8.13 liaa. itlid.'2'l' 
repc1"cur;r-d ons.. l!'or if his rej ection W1G justifie1 .. it folloVlc(l that 
il nO'\"1 account of the nature of the et~~rn:ll tru:t!:.r:: or r.'..3.Ximf! '!tlaa 
rc¥:p.tirEHl. For the theQry 0:[' irmatt3 ideas had. supplied an anS1,10r 
to the qU8stion '!rh~r do we accE-pt sorn0 proposHirmf3 as et('!rm.lly 
true?' Accordinc to the thoory, 'He aocepted thorn u.s tri.1{~ becau$c 
GOll h?t'l irrlrrt'inted th0m on our milHl'3 at Q1,.\:t' creation. TIut, eiven 
t118 eff:i.oa,cy of Locke's rebuttal, a. ne'l1 anSNer 1:1<),0 oalled. for" 
Al tho1..1,'?;h Locke never eave a eeneral arm'.-If?:t" to thecx'Ucstior'f he did 
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cl:lrify th"3 issue of thl} f3ta.tus of f,roposi t.iom~ illhich i1.r;~ 
necessarily true, a problem Hhich, t'J,s '1"3 n:lVB at v9.riou .. 8 points 
seen, was an iSf.l'ue vlhieh h.:tcl. IB,l to 110t a l:i:ttle cnnfu.sion in 
the course of the scientific revolution. 
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Chapter X 
The Basis in EXperienoe 
!ntroduotion. 
Looke believed that if he was to suooeed in supplanting the theory 
of innate ideas by his experiential aocount of knowledge he must show 
that all the ideas that we do have are the produ~ of experienoe. 
This is the task which he set himself in the seoond Book of the Essay. 
Not surprisingly, it is the longest of the four. The task is, in the 
Baoonian fashion, to give a natural history of our ideas, to show that 
every one of them oan be aooounted for by reference only to experience 
and nothing else. The method gives a speoious objeotivity to Looke's 
approaoh whioh is not always justified, for several key oonoepts, 
suoh as those of causation, and substance, are olaimed by Looke to be 
grounded in experienoe in at least some sense, when his argument in 
fact does little to substantiate the olaims. 
Book Two contains the meat of Looke's empirioism. As already 
hinted, it also oontains several of his most notorious errors. The 
juxtaposition of sound, often brilliant, argument, with unjustified 
assumption, is one of the most frustrating aspeots of Book Two. What 
is even more annoying is that the mista.kes that Looke made often are 
irrelevant to the general trend of his argument. Thus Book Two ta.kes 
for granted that the objeots of all experience are ideas, a position 
Whioh, as we shall see, Looke never justified, and whioh is largely 
irrelevant to his general acoount of the extent and limits of knowledge 
whioh we find in Book Four. 
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In one ohapter it is quite impossible to treat all of the topios 
raised by Looke, and, indeed, some of his most interesting views, 
for example, his theory of personal identity, will not be oonsidered. 
We shall oonoentrate on those aspeots of the Book whioh most olearly 
illustrate the ESsay's oonneotions with the soientifio revolution, 
and those whioh are most oentral to his positive account of knowledge 
in Book Four. 
The Nature of Idea.§. 
In Chapter I of the Essay; Looke had apologised "for the frequent 
Use of the word idea •••• It being that term which, I think, serves 
best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when 
a. man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant bY' phantasm, 
notion, speoies, or whatever it is whioh the mind oan be employed about 
in thinking, and I oould not avoid frequentlY' using it." 1 The 
existenoe of such entities, Looke believed, was substantiated empirioally. 
"I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such ideas 
in men's minds: everyone is oonsoious of them in himself, and ments 
Words and aotions will satisfy him that theY' are in others.,,2 Granted 
their existenoe, the problem whioh Looke saw himself as solving 
lias "how they oome into the mind". Having, in Book One, vanquished 
the theory of innate ideas as a plausible answer to the problem, in 
llook Two Locke put forward his own posi tiv. acoount. All ideas, he 
argued, are the produot ofexperienoe •. 
Before we turn to Lookets detailed acoount of the origin of 
ideas we should take note of various aspeots of his initial position. 
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Ideas, Locke held, are whatever it is that a man is aware of when he 
thinks, they are the raw materials whioh the mind uses. The mind, 
Looke believed, was a kind of thing, an entity, analogous with a 
physioa1 objeot, but made not ot physical, but mental, substanoe. 
Looke explained the problem that he will solve in Book Two using this 
analogy: "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, 
Void of all oharaoters, without any ideas:- How oomes it to be furnished? 
Whenoe oomes it by that vast store whioh the busy and boundless fanoy 
ot man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whenoe has 
it all the materials of reason and knowledge?,,3 Looke took over 
trom Desoartes the view that the mind is a thing, separate from 
physioal things, yet analogous to them, unquestioningly. Given the 
assumption, it is very natural to construe mental entities as properties 
ot mind, just as it is natural to think of the type on the printed 
Page as being a property ot that page. And given that p~sical objects 
Were subjeot to the laws ot physios, and had a struoture which could 
be analysed aooording to the corpusoular philosophy, it was fairly· 
natural to suppose that the mind was also subject to para-physical 
laws, and had a para-physical structure whioh could be analysed by a 
Similar prooess. Looke took only the most elementary steps towards 
SUPplying the speoious laws of this para-physics, in a chapter called 
tOt the Association of Ideas', whioh he added to the second ]Ook of 
the fourth edition of the Eeslt_ Dut Lookets work did attempt to give 
an aooount ot the para-physical properties of mind, and he did this 
aSSuming a model which was the same, or very nearly the same, &s the 
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model employed by those who advooated an atomic theory of matter. 
Whether Looke did this deliberately we do not know! though it seems 
unlikely, for to have done so would have entailed Looke approaching 
his "natural history of the soul", (to use Voltaire's phrase), with 
preconoeptions, an attitude at odds with the plain historioal method 
to whioh he aspired. In support of this, it is worth noting that 
a large part of the first ohapter of Book Two reiterates Looke's 
objeotions to the Cartesian view that the souls always thinks, under-
lining how important Leeke took it to be that mental events oannot 
sensibly be talked of except as oonsoious happenings, a point whioh 
he rightly saw as eruoial to the establishmentot his empiricist 
thesis. Onoe again he inveighed against Desoartes and the Cartesians 
with the argument that the Cartesian view was merely an hypothesis of 
the unaooeptable sort. Thus he wrote:-
"It is doubted whether I thought at all last night or 
no. The question being about a matter of faot, it is begging 
it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the 
very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove atVthing, 
and it is but supposing that all watohes, whilst the balanoe 
beats, think, and it ie suffioiently proved, and past doubt, 
that I'f13 watoh thought all last night. But he that would not 
deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of 
fact, and make it out by sensible experienoe, and not presume 
on matter ot tact beoause of his hypothesis, that is beoause 
he supposes it to be so; whioh way of proving amounts to this, 
that'I must necessarily think all last night, because another 
supposes I always think, though I I'f13Selt oannot perceive that 
I always do so." 4 
A man so opposed to hypotheses was hardly likely oonsoiously to 
approaoh his aooount of the mind with preoonoeptions about its nature. 
At the end of the first chapter Locke draws an important distinotion 
between two difference oauses of our ideas. Some ideas, he said, , 
, ! 
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are oaused by sensation, and others are caused by refleotion. What 
Looke meant by an idea of sensation is any idea whioh is the product 
of a oausal chain whioh has its origin in the motion of some part 
of the human bo~. On the basis of empirical evidenoe Looke believed 
that there are no ideas until man has ideas of sensation. 
The seeond sort of cause for ideas that Looke offered was what 
he, significantly, oalled 'refleotion'. Be explained what he meant 
by ideas of refleotion in the following words:-
"The mind reoeives the ideas (of sensation] •••• from 
without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and 
observes its own aotions about those ideas it has, takes 
trom thenoe other ideas, whioh are as capable to be the 
objeots at oontemplation as any of those it reoeived from 
oornmon things." 5 
Two examples are thinking and willing. 
Ideas at sensation and refleotion are generally unavoidable, 
Looke pointed out, in the sense that we have no oontrol over what 
oolour we see when we look at a rose, or what sound we hear when we 
. 6 .... , . 
listen to a bird singing, any more than "a mirror oan refuse, alter, 
or obliterate the images or ideas which the objeots set betore it 
do therein produce.n7 The implication of this is that the origin 
of many ideas oan be explained entirely meohanioally. Locke oertainly 
did not believe that man was a machine, but he did. believe that quite 
a lot about his mental life oould be explained by invoking meohan!sm. 
(Looke, inoidentally, rejeoted the Cartesian view that animals are 
maohines. He believed, on the basis of observation, that some of 
, , 8 
them oOuld reason. ). 
- 265 -
A more detailed examination of Lookets aooount of the oausal 
chain involved in the production of ideas will follow later. For the 
moment let us just note that Locke evoked oausal explanations of ideas. 
entirely on an empirical basis in a way in which everybody is familiar. 
We are, indeed, so well aware of the causal origins of sensation that 
Locke's thesis is almost a oommonplace. But this was one of its 
greatest strengths; nobody from Plato on (with the possible exception 
of Malebranohe, to whom Looke himself offered a reply) had rejeoted 
the view that physical causal explanations were appropriate as an 
aocount of some of men's ideas. Locke's much more difficult task was 
to show how it oould account tor all of them. 
It the causal acccunt ot ideas was a contemporary commcnplaoe, 
SUbstantiated by vast empirical evidence, the same cannot be said 
of Looke's seccnd thesis about ideas, the division he propounded between 
simple (atomio) ideas, and complex (molecular) ones. The contusions 
in Looke's theory will not long delay us, for they have been well 
considered elsewhere.9 I shall just take one example to illustrate 
the diffioulties that Locke is in with his distinction, and then we 
shall oonsider why it was that Locke wished to put forward such a 
theory. 
Locke put forward at least three different criteria tcr Simple 
ideas ot sensation. Two of them were:-
<a> a simple idea is one whioh "in itself unoompounded, oontains 
in it nothing but one uniform appearanoe, or oonception in the mind, 
and is not distinguishable into different ideas",IO 
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and,(b), a simple idea is one whioh oannot be invented or framed. It 
is one whioh we oome by as passive reoipients and whioh is entirely 
unconneoted with the imagination or will.11 
As an example of a simple idea Looke offered "the whiteness of 
a lilly", and it is not diffioult to see what it was that Looke meant 
by such an example. Assuming that the degree of whiteness is uniform, 
then there does seem to be a sense in whioh the oolour is entirely 
simple. (Though, even here there are diffioulties; are we not bound 
to notioe both the colour and its boundary?) But if we accept Looke's 
example, it might be argued that such examples oould be framed 
independently of experience, Looke's seoond criterion. For, as Hume 
pointed out, it certainly seems perfectly- possible for somebody who 
is acquainted with all the colours that there are, exoept for one 
particular shade of blue, and who is presented with all the other 
shades of blue in a continuous gradation, exoept the shade with whioh 
he is not aoquainted, to imagine the missing shade, even though he 
has never seen it.12 So it might well be the case that Lockets two 
oriteria could in fact come into oonflict, and certainly it is only 
a contingent tact, if it is a faot, that they do not. 
How damaging are these difficulties to Locke's acoount of ideas? 
The answer, I believe, is that they are only damaging beoause Looke 
believed that an empirioist account of knowledge must be given in terms 
of an atomic and molecular theory of ideas. But there is no reason 
to believe, a priori, w~ an empiricist account of knowledge should 
be given in these terms. There is no reason, even on empirical grounds, 
w~ one should believe that experience should be analysed in' this sort 
. " 
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of~. For us to see that this is so it is neoessary for us to do 
what we have alrea~ suggested, namely to examine the reasons why 
Locke wished to put forward this particular acoount of the genesis 
of ideas. 
A powerful influenoe on Lookets acoount of simple and complex 
ideas was his reoognition of the sucoess of the oorpusoular philosophy 
in explaining the properties of material objects, and I believe that 
it was this model which was of oruoial importance for Lookets theory. 
The evidence for this view, though generally unnotioed, is aotually 
to be found in the Essay. The orucia.l passage is the one whioh 
follows. It is signifioant that in it, when Looke explains the origin 
of simple ideas, he direotly oompares the workings of the mind with 
the physios of nature. He wrote:-
"But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, 
or enlarged understanding, by any quiokness or variety of 
thought, to invent or frame one new single idea in the mind, 
not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor oan any foroe 
of the understanding destroY those that are there. The dominion 
of man, in this little world of his own understanding being 
muohwha.t the same as it is in the great world of visible things; 
wherein his power, however managed by act and skill, reaches 
no further than to oompound and divide the materials that are 
made to his hand; but he oan do nothing towards making the 
least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what 
is already in being.· The same inability will everyone find. 
in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding 
one single idea, not received in by his senses from external 
objects, or by refleotion from the operations of his own mind 
about them." 13 
The modern age of scienoe has generally been taken as the 
overthrow of the medieval conoeption of the macrooosm and miorooosm. 
But, undoubtedly, in Looke's words here we find an updated return to 
that analogy, albeit with a subtle twist. Yan tsto be understood 
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in terms of the universe; not the universe in terms of man. Simple 
ideas, Locke believed, oorrespond to the atoms of matter of which 
Newton was to write in the 2Etioks:-
"it seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed 
matter in solid, massy, hard impenetrable, movable partioles, 
of such size and figures, and with such other properties and in 
such proportion to space as most oonduced to the end for 
whioh he formed them; and that these primitive partioles being 
solids are incomparably harder than a~ porous bodies oompounded 
of them, even so very hard as never to wear or break into 
pieoes, no ordinar,y power being able to divide what God himself 
made one in the first oreation." 14 
Newtonls words were,of oourse, written several years after Looke's. 
But the same theory had been argued for by Boyle in the Skeptioal 
Chemist. We oan illustrate Boyle's position with his own words as 
follows:-
t'And to prevent mistakes, I must advertize you, that I now mean 
by elements as those ohemists, that speak plainest, do by their 
prinoiples, oertain primitive and simple, or perteotlyunmingled 
bodies, whioh not being made of a~ other bodies, or of one 
another, are the ingredients, ot which all those oalled pertectly 
mixt bodies are immediately compounded, and into whioh they are 
ultimately resolved •••• " 15 
Boyle also subsoribed to the view that the basic atoms of matter could 
not be created by man:-
" •••• it far exoeeds the power of meerly natural agents •••• to 
produce anew, so muoh as one atom of matter, which they oan 
but modifie and alter, not create; whioh is so obvious a truth 
that almost all seots of philosophers have denied the power of 
produoing matter to seoond causes." 16 
In suoh views surely we oan see the origin of Looke's aooount of ideas. 
Just as in the oorpusoular theory it was reokoned possible to acoount 
for the great variety of entities by referenoe to the combination of 
a limited number ot simple elements in various oomplexes, so Looke 
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held it was possible to acoount for the wide variety of ideas whioh 
man is oapable of experienoing, by referenoe to the elements of 
simple ideas, which, like the atoms of the physical world, oannotbe 
created or destroyed, but only oombined in various ways. 
There was one important difference between Lockets atomio aooount 
of experienoe and the oorpusoular philosophy with whioh it had so 
much in oommon. Locke believed that it was better grounded in the 
faots than the oorresponding physios beoause, unlike the atoms of 
matter, the atoms of experience were direotly visible. Locke 
reoognised that the atoms of Boylets soienoe were only inferred 
entities, we have "no ideas of the partioular prima.ry qualities of 
the minute parts".17 :But the atoms of experience were everywhere 
presented to us. The implioations of this, though Locke did not 
fully reoognise them, are oonsidera.ble. It follows that in theory 
at least, the soienoe of mind oan be better grounded in the known 
faots than the soienoe of matter. It is not, therefore, surpriSing 
that the philosophers who followed Looke were more attraoted to an 
Idealist aooount of the world. The world of ideas t on Looke's own 
theory, was muoh more knowable than &rf3 other. 
I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that the only reason 
why Looke supported an atomio theory of ideas was beoause 'of his 
inclination towards an atomio theory of matter. Quite olearly, he 
believed that the aooount of experience whioh he offered was 
substantiated by the' facts. :But the facts of experienoe are in faot 
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themselves oompatib1e with other than atomio theories of experienoe, 
and I would suggest that Locke might well have recognised this 
himself if he had not been so inclined to support an atomio theory 
of matter. l8 
Given the theory, Locke's task was to show that an:! idea can be 
shown to be composed of simple ideas. For many ideas Locke offered 
plausible explanations, but, notoriously, he was not universally 
sucoessful. One such case, perhaps the most important, was the "obsoure 
and relative idea of substanoe in general", whioh Looke oould never 
oonvinoingly claim was analysable into simple ideas, but whioh he 
was equally reluotant to abandon. 
If the analysis of experienoe for which Looke argued owed muoh to 
contemporary physioal theory, it also exhibits the first signs of' what 
has beoome known as logioal empirioism, a position itself logically -
if' notoauaally - independent of oontemporary scienoe. The position 
might be expressed in this way. lihen Locke talks of simple ideas, 
what he should really have said is that there are some ,terms whioh 
cannot be defined in terms of other words, but only ostensively. 
Other terms oan be defined in terms of other words, but eventually 
the terms included in the def'iniens'must themselves be oapable of' 
ostensive definition. All meaningful disoourse, therefore, must 
use terms which are either themselves derived direotly from experience, 
(by ostensive definition), or must be oapable of' being indireotly 
so derived. AIry terms which oannot be so defined or derived are 
meaningless. Therefore, all meaningful disoourse is ultimately 
dependent upon experienoe, and, a fortiori, so are all olaims to 
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knowledge. 
Locke, however, was prevented by his own account of ideas 
and language from ever presenting his theory in this sort of way, 
even if he had wanted to, whioh is itself rather doubtful. Lookets 
theory of language included the doctrine that words were simply 
names for ideas.19 It was for Looke, therefore, ideas which were 
baSic, and it was upon his account of ideas that his theory of 
meaning was founded. In oontrast, the logical empirioist's aooount 
of meaning does not presuppose a theory of experienoe, for it is 
from the theory of meaning that the empiricist thesis that all 
knowledge is derived from experience is itself derived. Thus, for 
the logical empiricist, the way in whioh I oome by my experience 
is itself not a central iSBue, whereas for Looke it was entirely 
central. 
The reason why this was a oentral issue for Looke hardly needs 
elaborating. It was beoause he was treating the mind or human 
understanding as it it were an objeot whioh could be examined and 
explored in the same sort of way as the objeots of the physioal world 
can be examined. The plain historioalmethod led him to explore the 
phenomena of the mind, and he tried to understand its meohanios before 
he ever turned to the problom of how it was at all possible for the 
language which he used to be signifioant. 
Locke's Causal Theory of Peroeption, 
It is olear from Looke's writings that he oonsidered the theo~· 
of peroeption which he advooated to be a well-established empirical 
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faot, in BO far as it both could be an empirioal faot, and 
was also aotually known about. The phenomena are olear, Looke 
argued, but some parts of the detailed mechanism are obsoure. 
The acoount oan be stated, using the most prevelent example, that 
of sight, as follows. Light travels from a light souroe to an 
object; it is refleoted from that objeot to the eye of an observer; 
it enters the eye and produces an image on the retina. From the 
back of the retina, motion is propagated along the nerves to the 
brain; in some (unexplained) way the brain oauses an idea to 
ooour to the mind whioh is our idea of the objeot. Although Locke 
never gave a very olear statement of the theory whioh he obviously 
aooepted, he oame olose to it in the following:-
"The next thing to be oonsidered is, how ~odies produoe 
ideas in us; and that is manifestly & impulse, the only 
way whioh we oan oonceive bodies operate in. 
"If then external objeots be not united to our minds 
when they produce ideas in it and yet we perceive thes~ orisipa~ 
Qtllllties in suoh of them as singly fall under our senses, it 
is evident that some motion must be thence oontinued by our 
nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the 
brains or the seat of sensation, there to nroduoe in opt mipd~ 
the ;partioulAr ideas lie hay; 9f them. And sinoe the extension, 
figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, 
~ be peroeived at a distanoe by the sight, it is evident 
some singly imperceptible bodies must oome from them to the 
eyes, and thereby oonvey to the brainsomemotign, whioh 
produoes these ideM whioh we have of them in us." 20 
Like everyone else in the seventeenth centur.1, Looke acoepted 
that action at a distanoe is impossible, and that motion oanproduoe 
nothing but motion in the physioal world. (Though olearly not in 
the mental world.) But whether these are oontingent or neoessary 
truths Looke does not say. As so otten in his acoount he uses a 
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psychological, not a logical, word to indicate what he takes to 
be impossible, and fails to tell us whether the inoonoeivable is 
also the logioally impossible, or is simply taken by him to indioate 
the limit of our psyohologioal capaoities. But Looke openly 
admitted that the transition from the physical motion to the 
production of the non-physical idea in the mind was something which 
he oould not explain, an inability which does not appear to have 
worried him; the gap in the story was openly admitted and openly 
dismissed:-
nIt is therefore the aotual reoeiving of ideas from without 
that gives us notice of the existence"of other things, and 
makes us lr..now that something does exist at that time without 
us, whioh oauses that idea in us; though perhaps we neither 
know nor oonsider how it does it. For it takes not from the 
certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by them, that 
we know not the manner wherein they are produced •••• ft 21 
The phenomena, Locke olaimed, establish that ideas, in what is called 
normal peroeption, are produced by outside objects; the faot that 
the mechanism which produces them is inexplioable, is . irrelevant. 
It was the constant conjunotion of ideas and objeots, Locke held, 
which· allowed us to assert the causal link, not our detailed knowledge 
of the aotual mechanism which in fact is the oausal chain. Indeed 
Lookets position about the oausal connection whioh exists between 
object and idea was exactly the same as the position whioh Newton 
advooated with respeot to gravitation. That objeots do tend to 
move towards· each other inversely as the square of their distanoe, 
and in relation to their mass, was Newton held, a phenomena well 
established empirioally. But Newton did not pretend to have· 
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established "the cause of this power". He would not frame (or 
feign) an hypothesis to aocount for this, because such an hypothesis 
would go beyond the evidence in an unacceptable way. "And to us!', 
he wrote, "it is enough that gravity does really exist and act 
according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves 
to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies and of our 
22 
sea." 
What I am here suggesting is that Locket s lack of conoern for 
his incapacity to explain the connection between mind and matter is 
explained by his commitment to the same sort of empirioal outlook 
that we find exhibited b,y Newton towards his inability to explain 
gravitation. But it is another matter whether Locke was right to 
see the problem in this way. For, whilst Newton could, and indeed 
did offer - albeit reluctantly - explanations for gravitation in terms 
of the ether, (an entity for which he believed there was some 
empirical evidence), it is not at all clear that a~ plausible 
hypothesis could be devised by Locke to account for an interaction 
between the two entirely disparate substanoes mind and body. 
This difficulty for Looke, and for all dualist theories, can 
best be appreoiated by oonsidering the notion of interaction. We 
normally understand the concept of interaotion in terms of physioa1 
objeots, and the paradigm of suoh was the interaction between two 
physical objeots as desoribed by Cartesian - or later - Newtonian 
mechanics. The most simple example of such interaction is when one 
object in motion pushes another. But the mind, as Looke understood 
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it, was not the sort of thing of which it makes sense to say that 
it can be pushed, for nothing physical can be truly said of it 
at all. We, therefore, do not know what it is to talk ,of physical 
substance interacting with mental substance at all. It was not, 
therefore , just that Locke did not have an hypothesis to account 
for the mechanism of mind-bo~ interaction, but that there seems 
to be no possible hypothesis which would do what is required. 
This objection had alrea~ been made in the seventeenth century 
when Locke wrote the ESsay, for Gassendi had made it in reply to 
Descartes' conception of the relation between mind and bo~. 
Concerning the possibility of bodily movement being initia.ted by 
the unerlended soul he wrote:-
"How can there be effort directed towards anything, and motion 
on its part, without mutual contact of what moves and what 
is moved? How can there be contact apart from bo~ t when 
(as is so olear to the natural light) 
'Apart from bo~, nought touches or is touched'?" 23 
To this sort of objection Locke, no doubt, would have considered 
he had a reply. It might be expressed like this: 'I grant our 
inability to understand the nature of this interaction, but it is 
obvious that it does occur from experienoe. Further, our position 
is no better with a whole range of phenomena with which weare 
constantly presented.' One such was the problem of the cohesion 
of the parts of material objeots, which Looke used to illustrate 
that our understanding of matter was at least as soanty as our 
unclerstanding of mincls. Locke took as an example, the cohesion 
generated in wa.ter by freezing. Wa.ter he assumed to be atomic 
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in struoture. The parts of water do not cohere when it is in a 
liquid state, but do when it is frozen, and of this he wrote:-
"He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose 
little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known 
the cement that makes them stiok so fast one to another, 
would disoover a great and yet unknown seoret; and yet when 
that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension· 
of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, 
till he oould show wherein oonsisted the union, or consolidation 
of the parts of those bonds, or of that oement, or of the 
least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears that 
this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be 
found when examined, to be as incomprehensible as anything 
belonging to our minds, and a solid extended substanoe as 
hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, wbatever 
diffioul ties some would raise against it." 24 
Lockets point here is olear. In passing it is also worth noting 
that it was not merely academic. Galileo, for one, had offered 
a theory of the strength of materials which raised the difficulty 
which Looke here had identified.25 Similar problems arose, Locke 
argued, when We looked in detail at how it was that one body 
communicated motion by impulse to another body, just as much as when 
we tried to understand how mind could excite motion by thought. 
Of these Locke wrote:-
"For in the communioation of motion by impulse, wherein 
as muoh motion is lost to one body as is got to the other, 
whioh is the ordinariest oase, we can have no other conception, 
but of the passing of motion out of one body into another; 
which, I think, is as obsoure and inconceivable as how our 
minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every 
moment find they do." 26 
And, like Newton, Locke, in his seoond reply to Stil1ingfleet, showed 
that although the oause of gravitation was something he did not 
understand, nevertheless its existence was established empirioally 
by Newton's work:-
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"The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways 
inconoeivab1e to me, is not only a demonstration that 
God oan, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ~s 
of operation above what oan be derived from our idea of 
bo~, or oan be explained by what we know of matter, but 
also an unquestionable and every where visible instanoe, 
that he has done so." 21 
Locke went on to say that the next edition of the Essax would take 
account of Newton's discovery; which is further evidence that the 
Prinoipia did not make an impact on Locke before the publication of 
the first edition of.the ESsax. 
Lockets conoeption of Causation. 
From the examples which we have just oonsidered it is possible 
to see that Locke was committed to a oertain theory of oausation. 
In fact Locke was committed to an acoount of oausation which oomes 
very olose to, thought it is by no means so clearly stated, as 
that which was later to be advooated by Hume. Implioit in Looke's 
examples is the view that oause and effeot are to be identified 
by means of the existence of.oonstant oonjunotions in experience. 
By experience we know, so Locke argued, that our idea. of an object, 
and it being before us, (as in ordinary vision) , are oonjoined. 
We therefore have the right to assert that the objeot's being before 
us is a oause of our having .this idea, even though we oa.nnot 
understand the meohanism whioh brings this about. And. just the 
same situation holds of attributing the oause of motion in one 
object to its being pushed by some other objeot, even though the 
aotua1 transmission of motion by impulse is to us unintelligible. 
Looke explained how we oome by our idea of oausation in 
Chapter XXVI of Book II of the Essay. His acoount begins, unhappily, 
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wi th a oiroular definition. But when he turned to partioular 
examples, although even here his formulation is rather muddled, 
the pioture whioh emerges is one whioh is generally oonsistent 
with his thesis that all our ideas are derived from experienoe. 
He began his acoount as follows:-
"In the notioe that our senses take of the oonstant 
vioissitudes of things, we oannot but observe that several 
partioular, both qualities and substanoes, begin to exist; 
and that they reoeive this their existenoe from the due 
applioation and operation of some other being. From this 
observation we get our idea of oause and effeot." 28 
Already Looke is in some diffioulty. Clearly we oannot derive our 
idea of oause and effeot from notioing t~~t some objeot ("other 
being')operates to produce the existenoe of some other objeot or 
quality, for to notioe this is to notioe that a oauseand effeot 
relation holds, and oannot, therefore, be itself an explanation of 
that idea. Similarly, Looke's definition of oausation leads him 
into diffioul ty: . "That whioh produces any simple or oomplex idea. 
we denote by the general name, oa.use, and that whioh is produce<1,' 
effeot." As Fraser noted, Hume asked 'what does he mean by product~ 
ion?,29 But, this aside, Looke's statement is true, even it unhelpful. 
He is muoh more helpful when he turned to examples:-
"Thus finding that in that substance whioh we oa11 wax, fluidity,'.' 
whioh is a simple ~ that was not in it before, is oonstantly 
produoed by the applioation of a oertain degree of heat we oall 
the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the 
oause of it, and fluidity the effeot." 30 
For the moment, ignoring Looke's oonfusion in trea.ting heat both as. 
an idea. and as a property of the wax, (a diffioulty whioh he is led 
into by his distinction between primary and seoondary qualities), 
we oan see tha.t his basio assertion is that we oal1 heat the oause 
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of fluidity in wax because whenever heat is applied to wax the 
wax melts. Our knowledge of cause and effect, Locke here 
maintained, is entirely the product of experience, and he held 
that the experience consists of two elements, constant conjunction 
of cause and effect, and what Locke called 'power'. The origin 
of the constant conjunction in experience is clear enough. Thlt 
what about power? Locke also believed that this could be explained 
empirically. His acoount of the origin of our idea of power was 
this:-
"The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the 
alteration of those simple i~eas it observes in thiDg~ 
without; and taking notioe how one comes to an end, and 
ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not 
before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and 
observing a constant ohange of its ideas, sometimes by the 
impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes 
by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from 
what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the 
like changes will for the future be made in the same thinot'?S, 
by like agents, and by the like ways, - oonsiders in one thing 
the possibility of having any of its simple ideas,ohanged, 
and in another the possibility of making that change; and so 
comes by that ~ which we call povrer." 31 
There is a sense in which Looke's statement of how we oome by 
the speoific abstract idea of power is perfectly adequate, for he 
gives an explanation of hOli it is that we come by this . idea as a 
result of experience. But, in another, and more importa.:r.,t., sense, 
Looke's aooount is far from aooeptable, because he slides from a . 
sta.tement of observations of suocessive ideas to the assertion that 
we notice that some of these changes seem to be caused by our 
choices. Thus he employs the conoept he is exp1ioating in his 
explanation. He therefore failed to explain at all why we ever, Or 
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how we ever, make the move from suooession to causality. Granted 
that Locke's account is for this reason far from satisfactory, 
it would be wrong to dismiss it completely, because it does have 
some important merits, as well as its fairly obvious inadequacies. 
The first and most important merit of Locke's acoount is that 
by it Looke is not oommitted to the view that there is a logioal 
conneotion between oause event and effeot event. That this was 
in faot Looke's position can be seen if we take his acoount of 
oausality in oOnjunotion with his remarks on logioal neoessity, and 
many oomments about the powers of God. 
Although Looke did not use the expression 'logioa1 neoessity', 
he did talk of 'the neoessar,y agreement between ideas', and also 
of oontradiotion. An example of the neoessary agreement between 
ideas is exemplified by any tautology, or what Looke oal1ed 
'trifling proposition', suoh as 'lead is a metal'. In Looke's 
lanu~ge, the oomplex idea of lead oontains within it the idea of 
metal.32 Knowledge, Looke held, was alw~ a oase of ttthe peroeption 
of the oonnexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy 
of any of our ideastt • 33 And in this example there is a oonnexion 
between our idea of lead and our idea of metal. »at in the oase 
of most oausal statements (though not all) there is no ouch agreement 
between our ideas. The attribution of a oause and effect relation 
is based upon observation of sucoession, and nothing else. Thus, 
to take one of Looke's examples, there is no connexion in our ideas 
between wood, fire , and ashes. We simply disoover empirioa1ly 
"that the substance wood •••• by the applioation of fire, is turned· 
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into another substanoe, called ashes.n34 
vlhat emerges, therefore, from Locke's aooount of causation 
is that although he failed to give an ad~te acoount of the 
origin of our idea of causation because his explanation presupposes 
our already having the idea of causation, he nevertheless did imply 
that causal conneotions can only be discovered through the 
observations of regularities. 
Lockets conception of how we can identit,y causes must be seen 
in the light of his opposition to hypotheses, which we have alrea~ 
found in both his scienoe and his philosophy. It was essential to 
that view of science that causes should not be (because they could 
not validly be) inferred from effeots. It was central to Newton's 
view of science, as we have seen. It was the position which 
Glanvill had eo olearly expressed in Xhe vanity of Doemetisi~. 
It lay at the oore of the anti-Gartesian attitude in seience whioh, 
on the question of method, was so prominent amongst the English 
soientists of the period. 
But there was a further reason for Looke to rejeot a logical 
link of a sort that would make it possible to deduce oauses from 
effeots. The view that there was no such oonnection followed from 
a theologioal premise whioh the English soientists aooepted. The· 
premise was that God was free to make an;rthing the oause of anything. 
It followed from this that what he had. in fact made the oause of what 
was only decidable empirioally. It was for exactly this reason 
. that Looke, in the Essay, was willing to postulate the proposition 
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that matter might think, a position whioh he explained most olearly 
in his seoond reply to stillingfleet.35 If God had so deoided, 
Looke argued, He oould have created thinking matter, because there 
is no contradiotion in the notion of thinking matter, and nobody, 
before Desoartes, Looke said, ever thought that there was. If 
there is no oontradiotion, to deny that it is possible that matter 
might think is to plaoe boundaries on God t s omnipotence, and the 
only boundar,y, rightly, that Locke was willing to allow was oontradio-
ion. It is worth adding, in oonnection with this, that the advooacy 
of the unrestrained freedom of the Divine Will had a history in 
English empirioal thought going back at least to Ookham, who had 
also advooated the theological premise whioh we find in Looke and 
the English scientists of the period.36 
Our investigation of Looke's concept of oausation, presupposed 
by his theory of peroeption, reveals that although Looke's aooount 
is far from adequate, it was one whioh was .consistent with the 
developments in the physioal sciences ourrently taking plaoe in 
England. Moreover, for all its haziness, the concept of causation 
which Locke explored and for which he offered his aooount was the 
oonoept which was aotually employed by the soientists, and by 
11ewton especially. Like newton, Locke acoepted the total oontingency 
of the disooveries of the soientist, including the oausal discoveries, 
and he was oommitted to that oonception of causation which was 
itself to be both clarified and critioised by Bume, and later, Kant. 
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It was a oonception of oausation whioh made its impaot under 
the influence of the new soienoe and the new empirioal philosophy. 
Ideas and Objeots. 
Aooording to Looke's oausal theory of peroeption, ideas are 
produoed in our minds as a result of a oausal ohain stretohing 
from objeot to mind. This has given rise to what has beoome a 
traditional objeotion to Looke's aooount. If we are only presented 
with ideas in experience, and all our knowledge oomes from 
experience, surely the only things whioh we oan know to exist a.re 
ideas. We oan never know that there are independent material 
objeots of the sort that Locke believed are often the initial oauses 
of our ideas. If this oritioism of Looke is correct then clearly 
it is very damaging to his whole account of perception at least, 
if to nothing else. 
Generally, philosophers have agreed that the oritioism is 
justified. Looke assumed that there are material objeots, yet 
on his own theory he oannot know that there is anything besides 
ideas. In the last analysis I think this oritioismof Looke is 
oorreot; but .the issue is more complioated than it is often taken 
to be. It will therefore be worth oonsidering the argument in 
. . 
a little detail. 
The first point to note is that no acoount of peroeption oan 
esoape from the faot that we normally construe peroeptual situations 
as ones in whiohthere are things peroeived and an awareness of the 
perception. Thus, if I see a tree, then there is a. tree, and I also 
t"' : 
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have a visual experienoe. Normally, that is, perceptual 
ooourrences are taken to involve both objeots independent of 
me and my having certain experiences. In his acoount of peroeption, 
Looke wished to do justioe to this part of our normal understanding 
of perception. Thus, when Looke argued that what we are aware of 
in perception are ideas, he generally meant that when we peroeive 
objeots we have experiences. There is no reason to believe that 
Locke thought of these experiences as being of a particular sort, 
for example, images, but, equally, he thought images to be one sort 
of idea. The point is made by Locke in his chapter on perception:-
"this is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the 
body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are 
made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notioe of 
within there is no peroeption. Fire may burn our bodies with 
no other effeot than it does a billet, unless the motion be 
continued to the brain, and there the sense of heat or idea 
of pain, be produced in the mind; wherein consists aotua1 
peroeption." 37 
Lookejustified his acceptance ot this conoeption of perception 
entirely on empirical grounds. It was, for Looke, simply an 
empirioa1 fact that the causal chain 1inldng , the mind and the 
world must ,be oomp1eted if experienoes of the external world, 
ino1uding pain and other bodily experiences, are to ocour. But 
the problem is whether or not we oould ever be justified in 
believing that there are external objects at all, whether there 
are any other 'things' in the world besides ideas and mindS. 
To this question Looke answered that man was justified in a 
be1iet in an external world. He offered two arguments for his 
position, justifications whioh, it not absolutely conolusive, he 
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believed oould be taken as satisfactory by all reasonable men. 
Looke's first argument is an appeal to general theological 
oonsiderations about mants nature and his relationship to God 
and the world. The seoond is an appeal to experience as a 
justification for the belief in the existenoe of material objeots. 
This seoond argument oomes interestingly olose to being an appeal 
to a paradigm oase. 
Locke's theologioal justification "'Tas nOl'lhere spel t out by him 
very olearly, and he did not re ly' on it to establish his point. 
But it is an argument to be noted because it brings out oertain of 
Locke's preconceptions. For the argument to be appreoiated we must 
remember that Looke, like many,of his oontemporaries inoluding his 
oritio Berkeley,38 believed in the Great Chain of Being. Locke 
expressed this oommi tment in the J13sa1 thus:-
nt-ilien we oonsider the infinite power and wisdom of the ~!aker, 
we have reason to think that it is Duitable to the magnifioant 
harmony of the universe, and the great desien and infinite 
goodness of the Arohiteot, that the speoies of oreatures should 
also, by gentle degrees, ascend upwards from us towards his 
infinite perfeotion, as We See they graduallydesoend from us 
downwards: whioh if it be probable, we have reason then to 
be persuaded that there are far more speoies oforeatures above 
us than there are beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, 
much more remote from the infinite being of God than we are 
from the lowest state of being, and that which approaohes 
nearest to nothing." 39 
species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of 
sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence: 
that in all the visible and corporeal world, we see no chasms or 
gaps.n40 
Given our comparatively lowly position on the soale, it is 
not surprising that there are many things which we do not understand 
and oannot justify in any absolute sense. One such area where no 
absolute justifioation is possible is in our belief in the existenoe 
of objeots external to us. No absolute justifioation is possible, 
but we have all the proof we require for our partioular station in 
the whole of creation. The position is clearly expressed by Locke 
in .Book Four of the Ess~3' where Locke considered our knowledge of 
external objeots. If, he said:-
"any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and 
to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think 
and do, during our whole being, is but the series and 
deluding appearanoes of a long dream, whereof there is no"· 
reality; and therefore will question the existence of all 
things, or our knowledge of anything: I must desire him to 
consider, that, if all be a dream, then he doth dream that 
he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that a 
waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he 
~ dream that I make him this answer, That the oertainty of 
things existing in rerum natura when we have the testimony of 
our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain 
to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being 
suited not to the fUll extent of being, nor to a perfeot, 
olear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt 
and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they 
are i and accommodated to the use of life: they serve to 
our purpose well enough, if they will butg1.ve us oertain 
notice of those things, which are convenient or~inoonvenient 
to us." 41 
. j 
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Granted that we have no absolute oertainty, Locke argued, we also 
need no absolute certainty. The faculty of peroeption which various 
animals have, Looke elsewhere said, reflects the way in which God 
has oreated each animal with the sort of faculties most appropriate 
to its kind "so that the wisdom and goodness of the l~er plainly 
appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric, and all the 
several degrees and ranY~ of creature in it.,,42 
Looke's theology, then, supplies him with an explanation why 
we can offer no absolute proof, through our senses, for the world 
around us. But the theology is itself only bare probability, and 
it cannot, for that reason, be taken as supplying any sort of 
justification either for the existence of the external world, or 
for the theological propositions themselves. 
Locke's argument on the basis of experience for the existence 
of an external world is more interesting and more substantial than 
the one we have just considered. The two arguments were often 
run together by Locke, (especially in Book Four, Chapter XI~) but 
I shall now consider the experiential argument separately. Onoe 
again Looke does not take the argument to be absolutely oonolusive, 
but a modification of it, not entirely lacking in textual support, 
is. 
Looke,argued, in effeot, that there are situations in whioh 
it would be a.bsurd to doubt that there are objeots external to us. 
Looke did not construe this a.bsurd.! ty as logical absurd! ty, whioh 
he would have to do if on his terms, he was to esta.blish oonclusively 
- 288 -
the existence of an external world. But he did come very close 
indeed to construing the absurdity as a logical one. In his reply 
to the sceptic who holds that knowledge of the existence of the 
external world is not possible Locke put forward the following 
counter-example:-
"he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the 
force of its flame by putting his finger in it, will little 
doubt that this is something existing without him, which does 
him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is assurance 
enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his 
actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves." 43 
Lockets argument here amounts to this: if it is held that in the 
situation described we cannot talk of the existence of a flame, 
then we ought to note that neither can we talk of human actions 
as events in the world, for our claim to knowledge of the existence 
of human actions has much the same presuppositions as our olaim to 
knowledge of the existence of the flame. 
Locke went on to s~ something considerably stronger, and, 
indeed, different from this, for he said that the existence of the 
flame was as certain as "our pleasure or pain". Undoubtedly he wa.s 
wrong about this. We can doubt that a flame has an existence 
independent of our experience in a way in which we cannot doubt 
that what we are nOii experiencing is painful. But what I take Loolce 
to be getting at is that there is something patently absurd in 
denying that a flame exists in such a si tua.tion. And the reason 
why it is absurd is because what we mean to imply when we say tha.t 
a flame eXists is that, amor..g other things, fingers get burnt when 
: ~ 
Ii 
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plaoed where the flame is taken to be. One function of existential 
olaims about p~sioal objeots is to indioate oertain aotual and 
possible experienoes. FUrthermore, we understand the word 'flame' 
because, in such situations as Locke desoribes, we use the word 
'flame' to identify the objeot before us. If suoh situations are 
not oases of flames existing, we are tempted to ask, what would be? 
The soeptio would indeed be pushed to speoify what it was, over 
and above what is alrea.dy given, that he would w-±sh for 
before he would be sure that there was a flame, as opposed to some 
illusory flame, before him. 
Looke's arcument has at least some elements in oommon with 
what has beoome known as the Argument from the Paradigm Case.44 
Lookets argument is not in fact suoh an argument, beoause he did 
not olaim formally to prove the existence of the oandle by means 
of it. .But there are other passages in the nEssay which oome· even 
oloser to suoh an argument; thus, we find Locke accounting for how 
it is that we come by our idea of solidity in the following way:-
"It any one asks me, lihat this soligitI is, I send him to his 
senSes to inform him. Let him put a flint or a football 
between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he 
will know." 45 
What we mean by solidity, Looke was saying, is just that sort of 
thing whioh we oome to know in such situations. 
-
Although Locke did deploy such arguments, be. reoognised that 
they did not substantiate the existence of an external world 
against the absolute soeptio, beoause the arguments do not pro;v;e, 
suoh an existence, rather they presuppose it. One oannot. 
\ 
: \ 
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substantiate the existenoe of a oandle, simply by relating 
the experienoes which one can have if one places one's fingers 
in a flame (of a candle) beoause what is at issue is whether 
these experienoes do substantiate the claim or not. To this 
radical form of soepticism Locke provided no answer, any more 
than Hurne was to do when he wrote with regard to the senses: 
"tis in vain to ask, lihether there be bo~ or not? That is a 
point whioh we must truce for granted in all our reasonings.H46 
The ~~istenoe of bodies Looke did indeed take for granted in all 
his reasonings. 
Lockets position, therefore, about the oonnection between 
experienoe and the existence of an external world is ultimately 
unsatisfactory. It might be expressed in this way: Locke aooepted 
that any finite set of flame-like experienoes did not prove that 
the flame existed independently of the experienoes; or, formally, 
that any finite set of experiential statements does not entail 
a material-object statement. Nevertheless, Looke held that we are 
entitled, for the reasons whioh we have oonsidered, to believe 
that there are independent objeots on the basis of experienoe. 
Lockets fundamental troubles here are undoubtedly a produot 
of his terminology, itself at least partially a produot of the 
preoonoeptions whioh he brings to his philosopl~ from oontemporar,y 
physios. Having asserted that all that we are eVer aware of are 
ideas, Looke believed that he had thus identified a sort of entity, 
a paraphysioal thing, whioh is the mental oounterpart of the 
physioal world. Instead of desoribing peroeption as "having iaeas" 
- 291 -
Locke should have said that although it is necessarily true that 
whenever we are aware then we are having some experience, it does 
not follow from this that what it is that we are aware of' is the 
idea or experience. What we see, hear, feel, taste, etc., on 
a~ particular ocoasion is not normally a mental entity, and is 
oertainly not neoessari1y some mental entity. Normally we see, 
hear, feel, eto., such things as tables, pins, and people, although, 
undoubtedly, when we see such objeots, it is also true that we do 
have experienoes. 
Interestine1y. Looke on occasions seemed to be very olose to 
beinz aware of' these sorts of consideration. As A~ D~ Uoozley has 
pointed out, in a very interesting introduction to the Essax47, 
the evidence which is normally taken to establish that Locke was a. 
holder of a representationalist theory of perception is not nearly 
so overwhelminz as most co~entators on Locke have taken it to be. 
The question, \olooz1ey asks, is whether there is absolutely con-
elusive evidence that Locke did believe that ideas were thi~t Were 
indeed the objects of perception.48 As he points out, although 
Locke held soma kind of representationalist theory, it is not 
clear what kind of representationalist Locke was in his theory of 
perception. Looke"talked. of seeing tables, and of havir.g ideas of' 
ta.bles, but never of seeing ideas of tables.,,49 .And it would appear 
from this that, sometimes at least, Locke held that the correct 
objects of normal perceptual'verbs are words which refer nott~ 
. . 
mental entities but to objects in physical space, independent or us. 
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Dut,for all its ingenuity, Woozleyts account of Locke's 
theory of perception cannot be accepted. For, although it is 
true that Locke often does refer to objects of the physical world 
as if we can and do perceive them directly, ultimately his whole 
account does presuppose that what we are directly aware of are 
mental entities, ideas which are modes of the mental substance, 
mind, and not modes of the physical substance, matter. Locke's 
ul timate commitment to this position emerges very olear.lY from 
his account of language. For Locke, words are the signs of ideas, 
not of thinea external. to their user. Uords, for Locke, are 
tfsigns of internal conceptionstt50 they are "mArks for the ideas 
wi thin his own mind".5l Loc1;:e held, in an uncompromising way, 
to what, under the influence of Wittgenstein's EQilgsonhipa! 
Investigations, has come to be called a private lansuage theory of 
meaning, in which the objects of reference for all of our words 
are not public, but logically private,entities. Indeed, Locke 
would have been inconsistent to have advocated ~ other account, 
given his view that the objects of our awareness are always mental 
entities, ideas or experiences which are things in our minds and 
never things in the world. If Locke, therefore, had held a direot 
realist's account of perception it would have been radically 
inconsistent with his theory of meaning, but no such inconsistency 
arises if we acoept, as I have argued we would.be right to accept, 
that he in fact held that what we are aware of in perception is 
some kind of mental entity, itself often produced bye. causal. 
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chain stemming from some external object. 
For all the difficulties in Locke's account of perception, 
and there are many, we must not lose sight of its positive merits. 
Lockets account presents the problem of perception in terms of 
the scienoe of his day and he fairly clearly sets out the main 
facts of the situation. He left the issues in a form which made 
them amenable to further soientific investigation by both 
physiologists and psyohologists and the problems that he failed 
to solve have remained oentral issues to the present day.52 
Conclusions. 
I have not attempted to look in detail at all the problems 
raised by Looke's positive acoount of how it is that we oome by 
the ideas that we do have! what I have attempted to do is to 
seleot several key aspects of Looke's position and examine these. 
We have seen that Locke often failed to establish that oentral 
conoepts suoh as tcausation', and 'physical objeot t can be aooounted 
for satisfactorily by his particular brand of empiricism. But, 
despite these important limitations, he did follow through his 
programme in a way whioh threw important light on the issues 
involved. Constantly, also, we find in Locke a oonscious rejeotion 
of the a priori road to knowledge, an insistence, almost a dogmatic 
insistence, that the "furniture of the mind" is contingent and 
empirically founded. Further, we have found that his thinking 
is permeated with preconoeptions talcen from the method of Bcienos 
which we have earlier found in the works of the contemporary English 
scientists: it is the rejeotion of hypotheses.in favour of the 
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historical plain method that he constantly pursued. 
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Chapter XI 
Locke on ~nterial,Objects_ 
!.ntroduction~ 
In the last chapter we examined Locke's account of the origin of 
some of our ideas, and we looked at some aspects of his theory of how 
it is that we come to have knowledge of an external world. But there 
still remain many other points of interest and importance in Locke's 
discussions about our knowledge of material objects, and the genesis of 
that knowledge, to be considered. It is with these other topics that 
this chapter is concerned. Once again we shall find that Looke's 
thinking is permeated with ideas taken from contemporary science; once 
more, too, we shall find that Lockets position is much easier to refute 
on grounds of inconsistency than it is to rejeot on grounds of 
implausibility. 11e shall also discover that Lockets thinking in this 
area illustrates various important strands of his total outlook on 
science and knowledge. 
J~terial Substance. 
Locke was aware that we had an idea of matter. To be consistent 
with his empirioist programme he had to ehow that we oome by this idea 
as a result of experienoe. We have alreadyseen,how Locke attempted 
to justify a belief in the external world by his theory of peroeption, 
but there \'lere other important', aspects to Lockets aocount besid.es the 
ones that we have considered, and this is especially true cf his 
detailed discussion of material substanoe. 
One distinction whioh Locke made in his disoussions of n~terial 
things is a useful and important one for his arguments and should be 
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noted at the outset. It is the distinction between the "obscure and 
relative idea of substance in general" and "the idea of particular 
1 2 
sorts of substances" such as "man, horse, sun, water, iron. tf The 
distinction is important on several grounds, not least because unless 
it is clearly recognised, there is a danger of construing objections 
to Locke's account of "substance in general" as also counting against 
his remarks about particular substances or particular things. 
\,le shall turn first to Locke's account of substance in general. 
It is possible to find in Locke's writings two different justifications 
for a commitment to material substance, one empirical and the other 
deductive. The empirical argument is inductive and entirely consistent 
with Locke's empirioist programme. It runs as follows: Locke said 
that when we are willing to say that a property is instantiated then 
generally we can find something to which we are willing to say the 
property belono~. But, when we press this, in the last analysis, we 
find that we are left only with properties and nothing which independently 
is identifiable as the thing which has the properties. At this juncture 
we invent a thing, substance, which is taken as that which has the 
property even though we cannot separately identify substance as such. 
Thus Locke wrote:-
"If any one should be asked, what is the subjeot wherein oolour 
or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid 
extended parts; and if he were demanded, wha.t is it that; solidity 
and extension adhere in, he would not be in a muoh betteroaae 
than the Indian ••••• who, saying that the world was supported 
by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on, to 
which his answer was, a great tortoise; but being again pressed 
to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, 
something, he knew not what. n .3 
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On this argument the existence of substance is only a supposition 
based on inductive evidence. The evidence is that when we normally 
attribute properties there is something which we can identify 
independently as the thing which has the properties, so that when 
We have properties but no independently identifiable object to which 
the properties can be attributed then it is reasor~ble to suppose that 
there is such an object even though we cannot see, or in any other way, 
identify it. Such an argument, however, would not reach ·'beyond bare 
probability". 
But Locke also held that there were other, firmer , reasons for 
believing there to be material substance. He off~red these most clearly 
in his Third Reply to stillipgfleet. There Locke argued that there 
were logical as well as empirical reasons for believing in substanoe. 
"It is" t he said, "a rep~ncy to our conception of thi~ that modes 
should subsist by themselves ••••• because we cannot conoei!e how 
qualities should subsist by themselves.,,4 Locke held, then, that there 
was a necessary conneotion between a quality existing and there being 
somethingwhioh has that quality. The logical point which Locke 
has made might be paraphrased in this way' it is always nonsense to 
USe a predicate term without predicating it of something. Whenever, 
to use the symbols of the predicate caloulus, one asserts tf' then there 
must be some 'x' of whioh the tft is asserted •. This is neoessarily 
true because we always.take the tf' to be the predicate term or Some 
subject-predicate proposition, by definition • 
. Given this, it follows that whenever one asks the. question 
·\f.hat is some particular property the property of?' there must be aome 
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answer. But, given that we can only find out the answer by 
observation, for Locke offered no other way to establish the existence 
of material objects, it follows, Locke held, that eventually we will 
arrive at a positicn where we have predicate terms, but no observably 
identifiable subject. All that we shall be able to say is that there 
is something "we know not what" which has the properties. As Locke 
remarked:-
"He that is satisfied that Pendennis-castle, if it were not 
supported, would fall into the sea, must think of a support 
that sustains it: but whether the thing that it rests on be 
timber, or brick or stone, he has by his base idea of the 
neoessity of some support that props it up, no clear and 
distinct idea at all" 5 
Locke is undoubtedly right to maintain that there must be something 
which has the property simply because it is a flat tautology to say 
that properties or qualities are always properties, or qualities of 
something. But to allow this does not require him to invent something 
called material substance which is the thing which has the properties. 
We can see this if we consider an example: A stone has the property 
of' weight, we can ask of the stone what is it "lhich has this property. 
One answer is that it-is the solid extended parts of the stone which 
have this property. And what are solidity and extension the properties 
of? Locke's answer is that they are properties of something called 
the substance of the stone. Dut Locke via.S not forced to siva that 
anSvler, in fact he was mistaken to do so. i'lhat he oould have said 
instead is that solidity and extension are not properties of anything 
other than the stone itself, we have no need to invoke anythina else 
in order to find the appropriate, andoorrect)Bubject which has the 
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properties. 
Hhy, then, did Locke insist that there must be some other thing, 
substance, which is the ultimate property-bearer? A further part of the 
answer is that Locke was pushed towards the introduction of substance 
by the scientific preconceptions which he brought from contemporary 
physics to his philosophy. Locke believed that material objects have 
a structure which contemporary science had not yet fully comprehended 
but which was probably best understood in terms of an atomio theory 
of matter. Looke, that is, was strongly inolined to believe that 
matter was atomic in structure. His inclination is to be found in 
many passages in the .~~sa~ of which the following is but one, though 
typical, example:-
tI •••• gold or saffron has a power to produce in us the idea 
of yellow, and snow or milk, the !i2!. of white, which we oan-
only have by our Sight, without examining the texture of the 
parts of those bodies, or the particular figures or motion of 
the partioles which rebound from them, to oause in us that 
particular sensation: though, when we go beyond the bare ideaJL 
in Our minds. and would inquire into their causes, we cannot 
conceive anything else to be in any sensible object whereby it 
produces different ideas in us but the different bulk, figure, 
number, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.n 6 
No doubt one reason why Locke was strongly inclined to such an atomio 
interpretation of matter was his general acceptanoe of Doyle's oorpuscular 
philosophy. But Looke also realized that the evidenoe was not 
conclusive. He expressed his attitude clearly when he wrote ~ 
"'l'hough'the world be full of systems of it, yet I carmot say, 
I know one which can be taught a young man as a soience, wherein 
he may be sure to find truth and oertainty, which is what all 
sciences give anexpeotation of •••• I thinl~ the systems of 
natural philosophy, that have obtained in this part of the world, 
are to be read more to know the hypotheses, and to underatand 
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the terms and ways of talking of the several seots, than 
with hopes thereby to gain a oomprehensive soientifioal 
and satisfaotory knowledge of the works of nature: only 
this may be said, that the modern Corpuscularians talk in 
most things, more intelligibly tha.nthe Peripatetioks." 7 
The corpuscular theory of matter was for Locke an hypothesis, and the 
one "which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explioation 
of those qualities of bOdies,!.8 Dut it was only a.n hypothesis, not 
a proven faot. Despite this, Looke, on oooasion, showed more than 
a tentative commitment to it, thus he could write:-
"If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks 
of bodies, in the universe esoape our notioe by their remoteness, 
there are others that are no less ooncealed from us by their 
minuteness, These insensible corpuscles being the aotive parts 
of matter and the great instruments of nature on whioh depend 
not only all their secondary qualities but also most of their 
natural operations, our want of preoise distinct ideas of their 
primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignoranoe of what 
we desire to know about them. It 9 
And, as W~ D~ Joske has pointed out, some of Locke's remarks oommit 
him a priori to a Lucretia.n atomism. lO 
Looke, then, was ambivalent in his attitude towards the corpuscular 
philosophy. He believed that there was a. great deal of evidence for it, 
but he reoognised that he had no oonclusive reason for accepting it 
as beine true for it was only an hypothesis, a supposition to aoco~t 
for the observed phenomena, and nctan independently established 
empirical fact about matter. Nevertheless, the a.rguments of.:Boyle 
a.nd the other supporters of a.tomism undoubtedly enoouragedLocke in 
his commitment to material substance as the stuff out of which the 
atoms of matter (if there were such) were composed. And often in his 
work the hypothesis of atoms can be seen to over-ride Looke's 
philosophica.l caution, illustra.ting a.n important way in whioh. 
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contemporary science helped to determine Locke's philosophy. 
So far we have identified three separate reasons why Locke wished 
to introduce the concept of material substance. The first was 
empirically based, viz., in our experience there is always something 
which has the properties which we attribute to things, therefore, 
when we still have properties, but no independently identifiable 
subject for those properties, it is inductively justifiable to 
assume that in these cases also there is a subject. The second 
argument turns on the fact that it is logically necessary that qualities 
belong to some object, because predicate terms are necessarily always 
predicated of some subject term. Third, undoubtedly, if we consider 
that material objects have a structure, then we are committed to the 
existence of stuff out of which the structure is made; and given 
that we can have no direct experience of the parts, either because 
they are internal to the object or too small to see or in a~ w~ 
directly experience, \'ie cannot have a. "clear idea" of them, but only 
a "conf'uaed idea" of something nwe know not what" to which the simple 
ideas of experience are causally related, just as, today, understanding 
of physical objects is related by the average layman to a "confused 
id.ea" of sub-atomic particles. 
After his exploration of how it is that we come by our idea of 
substance in general, Locke turned to examine how it was that we come 
11 by ttthe ideas of particular sorts of substance~tt. Locke s~s that 
Our idea of substance in general must precede our ideas of particular 
. substances, a view which, on two counts, is inconsistent with his own 
stated position. Locke held that ideas are always first of the 
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particular and only later, after a process of abstraction,made general;12 
further, a substantial part of his explication of substance in 
general presupposes the existence of particular substances. But Locke 
is forced to conclude that the idea of substance in general is prior 
to that of substance in particular because the analysis of al'\Y 
particular substance must, of necessity, make referenoe to the notion 
of substance in general. Thus Looke held that our ideas of particular 
sorts of substances are a combination "of simple ideas, as are, 
by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notioe to exist~~ 
together; and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular 
internal oonstitution or unknown essenoe of that substanoe.,,13 Once 
again we are faced with one of Locke's fundamental mistakes. lIe 
believed that because it is logically true that attributes must always 
be attributes of something, the attributes must be attributes of 
something which is unknown. But the attributes of something are just 
attributes of that thing which is identified as the subject of the 
proposition which attributes the property. nThe desk is six feet 
longtt·is a proposition whioh attributes a property of length, not to 
some unknown entity, but to the objeot on which I am now resting. But 
it is true that the desk is composed ofma~ parts, and, as Looke 
maintained, is probably made of particles with which I am not direotly 
aoquainted individually in experience for they are eaoh too small for 
me either to see or otherwise identify. 
l~otwithstanding Lookets error about the nature of subjaot terms, 
what he had to say about the structure of objeots is largely-both· 
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true and in the context of seventeenth century soience, important. 
We shall return to this point later, but for the moment we shall follow 
through Locke's account of particular substances. 
Our conception of a corporeal substance or a material object, 
Locke said, is a composite one having three elements. First there 
are what Locke called the primar,y qualities of bodies. These qualities, 
Locke maintained, are in the object whether we perceive them or not; 
they are "bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion of the parts of 
bodies".14 Second are the "sensible secondary qualities, which, 
depending on these, (i.e. the primary qualities] are nothing but 
the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by 
our senses; which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise 
than as ~hing is in its cause".15 Third, are the "active and 
passive powers" of a substance, such as the power that a. loadstone 
has to alter "the minute particles of iron", or the power of gold to 
be mel ted, but not consumed , by fire. 
Our conception of any particular object, Locke a.rgued, is limited 
by our experience of that object, and "lhat we take an object's properties 
or powers to be will, no doubt, be affected by our experiences. "1 
doubt not" Locke wrote "but that there are a thousand changes, that 
bodies that we daily handle have a power to cause in one another, which 
. .. . 16 
we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects." 
And if our senses were different, then the same objects as we now 
perceive would no doubt cause us to have very different ideas from 
the ones which we normally have just as .t sa.nd or pounded glass t which 
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is opaque, and white to the naked eye, is pelluoid in a mioroBoopc".17 
Our partioular oonoeption, then, of any partioular material 
objeot, Looke held, is determined by our experienoes of that objeot, 
and undoubtedly our experienoes are only a small seleotion from the 
full range of logioaily possible experiences that beings (of any sort) 
might have of that objeot., Onoe again Looke points up our limitations; 
but these limitations are neither inoonsistent with our station nor 
inadequate to the tasks that man has been oreated to fulfil 
vlOrds of Pope: 
"m:1Y has not man a. microscopic eye? 
For this plain reason - man is not a flyn. lS 
Real and Nominal ~senoes. 
. 
. in the 
Locke'S aocount of our lcnOl.;le~c of the essences of material 
objects is a product of his theory of language-and his empirioist 
posi tion. k3 we have seen Looke vias coromi tted by his account of part-
icular substances to the position that we can have no knouledgo of those 
Substances other than that supplied by experience. liis theory of 
lallg"Wlge VIa.S also substrultially grounded in his empirica.l outlook. 
Looke's aocount of language and meaning is in essenoe very Simple. 
He maintained that words in general stand for ideas. As he expressed 
it: man uses sounds Has signs of internal conceptions; and to malce 
them stand as marl<o for the ideas within his Olin mind, whereby they 
might be made known to others, and the thoU&hts of ments minds be 
. . 19 
oonveyed from one to another." 
Sinoe words are signs, if they are to have any sienificanoethey 
must be signs of ideas which the person using them has actually 
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experienced; as Locke put it: "ilords being voluntary signs, they 
cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. 
That would be to mal~e them signs of nothing, sounds without 
signification".20 Language, then, according to Locke, could not 
transcend experience, arr:! more than knowledge could transcend 
experience. 
We shall not consider Locke'a account of language in any detail, 
nor press the difficulties which it raises. But the two central 
features which we have just noted, that words arc signs of ideas, and 
that a word cannot be significant without a corresponding experience, 
are fundamental to Locke'a account of our knowledge - and more 
especially the limitations of that knowledge - of particular substancei. 
Some words in our language, Locke pointed out ,are the names of 
particular things. But most of our words (and here Locke was thinking 
) 21 particularly of nouns are general terms. But how do we come by 
general words? To this Locke gave a celebrated answer. "Words", he 
said, "become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and 
ideas become general, by separating from.them the circumstances of 
time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this 
or that particular existenoe.,,22 
~fuoh philosophical energy has been spent attaoking Lockets 
conception of general ideas. Under the influence of Berkeley's 
account of Locke's theor.1,23 philosophers have generally accepted 
that Looke meant by an t1 abstract idea" a kind of mental image. despite 
------------. . 
the fact that nOlihere in Locke's writi:r.gs is there any evidence to 
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suggest that Locke understood the term in that way. But this aside, 
the effect of Berkeley's attack has been to mislead philosophers 
about the intentions lying behind Locke's account. One of the targets 
which Locke had in his sights when he gave his acoount of general 
ideas was the doctrine of substantial forms. His thesis was that 
a general word does not stand for some abstract Platonic entity, 
but for something whioh is in some sense present in the mind of the 
person who uses the word. As he put it: "this whole mystery of 
genera and speoies, whioh makes such a noise in the sohools, and 
are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else 
but abstraot ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed 
to them". 24 The point emerges again when Locke oonsiders the nature 
of essenoes. He said that we identify essenoes by referenoe to our 
abstraot ideas whioh themselves are founded upon experienoe, but 
whioh are also dependent upon the intellect whioh has identified 
oertain properties as being neoessary for a thing to be of a certain 
kind: "From whenoe it is easy to observe, that the essenoes of the 
sorts of things, and , oonsequently, the sorting of things, is the 
workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes those 
general ideas.n25 
Locke went on to argue that he was not denying the obvious 
fact that "Nature, in the production of things, makes several of 
them alike". But he was aSSerting that"the sorting of them under 
names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from . 
the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general 
26·· .. . 
ideas" • And. Locke .adduced in support of his aooount oases where 
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there is disagreement amongst men in classification.27 
The issue turns on the distinction between real and nominal 
essences. The real essence, Locke said, is "the real internal, but 
generally (in substances) unknown constitution of things, whereon 
their disooverable qualities dependn • 28 The nominal essence, on 
the other hand, is the essence !e attribute, in terms of the properties 
we regard as essential, on the basis of our (limited) experienoe, and 
which are labelled by a word which stands for this abstract idea. 
Of the real essences of corporeal substances there are two views, 
Locke said. One of them assumes that there are fixed and immutable 
essences "according to which all natural things are made, and wherein 
t · 29 hey do exactly and every one of them partruce". This view, Locke 
held, malces it impossible to know real essences, and is practically 
useless. "The other and more rational opinion", Locke said, "is 
of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but wU(nown 
constitution of their insensible qualities which serve us to distinguish 
them one from another~ according as we have ocoasion to rank them 
into sorts, under conunon denominations.n30 
The first view is a quasi-Platonio oonception of essences. 
ESsenoes, on this view, are a sort of mould, and natural objects 
are copies from this mould. It is not surprisinz that Locke, with 
his aversion to a priori theorising, rejeoted such a theory. But 
the rejection was more than this, for it was also an implicit abandon-
ment of one of the Baconian ideals, an ideal which was born of 
Baconts optimism rather than his empirioism. It will be remembered. 
that Bacon had recommended that science should pursue, and would 
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eventually obtain, knowledge of the form of nature. It was the 
goal of Baconian method to achieve certain knowledge by coming to 
understand these forms, albeit by an empirical method. Locke was 
opposed to the Baconian ideal in this respect, (though clearly 
much else of Bacon's programme he accepted) for he held that no 
observations can lead us to a knowledge of such essences or forms. 
To have such knowledge would require men to have knowledge of 
substances, and this, Locke held, man was not capable of achieving 
for we can never be in the position of knowing that the nominal 
essence which we postulate in fact is matched in reality to the 
object. Whether or not we agree with Locke on that point, he was 
undoubtedly right to draw attention to the fact that there oan be no 
logical guarantees about any identification of essence such that we 
oan, given some set of properties f t g, h, deduce that they must be 
accompanied by some further property j, in any particular case, the 
only way to discover whether or not an object has a oertain property 
is by observation, and observation contains no guarantee for future 
instances of that property being again present when other apparently 
similar objects appear. 
Lockets views about essences did not commit him to denying that 
we can improve our knowle~e of substances. To improve our. knowledge 
is to make empirioal discoveries about them, to disoover, for 
example, that gold is dissolved in aqua regia. But to make such a 
discovery is not to discover some eternal necessary property 
intrinsically linked to the form of gold, or if it is, we could never 
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know it to be so. What we take the essence of any substance to 
be, Locke maintained, is our conception of it, and there can be no 
guarantee that our conception is right. The general words which 
we use to identify substances simply stand for those ideas which are 
"that abstract idea whereof that name is the sign". Nominal essences, 
therefore, are products of our minds, the consequences of our 
experiences of particular instances of any particular substance. 
The consequence of this analysis of the connection between 
abstract ideas and nominal essences, and the rejection of the 
possibility of our having knowledge of real essences is of 
considerable importance in Lockets philosophy of soience, and indeed 
for seventeenth century conceptions of the possibilities of science 
generally, for Locke's argument shows that our knowledge of material 
objeots can never be other than of contingent facts about the world. 
Locke brought out the point very clearly, using gold as his example:-
"Supposing the nominal essence of E?ld to be a body of such a 
peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility, 
the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter 
on which these qualities and their union depend; and is also 
the foundation of its solubility in ague regia and other 
properties acoompanying that oomplex~. Here are essences 
and ~roperties. but all upon supposition of a sort or general 
abstract idea. which is considered as immutable; but there is.· 
no indivi"'Cbiar parcel of matter to which any of these qualities 
are so annexed as to be esseptial to it or inseparable from it. 
That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby 
it is of this or that sort; but take aw~ the consideration of 
its being ranked under the name of Boma abstraot ,!tlea., and. then 
there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it •. 
Indeed, as to the real essences otsubstanoes, we only suppose 
their being, without precisely knowing what they are; but that 
which annexes them still to the species is the nominal essenoe, 
of whioh they are the supposed foundation and cause." 31 
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In other words, the so-called necessary properties of any particular 
substance are only necessary because we construe it to be a substanoe 
of a particular sort of essence. And this is something which we do. 
It is not in any way inherent in the substance. Thus Locke wrote: 
"particular beings t considered barely in themselves, will be found 
to have all their qualities equally essential; and everything in 
each individual will be essential to it; or which is more, nothing 
at al1".32 The distinction between necessary and contingent properties 
of a substance, therefore, is not a dispute about the substance, but 
about how we are going to olassify the substanoe, or even if we are going 
to olassify it as a substance at all. 
On this important point Locke was undoubtedly oorroct. He 
recognised as possibly no other philosopher had done before him 
that it is our conception of the world which determines what properties 
are necessary, what contingent, rather than the world itself.33 But 
this is not to assert, as it might be taken to assert, that we oan 
arbitrarily describe the world in any way we like, for experience shows 
us that it is profitable to have oertain ooncepts, rather than 
alternative ones, and, given these concepts, they have the entailments 
and inoompatibilities which define them wholly i.ndependent of all and 
any human choice. Looke summed up his position thus:-
~a;ture makeR ma,:n;y; p!rtioular thi'Th?' whioh do a~ee o~e with 
another in many sensible qualities, and probably too ln their 
internal frame and constitution: but it is not this real essence 
that distinguishes them into sp~oi.es; it is ~ who, ta.king 
occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and 
wherein they observe otten several individuals to agree, 
rane~ them into sorts, in ord~r to their namin~, for the 
convenience of oomprehensive signs; tUlder whioh individuals, 
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according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, 
come to be raruced as under ensigns: so that this is of 
the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill; 
and in this, I thiruc, consists the whole business of eenus 
and !jpeci~s.tI 34 
Given this, largely correct, ar~lysis of words for the serts of 
material things, it is not surprising that Locke is sceptical of our 
ever reaching knowledge about material things. Given the analysis, 
Locke must reject both the Cartesian and Daconian programmes for 
science, for neither can lead to knowledge as their protagonists 
olaimed. Neither will clear and distinct ideas in themselves supply 
us with knowledge of the external world, nor , given Lockets 
definition of knowledge, will bare observation in the Baconian fashion 
ever lead to knowledge of the forms of nature. 
Primary and Secondatl Qyelities. 
One of the most famous aspects of Lockets philosophy, and one 
of the most heavily disputed, is his acoount of the qualities of 
bodies, and, in particular, his distinotionbetween what are generally 
oalled the primary and seoondary qualities. We have alreaqy seen 
that some such: distinotion was a oommonplace in oontempora.ry soienoe, 
especially in the work of Galileo, Desoartes, Boyle, and Newton. lfuch 
of what Locke had to say on this topio must be seen a.gainst this 
background, for Looke himself, in disoussing these matters, believed 
that what he was doing was physios and not epistemology. Thus he 
wrote at the end of the seotion in the ~ssay in which he disoussed 
the distinction: "I have in what just goes before been encagedin 
physioal enquires a little further than perhaps I intended ••••• I 
hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural 
phil os ophy.n35 
"'" . 
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That Locke oonstrued his remarks about the qualities of 
bodies as a pieoe of natural philosophy is signifioant. It indicates 
that Locke believed that the distinotion was one that turned on 
empirical oonsiderations rather than on logical ones (though this 
is not to imply that he believed that logical considerations were 
alw~s irrelevant) and that the truth of the distinction was 
grounded in nothing further than contingent faots about the world. 
This aspeot of Locke's thinking stands in marked and important 
oontrast to those earlier thinkers in the scientifio revolution who, 
for largely metaphysical reasons, had seen the qualities of bodies 
in terms of mathematics. There is nowhere in Locke any hint of that 
idea that the language of the universe is mathematios, that the forms 
of nature must subsoribe to a mathematical model. There was nothing 
of the Neoplatonist in Locke's attitude towards the physioal world. 
Nor would Looke have been at all willing to go along with the 
Cartesian preoonoeption of physios expressed in the remark that "my 
physics is here jointed to pure mathematics which I particularly 
wish it'to resembletf • 36 ' As with Boyle, as with Newton,the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities turned for 
Locke on what he took to be the empirioal evidenoe. 
This said, we are immediately presented with a diffioulty. 
Locke used two quite different criteria for drawing a distinction 
between primary and seoondary qualities, one of them empirioal, but 
the other a logical one. Locke began his acoount of qualities in 
this way:-
. , ' .. ~ ...... "-~'"~ .. -- . --~-
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"Qualiti~s thus considered in bodies are: 
First, such as are utterly inseparable from the bo~, in what 
state soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes 
it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly 
keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle 
of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and the 
mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though 
less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses. tI 31 
The diffioulty in this passage is not generally noticed. It is 
that Locke uses two quite different oriteria to identify primary 
qualities. First, there is .a logical oriterion: 'bodies, by 
definition, must have the following properties •••• n. Seoond, there 
is an empirical criterion: 'all bodies that we have ever 
experienoed have the following properties •••• ' Locke runs these 
two criteria together without appearing to notice how different 
they are. The list of properties which Locke so identifies are 
solidity, extension, figure, and mobility. 
Locke was undoubtedly right to believe that there are some 
defining charaoteristics which anything must have in order to be 
a body, a material objeot. And no doubt he was right to single 
out solidity, extension, and figure, though it might be held, surely, 
that it was unneoessary to include all three, because it is 
neoessarily true that if a~thing is solid, then it must be 
extended.38 Uobility is a much less clear case of a neoessary 
oondition for something being a bo~. Certainly it seems odd to 
, 
postulate an immovable body, for it always seems to make senSa to 
say of any conceivable object that it could be at another location 
from where it is, but it is not at all obvious that, in order to 
understand what a body is I must also understand the notion 
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of mobility, ~hereas I could not possibly understand the notion 
of body without an understanding the other three primary qualities 
listed by Locke. 
But even with solidity the issue was not as clear cut as all 
that, for had not Descartes defined 'body' simply as extension? 
And did not Locke admit that genera.l idea.s liere the product of the 
intelleot? So in what sense oould anybody be wrong who denied that 
solidity was part of the essence of body? Locke in faot gave an 
answer to this challenge, and his reply is instructive. If the 
Cartesians "mean by body and extension the same that other people 
do, viz.,by body something which is solid and extended, whose parts 
are inseparable and movable different ways; and by extension, 
only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid 
coherent parts, and which is possessed by them, - they confound very 
different ideas one with another."39 . For the idea of extension does 
not include solidity. Further, spaces cannot be separated, "neither 
really nor mentally", and therefore we cannot have a conoept of motion 
• . 40 from the idea of space, but we oan from the idea of body. Lookets 
reply, therefore, was to point out that if body is defined as 
Desoartes would have it, then that conoeption is very, very, 
differenoe from our ordinary conoeption of body, and what we 
. ·41 
should in fact be ooncerned with is that ordinary oonception. . 
It appears, then, that Locke identified a list of q~lities 
whioh any body must have if it is to match up to our ordinary 
conception of body: he has supplied a definition of body whioh is 
in keeping with the way in whioh we ordinarily use the term. But 
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it does not follow from this that the qualities identified 
by Looke are the only primary qualities, it does not follow, that 
is, that the list might not be added to, and, indeed, there is 
nothing in Looke whioh suggests that suoh additions might not take 
plaoe, whioh is not surprising, for Looke undoubtedly believed that 
the defining oharaoteristios were dependent on our experiences. 
And if our experiences were suoh that new properties of objects 
were disoovered which were universally manifested by physical objects, 
there would be strong pressure on us to ohange our genera.l idea 
of bo~, and thus our definition. Concurrently with the produotion 
of the Essay just such a discovery was being made by Isaao Newton: 
the phenomenon of universal gravitation. 
At this point it will be worth reminding ourselves of Newton's 
conception of primary qualities. Newton, it will be remembered, had 
defined the primary qualities as those "whioh admit neither inten-
sification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong 
to all bodies within the reach of our experiments". These, he sa.id, 
"are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoeverlt • 42 
With Newton, as with Locke, it was experienoe .that indioate4Which the 
primary properties are •. But Newton's list of such properties was 
in faot longer than Looke's. For Newton they were: extension, . 
hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia.43 Inertia, then, 
was a new primary property of objects, discovered by Newton; but it 
is not a QofinjPi property of bO~f and certainly it was not a 
defining property in 1690. 
lJewton.ts discovery of inertia as a universal property of 
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matter, or the discovery of any other universal properties of 
matter, has implications for Locke's account of primary qualities, 
but not particularly damaging ones. The implications a.re that new 
discoveries may very well lead us to say that there are other primary 
qualities of bodies than those that a.re entailed by our present 
conception of a boqy. It follows from this that we cannot establish 
what the primary qualities of a boqy are simply by introspection 
of our idea of body. All that we can discover by such introspeotion 
is what we take the defining properties of boqy to be. \le can only 
discover what are the fundamental properties of an object in the 
way that Newton did. 
From all of this we can see, then, that in Locke's account of 
primary qualities, the conflation of two separate criteria is an 
important confusion. It shows that Locke did not satisfaotorily 
distinguish between two questions:-
I). What is our nominal essence of a boqy? 
2). What are the fundamental causal properties which 
bodies have, and upon which other properties depend? 
The first question is one calling for a philoaophioal analysis of our 
conoept of boqy, which is to say a linguistio analysis of how the 
word 'bodyt is used. The second question is an empirical question, 
requiring the attention of the scientist. It is worth adding, 
however, that the scientist will be able to attempt an answer only 
atter some more or less correct answer has been found to the first 
question. ~ly the discoveries of the soientist may-well lead 
to a. revision of our conCeption of body in general, or of al~ 
substance in partioular. 
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Locke's failure to disti~Ji6h the two questions leads to 
further confusion. Because Locke identified certain properties 
as both defining properties of body and also as the primary properties 
in a physical sense, then it was natural to cono1ude that the 
so-called secondary qualities, qualities not required for a definition 
of matter, could be causally accounted for by the primary qualities 
already identified. In contrast, the impartial BacoDian should 
surely identify only all those properties which are found to be in 
common amongst all pbysical bodies, and then, by a physical 
investigation, establish which amongst all properties are causally 
more fundamental than others. A1 though no doubt Locke would 
have acknowledge that this was the correct procedure (his conCern 
for the importance of empirioal evidence for the primary qualities 
is witness to this) he did not succeed in putting his method 
into practice. 
In this connection it is worth considering Newton's disoussion 
of what is basically the same question , the distinotion between 
primary and sec~ndar,y qualities, in the third Rule of Reasoning 
in the Prinoipia. Like Locket Newton accepted that universality was 
a necessary condition for a property being a candidate for primacy. 
But besides universality Newton offered another neoessary condition 
for primary qualities. It was that "those qualities which admit 
neither intesifioation nor remission of degreestt should be so deemed. 
Newton explained this criterion by an example. The gravity of a 
body is not as essential property of bodies. Newton said, beoause 
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although it,appears that gravitation of bodies towards one 
another is universal, the gravity of bodies "is diminished as they 
reoede from the earth".44 In other words, the weight of an objeot 
is not a primary quality beoause the weight of an objeot is a 
funotion not only of the bo~ itself but of its environment: the 
weight of an objeot is subjeot to "intensifioation and remission 
of degrees". By oontrast, its inertial mass is not. And thus an 
objeotts "vis insitat • is "immutable" and therefore a. primary 
quality. 
Implioitly, then, Newton appears to limit primary qualities to 
those properties whioh an objeot has whioh are oausally independent 
of any factors external to the bo~ ~ bo~. Seoondary qualities, 
on this showing, would be either.those properties whioh are not 
universally manifested, or those whioh are a result of a. oausal 
interaction between one body and another, as weight is. 
Newton offered us a reason for acoepting his first oriterion 
of primary qualities. He said that . .qualities whioh ttare not liable 
to diminution oan never be quite taken aw~y n. 45 And the point here 
is that Newton's oriterion emerges as a special oase of his more 
general one of universality. Neoessarily, Newton was saying, a 
property whioh oannot be taken away IDU$t always be a property of 
body, and must, therefore, be universally manifested. But this is 
not to imply 'that we oan always establish a. priori whioh properties 
'oannot suffer diminution. It is only on the basis of experienoe 
that we oome to know that inertia is not so subjeot and that weight is. 
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Locke never fastened on to this Newtonian criterion for 
primary qualities, which is hardly surprising as the third Rule 
of Reasoning appeared for the first time only in 1713, in the second 
edition of the Principia, nine years after Locke's death. Nor is 
it surprising that Locke never thought of it himself, because the 
criterion offered by Newton is itself a very eubtle one which 
emerged from Newton's deep thought about the nature of matter in 
general, and gravity in particular. There is, indeed, some reason 
to think that the rule was actually designed to exclude grart ty a.s 
a universal quality of bodies.46 
Newton's criteria illustrate that there were oompeting acoounts 
and bases in the period we are oonsidering for drawing the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The competing 
acoounts arose largely under the pressure of oontemporary physical 
theories. If· one rejects all theories about matter, whether, as 
with :Boyle's,based upon substantial empirical evidence, or, as 
with Descartes', arrived at a priori, then there remains no basis 
for the distinotion between primary and seoondary qualities. It 
was exactly this point that Derkeley made in !he Princirles of Htunan 
KnOWledge. If one examines the world without any preconceptions 
about its oontents or structure, then any quality is on a par with 
any other. It is onlyi! one (wrongly) asserts that the nominal 
essence of body is necessarily its real essenoe, as Looke, in his 
unguarded moments, was inclined to do, or if one believes (oorreotly) 
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that observation and experiment give one reason to believe that 
some properties are different from others in that some properties 
are causally dependent on others, that any distinction can be made. 
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is 
bound to be made once it is agreed that explanations in nature, as 
Boyle expressed it, rested on the two great principles of matter 
and motion. ~~tter was understood to have certain properties, those 
listed as the primar,y qualities, and all other properties could, in 
principle be accounted for causally by reference to these. Thus 
heat, according to Galileo, was not a primary property of any object 
but was rather Ita. multitude of minute partioles having oertain 
shapes and moving with oertain velocities" which ttmeeting with 
our bodies •••• their touch as felt by us as they pass through our 
substance is the sensation we call heat".47 Or, as Locke expressed 
it, "For to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold, but 
is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when 
placed in a due light: and the heat which we oannot leave out of 
our idea of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than the white 
colour it introduces into wax. These are equally powers in the 
sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its sensible parts, so on 
a man, a.s to make him have the idea of heat; and so on wax, as to 
make it oapable to produce in a. man the idea of white.,,48 
But the fact that many properties of objects can be explained 
or acoounted for in terms of other properties is not sufficient to 
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establish that a seoondary property is not a real property of the objeot. 
That orystal glass is brittle is accounted for in terms of the arrangement 
of the molecules of suoh glass. !ut the brittleness is no less a property of 
the glass beoause it oan be explained in suoh a way. It is indeed a dis-
Positional property of the glass, or, as Looke preferred to oall it, a power. 
Looke reoognised, perhaps more clearly than Galileo, and in a way very 
similar to Eoyle, that a power is a real property of an objeot. When we have 
an idea, say of yellow, although there is no aotual yellowness in the objeot, 
there is, nevertheless something about the object which is the direot oause 
of our having that particular idea. It is this power, itself no doubt insep-
erable from the arrangement of the parts of the objeot whioh was for Locke the 
seoondary quality, and the oause of the corresponding idea of that quality.As 
Locke put it, the seoondary qualities are "nothing •••• but powers to produoe 
various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, 
figure, texture, and motion of parts." 49 
Locke, then, gave roughly a correot aooount of how physically and 
Physiologioally we oome to know that oertain objects are hot or yellow. And 
he correotly saw that this entailed a distinction between the causal aocount 
which we would give of the primary and seoondary qualities of objeots. Eut he 
did make an important error in his account. He assumed that the words in our 
language for secondary qualities, words for colours, sounds, and so on, name 
private objeots, only open to our individual inspeotion.What Locke failed to 
notice was that it does not follow from the faot that our awareness is the 
produot of a causal chain in normal perception, suoh as he described, that 
What we see, hear, feel, or touch is to be identified with the last stage of 
that causal chain. If Locke had been correct in his belief then ~erkeley's 
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charge that as we are only aware of ideas, then "if there were external 
bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were 
not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we had 
nowtt50 would be true. But if it were the case that yellow was simply the name 
of my idea or sensation then there could never be any dispute about what the 
colour of gold, or anything else, is. J3ut that I can misidentify the colour 
of an object shows that the correct identification depends upon factors other 
than ~ experience. For this reason we cannot identify colours solely with 
ideas in my mind. 
What emerges from this is that Locke's account of primary and 
secondary qualities contains three main theses, two of which are true, whilst 
the third is false. The first true thesis is that the properties of bodies 
can be arr~nged in a causally hierarchical order. Some properties are a 
causal consequence of other properties. The strength of a bar of iron is 
dependent on the thickness of the bar, and the nature of the minute parts of 
the ba~; the colour of gold is a function of the molecules of gold and their 
effect on white light which is reflected from them. The second true thesis 
is that both primary and secondary qualities are real properties of objects, 
b~t that the secQndary qualities are to be identified with the actual 
arrangement or ntexturet ' of the primary matter. 
The false thesis is that the names we have for our ideas of secondary 
qualities are the names only of private sensations, not of public objects. 
For" as we have seen, if this were the case that the ideas of these qualities 
simply were sensations then there could never be any dispute about them in 
the way in which it is perfectly possible to dispute, be mistaken, and be 
correct, about the colour, taste, or smell of an object. The person havinc 
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the sensation would be the sole arbitor as to what sensation he was having 
at any time, and whilst this may be true about sensations it is not true 
about colours and other secondary qualities. Ripe strawberries are sweet, 
English pillar boxes are red, and people who judge otherwise are mistaken 
about a matter of fact, which fact is a fact about strawberries or pillarboxes 
and not about their private sensations. 
Conclusions. 
. We have seen how Locke t s thinldng on both material sUbstance as suchJ 
and on the distinction he drew between primary and secondary qualities,was 
deeply influenced by his scientific preconceptions. Indeed, I have 
suggested that it was Locke's commitments to the scientific discoveries of 
his day which led him to both some fundamental truths and also some errors. 
Both his acceptance of substance as such and his aistinction between primary 
and secondary qualities were influenced by his understanding, and his 
misunderstanding, of the import of the scientific faots which he drew upon 
to support his position. But in such misunderstandings Looke was not alone, 
and more to the point, the accounts which he offered themselves clarified 
various aspects of the connection between science and philosophy which stood 
in great need of such clarification. 
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Chapter XII 
Locke, Knowledge and Scienoe 
Introduotion. 
It is in Book Four of the Essal that Locke at last comes to a 
positive statement of his own views on the nature and extent of human 
knowledge. In this chapter we shall review Lockets answers to these 
questions not only to assess them in their own right, but also to see how 
it was that they fitted in to the developments in science and in 
philosophy which had occurred during the scientifio revolution. It 
hardly needs to be said that we shall find that Locke's views are very 
much in keeping with the English soientists with whom he was olosely 
oonneoted, whioh emphasised the contingency, not the neoessity, of the 
discoveries of the natural soientist, a point which raised diffioulties 
for Looke who both wished to maintain that all knowledge was of necessary 
truths, but that also the soientists could and did discover truths (i.e. 
did come to know truths) about the world which were only contingent. Locketw 
solution to this dilemma was unsatisfaotory, but it was very muoh a sign 
of the times 'that the dilemma itself emerged so olearly in his work. 
Lockets Conception of Knowle~e. 
Given that the mind is only aware of ideas, it is evident,Looke 
said at the beginning of Book Four, "that our knowledge is only 
oonversant about them." 1 From henoe, 'Locke held, knowledge is "nothing 
but the perception of the connexion and a«Eeemen~, or dis&£!eement a~4 
. 2 
rupusnancl. of !BY of our id~~." 
)Iuoh has been said about Lockets d.efinitiona.nd it is not my 
intention to subjeot it to detailed sorutiny. But there are severa.l 
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aspects of it which cannot be allowed to pass unaoknowledged. First, 
we must reoognise the psychologism inherent in Locke's definition. 
It is the perception, by the mind, of a connexion between ideaawhich 
constitutes knowledge, and, ultimately, Locke held, this perception was 
an act of intuition. Significantly, Locke never ohallenged the validity 
of these perceptions. He never doubted that is, that such perceptions 
occur, and that such perceptions give knowledge: in short, he never 
subjected his examples of knowledge to that sceptical sorutiny to which 
Desoartes had subjected his. Locke presented as paradigms of knowledge, 
without further ado, "white is not black" and "the three angles of a 
triangle are equal to two right ones,"3 which we see to be true 
because we peroeive that the ideas respectively do not and do agree 
one with another. We perceive such agreement, he said, "by the natura.l 
power of perception and dist1nction".4 
'J.1here is both -merit and defeot in Locke's a.coount thus far. He 
wa.s right to recognise that knowledge can and should be defined in the 
last analysis by appeals to paradigm cases: his definition of knowledge 
is derived from particular examples of knowledge which he rightly 
recognised are not open to serious dispute. nUt Locke's psychologica.l 
criterion for identifying knowledge did not allow him to make the 
crucial distinction between contingent and necessary .truths. 'rhe. 
implication of Lockets position is that only neoessarytruths oan and 
are known, for in all other cases there is no agreement or repugnancy 
of the ideas which themselves are necessary oonditionsfor knowledge, but 
he did not appear either fully to see this implication, or to stiok 
rigidly to his own definition. 
- 326 -
The consequence of Locke's definition was to make the concept 
of knowledge excessively narrow, for obviously all statements which 
purported to oonvey knowledge about ideas whioh were not in the relevant 
respeots either in agreement or repugnant could not be accepted as Buch, 
yet Locke himself, and often in the Ess~ itself, claimed to know things 
which did not match up to his own rigorous demands. The most obvious 
and blatent example of this is his firm oommitment to the possibility 
of our knowing of the existenoe of objeots in the world external to 
our minds. Almost equally important, and just as inoonsistently, Locke 
held that Newton had given knowledge of the world in the disooveries 
conveyed in the Principia. ")Ir. Newton, in his never enough to be 
admired book," Locke wrote, "has demonstrated several propositions, 
whioh are so many new truths before unknown to the world, and are 
further advances in mathematica.l knowledge •••• • u5 A similar view wa.s 
expressed by him in Some ThOughts Concerning Educa~ion where he sa.id:-
"Though the systems of physicks, that I have met with, 
afford little encouragement to look for certainty, or scienoe, 
in a~ treatise, which shall pretend to give us a bo~ of natura.l 
philosophy from the first prinoiples of bodies in general; yet 
the incomparable }l'r. Newton has shown, ha.r far mathematicks, 
applied to some parts of na.ture, may, upon principles tha.t matters 
of fa.ot justify, oarry us in the knowledge of some, as I may so 
oall them, particular provinces of the inoomprehensible universe. 
And if others could give us so good and olear an aocount of 
other parts of nature, as he has of this our planetary world, and 
the most oonsiderable phenomena observable in it, in his admirable 
book 'Philosophae naturalis Prinoipia mathematioal we might in 
time hope to be more furnished with some true and oertain knowledge 
in several parts of this stupendous maohine, than hitherto' we 
oould have expeoted. And though there are very few who. have 
mathematios enough to understand his demonstrations; yet the most 
acourate mathematioians, who have examined them, allowing them to be 
such, his book will deserve to be rea.d, and give no small light and . 
pleasure to those, who, willing to understand the motions, 
properties,and operations of the great masses of matter in this our 
solar system, will but oarefullymind his oonolusions, whioh ~ 
be depended on as propoSitions well proved." 6 . 
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The inoonsistenoy between Looke's definition of knowledge and 
suoh examples'is of oonsiderable importanoe beoause it shows that Looke 
was not only very tempted, but aotually sometimes suooumbed, to 
treating the disooveries of soienoe, suoh as the general truths dis-
oovered by Newton, as knowledge, when, by his own definition, they had 
no suoh entitlement. Nor was it only the first two books of the 
Prinoipia whioh Looke acoepted gave knowledge, the books whioh were only 
~o be understood as a branoh of mathematios,7 it was aleo the physios 
of Book III, for it gave knowledge "of the great masses of matter in this 
our solar system". Further, and most importa.nt, Looke wa.s quite right 
to see Newton's work as one whioh did reveal new disooveries, did indeed 
give knowledge of the world. It was Looke's definition of knowledge 
whioh was at fault, not his inolination. 
We shall return to Looke's definition of knowledge and its 
implioations for the possibility of soientifio knowledge in a later 
seotion. FOr the present let us just note that Looke's definition raises 
grave diffioulties for some positions whioh he obviously wished to 
aooept,such as the truths of NewtonIa meohanios. We shall now oonsider 
the more fundamental question, more direotly raised by Looke's aooount 
of knowledge, namely his olaim that we oould have knowledge of the 
.' 8 
1t12a.rtieular existenoe of finite beings without us". 
Looke said that there were three sorts or degrees of knowledge: 
intuitive, whioh he placed highest, and upon whioh all other forms of 
knowledge ultimately depended; demonstrative, "where the mind peroeives 
the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately,,,9 and, 
,third, the sensitive knowledge of the existenoe of partioular external 
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objects. This last form of knowledge Locke conceded was not as certain 
as either of the other kinds, but "going beyond bare probability •••• 
passes under the name of knowledge.nlO The first two degrees of 
knowledge are not without their problems, but it is the third kind 
which has al~s presented the most difficulty to commentators. It is 
rightly pointed out that Locke held that " We oan have knowle~e no 
further than we have ideas.ttll Since external objeots are ex hYpothes~ 
not ideas, it follows that we oan have no knowledge of them, either that 
they exist, or what they are if they do exist. 
Looke's position with regard to sensitive knowledge is one so 
obviously oontradictory that it has eften led to a dismissal of Locke's 
wholeepistemolegy. Undoubtedly it is a very major fault in his whole 
scheme, but it hardly warrants such harsh judgement. From what We have 
seen .of the baokground to Lockets ESSBI it is olear that the very last 
thing that Looke oould possibly have denied was the existence of an 
independent physioal world, for the under labourer would fail to be an 
underlabourer if there were indeed no edifices under whose shadow he 
could work. Indeed it is fairly certain from the whole manner of 
Looke's approaoh that if his philosophy was indeed incompatible with 
the existence of such a material world, then, for him, it would have 
been so muoh the worse for his philosophy. Indeed, it was such an 
impossible notion for Locke that there might not be a material world 
that I believe be just oould not have appreciated that his acoount of 
knowledge might in fact entail that we could not know whether or.not 
there was. 
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Demonstrative Knowledge. 
We have already had occasion to note that Locke believed that 
natural philosophy was far from being a science.12 Locke understood 
by a science, a body of demonstrative knowledge. The paradigm of a 
science was mathematics, and for Locke, as for ma~ of his oontemporaries 
, , 
mathematios waS in fact the only science, or at least the only lar~~ 
body of demonstrative knowledge. 
Why Locke thought that mathematical knowledge was possible is 
something of central importance for an understanding both of Lockets 
views on the oonditions necessary for a knowledge of general, as opposed 
to particular, truths, and alao to explain why Locke thought that 
knowledge of ~ general truths about the physioal world was impossible 
for man. 
Central to Locke's aooount of our knowledge of mathematioal 
truths was his theor,y of nominal and real essenoe, whioh we have alrea~ 
had oooasion to consider in Chapter Eleven. Looke argued, with regard 
to material objeots,that all that we could hope to know of them was 
their nOminal, not their real. essenoe, for we can never be sure that 
the properties which we identit,y as the essential properties of an 
objeot are in fact so essential. :aut it was not at all the SMa with 
mathematics, Locke held, for the real essences of the entities named 
in mathematical propositions are identioal with their nominal essenoes. 
}~thematical propositions, then, which state relations between ideas, 
are not about ideas which are more or less imperfect oopies o£'some 
real essence, they are that real essenoe. ~~thematioal ideas are 
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themselves abstractions, made by' the mind, from particular experiences, 
and there is, therefore, no question of having to attempt to match 
the ideas which we have against some more perfect entity. Looke 
explained his acoount of mathematical knowledge thus:-
"Essenoe being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we 
~ further observe, that, in the species of simple ideas 
and modes, they are always the same; but in substanoes always 
quite different. Thus a figure including a spaoe between three 
lines is the real as well as the nominal essence of a triangle; 
it being not only the abstraot idea to whioh the general name is 
annexed, but the very essentia or being of the thing itself, 
that foundation from whioh all its properties flow, and to whioh 
they are all inseparably annexed." 13. 
Looke did not oonsider the diffioulties whioh oan easily be 
raised against his account of mathematios. He seems to have been quite 
sure that his analysis was oorreot. But one implioation of his position 
is obvious: Looke was as far away as possible from being a Platonist 
with regard to mathematios as he was with all other aspeots of his 
epistemology, for a Platonist must and does hold that the entities whiob 
are identified in mathematioal propositions are entities independent of 
the mind, just as muoh as Looke held that the entities named in 
propositions about substances refer to independent objeots. 
Granted that Looke held that only in those oases where the nominal 
and real essenoes of objeots were known to ooinoide oould we talk of 
knowledge of the essences, and therefore knowledge of general truths 
about objects, then it was oertain to be the case that there were large 
areas of human enquiry where knowledge had not, nor was ever likely 
to be obta.ined. :But Looke did notbe11eve that there,was no possibility 
ot demonstrative knowledge outside of mathematios a.nd ethics (whioh 
he also held was like mathematios in so far as nominal and real essenOes 
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coincided). Locke, in one chapter in the Essay appears to suggest 
that there is at least some possibility that demonstration might well 
be increased in the natural soiences. Locke wrote:-
"It has been generally taken for granted, that 
mathematios alone are oapable of demonstravie certainty; 
but to have such an agreement or disagreement as may 
intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the 
privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure 
alone, it may possibly be the want of due method and application 
in us, and not of sufficient evidence in things that demonstration 
has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of 
knowledge, and scarce so much aimed at by any but mathem.":l.tioians."l4 
It has been supposed, for example, by Fraser,l5 that Locke had in mind 
here the possibility of a demonstrative system of ethics,but this is 
not so. Rather Locke was thinking of the possibility of demonstration 
in the natural sciences. (It is interesting to compare Lockets remarks 
here with Newton's first paper on light and oolours which was presented 
.. M 
to the Royal Society in 1671/2 and oopies of which Locke owned. ) 
What Locke said was this. Some properties, such as numbers and 
figures, are capable of being demonstrated, because "the modes of numbers 
have every the least difference very olear and perceiva.bletf , and, "the 
mind has found out ways to examine, and disoover demonstratively, the 
just equality of two angles or extensions or figures tt • l1 But there are 
ma.ny cases where demonstration is not possible: "in other simple ideas, 
whose modes and differences are made and oounted by degrees, and not 
quantity, we have not so nice and aoourate a distinotion of their 
differences as to perceive, or to find ways to measure, their just 
equality, or the leaat d1fferences".18 Lockels explanation for this 
impossibility was that we cannot know the oauses of these simple ideas 
which are "partioles of matter whereof eaoh is too subtile to be 
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perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the 
different degrees of these simple ideas lt • 19 He went on to explain 
this further:-
"For, supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be 
produced in us by a certain number of globules, which having 
a verticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina 
of the eye, with a oertain degree of rotation, as well as 
progressive swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the 
more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered as to 
reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give 
them the proper rotation, which is fit to produce this sensation 
of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from 
an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such 
oorpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say 
that the nature of light consists in very small round globules; 
nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives certain 
rotation to these globules when it reflects them: for I am 
not now treating physically of light or oolours". 20 
We cannot, then, Locke held, prove that two white objects are equally 
white unless we can find out whether or not the two whites are caused 
by the same number of particles hitting the retina, for in the ideas 
of white which we have there is no difference, even though there may 
in reality be a difference which we cannot detect. In such cases there 
is no possibility of demonstrating the equality or non equality of the 
two shades. 
However, "where the difference is so great as to produoe in the 
mind clearly distinct ideas, whose differences oan be perfectly retained, 
there these ideas or oolours, as we see in different kinds, as blue and 
. 21 
red, are as oapable of demonstration as ideas of number or extension." 
The implioation here is that ideas of seoondary qualities, which, 
being ideas in the mind, having no external existenoe, are oapable of 
being fully peroeived, and that as a result it is perfectly possible to 
deduce conclusions from our experienoes of colours whick are truths about 
our ideas of oolours, and are not just "trifling propositions" about 
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~t they ~ about our ideas, and not about anything in the external 
world. As Locke expressed it: "What I have here said of whiteness 
and oolours I think holds true in all (ideas of) seoondary qualities and 
their modes". 22 
The extent of demonstrative knowledge, then, was for Locke 
extremely limited. It was indeed almost oompletely oonfined to the 
knowledge whioh we have of the relationship between our own ideas and 
where those ideas are not taken as copies of some. further entity but 
are the entities themselves, or, as Locke expressed, where the nominal 
and real essenoe ooincides. The implioations of this for the possibility 
.. 
of knowledge in the natural soienoes Locke well realized. 
Our Knowledge of the Wor14. 
As we have already noted, notoriously Locke held'that, although 
we are only aware of ideas, it is possible for us to know that objects 
exist independently and externailly from us. He held that we can 
demonstrate the existence of God (though this was the only case of 
demonstratir~ the truth of an existential proposition which Locke 
allowed), and he held that it was possible to know by means of our senses 
that particular objects exist: "for I ask anyone whether he be not 
invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he 
looks on the sun by day and thinks on it by night, when he actually 
tastes wormwood or smells a rose or only thinks on that savour or 
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odour?" There is, said Looke, fiB. very manifest difference between 
dreaming of being in the fire and being aotually in it.,,23 Suoh 
knowledge was olearly of the partioular and not of the general. Our 
knowledge of the general, Looke held was almost non-existenoe, and 
this for two, rather different, reasons. 
The first reason was based on the nature of empirical knowledge 
and was as important a statement as any in the soientifio revolution 
about the nature and limits of soientifio enquiry. The seoond arose 
out of Looke's general world vielY, or, as r earlier named it, 
oosmologioal oonsiderations. 
Locke argued that our knowledge of general propositions about the 
world was virtually non existent beoause none of . them stated oonnexions 
which we oould see to be necessary, even though we aooepted that they 
existed. Thus Looke held that our knowledge of the properties of. 
objeots is suohthat the properties are not kno~to be logioally 
related "e.g. our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving 
upward; of gold, a body heavy to a oertain degree, yellow, malleable, 
and fusible ••••• When we would know further oonoerning these, or 
any other sorts of substanoes, what do we inquire, but what ~ther 
. 24 
qualities or powers these substanoes have or have not?" 
The only w~ in whioh we can disoover these other properties is 
by empirical investigation beoause "the simple ideas whereof our 
complex ideas of substances are made up are, for the most part, such 
as carry with them, in their own nature, no visible necessarl oonnexion 
or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose oo-existenoe 
wi th them we would inform ourselves about". 25 And the rea.sons· why . 
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we do not disoover any visible neoessary oonneotion between the 
properties of objeots are (a) beoause we do not know the "primary 
qualities of their minute and sensible parts",26 if we did, the 
imp1ioation is, we might be able to deduoe or demonstrate the 
seoondary qualities: and, (b) a "more inourable part of our 
ignorance", and that is that "there is no disooverable oonnexion 
between any seoondary quality and those primary qualities whioh it 
depends on".27 And thus:-
"Though we see the yellow colour, and, upon trial, find 
the weight, rnalleableness, fusibility, and fixedness that 
are united in a piece of gold; yet beoause no one of these 
ideas has any evidenoe dependenee or neoessary eonnexion 
with the other, we cannot oertain1y know that where any 
form of these are, the fifth will be there also, how 
highly probable soever it may be ••••• for this co-ex:i,stenoe 
oan be no further known than it is peroeived, and it oannot " 
be perceived but either in partioular subjeots, by the 
observation of our senses, or, in general, by the neoessary 
oonnexion of the ideas themselves." 28 
This, then, was Looke's answer to the proble.m of induction: we oannot 
have oertainty of generalizations about the properties of physioal 
objeots. Nor oan we have oertainty about the powers of objeots "to 
ohange the sensible qualities of other bodies", whioh is na. great part 
29 . 
of our inquiries about them". Whioh is to say that we oannot have 
general knowledge of oa.use and effeots, beoause, of oourse, onoe again 
we oan establish no neoessary oonneotion. Thus, although on several 
oooasions partioular experiments produce constant results "whether 
they will sucoeed again we oannot be certain. This hinders our 
certain knowledge of universal truths oonoerning natural bodies" .30 
That is to say, knowledge of the future behaviour .of'objeets 1s for 
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us impossible , "certainty and demonstration are things we must not, 
in these matters pretend to".3l 
This then was Locke's belief. Whatever it was that the natural 
philosopher discovered, his knowledge did not go beyond the particular, 
and although no doubt generalization is inevitable, few, if any 
generalizations could be accepted as giving knowledge. " •••• as to a 
perfect science of natural bodies ••• I conolude it as a lost labour 
. 32 
to seek after it". 
Although Looke held that as a matter of faot we oannot arrive 
at certain knowledge of natural objects in the way which we have 
considered he suggests or implies several times that this short-coming 
in our abilities is a contingent, not a necessary, tact about ourselves. 
And the oontingency, he suggested, hinged upon our inability to obtain 
knowledge of the nature of the funclamental particles out of which the 
physical world was composed. If our taoulities were better, Looke 
suggested, and we could see, or some other sensor,yway oome to know 
the nature of the fundamental particles of matter, then we could oome 
to know the powers of those partioles and from suoh knowledge we could 
deduce the physical consequences of, say, chamical interaction. 
Unfortunately Locke never considered how it would be possible , even if 
we had such super senses, for us to know that we were right about the 
powers that, .we could identify in the particles of matter. And indeed, 
on his own principles, we find that we could not be so sure as Locke 
implies. 
Locke, it was said earlier, had two, rather different, reasons 
for rejecting the possibility of our obtaining general knowledge of·· 
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natural events. The first reason we have just considered. The 
seoond arose out of his oonception of the place of man within the 
total oosmological framework. It was, he maintained, our Itmedioority,,33 
which was our hinderence. Our mediocrity was for Locke a necessary 
consequence of our particular place on the ladder of the Great Chain 
of Being34. Our knowledge can never approach t~~t of the angels, still 
less that of God. Indeed,Locke's belief that we cannot have knowledge 
of large areas of physical enquir,y was intimately linked with his whole 
oonoeption of mants ultimate purpos~about whioh Looke is very 
Aristotelian. Beoause our faculities cannot and are not designed to 
comprehend the real essenoe of bodies, he said, but we oan know that 
there is a God and what our moral duties are, it follows that the real 
purpose of mankind in general is to disoover what his dut1es are, rather 
than to reach knowledge of the physioal world, whioh must be left to 
particular men who have the speoial abilities required.35 An 
implioation of Locke's position here is to suggest that there is almost 
something morally wrong in expeoting to reach absolute oertainty in 
the physical soiences, for to have suoh aspirations was tantamount to 
. . 
an identification of oneself with a being higher on the scale of oreation. 
There is also another implication of Looke's remarks whioh he 
was ver.y quick to dispel , and that was the hint that Locke was 
opposed to soienoe as an enterprize. In reply to this Locke gave as 
comprehensive a sta.tement of his attitude as he everdid:-
til would.!l2.l .... be thought to disesteem or dissuade the stud;y: of 
nature. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us 
ocoasion to admire, revere, and glorifY their Author and, if 
rightly direoted, may be of greater benefit to mankind than the 
monuments of exe.mplar.y charity that have at 80 great oharae been 
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raised by the founders of hospitals and alma-houses •••••• 
All that I would say is that we should not be too forwa.rdly 
possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge where it 
is not to be had, or by ways that will not attain it; that we 
should not take doubtful systems for complete scienoes, nor 
unintelligible notions for soientifical demonstrations. In 
the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to glean what we 
can from particular experiments. since we cannot from a disoovery 
of their real essences grasp at a time whole sheaves, and in 
bundles oomprehend the nature and properties of whole species 
together. Where our inquiry is conoerning co-existence or 
repugnancy to co-exist, which by contemplation of our ideas we ' 
cannot discover, there experienoe, observation, and natural 
history must give us by our senses and by detail an insight into 
corporeal substances. The knowledge of bodies we must get by 
our senses warily employed in taking notice of their qualities 
and operations on one another; and what we hope to know of 
separate spirits in this world we must, I think, expeot only 
from revelations_ He that shall consider how little general 
maxims, preoariouB prinoiples, and AlPotheses laid down at 
pleasure have promoted true knowledge or helped to satisfy 
the inquiries of rational men after real improvements, how 
little, I say, the setting out at that end has for many 
ages together advanced men's progress towards the knowledge of 
natural philosophy, will think we have reason to thank those 
who in this latter age have taken another course and have trod 
out to us, thoU8h not an easier way to learned ignorance, 
yet a surer way to profitable knowledge." 36 
Undoubtedly, Locke held, science was worth pursuing not only beoause 
its revelations· added to the glory of God, but also because the util-
itarian benefits which oould and did flow from scientifio ·discoveries 
were themselves of great oonsequenoe __ But the soientist should not 
have exaggerated expeotations for . his findingrh . 
Lockets views that i twas a oonsequenoe of our medioori ty 
that we did not have any demonstrative natural philosophy is not 
easy to square with his views on the oonti~enoy of the laws of nature. 
Looke held that the laws of nature are the prod.uot of "the arb! trary 
will and good pleasure of the wise Architecttt37• God was free, 
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therefore, to modifY the laws whenever he felt so inolined,for example, 
by performing miracles. And if this was eo, then nature could not 
be understood as being neoessary in any important sense. To this I 
believe that Looke would have replied that this is to misunderstand 
how it was that he construed the possibility of a demonstrative science 
of natural philosophy. He would, I think, have said something on the 
following lines: 'Wa are all agreed tr~t some properties of objeots are 
necessarily oonneoted with other properties. We are all agreed, for 
example, that material objects must be extend.ed. Granted that there 
are some necessary conneotions between some properties, are we in a 
position to decide definitively that there are no neoessary oonneotions 
between other properties of bodies simply because We do not oomprehend 
them? No, we are not. There m~ therefore be other necessary 
conneotions obvious to angels and God of which we are not aware.' 
Locke's analogies in conneotion with his discussions of the limits of' 
our physical knowledge are very illuminatioDg, thus he wrote:-
"Did we know the mechanical affectionS of' the particles of 
rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and A.!!l!!!, as a watchmaker does .those 
of a watch, whereby it performs its operations, and of a file, 
which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the 
wheels, we should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will 
purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man sleep: as weii as a 
watohmaker can that a little pieoe of paper laid on the balanoe will 
keep the watoh from going till it be removed; or that eome small 
part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose 
its motion, and the watoh go no more. The dissolving ot silver in 1&18. fortis and gold in EJAla reta, and not vice versa, would be 
t en perruips no more diff;J..cuf£ o· know than i t Ie· to a smith 
to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock and not 
the turning ot another. fI ,38. 
Looke ta.iled to distinguish the oases Where the knowledge whiohthe 
expert has is a oonsequenoe of oonotant conjunotion, as i tis in the 
- 340-
oase of the filing of some part of the meohanism of the watch, 
and the knowledge which is dependent on the agreement of ideas, as 
it is in the case of the key and the meohanism of the look. In the 
latter case there is a olear sense in which the idea of the key matches 
or is in agreement with the idea of the lock, but there is no 
such agreement in the case of the watch being stopped, for it is only 
by experienoe that the watohmaker is able to say what amount of weight 
will have that effeot. But even if it is plausible to argue that the 
example of the lock and key is a case of agreement between ideas, 
even here, in the last analysis,it is the lookmakerts past experience 
which has led him to a knowledge of what shapes will in fact open what 
locks, how near the matching shapes must be for them to work, and so 
forth. In other words the knowledge whioh indeed the looksmith and 
the watohmaker possess is only oontingent knowledge, and if suoh 
knowledge were to be oharacterised as being the peroeption of the 
agreement between ideas, following Lookets definition, then the oriterion 
of agreement would havebeoome so subjeotive (any man would be able to 
olaim knowledge about anything of whioh he felt sure) as to be useless. 
Although Looke's oriterion for knowledge does on oooasion.seem to 
slide towards such an emptiness, (for example, oompare PSS~~, IV IV 18, 
where Looke's words actually oommit him to such a position),. he 
oertainly believed that knowledge was dependent on something more than 
the psychologioal feelings of certainty of the olaimant. 
Indeed, it was for just this reason that Looke wrote Chapter. IV 
of the fourth Book, entitled 'Of the Reality of Knowledge'. It followed 
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from Locke's definition of knowledge that if we perceive agreement 
between our ideas then we have knowledge. But he also maintained that 
our ideas must themselves agree with reality, as Locke expressed it: 
"Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is oonformity 
between our ideas and the reality of things.tt39 But, Locke never 
explained how it was that we oould know that such oonformity existed, 
beoause, as we have a.lready considered in Chapter X when oonsidering 
Locke's account of perception, a.s we are only aware of ideas there is 
no w~ in which we can compare our ideas with things directly to see 
if there is the required conformity, except in those cases where our 
ideas ~ the things, as Locke held they were in mathematics and ethics, 
but which he did not hold was the case in our conception of substances. 
Locke did not conclude from our being aware only of ideas 
that we could not know if our ideas corresponded to anything a.t a.ll 
external to us, the conclusion that most philosophers from Berkeley 
on have believed that Locke ought to have come to; rather, he maintained 
only that our ideas of particular SUbstances might never be known to 
correspond to· their archetypes, thus reinforcing his much argued olaim 
that we ca.nnot expect to have knowledge of subst~noes to ar.y further 
. . 40 
erient than we have found properties to coexist in nature. Thus 
Locke used his definition of knowledgesnot to establish the non-existenoe 
of the physical world or the la.ck of our ability to know that it 
exists, but rather to reinforce his much more particular cla.imthat 
we cannot be sure of any claims to the essences of particular substances. 
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For the same sort of reasons, Locke held that we can only 
know the truth of general propositions in so far as their was both 
agreement and known reality:-
"To conclude: General propositions, of what kind 
soever, are then only capable of certainty when the terms used. 
in them stand for such ideas whose agreement or disagreement, 
as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us • 
••••••• Whence we may take notice that cancral oertainty is 
never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we eo to seek 
it elsewhere, in experiment or observations without us, our 
knowledee goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation 
of our abstract ideas that is alone is able to afford us ,eneral 
knowl eC!j;e. It 41 
There was, then, for Locke, no question of us being able to ~ the 
laws of nature, though he did believe that such lack of knowledge was 
not harmful to the possibility of rating generalizations more or less 
probable. 
Rational Expectation. 
Granted that natural philosophy nis not capable of being made a 
science," Locke oonsidered it important to identify what sort of 
information was oonveyed by the natural philosopher. His position was 
that natural philosophy was in general a oolleotion of empirical data 
and a series of hypotheses to explain that empirioal data. He implied 
just this conception when he oonsidered the raleof hypotheses in 
explanation. We may, Locke held:-
nto explain any henomena of nature, make use of a.ny probable 
!t,Y:P8thesia whatsoever: theses, if they are \fell made, are 
at least great helps to the memory and often direct us to new 
discoveries. But my meaning is that we should not take up an: 
one too hastily (which the mind, that would a.lways penetrate into 
. the causes of things and have principles to rest on, is very 
apt to do) till we have verylexamined partioulars and made several 
we 1 . 
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experiments in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis 
and see whether it will agree to them all, whether our principles 
will oarry us quite through and not be as inconsistent with one 
~henomenon of nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain 
another. And at least that we take care that the name of 
princi~les deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us reoeive 
that for unquestionable truth whioh is really at best but a very 
doubtful cOnjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) 
of the hypotheses in natural philosophy." 42 
It is important to see the difference there is between the position 
which Locke urged here and the attitude of Bacon's as we have already 
seen it expressed. Locke accepted the Baconian view that the mind 
was indeed too eager to aocept hypotheses as true which were only 
conjecturee,43 but, unlike Bacon, Locke did not, for that reason, esohew 
hypotheses altogether. HYPotheses, he held, could be, and indeed 
obviously were, useful in natural philosophy, even though, as we have 
already seen, he elsewhere expressed his oontempt for speoulative 
hypotheses which "fill the world with useless, though pleasing visions". 44 
There was, then, for Looke a place for hypotheses in natural philosophy, 
as long as they were of the right sort, even though in themselves they 
were notJand could not be,BOcepted as knowledge. 
Looke's attitude in this was entirely at one with his two friends 
Boyle and Newton. The whole tenor of Locke's oonoeption of the natural 
sciences was entirely in keeping with that expressed by Boyle is 
account of the conditions required for both "good" and "exoellenttt 
hypotheses. (cr. p.159 ff.) It was entirely in keeping too with the 
position expressed by Newton at the end of the 31st. Quer,y to the 
2Pticks (Cf. above, page 189 if). All firmly agreed that demonstration 
of neoessary .truths about. the world was a vain enterprize. 
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But with Locke, as with the other scientists of the period, 
the lack of demonstration was not sufficient to cause the abandonment 
of the programme, for where demonstration was not possible it was 
still reasonable to assess the probability of the truth of any propos-
ition, and to the importanoe and rationality of probability in our 
dealings with the world Locke was heavily committed. 
The historical origins of Locke's account of probability are 
most olosely associated with the views expressed by Antoine Arnauld 
and Pierre Nichole, the authors of the Post Royal {,ogio or Th~ Art of 
Thinking (first edition, Paris, 1662). Although the bulk of the 
book is oonoerned with formal deduotive inferenoe, there are 
important sections on probability at the end of the work which have a 
great deal in oommon with Lockets views as we find them in the F.asa~, 
and there is reason to believe that Locke was himself involved in the 
production of the English edition of the Lo~o which appeared in 
1674.45 But Looke's discussion of probability is indeed muoh more 
full and rewarding than the earlier writers' work. 
Looke's account of probability is to some extent adversely 
infeoted with the same error as his treatment of knowledge, namely 
his tendency to psyohologise the subject. Retailed to distinguish 
between a man's judgement .that a proposition is p~bably true, and 
the grounds for thatjudgement.46 But in praotioe the error is not 
of great consequence,for it is on the aoceptability or otherwise of 
the grounds for judeements of probability that Locke rightly conoentrates. 
To say that something is probable, Looke said, is to say that 
it is likely to be true, and this implies that there are grounds for 
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believing it to be so.47 The grounds themselves were fundamentally 
of two sorts: "First, the conformity of anything with our own 
knowledge, observation and experience. 
"Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation 
and experience.n48 Locke laid down six factors which he believed of 
importance in assessing testimony, all relating to the weight of the 
evidence in favour of the proposition under consideration, and he 
then went on to state that:-
" .... the mind, if it will prooeed rationa.lly, oue;ht to examine 
all the grounds of probability and see how they make more or less 
for or against any probable proposition, before it assents to or 
dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject 
or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably 
to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on 
one side or the other." 49 
Thus Locke was committed to the rationality cf the acceptance of 
propositions which nevertheless were only known to be probable, and 
the probability, and the rationality,was entirely a factor of the 
weight of empirical evidenoe in favour of the proposition, for: 
"as the frequency a.nd oonstancy of· experience and the number and 
credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, 
so is any proposition in itself more or less probable."SO 
Locke argued that our assessment of probabilities was limited 
by our experience. But he recognised that there were other areas of 
human enquiry where "the thine:2 be suoh that. fallin£ not under the 
reach of our senses, they are not oapable of testimony.,,51 These 
included "the manner of operation in most parts of the works of 
nature wherein, though we see the sensible effeots, yet their causes 
are unknown and we perceive not the way and manner in whioh they a.re 
produced.1t In suoh areas, he said, ItAnalogy ••••• is the only help 
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we have, and it is from that alone we dra.w all our grounds of 
probability.,,52 lIe then went on to consider some examples which 
might plausibly lead us to believe that, say, "heat and fire consists 
in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the 
burning mattertt and concluded: "This sort of probability, which is 
the best conduct of rational experiments, and the rise of hypothesis, 
has also its use and influence; and a wary rea.soning from analogy 
leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful productions, 
which would otherwise lie concealed.,,53 Lockets recognition of the 
importance of analogical arguments in science is very relevant to 
an assessment of Locke's attitude to the possibility of knowledge in 
natural science. Locke was commi tteed to a large part of natura.l 
philosophy always remaining conjecture of varying degrees of 
probability, and the conjectures themselves should be ba.sed upon wha.t 
we have ourselves experienced, for there is nothing else upon whioh 
probability can be ba.sed. It is only by the use of ar~logioal 
arguments that we can a.dvance our understanding of the nature of thOse 
parts of the physical world which are not directly open to empirical 
observation, such as in all our reasonings about sub-microsoopio 
entities.54 
Throughout 1300k Four of the F~sa;v Locke constantly returns to 
the theme of the difficulty of our ever having knowledge, aooording to 
Looke's definition of knowledge, of the Bub-miorosoopio entities. Again 
and again he emphasises the diffioulties, and, indeed, the impossibilities, 
involved in the attainment of knowledge beyond our direct experienoe.55 
That Looke ,sa.w this issue as an important one should not go unnotioed 
- 347 -
for it is indicative of the contemporary state of discussion of 
the status of contemporary theories about the natt~e of ~~tter. 
For the most part the advocates of the varying positions were concerned 
to make their position the accepted one. Especially was this true of 
the Cartesians, for undoubtedly a very large part of Cartesian physics 
presupposed the nature of matter which Descartes had prescribed. 
Locke's emphasis, therefore, on the !mknowabilitik of matter's 
essence was a direct challenge to Cartesian physics in almost all 
its aspects. The effect was also to discourage exaggerated claims for 
the truth of Boyle's corpuscular philosophy. Locke expressed his 
attitude clearly in Concerning Education where he wrote:-
ft •••• though the world be full of systems of it, yet I cannot 
say, I know any one which can be taught a yo1.U'l8 man as a 
science, wherein he may be sure to find truth and certainty, 
which is what all sciences give.an expectation of .... I think 
the systems of natural philosophy, that have obtained in this 
part of the world, are to be read more to know the hypotheses, 
and to understand the terms and ways of talking of the several 
sects, than with hopes to gain thereby a oomprehensive 
scientifioal and satisfactory knowle~e of the works of nature: 
only this IDa3 be said, that the modern Corpusoularians talk, 
in most things, more intelligibly than the Peripatetioks.u 56 
Certainly for Locke there was no room in soience, as there was no 
room anywhere else for that trenthusiasJll" whioh he so roundly condemned 
in Chapter XIX of the &~say. A man who loves truth, Locke said, will 
not entertain "any proposition with greater assuranoe than the proofs 
it is built on will warrant.,,57. 
Looke's recognition of the limits of scienoe in .this direotion, 
and his more general recoenition of the importanoe of jUdgements of 
probability proportional to the evidenoe of experienoe was fund~nental 
to the new attitude to soience whioh had arisen during the oourse of 
the scientific revolution. 
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Knot-J'lede;e, Religion and Morali tI. 
It is not ~ intention to offer extensive comments on Locke's 
religious and moral theories, but it would be wrong in a work of this 
sort to ignore them entirely, for they are typical of the man and 
bring out both the strengths and the weaknesses of Locke's approach 
to philosophical problems. 
It is a sign of the times, both Locke's and ours, that whilst 
today the general attitude is one in which whilst it is allowed that 
scienoe can and indeed does give knowledge, to make such olaims fOr 
religion and morality is much more likely to be challenged. In Lockets 
~, however, the situation was entirely the opposite: it was religion 
and morality which were accepted as certain; it was science about which 
there was general scepticism. It is olearly a very significant shift 
in general outlook. and one which makes the seventeenth oentury, for 
all its modernity, one very distant from our own. Locke expressed 
the general point in his journal entry for 24th June 1681:-
whereas: 
It •••• he that has a true idea of Ood, of himself as his 
creature, or the relatiomhe stands in to God, and his 
fellow-creatures, and of justice, goodness, law, 
happiness, k. &., is capable of knowing moral things, 
or have a demonstrative certainty in themft 
u •••• Pbysique, polity, and. prudenoe, are not oapable 
of demonstration, but a man is principally helped in 
them by the history of matter-of-fact, and.a sagaoity 
of inquiring into probable causes, and finding out an 
analogy in their operations and effects." 58 
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God's existence could be proved, Locke held, and in the Essay 
he offered such a proof. The argument is this: 
(a) Ihn knows he is somethill€ whioh aotually ex.ists. 
(b) "Nothing oan no more produce any real being than it oan 
be equal to two right angles." 
(c) "from eternity there has been something, sinoe what was 
not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be 
produoed from something else." 
(d) 'Next, it is evident that what had its being and beginning 
from another must also have all that whioh is in and belongs to ita 
being from another too." 
(e) tlso this eternal being must be also the most powerful". 
(f) Similarly, man has perception and knowledge, and, therefore 
must be some knowing intelligent being. 
(g) Suoh things could not be caused by something less than 
themselves, "it is repugant to the idea of senseless matter that it 
should put into itself sense, peroeption, and knowledge." 
(h) Therefore "there is an eternal, most powerful, and most 
knowing being •••• ,,59 
The cruoial stages of the argument are oontained in (d) and (g). 
Wi thout pursuing the argument at length, it is enough to say that it· 
1s by no means obvious that either of the statements is true. First 
it is not at all olear why it should be assumed that there is just 
~ thing from whioh all else has arisen; . seoond, Looke takes for 
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granted that "senseless matter" is "less" than sense, perception, 
and knowledge, but it is not at all clear in what sense, if any 
this can be said to be true. It is certainly not true in a physical 
sense, i.e. in the sense that, for example, there is not enough 
energy in the brain to account for the brain states which accompany 
intellect mental activity. But any other sense of "less" would appear 
to be a value judgement about the desirability or otherwise of mental 
over physical happenings, and not a factual matter at all. In the 
light of these points, therefore, it does not appear that tacke's 
argument does in fact establish the existence of God by demonstration. 
as he believed. 
This said, there are some other considerations about Locke's 
position which are worth noting. First, Locke never accepted the 
ontolOgical argument as it had been presented by Descartes as a proof 
for the existenoe of God. He made this very clear in a paper, first 
published in Kinets~, entitled uDEUS. - Desoartes' Proof of a 
God from the Idea of necessary Existenoe, examined. 1696.n In it 
Looke attacked the ontologioal argument because he said that by it 
"senseless matter might be the first eternal beine and cause of 
all things , as well as an immateriai intelligent sPirit.,,60 Uis 
argument was that all that the ontological argument oan be said to 
establish is that there must have been something whioh has existed 
from eternity, but it does not establish what that something is. 
Whereas, said Looke, the difference between an atheist anti a theist 
is not whether something or other has so existed, for both aooepted 
that something ha.d, the question was whether it wa.s a.n all-knowi.ng 
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mind or physical matter. Locke concluded with the following 
typical paragraph:-
"By ideas in the mind we discern the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas that have a like ideal existence in our minds, but 
that reaches no further, proves no real existenoe, for the 
truth we so know is only of our ideas, and is applicable to 
things only as they are supposed to exist answering such ideas. 
But any idea, simple or complex, barely by being in our minds, 
is no evidence of the existence of anything out of our minds, 
answerir~ that idea. [To which one can almost hear Berkeley 
saying "Quite so.tt] Real existence can be proved only by 
real existence; and therefore the real existence of a God 
can only be proved by the real existenoe of other things. 
The real existence of other things without us oan be evidenced 
to us only by our senses t but our own existenoe is known to 
us by a certainty yet higher than our senSes can give us of 
the existence of other things, and that is internal peroeption, 
a self-consciousness, or intuition; from whence therefore ~1Y 
be drawn, by a train of ideas, the surest and most incontestable 
proof of the existenoe of a God." 61 
It is worth nothing further that Looke bases his argument for 
the existenoe of God on the empirical premise of his knowledge of 
his own existence, albeit an empirical premise whioh is known intuitively 
to be true. The fact that Locke believed that one could know some 
empirioal propositions to be oertainly true by intuition is an 
interesting, some might say, peculiar, aspect of his thought. The 
point is relevant to Locke's thinking on the possibility of moral 
demonstration as well. 
Although Locke did hold that God's existence could be proved 
formally it was to the Bible that Locke turned as the source of true 
Christian knowledge. As he wrote to Riohard King in 1703,barely a 
year before his dea.th: "you ask me 'what is the shortest and surest 
way, for a young gentleman to a.tta.in a true knolfledge of the Christian 
religion, in the full and just extent of it?' •••• and to this I have 
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a short plain answer: fLet him study the holy scripture especially 
the New Testament. t Therein are contained the words of eternal life. 
It has God for its'author; salvation for its end; and truth, without 
62 
a.n:y mixture of error, for its matter." 
I 
Like Boyle and many others, Locke saw the truth of the Christian 
religion vouchsafed for by the miraoles desoribed in the Bible, once 
again illustrating the importance of Hurne's examination of the 
argument from miracles in his first ,mnquiry. In The Reasonableness of 
Christia,nity as Delivered in the Scriptures (1695) Locke wrote:-
tfThe evidenoe of our Saviour's mission from hea.ven is 
so great, in the multitude of miraoles he did before 
all sorts of people, that what he delivered cannot not 
be reoeived as the oracles of God, and unquestionable 
verity. For the miracles he did were so ordered by 
the divine providenoe and wisdom, that they never were, 
nor oould be denied by any of the enemies, or opposers 
of Christianity." 63 
And like Newton, with whom Locke had much oorrespondence on theological 
topics,64 Looke thought that "the works of nature, in every part of 
them, suffioiently evidence a Deity ... 65 
In many respects Lookets attitude towards knowledge of morality 
matched his approach to religion, which is hardly surprising. He 
believed that morality oould be demonstrated, but he preferred to 
refer people to the Bible and the sermons of suoh divines as Dr. Isaao 
Barrow, Archbishop Tillotson, and Dr. Whichoote.66 In the F~sa: Looke 
often oommitted himself to the possibility of produoing a deduCtive 
system of ethics, thoueh he thought that the produotion of such a system 
might be more diffioultthan geometry. His most olear and famous 
sta.tement on this topic is to be found in the fourth Dookof~the .F.{,H~I\.z 
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in which Locke suggests both tl1at from a knowledge of God's existence 
it would be possible to deduce man's duties, and also that there 
were many solf-evident moral propositions. Locke wrote:-
"The ~ of a supreme Deing, infinite in power, 
goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are and on whom 
we depend, and the idea of ourselves as understanding 
rational beino~, be~such as are clear in us, would I 
suppose, if duly considered and pursu.ed afford such 
. foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place 
morality amoni70St the sciences cap%ble of demonst~ation: wherein 
I doubt not but from self-evidenoe propositions, by necessary 
consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the 
measures of right and wrong might be made out to anyone that 
will apply himself with the same indifferenoy and attention 
to the one as he does to the other of these sciences •••••• 
v!hp,re there is no l?roperty there is no iniustice is a 
proposition as oertain as any demonstration in }~clid: •••• 
Ao~ih, no government allo\ffl absolute liberty: the ~ 
of government being the establislunent of society upon certain 
. rules or laws which require conformity to them, and the ~ 
of absolute liberty being for anyone to do whatever he pleases, 
I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition 
as of any in mathematics." 67 
Looke never produced the work on ethics hinted at in this passage 
though he was often asked to do so, but in the Lovelace oollection 
of Locke manuscripts there are a few notes which sue~est that Locke 
at least toyed with the idea.68 
There are major difficulties in Looke's ethioal programme which 
to consider in detail would require a work of their own.59 However 
it is possible briefly to indioate some of the main difficulties and 
to draw attention to some of the implications of Locke's position. 
" . 
Although Looke held that ethios was capable of demonstration he 
was also a Hedonist. As Lookeexpressed it in the manusoripts already 
referred to "l.!orality is the rule of mants acting for the attaining 
11 . happiness." A similar outlook was expressed in the !psa.: when he 
- 354 -
wrote "what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call 
good t and what is apt to produce pain in us we call ~,for no' 
other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in 
, 72 
us, wherein consists our happiness and misery." Locke seems to 
have believed that men always aot for the attainment of happiness, 
he wrote in his notes "Axiom I~ All men desire the enjoyment of 
happiness and the absenoe of misery and that only and always,,73 Yet, 
at other times, he seems committed to the view that it is manl~ 
dut;z to pursue happiness: thus Locke wrote: "It is a manls proper 
business to seek happiness and avoid misery", in a. paper entitled 
"Thus I so Think" 73 which is a statement of Looke IS very Aristotel:i.an 
ethioal views. But olearly if man cannot help pursuing happiness it 
is very odd to think of him as having a. duty to pursue it. Further 
it is by no means olear how Looke oame to know the truth of either 
of these statments. Thi1t men desire happiness might be disoovered 
empirioally, but Looke is so oonfident of its truth that it appears 
to be more than this, thus he wrote: "If it be further asked, what 
is it moves desire? I answer: happiness, and that alone.n74 He 
treats the proposition as if it were one of the self-evidently true 
propositions from whioh the deduction of ethics could begin, as indeed 
is made clear from his labelling it an axiom in his manuscript notes. 
Certainly we can agree with Locke that certain moral propositions 
are necessarily true. But, as Berkeley was to point out in his 
Commonplace Book:-
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"To demonstrate morality it seems one need only 
make a dictionary of words, and see which included, 
which. At least, this is the greatest bulk of the 
work. Lookets instanoes of demonstration in morality 
are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions." 75 
It is worth remembering, too, that Locke, in the Essay, held 
that the reason why we could know the truth of moral propositions 
with certainty was because there were no entities a,eainst which we 
have to matoh up our moral notions to make sure that they correspond. 
(See the section on Demonstrative Knowledge above.) But suoh an 
attitude is totally inoompatible with an objective ethics, and yet 
surely Looke, who believed in the Law of Nature, cannot really have 
subscribed to such a subjectivist position. The comparison with 
mathematics here is rather misleading, for, whereas we can agree with 
Locke that there are no Platonic mathematical entities, but nevertheless 
we can also agree that mathematical propositions are true in a perfectly 
objective sense, it is by no means obvious that the comparison with 
ethical propositions can be taken so far. Further, it is just in 
so far as we might wish to challenge the unquestionableness of a 
mathematical system, for example, as has oocurred with the introduction 
of alternative geometries , t~~t we are inclined to think of truth 
as being perhaps an inappropriate dimension of assessment for the 
propositions of geometry. 
All in all Looke's treatment of moral philosophy is far from 
satisfaotory. But if his thinking was muddled the effect of that 
thinking was not altogether bad, for Locke's emphasis on the 
importance for mora.lity of happiness, a ooncept not altogether laokine 
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in empirical content, was the first clear sign of the rise of 
the utilitarianism which wa.s to come in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Furthermore, it was, I believe, an awareness 
of the difficulties of obtaining knowledge in an~ areas of enquiry 
which was itself much emphasised by the new science which enoouraged 
that attitude of toleration on matters of private belief which was 
such an important feature of Locke's general attitude, and which 
was to become a cornerstone of EnGlish liberalism. 
COl'lolusionA. 
The implications of Locke's positive account of the nature 
and limits of knowledge in Book Four for the contemporary scientifio 
enterprize t and indeed for all succeeding enterprizes, is very far 
reaching. The wider implications of Locke's findings we shall turn 
to in the next section.; here let us just take notice of some direct 
consequences without attempting to assess their full cosmic significance. 
From what we have seen it emerges that Lockets definition of 
knowledge, with its psychological link with certainty, leads him to 
include within the scope of knowledge only a very limited number of the 
sorts of things which we are normally quite happy to say that we know. 
Certainly, therefore, Locke's concept of knowledge was far narrower 
than we are content to work with in our ordinary dealings with the 
world, and for that reason it can rightly be maintained that 
whatever concept of knowledge it was that Locke examined it was not 
~ concept, nor, indeed, in his less guarded moments, was it even 
Looke's. But, be that as it may, the oonoept that Locke identified 
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is certainly identifiable, and Locke was right to stess that there is 
an important distinction to draw between that which is necessarily 
so and that which is not. In emphasising this distinction Locke 
immediately forced attention on the grounds which we can produoe for 
justifying claims which are not themselves immediately conceded as 
neoessar,y. and it was here that he was entirely right to argue tl~t 
in such areas it 1s experienoe and experience alone, which could give 
any grounding for rational probability. But Lockets point was in 
faot a great deal stronger than this. He argued not only that 
where we had no agreement of ideas then we also had no ground for 
knowledge, but also that agreement in ideas was not, in itself, 
sufficient to give knowledge over important areas of our investieationa, 
for in so far as our ideas referred or stood in plaoe of objects 
external to us, then we could only be sure that the .necessary agree-
ments between our ideas were truths about the world if our ideas 
were indeed true copies of the entities whioh they represented, or, in 
more modern idiom, only if our ooncepts oorrespond to reality oan we 
have knowledge. 
Gra.nted that knowledge was thus lim! ted, granted that its 
limitations arose cut of the nature of man's relation to the total 
oreation, the implioations of Lockets oonolusions for the future of 
science were fundamental and far-rea.ching. 
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Conclusions 
It now remains to attempt some appraisal of the significance of 
Locke's philosophy in relation to the soientific revolution. Lockets 
two most important effects were, I believe, first, to damp down 
enthusiasm for unbridled speculation in both natural philosophy and 
other areas of human enquiry, and, second, to discredit the optimism 
of those who expected the new soience to bring certainty in its train. 
It might be held that two such negative points could hardly be rated of 
great importance, but this is surely incorrect. The task of the 
underlabourer is to clear the ground, not to erect large buildings. 
l'!ore particularly, the amount of ground which is oleared very much 
determines the kind of building which can be plaoed upon the site. 
It was indeed just this which Locke successfully did. After his work 
certain intellectual edifices which might have arisen were seen to be 
no longer possible projeots. No doubt the landscape of Europe was 
saved some monstrous enterprizes. 
Locke's message was that our intellect is bounded by our 
experience, and what we can know is therefore bounded by our experienoe. 
The implications of this thesis are wide reaching and fundamental, for 
it spelled the end of several traditions in philosophy and soience 
whioh had, until the end of the seventeenth oentury,great influences 
on oontemporary thoueht. FOremost amongst theaewere(a) the Platonism 
which we have seen was central to muoh of the thoucht of the early 
soientific revolution; (b) the rationalism of the Cartesian programme, 
and, (0) oonneoted with both of these movements, bu·t also ex:ten(ling 
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beyond them into, for example, the work of Bacon, the optimistio 
hope that soientifio research in its various forms could lead to 
oertainty. 
It is true that by the time that Locke wrote Platonism was 
not a marl:::ed feature of the soience of the period, but there was 
an important indirect influence which Locke's thosis did much to 
undermine. It was the thesis tfu~t mathematics had a privileged 
status amongst all the scientifio disciplines. It was Locke's view 
that mathematics. far from beine able to supply insight into the 
perfect world of forms, was in fact a product of the intellect, and 
althoueh Locke's conventionalist position was not presented with 
much sophistication, it stands in very marked contrast to the 
position of the Neoplatonio thinkers of the early part of the century. 
Even if, therefore, Platonism in science, and Platcnism in philosophy 
generally was not ourrentlya powerful foroe, the effeot of Looke's 
approach was to rule out of oourt all pretensions to that particular 
metaphysios. Indeed Platonism in either English soienoe or English 
philosophy has had little influence since. Although it is diffioult, 
perhaps impossible, to estimate suoh influenoes it seems not unlikely 
that the tradition of empiricism in the form we have found it in the 
English soience of ~he later seventeenth century, with its intelleotual 
support in the shape of the F~say were important causal influences 
towards that outoome. 
liIuoh more certainly can we see theimpaot of Locke's empirioism 
on the rationalist programme of Descartes. The l~ad to knowledge, 
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Locke argued, cannot lie alone the route mapped out in the Discourse 
on I.lathod for there is no such road to be charted. Knowledge a.s 
Descartes and Locke understood it, was not simply or only a function 
of our recognition of olear and distinct ideas, but depended also, 
for most areas of inquiry, upon those ideas correctly representing 
reality external to the mind. Natural philosophy, therefore, could not 
with certainty extend beyond experience, and the rationalist.s distant, 
but none the less real, hope that science could be reduced to 
mathematics was deeply disoredited. 
Equally important, and no less damagingly, Locke's account of 
the nature and limits of k~owledge undermined the faith of those 
who saw the goal of natural philosophy as any form of certainty which 
would never need revision in the light of future experience. The 
generalizations of the natural philosopher, no matter how well grounded 
in past experience, and no matter how certainly deducible from some 
given principle, might always have to be given up in the light of 
future experience; they could never be other than morally certain 
or highly probable. 
Locke's commitment to the lack of absolute certainty, however, 
never led him into any deep scepticism about rationality. Although in 
most areas of human enquiry deductive certainty was not possible, it 
did not follow from this that rational belief was not possible. 
Rationality, Locke held, consisted in proportioning one's belief to 
the testimony of either our own senses, or where that was lacking, that 
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of other people·s. Where no such testimony was available, then 
conjecture might lead us to plausible analogy t itself unoertain, 
but not, for that reason, to be reckoned useless. 
Undoubtedly Locke's epistemoloeY contains many errors: his lack 
of clarity on the nature of logical necessity, his thesis that all 
that we are ever aware of are ideas, and his representationalist 
theory of perc~ption, his narrow definition of knowledge, and his 
downgrading of the imaGination, were all, in their way deep and 
important influences on subsequent philosophye But his positive 
achievement was to set men straight on the possible goals which could 
be achieved. His statements of the limits of the possibilities of the 
scientific enterprize were largely true, historically important, and 
very relevant. 
At the beginning of this work I have quoted a passage from one 
of the oldest of the extant scientific writino~. To a very large 
extent Lockets Essax was a reaohing baok across the intervening 
centuries to the writer of those words. The scientifio revolution was 
to a large extent an anomaly in the history of thought: the mystioism 
of the Neoplatonists, the rationalism and the optimism of the 
practioners of the new science stood in need of cool appraisal. It was 
just this appraisal whioh Locke so ably supplied. 
NOTES 
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and matter. 'Mind and Matter', Brain and Mind editor J. R. Smythies, 
(London, 1965) especially pp. 202-203. 
16. In labelling Spinoza a materialist it might be thought I do him an 
injustice. In one sense this is true. Spinoza' s system did not involVe, 
in fact expressly denied, that mind could be reduced to matter. Spinoza 
saw matter and mind as two attributes of one single substance which could 
not be identified with either of them. On this see Stuart Hampshire's 
Spinoza (London, 1951) p. 81. Spinoza's views, or alleged views, placed 
him in considerable danger. At the time of his excommunication from the 
l(ewish religion (1656) he was assaulted by a fanatiC, but the dagger used 
only pierced his coat. (d. Sir Frederick Pollock's Spinoza, HIs Life and 
Philosophy (second edition, London, 1899) pp. 16"'17. 
It is worth pointing out that Spinoza seems to have had little or no 
influence on Locke's philosophy. Although Locke owned all the available 
published works of Spinoza, including the EthiCS, published posthumously 
in Opera Postuma, (Amsterdam, 1677).. Locke never once, so far as I can 
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gulf in their approach to philosophy, at least at first acquaintance, for, while 
Spinoza saw his task as that of the great metaphysician, producing the unified 
account of knowledge, Locke fS whole intellectual approach was much more 
piecemeal. Locke owned, besides Spinoza's works, various criticisms of 
Spinoza fS philosophy, so he was clearly aware of him as an intellectual figure. 
About Hobbes fS materialism there can be no question. In Leviathan he 
wrote:-
"The World, (I mean not the earth only •.. but the Universe, that is 
the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, 
body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, 
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this is to be principally ascribed to the false philosophy of the material .. 
ists, . to which the mathematical principles of philosophy are the most 
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36. On Education was first published in 1693, collected from a series of 
letters Locke had written from Holland to Edward Clarke of Chipley about the 
education of Clarke's son. Reprinted in Locke's Works (1768 edition) Vol. IV, 
pp. 1 - 135. The actual reference is to be found on p. 121. All references to 
Locke's Works will be to the 1768 edition. 
37. In the General Scholium added to the second edition of the Principia, 
published in 1713. Ed. cit., p. 547. 
38. Cf. Newton's Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 209. 
39. Some Familiar Letters between Mr. Locke and Several of his Friends. 
Locke to Thomas Molyneux, Nov. 11692. Published in Locke's Forks, 
ed. cit •• Vol. IV, p. 384. 
40. The most ovbious example is Essay, II VIII 11. See also Locke's 
reply to Stillingfleet, Works, Vol. I, p. 754,: A. C. Fraser's note on p. 17 
of Vol. I of his edition of the Essay, and A. Koyte's Newtonian Studies 
(London, 1965) pp. 154-155. 
41. Locke's influence appears discernible in Newton IS projected (and 
rejected) Rule V of the Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy. 
Newtonian Studies esp. pp. 271 .. 272 
/ 
Cf. Koyre's 
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42. Compare RyJe's story:-
ftA good many years ago, I happened to be sitting with Earl Russell in 
a restaurant-car of a train to North Wales. Somehow our conversation 
turned to John Locke and I put to Russell this very question, perhaps 
with some hyperlx>le, - 'Why is it that although nearly every youthful 
student of philosophy lx>th can and does in alx>ut his second essay 
refute Locke's entire Theory of Knowledge, yet Locke made a bigger 
difference to the whole intellectual climate of mankind than anyone 
had done since Aristotle?' Russell agreed that the facts were so, and 
suggested, on the spur of the moment, an answer which dissatisfied 
me. He said 'Locke was the spokesman of Common Sense.' Almost 
without thinking I retorted impatientily 'I think Locke invented Common 
Sense. f To which Russell rejoined 'By God, Ryle, I believe you are 
right. No one ever had Common Sense before John Locke - and no one 
but Englishmen have ever had it since. ,tr Gilbert Ryle: 'John Locke'. 
Critica, Vol. I, No.2, May 1967, pp. 3.4. 
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Chapter I 
1. I shall refer to Copernicus's On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres 
by its abbreviated Latin title, De. Revolutionibus, as is customary. There is 
only one available English translation, from which quotations will be taken. 
It is published by Encyclopiedia Britannica Inc., in Volume 16 of the Great 
Books of the Western World series (Chicago, 1952). The work was first 
published in 1543 weeks before Copernicus's death. 
2. On this see A. Koestler: The Sleepwalkers (London, 1959) pp. 165"172. 
3. The letter is quoted in Kepler's AP9logia Tychonis contra Vrsum, 
published in Kepler's Operia Omnia, ed. Frisch, Vol. I, pp. 236-276. The 
translation is that published in A. Koestler's The Sleepwalkers, (London, 1959) 
p. 167. 
4. Ed. Cit., p. 505. 
5. Ibid, pp. 505-506. 
6. Simplicius, De Caelo. 488a. Quoted in S. Sambursky: The PhYSical 
World of the Greeks. (Second edition, London 1960.) p. 59. (The reference 
to Simplicius in Sambursky reads incorrectly '498a'.) 
7. Plato, in the Republic, seemed not very interested in observation. We 
find Socrates saying: 
Ulf we mean, then, to tum the soul's native intelligence to its proper 
used by a genuine study of astronomy, we shall proceed, as we do in 
geometry, by means of problems, and leave the starry heavens along. " 
Reeublic VII 530 B. (F. M. Cornford's translation, Oxford, 1941.) 
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8. Cf. A.C. Crombie: Augustine to Galileo, Vol. I, p. 82, ff. 
9. Ia XXXII, 1 and 2. The translation is that of the Blackfriars edition. 
of the Summa Theol0gieae , Vol. 6. p. 107. (London, 1965). 
10. Why 'Neoplatonism' is to be preferred as a term to 'Platonism' to 
characterise these Renaissance philosophies is discussed by Nesca A. Robb 
in her Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance (London, 1935), Introduction. 
11. Cf. Republic passim, but especially V 476, Vii 514 a - 521 b, and VII 
529. 
12. Cf. Republic, VII 521 c - 541. 
13. Cf. Republic, VII 521 c - 531 e. 
14. The arguments to substantiate this claim could be several. One would 
be: Knowledge is knowledge of the Forms. The Forms cannot change, so any 
proposition about the Forms which is true could never become untrue. Therefore, 
any true proposition about the Forms is necessarily true, as it is necessarily 
impossible for its negation to be true. 
15. For a discussion of the importance of Cusanus for the Renaissance see 
Ernst Cassirer's The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance PhilosoEhy. 
especially Ch. 1. (First German edition 1927; first English edition, Oxford, 
1963. ) 
16. Of Learned Ignorance (London, 1964) p. 11. 
17. Ibid, PP. 25-26. 
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18. On this see P. O. Kristeller: 'Florentine Platonism and Its Relations 
with Humanism and Scholasticism'. Church History, VIII, (1939). p. 201 ff. 
19. The Commentario1us. Published in Three Copernican Treatises, trans. 
and ed. by E. Rosen, (New York, 1959), pp. 57-58. 
20. Ibid, p. 59. 
21. Narratio Prima. Published in Rosen op. cit., pp. 147-148. 
22. ~ Revolutionibus, ed. cit., pp. 526-527. 
23. Ibid, pp. 527-528. 
24. Rosen, op. cit., p. 139. 
25. Quoted from Frances A. Yates: Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition (London, 1964), pp. 152-153. 
26. Quoted from Yates, ibid, p. 236. 
27. The Commentariolus, Rosen, p. 59. 
28. Copernicus did not quite identify the centre of the universe wi.th the sun's 
centre. The centre of the universe was for him the centre of the earth's orbit, 
which was a little distance away from the sun. 
29. Published in English translation in the same volume as the translation of 
De Revo1utionibus, p. 857. 
30. Quoted in Max Casper: ,!<epler. First Gennan edition 1948; English 
edition, New York, 1959. All quotations from the Collier paperback edition, 
1962, P. 303. 
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31. Ibid, p. 49. Interestingly, Kepler did not think that Copernicus 
advocated physical or metaphysical reasons for his system. He presumably 
accepted Oslander's Preface as expressing Copernicus's view. 
32. Quoted in Casper's Kepler, pp. 65-66. 
33. The fact that further observation of the orbit of Mars led Kepler to abandon 
his theory, re-inforces, rather than detracts, from the point. The geometrical 
forms had to exist in nature, Kepler was not interested in vague approximations. 
34. Epiteme of Copernican Astronomy, ed. cit., p. 861. 
35. Ibid, p. 863. 
36. Of Learned I£!1orance, ed. cit., p. 16. 
37. 'Necessity, Contingency, and Natural Law'. Melahges Alexandre Koyr~, 
Vol. 2, L 'Aventure del 'Esprit, ed. I. B. Cohen and R. Taton, (PariS, 1964) 
pp. 458-470. 
38. On Grosseteste and Bacon see A. C. Crombie: Grosseteste and the 
Origins of Experimental Science (Oxford, 1953.) On the continuity of English 
thought from Roger Bacon to the Renaissance see F. R. Johnson: Astronomical 
Thought in Renaissance England' (Baltimore 1937) p. 76 ff. 
39. Recorde: The Castle of Knowledge (1556) pp. 98-99. 
40. Astronomical TIlOUght in Renaissance England, pp. 82-83. 
41. Unfortunately, the work promised by Recorde in The Castle of Knowleds:e 
in favour of the Corpernican system was never written. But Recorde's diSCUssion 
of Copernicus certainly implies at least a very sympathetiC attitude. 
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42. Giordanno Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, p. 150. 
43. Quoted from Henry Billingsley's translation of The Elements of 
Geometrie of the most ancient Philosopher Euclide of Megara (1570). The 
pages of the Preface by Dee are not numbered. All quotations from Dee are 
from this work. 
44. Cf. Popkin: The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, 
Ch. 2. 
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Chapter II 
1. 'Galileo and the SCientific Revolution t. 
, 
Published in Koyre's 
Metaphysics and Measurement (London, 1968) p. 14. 
2. The much debated question 'Was Galileo a Platonist?' would, I believe, 
gain from the employment of Wiltgen stein 's concept of 'family resemblance '. 
(Cf. Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1953) I p. 65 ff.) TIlere are 
undoubtedly some important links which show a traceable historical connection 
between the outlook of the Florentine Academy - and, indeed, the Academy of 
Plato, - and the attitudes of Galileo. But what is probably not at all helpful 
is to assume that there are a set of necessary and sufficient beliefs in virtue 
of which it is possible definitively to identify somebody as a Platonist. For 
further discussions of Galileo 's Platonism see the papers by Eric Cockrane, 
Ernst Cassirer, Edward W. Strong, and Thomas P. McTighe in Gali1eo, Man 
of Science, edited by Evvan McMullin, (New York, 1967.) 
3. Published as 'The Starry Messenger' in Discoveries and 0.einions of 
Galileo (New York, 1957), edited and translated by Stillman Drake. 
4. Ibid, p. 24. 
5. Ibid, p. 24, in a footnote. 
6. Johannes Kepler: Gesanmelte Worke, ed. by W. V. Dych and Max 
Casper.· Vol. XIII, p. 130-131. Quoted in Koestler's The Sleepwalkers 
p. 356. 
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7. References will be to Stillman Drake fS edition. (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1962.) 
8. Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
9. Ibid, p. 6. 
10. 'Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina' (1615). Published in Discoveries 
and Opinions of Galileo, p. 179. 
11. From the Forward to Drake's edition of the Dial08l!e Concerning the Two 
Chief World Systems, p. xix. 
12. The Assayer, published in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, 
pp. 237-238. 
13. Sarsi was a critic of Galileo 's views who was specially singled out for 
attack in The Assayer. 
14. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo., p. 241. 
15. Two Chief World Systems, p. 19. 
16. Ibid, p. n. 
17. Two Chief World Systems p. 406. Francis Baron, for different reasons, 
shared Galileo fS assessment of the vigour of Gilbert fS work. Bal:J)n's reaSOns 
for this judgement are discussed in Chapter IV. 
18. Ibid, p. 2fJ7. 
19. The Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, trans. Henry Crew and 
Alfonso de Sa1vio, with an introduction by AntoniO Favaro, first published 
New York, 1914. Reprinted by Dover Publications Inc. New York. All 
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references will .be to this edition. 
20. Ibid, p. 170. 
21. Two Chief World Systems, p. 31 
22. Ibid, p. 32. 
23. Ed. cit., p. 513. 
24. It is in fact incorrect to attribute this view to Plato. On this see Koyre"s 
Newtonian Studies, pp. 217"'219. 
25. Two New Sciences, p. 261. 
26. Two Chief World Systems, Forward, p. xvii. 
27. On this see Karl Popper's 'Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge'. 
First published in Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed. by 
H. D. Lewis (London, 1956). Reprinted in Popper's Conjectures and 
Refutations (London, 1963) p. 97 ff. 
28. Discoveries and Opinions of Gaineo, p. 274. 
29. Ibid, p. 275. 
30. Ibid, p. 277. 
31. Ibid, pp. 275-277. 
32. Two New Sciences, p. 19. 
33. 'The Atomic View of Matter in the XVth, XVlth, and XVIIth. Centuries', 
~, 10, (1928), p. 457. 
34. Published in 'On Motion' and 'On Mechanics' ,trans. and ed. I. E. 
Drabkin and Stillman Drake (Maddison, 1960) p. 15. 
- 378 -
35. Two New SCiences, p. 18. 
36. Ibid, p. 160. 
37. Ibid, pp. 166-167. 
38. Ibid, p. 243. 
39. Discoveries and Opinions of Gaineo, p. 197. 
40. Two New SCiences, p. 179. 
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1. I therefore disagree with Richard A. Watson's thesis that Cartesianism 
was abandoned because of insoluble epistemological problems which it raised, 
e.g. that no satisfactory account of the relationship between mind and body was 
possible in Cartesian terms. (Cf. The Downfall of Cartesianism (1673 .. 1712), 
(The Hague, 1966). Watson's explanation is to me not very convincing because 
many of the same epistemological problems are to be found, unanswered, in 
Locke, yet Locke's influence grew rapidly in the early eighteenth century. 
The main reasons, I would urge, for the rejection of Cartesianism was 
the success of the empirical method as exemplified by Newtonian science and 
Locke fS epistemology. 
2. It perhaps says something about the two men that whilst Newton certainl,y, 
though somewhat surreptitiously, aimed his Mathematical Principles of Natural 
, + .. 
. Philosophy at Descartes's Principles of Philosoph):, (compare the titles), Locke 
did not attack any particular work or,author in his ,Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. 
Newton was very explicit in his attacks on Descartes fS Principles in his 
early unpublished works. There are, for instance, glimpses of a polemical 
style not usually associated with Newton in his denunciation of Descartes's 
physics Jin his paper 'De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum" probably 
written between 1664 and 1668. "I shall venture to dispose of his (Descartes's) 
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fictions", he wrote, and, "we now see how absurd is this doctrine of Descartes. " 
This paper is now published in Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac 
Newton, ed. A. R. Hall and M. Boas Hall (Cambridge, 1962). 
3. ~ On this see A. Koyre: 'Newton and Descartes:. Published in his 
Newtonian Studies. 
4. In a letter to Lady Masham. Mss. in Remonstrants' Library, Amsterdam. 
Lady Masham to Le Clerc, 12th January 1704-5. Quoted in Fox Bourne: Life of 
John Locke (London, 1876) Vol. I, pp. 61-62, and also in M. Cranston: John 
Locke, A Biography (London, 1957) p. 100. 
5. An attitude which I have in some way attempted to correct in my article 
'Boyle, Locke, and Reason " Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXVII, 
No.2, 1966. 
6. The Two New SCiences, then circulating in manuscript. Cf. C. Adams 
and P. Tannery, Oeuvres de Descartes (PariS, 1898) Vol. II, p. 402, Note 1. 
References to this work will in future be abbreviated to 'A. and T. '. 
7. A. and T'J',Vol: II, p. 380. 
8. A. and T., Vol. II, p. 433. 
9. Cf. Aubrey's story of Hobbes:-
"He was 40 years old before he looked on Geometry; which happened 
aCCidentally. Being in a Gentleman's library, Enclid's Elements 
lay open, and 'twas the 47 EI Ubri 1. He read the Proposition. By G-, 
sayd he (he would now and then sweare an emphatical Oath by way of 
emphasis) this is impossible: So he reads the Demonstration of it, 
which referred him back to such a Proposition; which proposition he 
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read. That referred him back to another, whl ch he also read. Et sie 
demceps (and so on) that at last he was demonstratively convinced of 
that trueth. This made him in love with Geometry." John Aubrey, 
Brief Lives (Penguin edition, London, 1962) p. 230. 
10. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 208. 
11. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 158. 
12. Discussion on this topic is to be found throughout the vast literature 
on Descartes. Some important recent articles are: L. Miller: 'Descartes, 
Mathematics, and God', Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957) pp. 451-465, 
reprinted in Meta-meditations, ed. A. Sesonske and N. Fleming, (Belmont, 
1965); Jaako Hintikka: 'Cogito erg? sum: Inference or Perfonnance?', 
Philosophical Review, LXXI (1962) pp. 3-32, reprinted in Meta-meditations, 
and also in Descartes, ed. Willis Doney, (London, 1967). Also see the 
articles and extracts in the same volume by A. J. Ayer, Bernard Williams, 
A. K. Stout, Harry G. Frankfurt, and Alan Gewirth. See also the related 
articles in the bibliography of that vol.ume. 
13. On this see especially Harry G. Frankfurt's article 'Descartes' 
Validation of Reason " referred to above, originally published in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, No.2. April 1965, PP. 149-156. 
14. It is, 1 imagine, fairly obvious from this that I find none of the 
arguments which I have seen, exonerating Descartes from the charge of 
circularity, convincing, despite their ingenuity. 
15. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, pp. 208-209. 
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16. Ibid, p. 255. 
17. A. and T. Vol. IX, p. 212. 
18. Principles of Philosophy, Part II, IV, Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, 
p. 256. 
19. Ibid. Haldane and Ross, p. 256. 
20. Principles of Philosophy, Part I, LIII, Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, 
p. 240. 
21. In his article 'The Creation of the Eternal Truths in Descartes's System'. 
First published in Reue Philosophique de la France et de 1 'Etranger, Vol. CXUI, 
Nos" 5 .. 6, 7-8, (May-August, 1937) pp. 15 ... 29. Reprinted in Descartes, cd. 
Willis Doney, p. 202. 
22. See especially Haldane and Ross, Vol. II, pp. 248, 250 and 251. 
23. Meditations, III. 
24. God's existence, Descartes said, is necessary, All other existences, 
he said, are contingent. Cf. Principles of Philosophy, Part I, XIV and XV. 
25. A. and T., Vol. lIT. p. 39. 
. . 
26, Principles of Philosophy, Part III, IV, A. and T., Vol. IX, pp. 104"105. 
27. A.andT., Vol. II, p.141. 
28. This remark needs some qualification, this Newton did not believe that 
general mathematical propositions stood in need of empirical confirmation, 
but as a general statement it will do to indicate the vastness of the gap 
separating Cartesian from Newtonian method. 
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29. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 121. 
30. Cf. Principles of Philosophy, Part III, XLIII, XLIV, XLV, XLVII; 
Part IV, I. A. and T., pp. 123-124, and p. 201. 
31. The same point can be made about Descartes' account of the funcUon 
of the heart in the Circulation of the blood. His explanation is wrong, but 
it is an explanation which fits in with his general preconceptions. Descartes's 
mistake is more reprehensible as he was familiar with Harvey's work on the 
Circulation of the blood which correctly identified the heart's function. Cf. 
Discourse on the Method, Part V. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 112 ff. 
32. Principles of PhilosophXz IV, CCIII. Haldane and Ross, Vol. It 
pp. 299-300. 
33. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 300. 
34. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 300. 
35. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 301. 
36: Ibid, Vol. I, p. 302. 
37. Rohault's Treatise on Physics was the standard textbook in Cambridge 
between 1680 and 1700, until replaced by Newton's Principia. 
38. Bodleian Library Msc. Locke f. 3, Locke's journal for 1678. An entry 
for 4th March quotes from Rohault's Traite de Physique. 
39. Rohault was not alone in this attitude. Huygens, for example, wrote: 
"M.des Cartes has found the means of getting his conjectures and 
fictions accepted as truths ••• I have recovered a great deal from the 
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infatuation I had of it." Oeuvres Completes, Vol. X, p. 403. 
See also the only "proba.bl~ftt explanations of phenomena offered by 
Huyy:ens in the Traite de la Lumiere (1690). Cf. Treatise on Light, 
translated by Silvanus P. Thompson, London, 1912, reprinted by Dover 
Publications Inc. p. 2. 
40. Quoted from John Clarke's translation: Rohault's System of Natural 
Philosophy Illustrated with Dr. Samual Clarke's Notes Taken mostly out of 
Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy. (London, 1723). Two volumes. There are 
no page numbers to the Author's letter. Al quotations will be from this edition 
of Rohault's work. 
41. Ibid. 
42. It would be worth making a comparison with the method recommended 
by Ronault and the method actually practised by Newton as described in his 
first paper on light and colours submitted to the Royal Society in February 
1671-72. 
43. Treatise on Physics, Vol. I, pp. 13-14. 
44. Ibid, p. 14. 
45, Except in the sense that we could know for certain what were !!£L the 
causes of various effects, . 
46, Treatise on Physics, Vol. I, p. 14. 
47. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 14, 
48. Cf. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 203 fi. 
49. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 12. 
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Chapter IV 
1. I think here of R. F. Jones: Ancients and Modems (2nd Edition, 
St. Louis, 1961), Benjamin Farrington: Francis Bacon, Philosopher of 
Industrial Science (New York, 1961), Christopher Hill: The Intellectual 
Origins of the English Revolution (London, 1965), and Marjorie Purver: 
The Royal Society: Concept and Creation (London, 1967). 
2. F. R. Jones, op. cit. p. vii. 
3. Benjamin Farrington, op. cit., p. 113. Cf. p. 138 where the views 
of other writers on Bacon are noted. 
4. Henry G. Van Leeuwen: The Problem of Certainty in English Thous:ht 
1630-1690. (The Hague, 1963.) 
5. Ibid, pp. 1 ... 2. 
6. Van Leeuwen can, I believe, be faulted on another count. Amongst 
the English scientists of the later seventeenth century there was not one 
problem of certainty, there were several. Further discussion of this occurs 
in Chapter V. 
7. Of the Advancement of Learning (1605), Bk. Ill, 1. All references to 
Bacon, unless otherwise indicated, will be to The Works of FranciS Bacon, 
edited by James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (London, 1870). 
The passage quoted is in Vol. IV, p. 337. 
8, ~e Royal Society: Concept and Creation, especially pP. 143-150. 
9. Works, Vol. IV, pp. 65-66. 
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10. Ibid, p. 66. 
11. For example, by Spedding, ef. Works, III, p. S16. 
12. On this see Duane H. D. Roller: 'Did Bacon know Gilbert's De 
Magnete7 " ~ (44) June, 19S3. 
13. See above, p. 3S. 
14. De Magnete, translated by P. Fleury Mottelay, (republished New 
York, 19S8), p. xlvii. 
IS. Ibid, p. xlviii. 
16. Novum Organum, Works, Vol. IV, p. 6S. 
17. Ibid, p. 65. 
18. Of the Advancement of Learning, (Everyman edition) p. 104. This 
particular passage is not included in the standard edition of Bacon's .Works. 
19. Cf. Ibid,' p. 106, Novum Organum, Works, IV, pp. 183-184. Descriptio 
Globi Intellectualis, Works, V, p. S11. 
20. Novum Organum, Works, IV, p. 71. 
21. Descriptio Globi Intellectualis, Works, V, p. SU. 
22. The Great Instauration, Works, IV, p. 2S. 
23. Ibid, p. 2S. 
24. Ibid, p. 2S .. 
2S.1 Novum Organum, Works, IV, p. SO. 
26. !'Jovum Ors-anum, Works, IV, p. 149. 
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27. For example, in The Great Instauration he wrote:-
"The sense fails in two ways. Sometimes it gives no informaUon, 
sometimes it gives false information. For first, there are very many 
things which escape the sense, even when best disposed and no way 
obstructed; by reason either of the subtelty of the whole body, or the 
minuteness of the parts, or distance of place, or else slowness or 
else sviftness of motion, or familiarity of the object or other causes. 
And again when the sense does apprehend a thing its apprension is 
not much to be relied upon. For the testimony and information of 
the sense has reference always to man, not to the universe; and it 
is a great error to assert that the sense is the measure of things. tI 
Works, IV, p. 26. 
28. However, many of the early atomists ~ good mathematicians, for 
example, Thomas Hariot. On the introduction of atomism Into England see 
especially R. J. Kargon: Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton, 
(Oxford, 1966). 
29. De AUB'!l}entis Scientiarum, Ibok III, Works, IV, p. 370. 
30. Ibid, p. 371. 
31. De AUwr!entis Scientiarum, Book II, Works, IV, p. 292. 
32. Ibid, p. 292. 
33. Ibid, pp. 341-342. 
34. Though this did not mean that natural theology, properly understood, 
did not have a place in man's inquiries; Bacon quite definitely held that it 
did. 
35. The downgrading of the imagination as a key to knowledge was very 
much part of the seventeenth century ethos. Imagination played a central 
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role in such thinkers as Bruno. (On this see Francis A. Yates: The 
Art of Memory (London, 1966) pp. 293 ff.) But Bacon, and Descartes 
too, saw it as a hhdrance rather than a help to knowledge. 
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Chapter V 
1. On this topic see R. F. Merton's important Work: 'SCience, technology 
and society in XVIIth-century England". OsiriS (IV) 1938. See also 
Christopher Hill: Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (London, 1965). 
2. For a discussion of this see Kocher's SCience and Relis-ion in Elizabethan 
Ens-land, pp. 58-59, and E. A. Strathmann: Sir Walter Raleigh (New York, 1951) 
especially Ch. 7. 
3. Bacon IS attitude towards atomism has been the subject of much discussion. 
In his earlier writing~ Bacon shows that he was strongly attracted towards atomic 
explanations of matter, and, among the ancient philosophers, praised Democritus 
most highly. Cf. On Principles and Origins, Works, Vol. V, PP. 463-464. nut 
in the New Or@non he was much more cautious: 
"Nor shall we thus be led to the doctrine of atoms, which imples the 
hypothesis of a vacuum and that of the unchangeableness of matter 
(both false assumptions; we shall be led only to real particles, such 
as really exist ••• " 'Yorks, Vol. IV, p. 126. 
On Bacon's atomism, or lack of it, see: C. T. HarrisOll: 'Bacon, Hobbes, 
Boyle, and the Ancient Atomists', Harvard Studies and Notes in Philogy and 
Literature XV (1933); Maria Boas: 'The Establishment of the Mechanical 
Philosophy', Osiris 10 (1952); F. H. Anderson: The Philosophy of FranCis 
Bacon (Chicago, 1948); F. R. Jones: Ancients and Modems, especially 
pp. 57-58. 
4. On this see W. Kargon: Atomism in England from Harlot to Newton. 
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5. Of Bodies. (First published in Paris, 1644. All references will be 
to the London edition of 1669) p. 439. 
6. Of Bodies, p. 1. 
7. Ibid, p. 5. 
8. Ibid, p. 24. 
9. Ibid, p. 60 ff. 
10. There is a curious circularity about Digby's account of the loadstone 
because he only introduced the notion of floods of atoms moving from the 
north pole to the equator to explain why loadstones line up north and south. 
Cf. Ibid, p. 288. 
11. Ibid, p. 434. 
12. On the introduction of Cartesian views into England see MarjOrie 
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4. John W. Yolton: Jolm Locke and the Way of Ideas, (Oxford, 1956), 
Chapter 2. 
5. I IV 25. 
6. Although I do not intend in this work to consider the connection between 
Locke's .Essay and his politiCS, many important links do exist, and I believe 
it to be a grave error in assessing Locke either to construe these two areas as 
being either unconnected or t that they are inconsistent in a fundamental way. 
- 412 -
Cf. Peter Laslett: Introduction to his edition of the Two Treatises of Govern-
~ (Cambridge, 1964) pp. 79 ff. where Laslett makes much of the supposed 
inconsistencies between the Treatises and the Essay without any attempt to 
suggest positive links. 
7. I II 3. 
8. J. Edleston: Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes, 
p. 155. 
9. I III 9. 
10. I IV 8. 
11. I1I5. 
12. I II 5. 
13. Cf. Principles of Philosop,hX' Principle IX: "By the word thought I 
unde,rstand that of which we are conscious as operating in us. ff Haldane and 
Ross, Vol. I, p. 222. 
14. I II 22. 
15. I II 23. 
16. Meditation In, Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 160. 
17. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 433. 
18. ~J p. 442. 
19. Most clearly expressed in The Discourse on the Method, Part IV, 
Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, pp. 102-103. 
- 413 -
20. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding Book IV, Chapter XI. 
The Open Court edition, translated by Alfred G. Langley, (La Sall~.1949), 
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pp. 94-95. 
37. II IX 3. 
38. Cf. Siris 303: 
"There runs a Chain throughout the whole system of beings. In 
this Chain one link drags another. The meanest things are 
connected with the highest. It 
Interestingly, Arthur Lovejoy in his classic work The Great Chain of 
Being (Harvard. 1936) did not mention Berkeley in connection with the 
theory, though he gave quite a lot of attention to Locke. 
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Chicago, 1942); J. W. N. Watkins: "Farewell to the Paradigm-Case Argumenttt, 
AnalYSiS, 18 (December, 1957); A. G. N. Flew: ""Farewell to the Paradigm-
Case Argument' A Comment", Analysis 18, (December 1957); and several 
subsequent articles in Analysis; Robert J. Rickman: "On the Argument of 
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47. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited and abridged with 
an introduction by A. D. Woozley. Fontana Collins, (London, 1964). 
48. Ibid, pp. 24-35, 
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49. IV XV 5, 
50. IV XV 6. Compare J. P. Day·s comments on the connection between 
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51.· IV XVI 12. 
52. IV XVI 12. 
- 425 -
..13. IV XVI 12. This last passage would alone seem sufficient to show 
that R. M. Yost Jr. is wrong to claim that 
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70.. Bodleian Library MS. John Locke, c. 28 f. 139. 
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73. Lord King: Life of Locke, p. 306. 
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75. G. Berkeley: Complete Works, edited by A. C. Fraser, (Oxford, 
1901) 4 Vols. Vol. I, p. 39. 
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